Marriage of Skellchock

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0224
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0224 Marriage of Skellchock 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0224 Larimer County District Court No. 18DR30326 Honorable Kara E. Clark, Magistrate Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Derek Skellchock,

Appellant,

and

Alora-Ann Paige Volz,

Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 15, 2026

Derek Skellchock, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case, Derek Skellchock

(father) appeals the district court’s orders adopting the magistrate’s

order denying his motion to modify parenting time and the

magistrate’s order denying his motion to recuse. He also contends

that, after January 2020, Eighth Judicial District Court Chief Judge

Susan Blanco lacked jurisdiction over the case, meaning that the

orders she later issued were void. We reverse the order denying

father’s motion to modify parenting time and remand that issue to

the district court for further proceedings. We otherwise affirm.

I. Standard of Review

¶2 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 11.

We review de novo whether the magistrate and the court applied the

correct legal standard. Id. We also review de novo their

conclusions of law, but we accept the magistrate’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

II. The Motion to Modify Parenting Time

¶3 Father contends that the district court erred by adopting the

magistrate’s ruling denying his motion to modify parenting time.

1 He argues that the magistrate misapplied the law when she

determined that his motion was barred by the two-year filing

restriction imposed by section 14-10-129(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. We

agree.

A. Relevant Facts

¶4 In 2020, the district court dissolved father’s marriage with

Alora-Ann Paige Volz (mother) and ordered an equal allocation of

parenting time with their child.

¶5 In April 2024, the court modified the allocation of parenting

time. It ordered that, during the school year, the child will reside

primarily with mother and father can exercise overnight visits every

other weekend. As for the summer months, the court allocated the

parents equal parenting time.

¶6 Four months later, father filed a motion to modify parenting

time. He argued that, due to changed circumstances, returning to

an equal parenting time schedule was in the child’s best interests.

He explained that, since the April 2024 order, he had relocated to

the child’s school district, completed all court-ordered evaluations,

and participated in therapy.

2 ¶7 The magistrate denied father’s motion without a hearing. The

magistrate explained that, in the April 2024 order, the court

modified the allocation of parenting time by allocating mother

majority parenting time with the child. The magistrate determined

that, as a result, father’s motion was subject to the two-year filing

restriction imposed by section 14-10-129(1.5). The court found

that father had filed his motion within that two-year time period,

and he had not alleged sufficient facts showing that the present

environment may endanger the child — an exception to the two-

year filing restriction.

¶8 Father petitioned the district court to review the ruling,

arguing that the magistrate misapplied the law by concluding that

section 14-10-129(1.5) barred his request. The district court

rejected father’s argument and adopted the magistrate’s ruling.

Father filed a C.R.C.P. 59 motion, and the court denied it.

B. Analysis

¶9 Generally, a court may modify a parenting time order

whenever the modification serves the child’s best interests. § 14-

10-129(1)(a)(I). However, when one parent files “a motion for a

substantial modification of parenting time which also changes the

3 [parent] with whom the child resides a majority of the time,” neither

parent may file another motion to modify parenting time within two

years of the court’s disposition of the previous motion unless the

court determines that the child’s present environment may

endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the

child’s emotional development. § 14-10-129(1.5); see In re F.A.G.,

148 P.3d 375, 377 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 10 A court’s allocation of equal parenting time means that the

child doesn’t reside a majority of time with either parent. See In re

Marriage of Stewart, 43 P.3d 740, 742 (Colo. App. 2002); see also In

re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 649 (Colo. App. 2006)

(acknowledging that modifying an equal allocation of parenting time

closely resembles an initial allocation of parenting time because

both decisions arise from situations in which the parents

theoretically share the legal and physical care of the child).

Therefore, an order modifying an equal allocation of parenting time

by giving one parent majority parenting time doesn’t change the

parent with whom the child resides a majority of the time. See §

14-10-129(1.5); In re Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 533 (Colo.

App. 2008); see also Stewart, 43 P.3d at 742 (“[I]n instances where

4 the parties share equal parenting responsibilities, any subsequent

modification of that arrangement is governed by the best interests

standard.”). Likewise, a request to modify an unequal parenting

time schedule by returning to an equal allocation of parenting time

doesn’t seek to change the parent with whom the child resides a

majority of the time. See § 14-10-129(1.5); Newell, 192 P.3d at 533.

As a result, under section 14-10-129(1.5), a substantial

modification of parenting time that also changes the parent with

whom the child primarily resides means that one parent replaces

the other parent as the child’s primary residential parent. See § 14-

10-129(1.5); Newell, 192 P.3d at 533.

¶ 11 The magistrate concluded that father’s motion to modify

parenting time was barred by section 14-10-129(1.5) because the

April 2024 order allocated to mother majority parenting time and

father sought to change that allocation four months later. However,

the April 2024 order didn’t change the parent with whom the child

resided a majority of the time. See § 14-10-129(1.5); Newell, 192

P.3d at 533. Rather, it modified the equal parenting time schedule

and established, for the first time, mother as the majority time

parent. And although father filed his motion to modify shortly after

5 the April 2024 order, he asked to restore the equal parenting time

schedule; he didn’t ask to replace mother as the majority time

parent.

¶ 12 Thus, under the plain language of section 14-10-129(1.5), the

two-year filing restriction didn’t apply to father’s motion to modify.

See F.A.G., 148 P.3d at 377 (when interpreting a statute, we

construe its words and phrases according to their plain and

generally accepted meanings). The magistrate therefore improperly

denied father’s motion to modify parenting time based on the

restriction imposed by section 14-10-129(1.5). Instead, the

magistrate needed to evaluate father’s allegations under the best

interests standard to determine whether his verified motion

established adequate cause to conduct a hearing on his motion to

modify. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I); § 14-10-132, C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 13 For these reasons, we conclude that the court erred by

adopting the magistrate’s decision denying father’s motion to modify

parenting time. We reverse the ruling and remand the case to the

district court to reconsider father’s motion. On remand, the court

must consider the parents’ and the child’s present circumstances

and may allow the parents to present evidence of such

6 circumstances in support of their conflicting positions concerning

the child’s best interests. In re Marriage of Schlundt, 2021 COA 58,

¶ 56.

III. The Motion to Recuse the Magistrate

¶ 14 Father next contends that the district court erred by adopting

the magistrate’s ruling denying his motion to recuse the magistrate.

We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 15 Father has filed multiple motions to recuse judicial officers

who have presided over this case. In December 2024, he filed a

motion to recuse the magistrate who denied his motion to modify

parenting time, giving four reasons in support of her recusal.

• First, father asserted that procedural irregularities

relating to a pending contempt citation against him

“suggest[ed]” that the magistrate was biased against him.

He explained that, at an advisement hearing, the

magistrate allowed mother to appear virtually despite an

order instructing them to appear in person, and that

such circumstances “rais[ed] concerns of [the

magistrate’s] potential ex parte communication” with

7 mother. (Father didn’t appear at that advisement

hearing.)

• Second, he asserted that, in “2022 or 2023” (and before

the magistrate became a magistrate), father sought legal

representation from the magistrate and that her former

law firm told him that there was an undisclosed conflict

of interest. He claimed that this interaction “raise[d]

concerns” that a conflict of interest “may persist.”

• Third, he asserted that the magistrate had a professional

relationship with mother’s former attorney, raising

another concern about the “appearance of bias.” He

explained that the magistrate previously worked at

Bringing Home Justice and that mother’s former attorney

also worked at that organization.

• Fourth, he asserted that the magistrate’s appointment

under the supervision of Judge Blanco, who had recused

from the case in January 2020, “heighten[ed] concerns

about the adequacy of oversight and procedural integrity

in this matter.”

¶ 16 The magistrate denied the motion.

8 • First, the magistrate found that there were no procedural

irregularities or ex parte communications supporting her

recusal. She explained that even though mother

appeared virtually at the contempt advisement, the

advisement didn’t occur at that time, and the court reset

it for a later date.

• Second, the magistrate rejected father’s allegations of a

conflict of interest. She explained that she didn’t work at

a law firm in 2022 or 2023, and there was no other

record of a conflict of interest revealed by her former law

firm.

• Third, the magistrate rejected father’s allegation that she

had a professional relationship with mother’s former

attorney. She explained that the magistrate stopped

working at Bringing Home Justice before the child in this

case was born, the magistrate and mother’s former

attorney never worked at Bringing Home Justice at the

same time, and, in any event, mother’s former attorney

no longer represents mother.

9 • Fourth, the magistrate determined that father’s

remaining claims relating to the authority and oversight

of the magistrate didn’t establish a basis for her to

recuse.

¶ 17 Father petitioned the district court to review the magistrate’s

order, and the court adopted the order.

¶ 18 A judge’s decision on whether to disqualify herself is

discretionary and won’t be reversed absent a showing that the judge

abused her discretion. Bocian v. Owners Ins. Co., 2020 COA 98, ¶

12. A judge’s failure to disqualify herself in the face of a legally

sufficient motion is an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. Id.

The sufficiency of a motion to disqualify is a legal determination

that we review de novo. Id.

¶ 19 “[D]isqualification is appropriate when the motion and

supporting affidavits allege sufficient facts from which it may

reasonably be inferred that the judge is prejudiced or biased, or

appears to be prejudiced or biased, against a party or counsel to the

litigation.” Id. at ¶ 13; see also People v. Schupper, 2014 COA 80M,

¶ 59 (noting that to warrant reversal based on a judge’s alleged

10 bias, the record must clearly establish that the judge’s conduct so

departed from the required impartiality as to deny the party a fair

trial). In the absence of a valid reason for disqualification, the judge

has a duty to preside over the case. Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d

1355, 1374 (Colo. 1993).

¶ 20 A judge considering a motion to recuse must accept the

factual statements in the motion and the affidavit as true. In re

Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208, 1223 (Colo. App. 2006).

However, allegations based on “mere suspicion, surmise,

speculation, rationalization, conjecture, [or] innuendo,” or

“statements of mere conclusions of the pleader,” are insufficient to

require recusal. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marriage of

Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Colo. App. 1989)). Therefore, the

motion and affidavit must assert more than a subjective belief that

the judge is prejudiced or biased against a party. Edmond v. City of

Colorado Springs, 226 P.3d 1248, 1252 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 21 Father argues that the magistrate erred by denying his motion

to recuse because the motion and supporting affidavit established

bases for the magistrate’s disqualification and required the

magistrate to refer the matter to another judge. But we conclude

11 that, even accepting father’s allegations as true, his motion didn’t

present sufficient facts showing that the magistrate was prejudiced

or biased against him. Father’s perceived irregularities in the

contempt advisement proceedings and his suspicion of ex parte

communications amounted to no more than unsupported

speculation of the magistrate’s potential bias. See McSoud, 131

P.3d at 1223. Father’s additional allegations related to the

purported conflict of interest were vague, conclusory, and based on

mere suspicions and speculation. See id. And his assertion

concerning the magistrate’s work at Bringing Justice Home was

based merely on the allegation that the magistrate and mother’s

former attorney were employed at the same organization. He didn’t

allege that (1) the magistrate worked at the organization during the

time mother was represented; (2) she and mother’s former attorney

had any direct connection or relationship with each other; or (3)

they worked at the organization during the same timeframe. See

id.; cf. Adams Cnty. Hous. Auth. v. Panzlau, 2022 COA 148, ¶ 22

(affirming a judge’s denial of a motion to recuse based on an

allegation that the judge previously worked at a firm that

represented the opposing party). Additionally, father’s allegations

12 concerning the appointment and oversight of the magistrate by

Judge Blanco were conclusory and didn’t provide a valid basis for

the magistrate’s recusal. See McSoud, 131 P.3d at 1223. Moreover,

as discussed below, father’s complaints about Judge Blanco’s

involvement with the appointment and oversight of the magistrate

lack merit.

¶ 22 The district court therefore didn’t err by adopting the

magistrate’s ruling denying father’s motion to recuse. See, e.g.,

Sanders v. People, 2024 CO 33, ¶ 50 (“[W]hile both an appearance

of impropriety and actual bias are grounds for recusal from a case,

only when the judge was actually biased will we question the

result.” (quoting People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 29)).

IV. Judge Blanco’s Authority

¶ 23 Father contends that, following Judge Blanco’s January 2020

order to recuse, she lacked jurisdiction to issue orders later entered

in this case. This is the third time father has raised this

jurisdictional argument to this court. Each of the two previous

divisions rejected father’s contention, explaining that father’s

actions after January 2020 waived his claim that Judge Blanco

lacked authority to rule on his motions. See In re Marriage of

13 Skellchock, (Colo. App. No. 24CA1282, Oct. 23, 2025) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); In re Marriage of Skellchock,

(Colo. App. No. 23CA1178, July 17, 2025) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(e)). We see no reason to depart from that rationale and

therefore won’t disturb Judge Blanco’s orders.

V. Disposition

¶ 24 We reverse the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s

ruling denying father’s motion to modify parenting time. We

remand the issue to the district court to reconsider father’s motion

consistent with this opinion. We otherwise affirm.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.