24CA1441 Mora v Davies 07-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1441 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV836 Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge
Denise Mora,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John Davies, and Office of Clerk and Recorder, Public Trustee,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025
Denise Mora, Pro Se
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, McKenzie Brandon, Assistant City Attorney, Andrew Ken, Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Denise Mora appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
second amended complaint (SAC) under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5),
and 12(b)(6). We affirm the court’s judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Acting pro se, Mora filed an amended form complaint in the
district court, naming “Publick Trustee Webb Municipal Jhon Divies
Ect” as the sole defendant. Mora left the spaces for “claims for
relief” blank on the amended complaint and wrote “Rockey
Mountain New Paper” in the fact section. Mora referenced and
included an attached exhibit letter that provided more factual
context. Based on the amended complaint and the attached
exhibit, the district court accepted the following as the facts of the
underlying case:
[Mora’s] grandfather’s home was foreclosed in the 1990s. [Mora] attempted to purchase the home. [Mora] tendered an amount of payment to someone but was not provided with any documentation of the sale. [Mora] believed that the sale would be documented in the “Rocky Mountain News Paper.”
John Davies served as the Public Trustee for the City [and] County of Denver. At some time, he told [Mora] that she had to file a “quick quiet title transfer.” Davies later resigned from his position as the Public Trustee.
1 At some time, [Mora] got a real estate entity involved and discovered multiple individuals making claims of ownership on the property. [Mora] believe[d] that the foreclosure and subsequent claims on the property [we]re illegitimate and that procedures were not followed during the foreclosure.
¶3 The defendants1 moved to dismiss the amended complaint
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing that Mora failed to connect her
allegations to any specific claim for relief. The district court agreed
and granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court
gave Mora an opportunity to file a second amended complaint.
¶4 Mora filed her SAC, which included an attachment that
reiterated the information provided in the exhibit to her amended
complaint but also provided more information. The attachment set
forth the following factual allegations:
• Mora, who “was a young girl at the time,” attempted to
purchase her grandfather’s property after learning it was
foreclosed on “in the late 1987s to early 1990s.”
1 The Office of the Clerk and Recorder of the City and County of
Denver, Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver, and John Davies, in his official capacity as Public Trustee, entered their collective appearances as the defendants in the case.
2 • Mora spoke to a woman at the counter of the “Public Trustee
building” about purchasing the property, and the woman,
“noticing [Mora’s] youth, commented on how young she was.”
• Mora told the woman that she was “here to buy [the
property],” provided the money, and provided her name. The
woman processed the transaction, but Mora did not fully
understand the process.
• Mora later found a report discussing properties in Denver and
“discovered that her grandfather’s house was illegally sold,
despite her having purchased it in the late 1980s.”
• Mora spoke with an official named John, who told her that “all
documents on the property were lost due to a system
transfer,” and he advised Mora to execute a quitclaim deed to
“transfer the title due to the lost documents and system
errors.”
Mora then asserted that “the sale of her grandfather’s property was
conducted illegally,” and she requested “legal remedy for the
mismanagement and subsequent loss of the property.” She also
claimed that she suffered from age discrimination “during the initial
transaction” and requested that the district court “address the
3 grievances resulting from the improper handling of the property
documents.”
¶5 The defendants moved to dismiss Mora’s SAC under C.R.C.P.
12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), claiming (1) that Mora lacked
standing for failing to state an injury-in-fact or a legally protected
interest; (2) that the SAC failed to state a claim for relief; and (3)
that Mora failed to include the current owner of the property as a
defendant. Mora filed a response, claiming that she “did seek legal
help but was turned away” and “put in legal limbo” by the “help
room,” she was discriminated against because she did not
understand why her first complaint was not correct and “denied” by
the help room, and the case “ha[d] a high concern of money
laundering.” Mora cited other concerns with the foreclosure
process, including an alleged lack of transparency, irregularities,
and unusual transactions occurring during the process. Mora then
requested an investigation into the foreclosure process that had led
to a loss of “critical records” and requested assistance initiating a
quiet title action for the property.
¶6 The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
concluding that Mora’s SAC lacked standing, failed to state a claim
4 upon which relief may be granted, and failed to join an
indispensable party. Mora appeals.
II. Discussion
¶7 Mora is self-represented on appeal. Although she does not
specifically claim that the district court erred by dismissing her
SAC, based on the arguments raised in her opening brief, we
construe this as part of her argument. See Al-Hamim v. Star
Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11 (recognizing that we liberally
construe filings by self-represented litigants).
¶8 Mora contends the following:
(1) The foreclosure proceeding was flawed “due to lost
documents that should have been presented,” and their loss
“calls into question the validity of the proceedings.”
(2) The money lending practices used in the case were
predatory or otherwise illegal, and they disproportionately
impacted Mora.
(3) The defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations
for Mora’s disability, which violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
5 (4) The defendants’ mishandling of documents left Mora in a
state of “legal limbo,” which complicated the legal status of
the case.
(5) The defendants’ actions constituted age discrimination
against older individuals in housing and employment
matters.
(6) The defendants and agencies involved mishandled the case
by withholding evidence and misrepresenting facts.
(7) The defendants neglected to provide Mora with assistance,
and the Denver County Court Clerk’s Office and defendants’
counsel failed to answer and return Mora’s phone calls.
¶9 First, because they are unpreserved, we decline to address
contentions two through seven mentioned above. Second, we
disagree that the district court improperly dismissed Mora’s case.
A.
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24CA1441 Mora v Davies 07-17-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1441 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV836 Honorable Andrew P. McCallin, Judge
Denise Mora,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
John Davies, and Office of Clerk and Recorder, Public Trustee,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Freyre and Gomez, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 17, 2025
Denise Mora, Pro Se
Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, McKenzie Brandon, Assistant City Attorney, Andrew Ken, Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Denise Mora appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
second amended complaint (SAC) under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5),
and 12(b)(6). We affirm the court’s judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Acting pro se, Mora filed an amended form complaint in the
district court, naming “Publick Trustee Webb Municipal Jhon Divies
Ect” as the sole defendant. Mora left the spaces for “claims for
relief” blank on the amended complaint and wrote “Rockey
Mountain New Paper” in the fact section. Mora referenced and
included an attached exhibit letter that provided more factual
context. Based on the amended complaint and the attached
exhibit, the district court accepted the following as the facts of the
underlying case:
[Mora’s] grandfather’s home was foreclosed in the 1990s. [Mora] attempted to purchase the home. [Mora] tendered an amount of payment to someone but was not provided with any documentation of the sale. [Mora] believed that the sale would be documented in the “Rocky Mountain News Paper.”
John Davies served as the Public Trustee for the City [and] County of Denver. At some time, he told [Mora] that she had to file a “quick quiet title transfer.” Davies later resigned from his position as the Public Trustee.
1 At some time, [Mora] got a real estate entity involved and discovered multiple individuals making claims of ownership on the property. [Mora] believe[d] that the foreclosure and subsequent claims on the property [we]re illegitimate and that procedures were not followed during the foreclosure.
¶3 The defendants1 moved to dismiss the amended complaint
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing that Mora failed to connect her
allegations to any specific claim for relief. The district court agreed
and granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice. The court
gave Mora an opportunity to file a second amended complaint.
¶4 Mora filed her SAC, which included an attachment that
reiterated the information provided in the exhibit to her amended
complaint but also provided more information. The attachment set
forth the following factual allegations:
• Mora, who “was a young girl at the time,” attempted to
purchase her grandfather’s property after learning it was
foreclosed on “in the late 1987s to early 1990s.”
1 The Office of the Clerk and Recorder of the City and County of
Denver, Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver, and John Davies, in his official capacity as Public Trustee, entered their collective appearances as the defendants in the case.
2 • Mora spoke to a woman at the counter of the “Public Trustee
building” about purchasing the property, and the woman,
“noticing [Mora’s] youth, commented on how young she was.”
• Mora told the woman that she was “here to buy [the
property],” provided the money, and provided her name. The
woman processed the transaction, but Mora did not fully
understand the process.
• Mora later found a report discussing properties in Denver and
“discovered that her grandfather’s house was illegally sold,
despite her having purchased it in the late 1980s.”
• Mora spoke with an official named John, who told her that “all
documents on the property were lost due to a system
transfer,” and he advised Mora to execute a quitclaim deed to
“transfer the title due to the lost documents and system
errors.”
Mora then asserted that “the sale of her grandfather’s property was
conducted illegally,” and she requested “legal remedy for the
mismanagement and subsequent loss of the property.” She also
claimed that she suffered from age discrimination “during the initial
transaction” and requested that the district court “address the
3 grievances resulting from the improper handling of the property
documents.”
¶5 The defendants moved to dismiss Mora’s SAC under C.R.C.P.
12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), and 12(b)(6), claiming (1) that Mora lacked
standing for failing to state an injury-in-fact or a legally protected
interest; (2) that the SAC failed to state a claim for relief; and (3)
that Mora failed to include the current owner of the property as a
defendant. Mora filed a response, claiming that she “did seek legal
help but was turned away” and “put in legal limbo” by the “help
room,” she was discriminated against because she did not
understand why her first complaint was not correct and “denied” by
the help room, and the case “ha[d] a high concern of money
laundering.” Mora cited other concerns with the foreclosure
process, including an alleged lack of transparency, irregularities,
and unusual transactions occurring during the process. Mora then
requested an investigation into the foreclosure process that had led
to a loss of “critical records” and requested assistance initiating a
quiet title action for the property.
¶6 The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,
concluding that Mora’s SAC lacked standing, failed to state a claim
4 upon which relief may be granted, and failed to join an
indispensable party. Mora appeals.
II. Discussion
¶7 Mora is self-represented on appeal. Although she does not
specifically claim that the district court erred by dismissing her
SAC, based on the arguments raised in her opening brief, we
construe this as part of her argument. See Al-Hamim v. Star
Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11 (recognizing that we liberally
construe filings by self-represented litigants).
¶8 Mora contends the following:
(1) The foreclosure proceeding was flawed “due to lost
documents that should have been presented,” and their loss
“calls into question the validity of the proceedings.”
(2) The money lending practices used in the case were
predatory or otherwise illegal, and they disproportionately
impacted Mora.
(3) The defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations
for Mora’s disability, which violates the Americans with
Disabilities Act.
5 (4) The defendants’ mishandling of documents left Mora in a
state of “legal limbo,” which complicated the legal status of
the case.
(5) The defendants’ actions constituted age discrimination
against older individuals in housing and employment
matters.
(6) The defendants and agencies involved mishandled the case
by withholding evidence and misrepresenting facts.
(7) The defendants neglected to provide Mora with assistance,
and the Denver County Court Clerk’s Office and defendants’
counsel failed to answer and return Mora’s phone calls.
¶9 First, because they are unpreserved, we decline to address
contentions two through seven mentioned above. Second, we
disagree that the district court improperly dismissed Mora’s case.
A. Most Arguments Raised in Mora’s Amended Opening Brief Were Not Properly Preserved
¶ 10 Except for the argument that the foreclosure proceeding was
flawed because key documents were lost, Mora’s remaining claims
were not presented to the district court, and, therefore, we are
unable to address them.
6 1. Applicable Law
¶ 11 For us to consider Mora’s arguments on appeal, each
argument must be preserved — that is, it must have first been
presented to the district court. See Madalena v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
2023 COA 32, ¶ 50; Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019
COA 11, ¶ 21. Additionally, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, a
court may only consider claims raised in the plaintiff’s complaint.
N.M. v. Trujillo, 2017 CO 79, ¶ 48; Al-Hamim, ¶ 24; Yadon v. Lowry,
126 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2005).
2. Analysis
¶ 12 Of the claims Mora raises in her amended opening brief on
appeal, only the first claim was raised in her SAC before the district
court. In her response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Mora
mentioned case status and handling, failure to provide assistance,
failure to accommodate a disability, and possible money laundering.
But these issues were not raised in the SAC. And though Mora
asserted age discrimination in her SAC, the basis for that claim was
discrimination for her young age and her inability to understand
why her amended complaint was dismissed. In her amended
opening brief, Mora instead contends that she was discriminated
7 against due to old age, which is an argument that the district court
did not have the opportunity to review.
¶ 13 Because Mora’s SAC did not raise contentions two through
seven listed above, we do not consider them. See Al-Hamim, ¶ 24
(declining consideration of claims raised in the appellant’s opening
brief that were not pleaded in his complaint).
B. The District Court Did Not Err by Dismissing Mora’s Second Amended Complaint
¶ 14 We agree with the defendants’ argument that Mora’s
remaining claim — that the foreclosure process was flawed — was
properly dismissed by the district court. Because proper dismissal
under one rule is dispositive of the entire case, we will only discuss
whether Mora’s claim survives a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to
dismiss.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 15 Because Mora is a self-represented litigant, we liberally
interpret her SAC and response to the defendants’ motion to
8 dismiss. See Al-Hamim, ¶ 11; People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686,
696-97 (Colo. 2010).2
¶ 16 “The purpose of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) is to test the legal sufficiency
of the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has asserted a
claim or claims upon which relief can be granted.” Hemmann Mgmt.
Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc., 176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2007).
Dismissal under this rule is generally disfavored and should only be
granted when “the plaintiff’s factual allegations cannot support a
claim as a matter of law.” BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d
66, 71 (Colo. 2004).
¶ 17 We review orders to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) de novo
and apply the same standard as the district court. Denver Post
Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011).
2 Mora’s amended opening brief does not comply with C.A.R.
28(a)(7)(A), which requires citation to the record and requires the appellant to indicate whether the issues raised were preserved on appeal. Mora’s status as a self-represented litigant does not exempt her from complying with the procedural rules that all parties must follow. See Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶ 11; In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 33. We decline, however, to impose sanctions under C.A.R. 38(a) and simply remind Mora that all litigants have a duty to comply with the rules. See Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289, 291 (Colo. App. 2006) (recognizing that it is the litigant’s duty to locate and synthesize relevant facts and arguments).
9 ¶ 18 To survive a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). A claim is
plausible on its face when the factual allegations raised are more
than speculative and “allow a ‘court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Woodall v. Godfrey, 2024 COA 42, ¶ 7 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678).
¶ 19 During our evaluation, we accept all material facts as true and
view a complaint’s factual allegations in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC v. Colo. Republican
Party Indep. Expenditure Comm., 2017 COA 32, ¶ 2. “[W]e may
consider only the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents
attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and matters
proper for judicial notice.” Denver Post Corp., 255 P.3d at 1088.
We are not required to accept legal conclusions as true, even if they
are asserted as factual allegations. Id.
¶ 20 In her SAC, Mora asserted:
10 (1) She gave a woman at the public trustee’s office money to
purchase her grandfather’s property.
(2) The woman processed the transaction.
(3) She came across a property report in 2020 and
“discovered that her grandfather’s house was illegally
sold.”
(4) She contacted Davies, who told her that all documents
for her grandfather’s property were lost due to a system
transfer.
(5) Davies advised Mora to execute a quitclaim deed to
transfer title of her grandfather’s property.
She then claimed that the sale of her grandfather’s property was
conducted illegally, that the property was mismanaged, and that
the property documents were mishandled. None of these assertions
raise an actual claim against the defendants. While Mora did
include more factual assertions in the SAC than in her first
complaint, these additional facts were not enough to support a
claim against the defendants as a matter of law.
11 3. Conclusion
¶ 21 Because Mora failed to state a claim for relief that is facially
plausible, the district court properly dismissed her complaint under
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.