Marriage of Skellchock

Opinion

24CA1282 Marriage of Skellchock 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1282 Larimer County District Court No. 18DR30326 Honorable Juan G. Villaseñor, Judge Honorable Susan Blanco, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Derek Skellchock,

Appellant,

and

Alora-Ann Paige Volz,

Appellee.

ORDERS AFFIRMED

Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Bernard* and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025

Derek Skellchock, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee

* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Derek Skellchock (father) appeals the district court’s order

modifying parental responsibilities and child support. Father also

appeals the court’s order denying his C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) motion to set

aside orders issued by Eighth Judicial District Court Chief Judge

Susan Blanco after January 2020. We affirm.

I. Parental Responsibilities

¶2 Father contends that the court’s order modifying parental

responsibilities must be reversed because the court erred by (1) not

continuing the modification hearing when father presented the

court with purported improprieties in the investigation by the child

and family investigator (CFI) and (2) drawing a negative inference

against father when he did not release information on his physical

and mental health. We consider and reject his contentions.

A. Relevant Facts

¶3 In 2020, the district court dissolved father’s marriage with

Alora-Ann Paige Volz (mother) and directed them to exercise equal

parenting time with their child. The court allocated to mother sole

decision-making responsibility for medical, educational, and

religious decisions. It allocated to father sole decision-making

responsibility for extracurricular activities.

1 ¶4 After a division of this court affirmed the permanent orders,

see In re Marriage of Skellchock, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0503, Feb. 24,

2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)), father asked the

court to modify parental responsibilities by increasing his parenting

time and allocating to him educational and medical decision-

making responsibility. Mother also asked the court to modify

parental responsibilities, seeking to increase her parenting time and

receive decision-making responsibility for the child’s extracurricular

activities.

¶5 At a status conference on December 19, 2023, the court

appointed a CFI and reset the modification hearing for March 22,

2024. In its written order, issued the same day, the court indicated

that the CFI’s report was due three days later. The day after the

status conference, the CFI filed a status report informing the parties

that because the hearing was reset for March 22, 2024, she would

“file her report by no later than March 1, 2024.” The CFI also

emailed the parties and informed them of this updated due date.

¶6 On March 1, 2024, the CFI filed her report. The CFI reported

that she received limited information from father. She explained

that she ended father’s interview, which occurred on February 12,

2 2024, because he refused her repeated requests to stop recording it.

She also explained that father did not comply with her requests for

information and that she believed he purposefully interfered with

the investigation and tried to intimidate or manipulate her. The CFI

reported that, by contrast, mother fully participated in the

investigation. Based on her investigation, the CFI recommended

that the child reside primarily with mother.

¶7 About a week later, father filed a motion to continue the

modification hearing, raising concerns about the CFI’s investigation

and the timing of her report, and he asked for more time to secure

an expert to review the CFI’s report and collect evidence to rebut

her recommendation. The court denied the motion.

¶8 Then, after a full-day hearing, the court issued a thorough and

detailed order modifying parental responsibilities. The court

increased mother’s parenting time, directing that, during the school

year, the child would reside primarily with her and father may have

overnight visits every other weekend. The court further ordered

that, during the summer months, the parties would exercise equal

parenting time. In support of its decision, the court found that

3 mother placed the child’s best interests ahead of her own and lived

close to the child’s school. By contrast, it found that father had

• recently moved to a new home, which was about a forty-

five-minute drive away from the child’s school;

• verbally abused mother, knowingly ignoring court orders

prohibiting such behavior;

• engaged in “manipulative and controlling” conduct and

attempted to “manipulate these proceedings”;

• made “vindictive” decisions to exclude mother from the

child, tried to create a wedge between mother and the

child, and used the child to “play games” with mother;

• not placed the child’s needs ahead of his own due to his

“anger toward and negative views of [m]other”; and

• “fail[ed] to act in the child’s best interests in fundamental

ways.”

¶9 The court also modified decision-making responsibility,

allocating to mother sole authority over extracurricular activities.

The court explained that father

4 • “bull[ied]” mother, treated her “disrespectfully, oftentimes

without provocation,” and “antagonize[d] virtually every

situation”;

• would not communicate with mother in a respectful

manner;

• repeatedly “disregard[ed] [mother’s] authority and ma[d]e

decisions without her” in violation of the court’s

permanent orders; and

• abused his limited decision-making authority “to wring

additional parenting time to the detriment of the child’s

best interests.”

¶ 10 Father filed a C.R.C.P. 59 motion for post-trial relief, asserting

irregularities in the proceedings. The court denied the motion.

B. Governing Legal Standards

¶ 11 As relevant here, a court may modify the allocation of parental

responsibilities to serve the child’s best interests. See § 14-10-

129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (parenting time); § 14-10-131(2), C.R.S.

2025 (decision-making responsibility).

¶ 12 The court has broad discretion when determining whether to

modify parental responsibilities, and, like all parental orders, we

5 must exercise every presumption in favor of affirming its ruling. In

re Parental Responsibilities Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 13.

We therefore will not disturb the court’s decision absent a showing

that the court abused its discretion, meaning that it misapplied the

law or that its decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8.

C. The Motion to Continue and the CFI’s Investigation

¶ 13 In his motion to continue, father asserted, as relevant here,

that he had “several concerns with the CFI Report, most notably”

the CFI excluding him from the investigation. He also argued that

the CFI violated Chief Justice Directive 04-08 by submitting her

report only twenty-one days before the hearing and that he was not

left with enough time to hire an expert to review the CFI’s

investigation and report. See Chief Justice Directive 04-08,

Directive Concerning Court Appointments of Child and Family

Investigators Pursuant to Section 14-10-116.5, C.R.S., § VIII(C),

standard 10 (amended Aug. 2024) (“If the court order does not

specify the due date, the report is timely if filed at least 35 days

before the trial or hearing.”) (CJD 04-08).

6 ¶ 14 The court found that father did not establish good cause to

continue the hearing. The court acknowledged that, since it

incorrectly set the CFI’s report’s due date for three days after it

appointed the CFI, the report was due February 16, 2024 (thirty-

five days before the hearing), under CJD 04-08. See id. However,

the court found that, in December 2023, father was informed that

the CFI would not complete her report until March 1, 2024, and

that father raised no objection to that completion date until after

the report was submitted.

¶ 15 The court also rejected father’s claim that the CFI did not

allow him to participate in the investigation. The court found that

father refused to adhere to the CFI’s repeated requests to stop

recording their interview and that he did not provide the CFI with

the information she requested. It then found that father had the

opportunity to participate but he chose not to do so. The court

further found that while father claimed that he was unable to

secure an expert to complete a work product review before the

hearing, father gave no information about a timeframe by which an

expert could provide an opinion. Additionally, the court said that to

properly challenge the CFI’s opinions, father should have asked for

7 the appointment of a parental responsibilities evaluator (PRE), but

he did not do so.

¶ 16 A court should grant a motion to continue only when the

moving party shows good cause, meaning that “there are

unforeseen and exceptional circumstances requiring a

continuance.” Miller v. Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App.

2009); see C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11. We will not disturb the court’s

decision unless the court abused its discretion. People in Interest of

E.B., 2022 CO 55, ¶ 14. In determining whether the court abused

its discretion, we consider “the total circumstances as reflected by

the record,” People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 389 (Colo. 1989), and

even if the court abused its discretion, “reversal is not warranted

unless a party demonstrates actual prejudice,” Black v. Black, 2018

COA 7, ¶ 107.

¶ 17 Father begins by arguing that the court incorrectly found that

he knew the CFI’s report would not be filed until March 1, 2024,

claiming that her status report was not sent to him. Even if we

assume that father did not receive the status report, the record

reveals that he received the CFI’s December 19, 2023, email

informing him that her report would be completed by March 1, and

8 he raised no objection to that timing until he filed his motion to

continue. Moreover, the court found, with record support, that

father’s attorney entered an appearance on February 16, 2024 —

the same day of the default deadline under CJD 04-08 and a few

days after the CFI ended her interview with father. See CJD 04-08,

§ VIII(C), standard 10. The court therefore acted within its

discretion by finding that the March 1, 2024, filing of the CFI report

did not establish good cause for continuing the hearing. See E.B.,

¶ 14; Miller, 207 P.3d at 932.

¶ 18 Father next argues that he had the right to record his

interview with the CFI and thus the court erred by finding that he

did not participate in the CFI investigation by refusing to stop

recording the CFI’s interview. Father acknowledges that nothing in

Colorado establishes a legal right to record the interview with the

CFI. Instead, he relies on two cases from New Jersey. See Koch v.

Koch, 38 A.3d 703, 709 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2011); B.D. v.

Carley, 704 A.2d 979, 981 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). These

out-of-state cases are not binding on this court or the district court.

See Johnson v. Staab, 2025 COA 45, ¶ 31. But even if we assume,

without deciding, that the CFI improperly ended her interview with

9 father based on his recording, his refusal to end the recording was

not the sole basis supporting the court’s finding that father chose

not to participate in the CFI’s investigation. The CFI also reported

that, before the interview, father did not (1) release his medical

information; (2) complete the CFI’s questionnaire; or (3) sign

paperwork requested by the CFI. The CFI further reported that she

believed father purposefully tried to interfere with her investigation

and intimidate or manipulate her. Therefore, even in the absence of

father’s refusal to end his recording of the interview, the record

supports the court’s finding that he did not participate in the CFI’s

investigation. See Wells, 776 P.2d at 389; Black, ¶ 107; see also

C.A.R. 35(c) (directing the court to disregard any error or defect that

does not affect the parties’ substantial rights); People in Interest of

A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App. 2007) (concluding that an

alleged error, without a valid allegation of prejudice, is not grounds

for reversal).

¶ 19 Father also makes the conclusory claim that the “court

violated [his] rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act,”

asserting that his “hearing or memory disabilities” justified

recording the interview. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. Father

10 neither raised this issue with the district court nor asked for

permission to record the interview as an accommodation under the

Americans with Disabilities Act. See In re Marriage of Ensminger,

209 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Arguments not presented

at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Nor does he

develop any meaningful legal argument in support of this claim on

appeal. See In re Marriage of Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 27 (declining

to address an undeveloped argument). We therefore will not

address it further.

¶ 20 Father next challenges the court’s statement that he needed to

request a PRE evaluation to properly challenge the CFI’s report.

But even if we assume that this one statement was unwarranted,

father does not show that, under the totality of circumstances, the

court’s determination that father failed to establish good cause for

continuing the hearing warrants reversal. See Wells, 776 P.2d at

389; Black, ¶ 107; see also C.A.R. 35(c); A.C., 170 P.3d at 845.

Beyond the court’s reference to a PRE, the court explained that,

before March 2024, father knew of the timing of the CFI’s report

and was aware of his concerns with the CFI investigation, but that

he did not ask to continue the hearing until a week after the CFI

11 filed her report and two weeks before the hearing. As well, the

court highlighted that father provided no information about a

timeframe for obtaining an expert to conduct his desired work

product review, and father did not describe any efforts he took to

hire such an expert. The court’s findings, supported by the record,

amply support its determination declining to continue the hearing.

¶ 21 Father further claims that continuing the hearing and allowing

him to obtain a work product review would have shown that, in

addition to the delayed report filing, the CFI violated other

standards set forth in CJD 04-08, including standards 1, 2, 8, and

18. See CJD 04-08, § VIII(A), (C), (D). But father did not raise any

of these issues with the district court until after the court denied

his motion to continue and modified parental responsibilities. See

Briargate at Seventeenth Ave. Owners Ass’n v. Nelson, 2021 COA

78M, ¶ 66 (“Arguments made . . . for the first time in a post-trial

motion are too late and, consequently, are deemed waived for

purposes of appeal.”); see also People v. Schaufele, 2014 CO 43,

¶ 49 (Boatright, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Motions for

reconsideration are designed to correct erroneous court rulings;

they are not designed to allow parties to present new legal

12 arguments for the first time and then appeal their denial . . . .”).

Moreover, it is the role of the district court to apply the applicable

legal standards and weigh the recommendations of a CFI, along

with all evidence, to decide whether to modify parental

responsibilities. See In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.J.,

242 P.3d 1128, 1133 (Colo. 2010); see also In re Marriage of

McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 334 (Colo. App. 1998) (recognizing that

the court is not required to follow the recommendation of the

evaluator and may reach its own conclusions concerning the child’s

best interests). At the hearing, even though father did not directly

mention the CJD 04-08 standards, he questioned the CFI and

challenged her recommendation due to purported inadequacies with

her investigation. The court weighed father’s complaints and

determined, with record support, that modifying parental

responsibilities served the child’s best interests. See Collins, ¶ 8;

S.Z.S., ¶ 13.

¶ 22 The court therefore acted within its discretion by denying

father’s motion to continue the hearing.

13 D. Father’s Physical and Mental Health Information

¶ 23 Father next argues that the district court abused its discretion

by drawing a negative inference against him when he declined to

release his physical or mental health information, claiming that it

was protected by the physician-patient privilege. We are

unpersuaded.

¶ 24 In her report, the CFI said that she learned father had post-

traumatic stress disorder and physical disabilities. She said that

she sent father a questionnaire and asked him for information

about his physical and mental health conditions and treatment, but

that he did not provide that information. The CFI also reported that

father refused to sign a release for his physical and mental health

information, claimed the information was not relevant, and said

that the release “violated HIPAA.”

¶ 25 At the hearing, father again said that his physical and mental

health information was not relevant. The court corrected him and

asked him to describe his physical and mental health conditions.

See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(V), C.R.S. 2025 (providing that the mental

and physical health of all individuals involved is a relevant factor to

consider in determining the best interests of the child). In

14 response, father listed multiple physical impairments and reported

a diagnosis for post-traumatic stress disorder.

¶ 26 When the court later modified parental responsibilities, it

found that father had “significant mental-health concerns that

directly affect[ed] his ability to act in the child’s best interests.” The

court also found that father reported various physical and mental

health conditions but that he refused to identify those conditions

with the CFI, would not sign a release for his medical information,

and was evasive when questioned about his health.

¶ 27 Father filed a motion for post-trial relief under C.R.C.P. 59.

He argued that his physical and mental health information was

protected by the “doctor-patient privilege” and that when he

asserted this privilege, the court (and the CFI) improperly used his

nondisclosure against him. The court denied the C.R.C.P. 59

motion and found that “there’s nothing irregular about weighing

evidence that [father] engaged in efforts to conceal the nature and

extent of his medical and psychological conditions — which are

directly relevant to the best interest’s factors — by failing to provide

basic information about the same.” The court further explained

that it had sole discretion to determine the credibility of witnesses

15 and the weight to give to the evidence, and it explained that it

exercised that discretion when it considered father’s evasive

conduct. The court added, “While [father] remains free not to waive

his physician-patient privilege, that choice — in a civil case —

comes with consequences and the [c]ourt remains free to make

adverse inferences regarding that choice.”

¶ 28 The physician-patient privilege protects a physician’s

disclosure of a patient’s “information acquired in attending the

patient that was necessary to enable him or her to prescribe or act

for the patient” without the patient’s consent. § 13-90-107(1)(d),

C.R.S. 2025; see also § 13-90-107(1)(g) (describing the similar

privilege for therapeutic information acquired by a mental health

provider). The “privilege is not a blanket protection against the

disclosure of any and all medical information.” Hartmann v. Nordin,

147 P.3d 43, 49 (Colo. 2006). The court narrowly construes the

privilege, and it is the burden of the party asserting the privilege to

establish that it applies. Id.

¶ 29 Father does not direct us to anything in the record before the

court entered its order modifying parental responsibilities where he

justified withholding his physical and mental health information

16 because it was privileged information. To be sure, the CFI

mentioned that father claimed a violation of “HIPAA” (presumably,

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, see Pub. L.

No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996)), but father never

expanded on this generic reference or connected it to the physician-

patient or therapist-patient privilege. See § 13-90-107(1)(d), (g).

Moreover, when the court directly questioned father about his

physical and mental health, father responded to the court’s

questions and never asserted that the information was protected by

any privilege. Therefore, father did not establish that a privilege

applied to his physical or mental health information before the

court ruled on the motions to modify parental responsibilities. See

Hartmann, 147 P.3d at 49.

¶ 30 Still, father highlights that, in his C.R.C.P. 59 motion, he

asserted that the physician-patient privilege applied to his physical

or mental health information and that, in the court’s order denying

that motion, it said that it could make an adverse inference against

him for declining to waive the privilege. Father argues that the

court improperly used that inference to make assumptions about

his health and that no legal authority permitted the court to do so.

17 While the court mentioned that it may make an adverse inference, it

is unclear from the ruling whether the court drew such an inference

against father when it modified parental responsibilities. But even

if it did, the court in a dissolution case generally may draw an

adverse inference against a party who failed to disclose relevant

information. See In re Marriage of Sgarlatti, 801 P.2d 18, 19 (Colo.

1990); cf. Neher v. Neher, 2015 COA 103, ¶ 64 (acknowledging that

“in a civil case, the finder of fact may draw an adverse inference

from assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege”). Although father

disagrees, he does not direct us to any specific legal authority that

prohibited the court from drawing an adverse inference against him

here. See Drexler, ¶ 27 (recognizing the appellant’s burden to

provide supporting legal authority for contentions of error).

¶ 31 The court then weighed the evidence and the surrounding

circumstances, including father’s lack of disclosure. It found that

father tried to (1) conceal “basic information” about his physical and

mental health and (2) downplay his symptoms to the court. See In

re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (acknowledging the

court’s discretion to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the

credibility of the witnesses). The record supports those findings,

18 and the court therefore acted within its discretion by modifying

parental responsibilities. See Collins, ¶ 8; S.Z.S., ¶ 13.

II. Child Support

¶ 32 We next reject father’s contention that the court incorrectly

determined mother’s income for purposes of modifying child

support.

¶ 33 Father was obligated to pay child support in the amount of

$200 per month. A division of this court affirmed that ruling. In re

Marriage of Skellchock, (Colo. App. Nos. 22CA0249 & 22CA0250,

Oct. 13, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶ 34 Related to the present proceedings, the parties asked the court

to modify child support if it modified parenting time. Father also

argued that changes to mother’s employment warranted modifying

child support.

¶ 35 After the hearing, the court found that mother was unable to

return to her prior career as a welder due to a serious workplace

injury. It found that she had been working in the restaurant

industry as a bartender and recently quit that job, and it noted that

she was studying to earn her certification as a welding inspector.

19 The court determined that mother was voluntarily unemployed, and

it imputed to her a potential monthly income of $2,499, which was

the income she could earn at a full-time job paying minimum wage

— $14.42 per hour.

¶ 36 The court also found that father’s monthly income was

$3,980, which represented his veteran’s disability benefits. It then

calculated that father’s modified child support obligation was $497

per month.

¶ 37 We review a court’s child support order for abuse of discretion.

In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018 COA 154, ¶ 8.

¶ 38 To calculate child support, the court generally uses the

parties’ actual gross incomes. § 14-10-115(1)(b)(I), (3)(a)(I), (3)(c),

(7), C.R.S. 2025. But if the court determines that a parent is

voluntarily unemployed, the court calculates child support based

on that parent’s potential income. § 14-10-115(5)(b)(I); see People v.

Martinez, 70 P.3d 474, 477 (Colo. 2003). Potential income is the

income a party could earn from a full-time job commensurate with

their demonstrated earning ability. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019

COA 83, ¶ 26.

20 ¶ 39 We defer to the court’s income finding unless the record does

not support it. Id. at ¶ 27; see also Martinez, 70 P.3d at 480 (noting

that the court’s decision on a party’s potential income “is typically a

question of fact” entitled to deference on review).

C. Mother’s Income

¶ 40 Father agrees with the court’s finding that mother was

voluntarily unemployed, but he argues that her previous work

experience showed that she could earn more than minimum wage.

He highlights two January 2024 paystubs, in which her earnings

were equivalent to wages of $31.60 per hour and $28.85 per hour.

¶ 41 However, the court found that father was “[c]herry-picking”

two pages from mother’s paystubs, and it explained that it

“considered all the evidence” when determining that the proper

potential income for mother was $2,499 per month. The court

further explained that, during the last three years that mother

worked in the restaurant industry, her annual earnings were less

than a full-time minimum wage job. It also found that, presently, it

was difficult for mother to work full time because she was studying

to take the welding inspector exam.

21 ¶ 42 The record supports the court’s findings, and we therefore will

not disturb its income determination. See Tooker, ¶ 27; see also

§ 14-10-115(5)(b.5)(II) (directing the court to consider the party’s

specific circumstances when determining potential income). Mother

testified that, in her last job as a bartender, she was paid $10.63

per hour. Mother acknowledged that she also received tips, but she

reported that, during the last three years working in the restaurant

industry, her total annual gross income was $22,740 in 2021,

$18,881 in 2022, and $22,742 in 2023 — all less than the

approximately $30,000 annual income imputed to mother based on

a full-time minimum wage job. In addition, the two paystubs

highlighted by father merely revealed that, during that time,

mother’s total monthly earnings were approximately $2,500 and

equivalent to the income imputed to her. (In the first bi-weekly pay

period, she earned $1,224 for working 38.75 hours, and in the

second, she earned $1,299 for working 45.05 hours.) Moreover,

mother described the severe physical injuries she sustained as a

welder, and she testified that studying for the welding inspector

exam was “intense” and impacted her ability to work full time.

22 ¶ 43 The court therefore did not err by determining that mother’s

potential monthly income for purposes of child support was $2,499.

III. C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) Order

¶ 44 In addition to the motions to modify parental responsibilities

and child support, father filed a C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) motion to set

aside orders issued by Judge Blanco after January 2020. The

district court denied that motion, and father appeals that ruling.

He contends that Judge Blanco recused from the case in January

2020 and that she lacked jurisdiction to issue the later orders. See

Beckord v. Dist. Ct., 698 P.2d 1323, 1330 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 45 However, another division of this court recently rejected

father’s contention that Judge Blanco’s post-January 2020 orders

were void. In re Marriage of Skellchock, (Colo. App. No. 23CA1178,

July 17, 2025) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The

division explained that father’s actions after January 2020 waived

his claim that Judge Blanco lacked authority to rule on his

motions. Id. at ¶¶ 12-16; see People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M,

¶¶ 45-46, 53 (recognizing that a party can waive their claim that a

judge acted without authority); Aaberg v. Dist. Ct., 319 P.2d 491,

493-94 (Colo. 1957) (same). We see no reason to depart from that

23 division’s rationale, and we therefore affirm the court’s order

denying father’s C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3) motion.

¶ 46 To the extent father also suggests that orders issued by

District Court Magistrate Kandace Majoros were void, he develops

no factual or legal argument to support that suggestion. We thus

decline to address it. See Drexler, ¶ 27.

IV. Disposition

¶ 47 We affirm the court’s orders.

JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE BERGER concur.