25CA1286 Topa v Frechin 06-11-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1286 Jefferson County District Court No. 24CV188 Honorable Christopher B. Rhamey, Judge
Halina Topa,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Richard Frechin, Heidi Frechin Wilson, and Kathleen Walker,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 11, 2026
Halina Topa, Pro Se
Pradhan & Backus, Ltd., Akshay A. Pradhan, Matthew R. Bachus, Martina A. Slocomb, Littleton, Colorado for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Following a long history of alleged abuses starting in 1987,
plaintiff, Halina Topa, brought various claims against defendants,
Richard Frechin, Heidi Frechin Wilson, and Kathleen Walker. Topa
challenges the district court’s dismissal of those claims, as well as
its denial of her motion to amend the complaint to add additional
claims. We reject her challenges and affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Topa’s pro se complaint alleged the following facts, which we
accept as true for the purpose of evaluating the district court’s
ruling on defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
Brown v. Long Romero, 2021 CO 67, ¶ 17.
¶3 In 1987, Topa met Frechin, who told her he was divorced and
had an ex-wife (Walker) and one child (Wilson). Despite Topa’s
indication that she wasn’t interested, Frechin repeatedly made
romantic advances towards her.
¶4 In 1989, after the renter in Topa’s upstairs apartment moved
out, Frechin moved into that unit. Topa and her daughter lived
downstairs. From then on, Frechin “exhibit[ed] controlling and
moody behavior.” Topa also learned that Frechin was not divorced,
1 as he’d claimed, but was still married to Walker, and that he had a
second child. Frechin and Walker divorced the following year.
¶5 Feeling “intimidated” by Frechin’s abusive behavior, Topa
started working on his property, performing housekeeping,
babysitting his children, and assisting with his real estate business.
In 1990, as a result of Frechin’s failure to pay rent for the upstairs
unit, Topa lost her house in foreclosure. She then moved with
Frechin to another home, where his abusive conduct continued.
¶6 Topa and Frechin had a child in 1992. A year later, Frechin
sued Topa for custody. Thereafter, Frechin and Walker engaged in
a campaign to alienate the child from Topa, and Frechin continued
to engage in acts of physical violence, emotional manipulation, and
intimidation. Topa and Frechin were involved in further court
proceedings relating to their child in 2008.
¶7 In 2008, Frechin obtained a protection order against Topa in
county court, and then, in 2012, Wilson also obtained a protection
order against her. In 2023, the county court considered the
continued need for the protection orders, with hearings held on
September 27 regarding Wilson’s protection order and on November
13 regarding Frechin’s protection order.
2 ¶8 On September 11, 2024, Topa filed her complaint in this case.
Based on her allegations spanning from 1987 to 2008, as well as
Frechin’s and Wilson’s statements at the 2023 hearings, Topa
asserted the following self-styled claims:
• Count 1: Fraud and Misrepresentation
• Count 2: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
• Count 3: Assault and Battery
• Count 61: Defamation
• Count 7: Parental Alienation and Custody Interference
• Count 8: Conspiracy to Kidnap
• Count 9: Coercion and Manipulation
• Count 10: Economic Exploitation
• Count 11: Restriction of Movement or Control Over
Personal Life
• Count 12: Sexual Exploitation
• Count 13: Abuse of Vulnerability
¶9 Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
asserting, among other things, that Topa’s claims were time barred.
1 Topa’s complaint skipped Counts 4 and 5.
3 Topa then filed a motion to amend her complaint, reasserting most
of her claims and requesting to add ten more. She also asserted
that her claims were timely based on the continuing violation
doctrine.
¶ 10 The district court addressed both motions in a single order.
First, the court concluded that, aside from the portions of her
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims
that rested on the statements at the 2023 hearings, Topa’s claims
were all time barred. The court accordingly dismissed all but those
two claims. Second, the court determined that the motion to
amend didn’t allege any new facts that would bring Topa’s claims
within the limitations period, nor did the newly alleged continuing
violation doctrine save the untimely claims from dismissal. The
court accordingly denied the motion to amend as futile.
¶ 11 Defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment on the
two remaining claims. The court granted the motion, concluding
that the statements on which the claims were based were protected
under the absolute litigation privilege and that the evidence didn’t
support the claims.
¶ 12 This appeal followed.
4 II. Judgment on the Pleadings
¶ 13 We first address — and reject — Topa’s challenge to the
district court’s partial grant of judgment on the pleadings. We set
out the relevant legal standards and then apply those standards to
each of the claims the court dismissed on the pleadings.
¶ 14 We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under C.R.C.P. 12(c). Brown, ¶ 17. We
also review de novo a district court’s dismissal of claims on statute
of limitations grounds. SMLL, L.L.C. v. Peak Nat’l Bank, 111 P.3d
563, 564 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 15 “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate if, from the
pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 754
(Colo. 2001). The standards applicable to motions for judgment on
the pleadings are similar to those that apply to motions to dismiss
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Paradine v. Goei, 2018 COA 55, ¶ 6. Thus,
a court “must construe the allegations of the pleadings strictly
against the movant, must consider the allegations of the opposing
part[y’s] pleadings as true, and should not grant the motion unless
the pleadings themselves show that the matter can be determined
5 on the pleadings.” Brown, ¶ 17 (quoting Melat, Pressman & Higbie,
L.L.P. v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 17).
¶ 16 “A statute of limitations defense may be considered [at this
stage] where the bare allegations of the complaint reveal that the
action was not brought within the required statutory period.”
SMLL, L.L.C., 111 P.3d at 564. “Where the complaint shows on its
face that the claim was brought outside the statute of limitations, a
party who contends that the statute of limitations should be tolled
has the burden to establish a basis for such tolling.” Id. at 565.
¶ 17 Finally, where, as here, a party is self-represented throughout
the case, we liberally interpret their complaint and other pleadings.
Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11.
Nonetheless, a self-represented party is subject to the same
procedural requirements that apply to represented parties. Id.
A. Count 1 (Fraud and Misrepresentation)
¶ 18 Under section 13-80-101(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, “actions for fraud,
misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit” generally must “be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.”
But to the extent that such actions seek to recover damages caused
by an act of domestic violence, they must be commenced “within six
6 years after [the] cause of action accrues.” § 13-80-103.6(1), C.R.S.
2025. Such actions accrue “on the date [the] fraud,
misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit is discovered or should
have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”
§ 13-80-108(3), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 19 Topa based her fraud and misrepresentation claim on her
allegation that Frechin falsely represented when the two met in
1987 that he was divorced and had only one child when, in fact, he
was still married and had two children. She also alleged that she
discovered the truth about his wife and second child in 1989 or
1990. These allegations fall outside the statute of limitations,
regardless of whether the three-year or six-year period applies. The
district court therefore did not err in dismissing this claim.
B. Count 2 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress)
¶ 20 Tort actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress
must be brought “within two years after the cause of action
accrues,” § 13-80-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, unless they seek to
recover damages caused by an act of domestic violence, in which
case they must be brought “within six years after [the] cause of
action accrues,” § 13-80-103.6. Such actions accrue “on the date
7 both the injury and its cause are known or should have been
known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(1).
¶ 21 For her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, Topa
alleged that Frechin engaged in “a pattern of abusive, controlling,
and manipulative behavior, including but not limited to, physical
violence, verbal abuse, and psychological manipulation.” Topa
alleged facts regarding this alleged abuse spanning from 1987 to
2008. She also alleged that at one of the 2023 protection order
hearings, “Frechin continued to slander [her], blaming his own
actions of violence, extortion, adultery, child abuse, and human
trafficking on [her] behavior, and causing her [i]ntentional
[i]nfliction of [e]motional [d]istress.”
¶ 22 We conclude that the district court correctly allowed this claim
to proceed only as to the facts alleged to have occurred in 2023, as
only those facts fell within the two (or six) years preceding the 2024
filing of the complaint. The court correctly determined that all other
allegations as to this claim are time barred.
C. Counts 3 (Assault and Battery) and 6 (Defamation)
¶ 23 Tort actions for “[a]ssault, battery, . . . libel, and slander” must
be brought “within one year after the cause of action accrues,”
8 § 13-80-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, unless they seek to recover damages
caused by an act of domestic violence, in which case they must be
brought “within six years after [the] cause of action accrues,”
§ 13-80-103.6. Again, such actions accrue “on the date both the
injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the
exercise of reasonable diligence.” § 13-80-108(1).
¶ 24 Topa based her assault and battery claim on acts of violence
alleged to have occurred in 1991. Because any such acts fall well
outside the one- or six-year limitations period, the district court was
correct in determining that this claim is time barred.
¶ 25 In contrast, Topa alleged that defamatory statements were
made about her during the protection order hearings on September
27 and November 13, 2023. Because these hearings occurred
within one year of the filing of Topa’s complaint, we agree with the
district court that Topa’s defamation claim was not time barred to
the extent that it was based on the statements made at the
hearings. To the extent that Topa’s claim was based on statements
from 2008 or before, we agree that it is time barred.
9 D. Count 7 (Parental Alienation and Custody Interference)
¶ 26 Topa’s claim for “parental alienation and custody interference”
was based on section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2025, and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 700 (A.L.I. 1977).
¶ 27 While there is no indication that section 14-10-129 (which
concerns modification of parenting time) creates a private right of
action, Colorado does recognize the tort of interference with the
parent-child relationship. See D & D Fuller CATV Constr., Inc. v.
Pace, 780 P.2d 520, 524 (Colo. 1989). The tort creates liability for
someone who, “with knowledge that the parent does not consent,
abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a
parent legally entitled to [the child’s] custody or not to return to the
parent after [the child] has . . . left [the parent].” Id. (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700).
¶ 28 Tort actions for interference with relationships are governed by
a two-year statute of limitations, § 13-80-102(1)(a), unless they seek
to recover damages caused by an act of domestic violence, in which
case they are governed by a six-year statute of limitations, § 13-80-
103.6. And once again, such actions accrue “on the date both the
10 injury and its cause are known or should have been known by the
¶ 29 To support this claim, Topa alleged that Frechin “engaged in a
pattern of behavior aimed at undermining and damaging the
relationship between [Topa] and her child . . . through [p]athogenic
[p]arenting, and coercive control of [the] child.” She further alleged
that the behavior “include[d] making disparaging remarks about
[Topa] to [the child] and manipulating the child’s perceptions.” But
once again, the underlying factual allegations date from 1993 to
2008. Indeed, the parties’ child was more than thirty years old by
the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the claim falls outside the
two- or six-year statute of limitations, and the district court did not
err in dismissing it as time barred.
E. Counts 8 (Conspiracy to Kidnap), 9 (Coercion and Manipulation), 11 (Restriction of Movement or Control Over Personal Life), and 13 (Abuse of Vulnerability)
¶ 30 Topa asserted four claims based on criminal statutes:
(1) “conspiracy to kidnap,” based on section 18-3-304, C.R.S. 2025;
(2) “coercion and manipulation,” based on section 18-3-207, C.R.S.
2025; (3) “restriction of movement or control over personal life,”
11 based on section 18-3-303, C.R.S. 2025; and (4) “abuse of
vulnerability,” based on section 18-6-401, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 31 Even assuming Topa could pursue civil claims for relief based
on alleged violations of the cited criminal statutes, but see Hurtado
v. Brady, 165 P.3d 871, 876 (Colo. App. 2007), the facts she alleged
to support these claims took place between 1987 and 2008. Thus,
regardless of whether the claims are governed by one-, two-, three-,
or six-year limitation periods under sections 13-80-101, -102, -103,
or -103.6, they are time barred. We therefore conclude that the
district court didn’t err in dismissing these claims.
F. Count 10 (Economic Exploitation)
¶ 32 Topa’s claim for “economic exploitation” referenced the
Colorado Wage Claim Act, §§ 8-4-101 to -127, C.R.S. 2025, as well
as principles of unjust enrichment.
¶ 33 In support of this claim, Topa alleged that she “was forced to
forego rental income [and was] compelled to work for [Frechin]
under false pretenses and without proper compensation,
constituting economic exploitation.” She also alleged that the work
included “maintenance and improvement of [Frechin’s] property,
with [Frechin] benefiting economically from [her] labor while
12 denying her the agreed compensation and fair treatment.” These
allegations spanned the same time period from 1989 to 2008.
¶ 34 To the extent that Topa’s claim fell under the Wage Claim Act,
it was subject to that Act’s two-year limitations period, unless it
was based on a willful violation of the Act, in which case it was
subject to a three-year limitations period. See § 8-4-122, C.R.S.
2025. To the extent that the claim was based on a theory of unjust
enrichment, it was subject to a three-year limitations period. See
Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 437 (Colo. App. 2011); § 13-80-
101(1)(a). And to the extent that the claim sought to recover a
liquidated debt, a determinable amount of money, rent arrears, or
damages caused by an act of domestic violence, it was subject to a
six-year limitations period. See § 13-80-103.5(1)(a)-(b), C.R.S.
2025; § 13-80-103.6. In any event, the cause of action accrued on
the date any debt or obligation became due. See § 13-80-108(4).
¶ 35 Topa’s allegations regarding this claim fall outside all these
limitation periods. The district court therefore did not err in
dismissing the claim as time barred.
13 G. Count 12 (Sexual Exploitation)
¶ 36 Topa’s claim for “sexual exploitation” was based on allegations
that Frechin sexually assaulted her in 1991 and otherwise
“engag[ed] in sexual abuse and exploitation of her” at some point
between 1987 and 2008.
¶ 37 As of 2022, section 13-80-103.7(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025, allows civil
claims based on sexual misconduct to be raised at any time, with
no limitations period. However, the amendment only “applies to
causes of action accruing on or after January 1, 2022, and to
causes of action accruing before January 1, 2022, if the applicable
statute of limitations, as it existed prior to January 1, 2022, ha[d]
not yet run on January 1, 2022.” § 13-80-103.7(1)(b).
¶ 38 Before this amendment, the statute provided a six-year statute
of limitations for such claims. See § 13-80-103.7(1), C.R.S. 2021;
Hurtado, 165 P.3d at 873. Applying this six-year limitations period,
the time to bring this claim had expired before the 2022 statutory
amendment. We therefore agree with the district court that this
claim is time barred and was properly dismissed on that basis.
14 H. Continuing Violation Doctrine
¶ 39 Next, we consider Topa’s argument that she should’ve been
allowed to pursue her time-barred claims under the continuing
violation doctrine. We are not persuaded.
¶ 40 The continuing violation doctrine allows plaintiffs to “sue for a
time-barred act by linking it with action that occurred within the
applicable limitations period.” Neuromonitoring Assocs. v. Centura
Health Corp., 2012 COA 136, ¶ 37. The doctrine generally applies
only in discrimination cases. Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co.,
5 P.3d 402, 405 (Colo. App. 2000). However, section 13-80-
103.6(2)(b) extends the doctrine to cases involving domestic
violence, providing that the statute of limitations in a civil action to
recover damages caused by a series of domestic violence offenses
starts to run “with the last in the series of acts.”
¶ 41 But the continuing violation doctrine applies only to a “series”
or “pattern” of unlawful acts over an extended period of time, such
that otherwise time-barred acts can be linked with acts that
occurred within the limitations period. See, e.g., Polk, 5 P.3d at
405; Harmon v. Fred S. James & Co. of Colo., Inc., 899 P.2d 258,
261-62 (Colo. App. 1994). Here, Topa didn’t allege anything in this
15 case that would make that link. Instead, she alleged a multitude of
actions occurring many years ago, ending in 2008, and then two
discrete and largely unrelated acts in 2023, with nothing alleged to
have occurred in the intervening fifteen years. Thus, we agree with
the district court that the continuing violation doctrine cannot be
applied to save Topa’s time-barred claims.
III. Motion to Amend
¶ 42 We now turn to Topa’s contention that the district court erred
by denying her motion to amend the complaint. We disagree.
¶ 43 When, as here, a party requests leave to amend a pleading,
“leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” C.R.C.P.
15(a). However, a district court may deny leave to amend if the
amendment would be futile. Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81, 86
(Colo. 2002). “An amendment is futile, if, for example, ‘it merely
restates the same facts as the original complaint in different terms,
reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled, fails to state
a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.’” Id. at
86-87 (citation omitted). “When deciding whether a motion to
amend pleadings is futile, the [district] court must accept the
moving party’s allegations as true.” Id. at 87.
16 ¶ 44 We generally review a district court’s ruling on a motion to
amend for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 85. However, “[w]hen a
[district] court denies leave to amend on grounds that the
amendment would be futile because it [could not] survive a motion
to dismiss, we review that question de novo as a matter of law.” Id.
¶ 45 In her motion to amend, Topa reasserted most of the claims
she had set forth in her initial complaint and sought to add ten
additional claims. But she didn’t allege any new facts that would
bring her existing claims within the relevant limitation periods. Nor
did she base her added claims on any new factual allegations to
bring them within any applicable one-, two-, three-, or six-year
limitations period.
¶ 46 Because the claims and allegations Topa asserted in her
motion to amend would fail to survive a motion to dismiss, we agree
with the district court that granting the motion would have been
futile. See Sandoval v. Archdiocese of Denv., 8 P.3d 598, 606 (Colo.
App. 2000) (the district court didn’t err in denying a motion to
amend the complaint when the claims raised in the amended
complaint were barred by the statute of limitations). Accordingly,
we conclude that the court properly denied the motion to amend.
17 IV. Summary Judgment
¶ 47 We now consider — and reject — Topa’s argument that the
district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of
defendants on those portions of her intentional infliction of
emotional distress and defamation claims that the court determined
were not time barred.
¶ 48 We review de novo orders granting summary judgment.
McDonald v. Zions First Nat’l Bank, N.A., 2015 COA 29, ¶ 44.
¶ 49 We “appl[y] the same standards as the [district] court in
determining whether summary judgment is warranted.” Id. at ¶ 85
(quoting Timm v. Reitz, 39 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo. App. 2001)).
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings and other
submissions establish that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. at ¶ 45. Initially, the moving party bears the burden of
establishing that there is no genuine issue of fact. Id. at ¶ 46. If
the movant does so, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to establish that there is a triable factual issue. Id. To satisfy that
burden, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing
18 a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at ¶ 61 (quoting McDaniels v.
Laub, 186 P.3d 86, 87 (Colo. App. 2008)).
¶ 50 The district court determined that summary judgment was
warranted because the statements on which Topa’s intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims rested
(1) were shielded by the absolute litigation privilege and (2) didn’t
support the claims. Because we agree with the first basis for
granting summary judgment, we don’t consider the second.
¶ 51 “Absolute privilege allows individuals to participate in fact-
finding processes . . . without fear that their participation will serve
as the basis for lawsuits against them.” Hushen v. Gonzales, 2025
CO 37, ¶ 37. This litigation privilege protects statements made by
participants in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings — including
witnesses in such proceedings — from “use in a subsequent tort
suit.” Id. at ¶ 20 n.7. The privilege applies so long as the
statements have “some reference to the subject matter of the . . .
litigation,” such that they may possibly be relevant to the litigation,
and are “made in furtherance of the objective of the litigation.”
Killmer, Lane & Newman, LLP v. BKP, Inc., 2023 CO 47, ¶¶ 22, 24
(first quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. c; and then
19 quoting Club Valencia Homeowners Ass’n v. Valencia Assocs., 712
P.2d 1024, 1028 (Colo. App. 1985)).
¶ 52 The statements at issue were made by Frechin and Wilson
during hearings to determine whether continued protection orders
against Topa were warranted. The entire transcripts of those
hearings were presented to the district court as part of the
summary judgment record. Frechin’s and Wilson’s statements
during the hearings — in which they detailed their interactions with
Topa and their perceptions of her behavior — plainly related to the
subject matter of the protection order proceedings and were made
in furtherance of their objective in those proceedings to protect
themselves. Accordingly, the statements are protected by the
litigation privilege. See id.
¶ 53 Topa argues that the statements should not be shielded
because she alleges that they were knowingly false and made in bad
faith. But such allegations are immaterial, as statements such as
these are absolutely privileged “even if [they] are false or defamatory
and made with knowledge of their falsity.” Dep’t of Admin. v. State
Pers. Bd., 703 P.2d 595, 597-98 (Colo. App. 1985); accord Coomer v.
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 2024 COA 35, ¶ 186.
20 ¶ 54 Because Topa’s intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation claims rested solely on these privileged statements and
she did not set forth any specific facts demonstrating a genuine
issue of material fact, we conclude that the district court correctly
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on those two
claims. See McDonald, ¶¶ 45, 61.
V. Cumulative Error
¶ 55 Now we consider Topa’s final contention — that the
cumulative effect of all the alleged errors deprived her of due
process and the right to be meaningfully heard. We disagree.
¶ 56 Under the cumulative error doctrine, although a single error
may by itself be considered harmless, “reversal will nevertheless be
required when ‘the cumulative effect of [multiple] errors and defects
substantially affected the fairness of the trial proceedings and the
integrity of the fact-finding process.’” Howard-Walker v. People,
2019 CO 69, ¶ 24 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Lucero,
615 P.2d 660, 666 (Colo. 1980)). But this doctrine, “although
applied regularly in criminal appeals, has not been extended to civil
cases.” Acierno v. Garyfallou, 2016 COA 91, ¶ 66.
21 ¶ 57 We have rejected each of Topa’s contentions of error. So, even
assuming the doctrine of cumulative error extends to civil cases, it
would not provide a basis for reversal in this case. See id. at ¶ 67.
VI. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 58 Finally, we consider defendants’ request for appellate attorney
fees under C.A.R. 38(b) and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, on the
basis that Topa’s appeal is substantially frivolous, groundless, and
vexatious. Even if we were to find that Topa’s appeal was
substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious, we still would
deny the fee request because Topa is self-represented and
defendants haven’t demonstrated that she clearly knew or
reasonably should have known the appeal was substantially
frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. See § 13-17-102(6); Artes-Roy
v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62, 63 (Colo. App. 1992).
VII. Disposition
¶ 59 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.