24CA1113 Marriage of Haibt 07-10-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1113 Douglas County District Court No. 21DR30473 Honorable Robert Lung, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Edward C. Haibt,
Appellant,
and
Heather Haibt,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Kuhn and Schutz, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 10, 2025
Edward C. Haibt, Pro Se
Hogan Omidi, PC, Kathleen A. Hogan, Chelsea E. Moore, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case, Edward C. Haibt
(husband) claims the trial court erred when it classified houses,
trusts, art, and furniture as the separate property of Heather Haibt
(wife); distributed the marital property; determined the parties’
incomes for purposes of maintenance; demonstrated bias; didn’t
allocate enough time for the hearing; awarded attorney fees without
a separate hearing; and ignored wife’s excessive spending and
loans. We disagree and affirm. We also remand for consideration of
wife’s request for an award of attorney fees.
I. Background
¶2 The parties had been married for twenty years at the time of
the 2023 permanent orders, and they didn’t have children. They
met while husband was on a temporary work assignment in the
Gunnison area. At the time, husband worked for Delta Airlines in
customer service, and wife worked for an RV company. Wife owned
and lived in a house in Gunnison (Gunnison house) at that time,
and she subsequently moved to Castle Rock near a golf course
(Castle Rock house), and husband moved in with her there, but she
retained the Gunnison house.
1 ¶3 The parties married in 2003, and wife’s mother died suddenly
two years later. Wife received a significant inheritance following her
mother’s death, and she decided to sell their Castle Rock house and
buy a multi-million-dollar house adjacent to a different golf course
in Parker (Parker house). Wife began spending large amounts of
time and money on her hobbies, which included sailing and golf.
¶4 In 2009 husband left his job in order to be a travelling
companion and golf partner to wife. Husband began working again
in 2019 as a financial advisor and, during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings, took a second job scheduling charter flights for
sports organizations.
¶5 Wife eventually purchased another house in Arizona solely
with money from her trust, and the title to that house was held by
an L.L.C. that wife owned. The couple also accrued several
expensive golf memberships at luxury golf clubs, seven cars,
jewelry, and art and furniture in all three houses.
¶6 Wife is the beneficiary of four trusts (Trusts One, Two, Three,
and Four). These trusts are almost entirely funded from
inheritances wife received following the deaths of members of her
family.
2 ¶7 Husband filed for divorce in June 2021. The parties disputed
whether any of the trusts contained marital property, so the trial
court appointed a special master to determine whether the trusts,
any distributions from the trusts, and any assets obtained with
trust funds were marital or separate property. The special master
found that the regular payments wife received from the main trust
— Trust One — were marital. The special master also found that
Trusts One and Two had gained value during the marriage and
recommended that the court find that this appreciation was marital
property. The parties stipulated that Trusts Three and Four didn’t
contain marital property.
¶8 At the permanent orders hearing, both parties requested an
award of the bulk of the marital estate. The court awarded
husband forty percent of the marital estate including four of the
cars, his retirement accounts, almost all of the furniture in the
Gunnison house, and approximately $675,000 in cash. The court
reasoned that husband had sacrificed his career for the marriage
and had made noneconomic contributions to the marriage by
serving as wife’s travel companion and golf partner. The court
awarded wife the rest of the estate, including all three houses, three
3 cars, and the art and remaining furniture. Finally, the court
ordered wife to pay husband maintenance in the amount of $6,000
per month for ninety-seven months.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶9 Husband’s appeal consists of twenty-one issues that at times
overlap or are repeated. Wife has requested attorney fees and costs
because she alleges husband’s appeal is frivolous and designed to
increase her legal costs. Husband contends that wife’s answer brief
violated the page limit and requests that the brief be struck.
¶ 10 Because of the number of issues husband presents, we have
grouped them according to the steps a trial court must take when
issuing permanent orders: (1) identifying any property as marital or
separate; (2) dividing the marital property equitably; (3) determining
maintenance; (4) determining whether to award attorney fees; and
(5) addressing remaining issues. In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016
CO 2, ¶¶ 21-23. We have also combined them, when necessary,
due to repetition of issues.
¶ 11 First, we address husband’s argument that wife’s answer brief
is too long, then we address his substantive arguments, and lastly
we address wife’s request for attorney fees.
4 A. The Answer Brief
¶ 12 Husband argues that wife’s answer brief violates C.A.R. 28(g)
because it’s longer than thirty pages. But C.A.R. 28(g) doesn’t have
a default page limit for a party’s answer brief — only a requirement
that it “contain no more than 9,500 words.” C.A.R. 28(g)(1). The
rule does go on to restrict a brief filed by a self-represented party
who doesn’t have access to a word processor to no more than thirty
double-spaced one-sided pages. C.A.R. 28(g)(2). But wife is neither
self-represented nor lacking access to a word processor. And wife’s
counsel certified that the answer brief comported with the word
limits and other requirements of C.A.R. 28. Accordingly, because
husband’s argument has no merit, we reject his request to strike
wife’s answer brief.
B. Classification of Property
¶ 13 Husband advances four challenges to the trial court’s
classification of property as wife’s separate property. Husband
contends that the court erred when it classified wife’s houses,
trusts, art, and furnishings as her separate property because (1)
wife comingled houses and trust assets with the marital estate and
they grew in value; (2) the special master didn’t sufficiently trace
5 whether payments on the Arizona house came from the principal or
income of Trust One; (3) furnishings and art acquired during the
marriage should have been presumed to be marital unless proved
otherwise; and (4) the court over-relied on flawed testimony from
wife’s forensic accountant. We disagree that the court erred.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 14 We can’t disturb a trial court’s division of property unless the
court abuses its discretion. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28,
35 (Colo. 2001). When dividing property, the trial court must first
determine whether a party’s interest constitutes property and
whether that property is marital or separate. Id. Property acquired
during the marriage is generally considered marital, but
inheritances are included in an exception to that rule. § 14-10-
113(2), C.R.S. 2024.
¶ 15 A party must object to a special master’s order or
recommendations no later than fourteen days after being served
with them. C.R.C.P. 53(f)(2).
2. Additional Facts
¶ 16 The trial court appointed a special master to decide whether
the trusts and any payments related to the trusts were separate or
6 marital property. The special master had both parties submit
expert reports and position statements on various issues, such as
the proposed value of wife’s trusts. Eventually, the special master
held a hearing where several experts testified, including wife’s
forensic accountant, Tiffany Nelson. The special master found that
the annual payments from Trust One to wife were marital property.
The special master found that Trusts One and Two had appreciated
during the marriage and classified that increase as marital
property. The special master also found that furniture and art —
valued at over $260,000 — were wife’s separate property. Finally,
the special master found by clear and convincing evidence that wife
had traced money from Trust One used to the purchase of the
Arizona house. The special master filed this report on February 2,
2024.
¶ 17 On February 27 — almost four weeks later and after the
objection deadline had passed — the trial court accepted, approved,
and adopted the special master’s final report and recommendations.
The trial court explicitly noted that neither party had objected to the
special master’s final report or recommendations.
7 ¶ 18 In their joint trial management certificate, the parties
stipulated to the values of the houses, the marital values of Trusts
One and Two, and that Trusts Three and Four weren’t marital
property.
3. Analysis
a. Assets Were Separate
¶ 19 Husband argues that the trial court erred by classifying Trusts
Three and Four as wife’s separate property. We disagree.
¶ 20 Husband stipulated at trial that Trusts Three and Four weren’t
marital property, and “‘[s]tipulations are a form of judicial
admission,’ and ‘are binding on the party who makes them.’”
Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1108 (Colo. App. 2010)
(citation omitted). A trial court has the discretion to relieve a party
of their stipulations if there is a “sound reason in law or equity for
avoiding or repudiating a stipulation.” Id. But husband doesn’t
point to a place in the record where he made such a request;
therefore the issue is waived. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021
COA 141, ¶ 24 (Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a
known right.”). Because husband waived the issue, we won’t
8 consider further the trial court’s determination that Trusts Three
and Four weren’t marital property.
¶ 21 Next, husband contends that the court erred by awarding wife
all three of the houses. But none of the houses were purchased
with marital funds, nor is husband listed on any deeds or loans.
Wife owned the Gunnison house before the marriage, the Parker
house was purchased by Trust One and titled in its name, and wife
purchased the Arizona house with funds from Trust One in the
name of an L.L.C. that she owned. While property that is acquired
during a marriage is presumptively marital, if that property is an
inheritance, or acquired in exchange for property acquired by
inheritance, then it falls under an exception to the general rule.
See § 14-10-113(2). Because wife demonstrated that she used
separate funds to purchase all three houses, the trial court didn’t
err by concluding that those homes were her separate property.
b. Tracing Analysis
¶ 22 Husband next argues that it isn’t clear whether separate or
marital funds were used to purchase the Arizona house because
wife didn’t trace the origin of the trust money used to purchase the
house to Trust One’s principal or interest.
9 ¶ 23 However, the special master explicitly found that wife had
traced her payment for the Arizona house to her separate property
with clear and convincing evidence. And husband never objected to
the special master’s recommendations before the trial court adopted
them. See C.R.C.P. 53(f)(2).
¶ 24 Therefore, we perceive no errors in the trial court’s ruling that
the Arizona house was purchased with wife’s separate property.
c. The Art and Furnishings Were Separate Property
¶ 25 Next, husband contends that the court erred when it ruled
that luxury furnishings and “other personal property” were wife’s
separate property. But again, husband stipulated that over
$260,000 worth of art and furniture were wife’s separate property.
Husband doesn’t point to anything in the record that shows he
requested the court release him from his stipulation; therefore the
issue is waived. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.
¶ 26 And if husband is referring to other items, he doesn’t identify
those items with any specificity. His record and legal citations don’t
provide any support for the propositions for which they are cited.
Therefore, husband’s argument is insufficiently developed. See
Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App.
10 2007) (refusing to address underdeveloped argument). In any
event, because husband waived the issue, we discern no error in
the trial court’s classification of any personal property, furniture, or
art as wife’s separate property.
d. Tiffany Nelson’s Expert Testimony
¶ 27 Husband next argues that the special master overly relied on
Tiffany Nelson’s expert testimony as a forensic accountant. Again,
however, husband didn’t object to the special master’s report before
the trial court adopted its recommendations. Therefore, this
challenge is waived, and we won’t address it. See Evans, ¶ 24.
C. Property Division
¶ 28 Husband argues that the court committed seven errors when
it divided the marital estate: (1) adopting a property division that
unfairly favored wife and left husband with insufficient resources to
maintain the marital lifestyle; (2) unfairly classifying as separate
debt a $100,000 loan wife took out against the Arizona house to pay
her separate, personal expenses during the divorce; (3) permitting
wife to encumber a marital asset by taking out the $100,000 loan
with the Arizona house as collateral; (4) failing to account for
husband’s noneconomic contributions to the marriage; (5) not
11 properly accounting for wife’s substantial spending; (6) denying his
request to be awarded the Arizona and Gunnison houses; and
(7) improperly awarding wife the Parker house and $260,000 worth
of art. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 29 We review a court’s order dividing marital property for an
abuse of discretion. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35.
2. Analysis
a. The Property Division and Marital Lifestyle
¶ 30 Husband argues that the court’s decision to award wife the
bulk of the marital estate, including all three houses and Trust
One, left him with insufficient resources to maintain the standard of
living he enjoyed during the marriage. But the court’s decision to
award wife the houses and Trust One was proper for two reasons.
¶ 31 First, as we discussed, supra Part II.B, the court properly
determined that those assets were wife’s separate property. She
inherited the money in Trust One and used it to buy the Parker and
Arizona houses. And she owned the Gunnison house before she
married husband.
12 ¶ 32 Additionally, the court relied on extensive testimony that the
couple’s spending during their marriage was unsustainable and
would completely deplete Trust One within four to five years.
Husband relies on In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, but that
case offers no support for his argument that wife’s separate
property should be appropriated for his benefit.
¶ 33 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s decision to
award wife the bulk of Trust One and all three of the houses.
b. The Loan
¶ 34 At trial, wife testified that she took out a $100,000 loan
against the Arizona house to pay off her credit card bills and to
comply with a court order that she pay $50,000 of husband’s
attorney fees.
¶ 35 Husband asserts that this loan was improperly categorized as
separate property by the judge. Husband claims that he was
improperly burdened by the additional debt that was created by the
loan. But husband doesn’t explain how he was burdened by the
loan — indeed, the record reflects that half of the loan was used to
pay husband’s attorney fees. And because wife was assigned the
entirety of the debt associated with the loan, we discern no burden
13 on husband. Because his argument is undeveloped, unsupported
by legal authority, and contradicted by the record, we decline to
address it further. See In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA
92M, ¶ 31.
c. Encumbrance of a Marital Asset
¶ 36 Husband argues that the loan encumbered a marital asset.
But, as set forth above, supra Part II.B, the court properly
determined that the Arizona house wasn’t a marital asset, and
instead was wife’s separate property. Thus the loan didn’t
encumber marital property. We discern no error by the trial court.
d. Husband’s Noneconomic Contributions
¶ 37 Husband next contends that the trial court didn’t properly
consider his noneconomic contributions to the marriage — namely,
that he was wife’s travel companion, social partner, and
homemaker, and that he had quit his job at Delta. But the record
contradicts his argument. At the permanent orders hearing, the
court noted that husband “sacrificed his career” to take on the role
of wife’s “travel companion” and “golf partner.” Indeed, the court
awarded husband forty percent of the marital estate in large part
based on husband’s noneconomic contributions to the marriage.
14 Therefore, because the record shows the court considered
husband’s noneconomic contributions when it divided the marital
estate, we discern no error.
e. Wife’s Spending
¶ 38 Husband contends that the court failed to address wife’s
spending of nearly one million dollars a year in its final orders. The
record contradicts his assertion. In fact, the special master
referenced wife’s spending, noting that she had depleted her
separate property by seven million dollars during the marriage.
“[Wife] spent [seven million dollars] in an extremely generous way
on herself and on her husband and all of the things that she’s
acquired.” Because wife inherited the seven million dollars, it was
her separate property. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36. Husband’s
assertion that by spending the seven million dollars wife depleted
the marital estate is unsupported by any evidence or legal
authority, so we reject it.
f. The Parker House and Art Collection
¶ 39 Husband asserts that the court erred by awarding wife the
Parker house and $260,000 worth of art. But again, husband
stipulated that the Parker house was wife’s separate property, and
15 that $260,000 of art and furniture was wife’s separate property.
Therefore, the issue is waived, and we won’t address it further.
Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.
D. Maintenance
¶ 40 With respect to its award of maintenance, husband argues
that the court erred when it (1) counted his second job as income
for the purposes of calculating spousal maintenance; (2) failed to
account for wife’s actual income from her trusts; and (3) failed to
account for wife’s future inheritance in Trust Four.1
¶ 41 We review a court’s decision to award maintenance for an
abuse of discretion, and we won’t disturb the court’s factual
findings if they are supported by the record. In re Marriage of
Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58. We review the court’s application
of the law de novo. Id.
1 Husband twice claims the court failed to account for wife’s future
inheritance. We consolidated those arguments.
16 2. Analysis
a. Husband’s Second Job
¶ 42 Husband argues that the trial court erred when it included his
second job as income for the purposes of calculating spousal
maintenance.2 Wife responds that husband didn’t sufficiently prove
how many hours he worked at both jobs, so the court didn’t err by
including his second job as income. We agree with wife.
¶ 43 The court referenced section 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C), C.R.S.
2024, when it made its findings regarding husband’s employment.
Section 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C) says that gross income, for purposes
of calculating maintenance, doesn’t include “[i]ncome from
additional jobs that result in the employment of the obligor more
than forty hours per week or more than what would otherwise be
considered to be full-time employment.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 44 Husband cites In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208 (Colo.
App. 2006), for the proposition that courts shouldn’t consider
temporary income when making long-term financial calculations
2 Husband also claims the court made an inappropriate remark
about how many jobs husband had, but his citation to the record isn’t to any such statement — only the court’s discussion of wife’s income.
17 like maintenance. But while McSoud addresses other legal issues
around permanent orders, it doesn’t address spousal maintenance
or how to determine a party’s income.
¶ 45 Husband doesn’t point to anywhere in the record where he
offered any testimony or other evidence that he worked forty hours
at his primary job as a financial advisor. “[A] party who fails to
present sufficient evidence at trial should not be allowed on appeal
to challenge the inadequacy of the evidence.” In re Marriage of
Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003). Moreover, it isn’t this
court’s responsibility to search the record for evidence that would
support the parties’ arguments. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5) (It is the
appellant’s responsibility to include “appropriate references to the
record.”); see also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252
P.3d 1182, 1186 (Colo. App. 2011) (This court isn’t required to
search the record when “a party does not point us to where an issue
was raised and resolved.”).
¶ 46 Accordingly, we reject husband’s contention that the court
erred by including his second job when it calculated his income for
the purpose of spousal maintenance.
18 b. Consideration of Wife’s Income
¶ 47 Husband contends that the court didn’t properly consider
wife’s actual disbursements from her trusts during the marriage.
The record contradicts his argument.
¶ 48 Kevin Bervik, the trustee of Trusts One, Two, and Three,
testified that wife’s income from the trusts was $23,500 a month.
But Bervik also testified that the actual distributions from the
trusts had been much higher than that during the final years of the
marriage — around $885,000 a year, or $73,750 a month. The
court rejected that higher level of income as inappropriate, because
both parties were operating at a loss:
But if I strictly look at [$]23,500 as [wife’s] gross income or her allowance under her own expert’s testimony, I — I can stick to that. But when we get to [section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C)], it says, “Financial resources of each party, including, but not limited to actual or potential income from separate property,” that brings in that other $50,000 a month that she’s benefitting from or she’s using.
I’ve already said she can’t live like that. Neither of these parties can live the way they propose they’re living or want to live or that they theorize . . . that is their reasonable financial needs. You can’t argue to me that that’s your reasonable financial needs when you’re living at a loss.
19 ¶ 49 Because the court’s decision not to impute wife’s income
consistent with her spending during the marriage was reasonable
based on the evidence in the record, we won’t disturb it.
c. Trust Four
¶ 50 Husband argues that the court should have considered wife’s
potential inheritance from Trust Four when it calculated spousal
maintenance. But the parties stipulated that any money that might
be awarded to wife from Trust Four wasn’t marital property3, and
husband doesn’t claim to have requested that the court release him
from that stipulation. Accordingly, the issue is waived and we
decline to address it. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.
E. Procedural Issues
¶ 51 Husband contends that the court erred when it (1) allotted
insufficient time for the final orders hearing; (2) exhibited bias
against him; and (3) failed to hold a separate hearing on his request
for attorney fees. We disagree.
3 The funds in Trust Four had been subject to a lawsuit for several
years at the time of the permanent orders hearing.
20 1. The Hearing Time Allotted
¶ 52 Husband argues that the trial court erred by (1) only allotting
450 minutes for the permanent orders hearing and then rushing
the hearing to attend a memorial event; and (2) not providing
enough time for husband to cross-examine Nelson, wife’s expert
forensic accountant, about Trust Three. We disagree.
a. Adequacy of Allotted Time for Hearing
¶ 53 Husband argues that the 450 minutes allotted by the trial
court was insufficient for a permanent orders hearing that involved
a highly complex divorce with substantial assets. He also argues
that the trial court rushed the proceedings by ending early on the
second day. His arguments aren’t supported by the record.
¶ 54 The trial court clarified the time it was allotting the parties at
the beginning of the permanent orders hearing:
[Husband’s counsel:] Secondly, Your Honor, I just wanted to make sure we are on the same page — or I’m on the same page as you are with regard to time. The scheduling order in this case indicates two days. When we had our phone conference before the scheduling order was issued, I think the Court indicated a day and a half. But I just wanted to make sure we’re within whatever time you’re allotting for the hearing.
21 THE COURT: Yeah. I have it down as a day and a half. I think I have it down as two days because I am issuing the order after this hearing. And I can’t do that if I give you a hundred percent of two days. . . .
So it is a full day today and a half-day tomorrow, and then — and generally, depending on the complexities of issues, we’ll take an hour or two to finalize my notes and then I just issue an oral ruling immediately after the hearing.
¶ 55 After the court clarified the timeframe for the hearing,
husband’s counsel responded, “Very good.”
¶ 56 It is clear that husband’s counsel agreed to the court’s
allotment of time for the hearing. Husband claims his counsel
objected to the time allotted by the court but provides no citations
to the record for us to review. See Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1186 (a
party must provide record support for their arguments). In the
absence of any record support that husband’s counsel objected to
the time allotted by the court, and in light of his agreement to the
same, the issue is waived, and we won’t address it. See Evans,
¶ 24.
22 b. Adequacy of Time for Cross-Examination
¶ 57 Husband next argues that the time allotted by the trial court
deprived him of his opportunity to cross-examine Tiffany Nelson,
the forensic accountant, about Trust Three. To the extent
husband’s argument relates to insufficient time, he waived that
argument by failing to object or request additional time. See Evans,
¶ 24. To the extent that husband is attempting to relitigate the
issue of whether Trust Three was marital property, we have already
determined that he waived that issue by stipulating that it wasn’t
marital property. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
2. Judicial Bias
¶ 58 Husband contends that the trial court judge exhibited bias
and compromised the fairness of the hearing by (1) displaying
favoritism and treating the financial behaviors of the parties
differently and (2) inappropriately offering financial advice to wife
after awarding husband a $675,000 equalization payment. We
disagree that the judge exhibited any bias.
a. Standard of Review
¶ 59 We review claims of judicial bias de novo. Sanders v. People,
2024 CO 33, ¶ 25. We will only question the result of a proceeding
23 if the judge was actually biased. People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M,
¶ 21. In order for a claim of bias to succeed, the party asserting
bias “must establish that the judge had a substantial bent of mind
against him or her.” People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 30
(citation omitted). “The record must clearly demonstrate the alleged
bias. Bare assertions and speculative statements are insufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof.” Id. (citation omitted).
b. Favoritism
¶ 60 Husband argues that the judge exhibited bias by excessively
focusing on how much he spent on haircuts, while ignoring wife’s
much more significant spending habits that resulted in “the
depletion” of seven million dollars of marital assets. But the judge
didn’t question husband’s haircuts:
[THE COURT]: . . . We received testimony about [husband] saying that he spends $1,300 a month in hair and clothing. He said that he — he gets — once a month, he gets an [eighty dollar] haircut. So then by that rationale . . . he’s spending $1,220 a month on — on clothing.
The judge only referenced the price of husband’s haircut in order to
accurately calculate how much husband was spending on clothing
24 every month. The judge’s comment doesn’t demonstrate any bias at
all.
¶ 61 Additionally, husband claims that the judge made two other
disparaging remarks that demonstrated bias, but his record
citations don’t match his claims. Both of his record citations in
support of these statements are to his own counsel’s cross-
examination of wife, not any statement that he claims the judge
made. Because his argument is entirely without merit, legal
authority, or legal analysis, we don’t address it. Humphries, ¶ 31.
c. Financial Advice
¶ 62 Husband’s penultimate contention is that the judge
demonstrated bias when he offered wife financial advice but not
husband. But that isn’t true. The judge wasn’t offering wife
financial advice. Consider the exchange in question:
[THE COURT]: . . . I’m finding that the equitable division of the marital estate is that Wife would pay to Husband $675,730.60 from her portion of the marital estate.
. . . Now, certainly I can understand the question being, “Well, how do I do that?” Well, to me, it seems obvious.
And — and I’m no financial expert, and I would suggest you consult one. But when you have a
25 property worth $2,050,000 and the only . . . outstanding debt [is $]391,726, it seem[s] very evident to me that you have $[1,600,000] in equity in this property and refinancing that to pay out [$]675[,000] should be easy.
But again, I’m no financial expert, so I suggest you consult one. But this payout is manageable, and it’s appropriate, and it’s equitable, and it’s supported by the law, and it’s certainly supported by the Court’s consideration of [section] 14-10-113.
¶ 63 It is clear that the judge was justifying the reasonableness of
his order that wife pay husband $675,730.60 — not offering
financial advice. Indeed, the judge repeatedly disavowed any
qualifications to be a financial advisor and encouraged wife to
consult one. Moreover, the judge’s comments fall far short of
establishing that he had a “substantial bent of mind” against
husband. A.P., ¶ 30 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reject
husband’s judicial bias claim.
¶ 64 Because husband failed to show that the judge was actually
biased against him, we reject his argument that the judge’s
statement warrants any reconsideration of the permanent orders.
26 3. Special Hearing on Attorney Fees
¶ 65 Last, husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to
hold a hearing to determine whether the attorney fees were
reasonable. But husband creates a fictitious citation — Kendall v.
Kendall, 94 P.3d 606 (Colo. 2004) — in support of this contention.
We therefore decline to address husband’s argument.
F. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 66 Wife argues that husband’s appeal is frivolous and requests
that this court order husband to pay her appellate attorney fees and
costs under C.A.R. 38(b) and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024. We
agree that husband’s appeal is frivolous for three reasons.
¶ 67 First, as we discuss throughout this opinion, the legal
citations in husband’s briefs rarely support the proposition for
which they were cited. Moreover, two of his contentions aren’t
accompanied by citations to any legal authority at all. Even more
egregious, as we noted supra Part II.E.3, husband cited a
nonexistent case. Cf. Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA
128, ¶ 41 (parties to any action in this court are warned against
filings that contain “hallucinations” produced by generative artificial
intelligence). Despite wife pointing out these deficiencies in her
27 answer brief, husband didn’t offer an explanation or rebuttal;
instead he continued the practice in his reply brief.
¶ 68 Second, most of husband’s twenty-one separate contentions
are woefully underdeveloped. Several are repeated. Many contain
claims that aren’t substantiated by the record or include inaccurate
record citations.
¶ 69 Third, husband’s brief violates C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) because it
doesn’t contain any legal authorities to justify husband’s standards
of review.
¶ 70 Given all of this, we agree with wife that husband’s appeal
lacks substantial justification because the appeal is substantially
frivolous and groundless. See § 13-17-102(2). But because
husband isn’t represented by counsel on appeal, that conclusion
alone isn’t an adequate basis for an award of attorney fees. Section
13-17-102(6) requires that “[a] party who is appearing without an
attorney . . . shall not be assessed attorney fees . . . unless the
court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have
known that the party’s action . . . was substantially frivolous,
substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” (Emphasis
added.) Because of the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry of
28 whether husband clearly knew or should have known that his
appeal was frivolous, as an appellate court we aren’t in a good
position to make this determination. The trial court, however, is.
See In re Marriage of Nevedrova, 2024 COA 112, ¶ 18 (“Because the
district court is better equipped to determine the factual issues
regarding the parties’ current financial resources, we remand the
issue of whether wife should be awarded reasonable appellate
attorney fees to the district court.”).
¶ 71 Therefore, on remand, the trial court should first assess
whether husband clearly knew or should have known that his
appeal was substantially frivolous and groundless as required by
section 13-17-102(6). If the trial court determines that husband
did have the requisite knowledge (and that, therefore, attorney fees
on appeal are appropriate), then it shall determine and award wife
her reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. See,
e.g., Tisch v. Tisch, 2019 COA 41, ¶ 93 (recognizing this court’s
discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the case to the trial court
for a determination of reasonable appellate attorney fees).
29 III. Disposition
¶ 72 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
trial court to address issues related to wife’s request for an award of
appellate attorney fees.
JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.