Peo v. Kuntz

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 5, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0674
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0674 Peo v Kuntz 03-05-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0674 City and County of Denver District Court No. 09CR3549 Honorable Eric M. Johnson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Darren Kuntz,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI Opinion by JUDGE YUN Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 5, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Darren Kuntz, Pro Se ¶1 Darren Kuntz appeals the postconviction court’s order denying

his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2010, Kuntz pleaded guilty to attempting to commit internet

sexual exploitation of a child and was sentenced to five years on sex

offender intensive supervision probation (SOISP). Shortly

thereafter, his SOISP sentence was revoked, and he was

resentenced to five years on SOISP. In March 2011, Kuntz’s SOISP

sentence was revoked a second time, resulting in a two-year prison

sentence. He completed his sentence in November 2013. In April

2024, Kuntz filed a petition to discontinue sex offender registration,

which the court granted.

¶3 In November 2024, Kuntz filed his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. The

postconviction court denied the motion, finding that (1) some of

Kuntz’s claims were either not cognizable in a criminal case or not

supported by a developed argument; (2) any potentially cognizable

claims under Crim. P. 35(c) were untimely; and (3) Kuntz’s

challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction was

without merit.

¶4 Kuntz now appeals.

1 II. Analysis

¶5 In his opening brief, Kuntz asserts various defects with his

criminal case. We agree with the postconviction court that his

Crim. P. 35(c) motion was untimely filed.

¶6 Subject to certain enumerated exceptions, a Crim. P. 35(c)

motion must be filed within three years of a defendant’s conviction

for a felony offense other than a class 1 felony. § 16-5-402(1), (2),

C.R.S. 2025. “For purposes of [section] 16-5-402 and

postconviction review, if there is no direct appeal, a conviction

occurs when the trial court enters judgment and sentence is

imposed.” People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 671 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶7 Although a jurisdictional challenge is an exception to the

statutory time bar, see § 16-5-402(2)(a), (b), Kuntz does not renew

his jurisdictional challenge on appeal. Instead, he contends that a

private website is mispresenting the jurisdiction where he was

arrested. This allegation does not implicate the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction and therefore does not establish an

exception to the procedural bar.

¶8 Thus, because Kuntz’s motion did not adequately assert an

applicable exception to the time bar, the postconviction court was

2 required to deny his motion as untimely filed. See § 16-5-402(1);

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV); see also Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(I) (“Any motion filed

outside of the time limits set forth in [section] 16-5-402 . . . shall

allege facts which, if true, would establish one of the exceptions

listed in [section] 16-5-402(2).”); People v. Ortega, 899 P.2d 236,

239 (Colo. App. 1994) (declining to consider an exception to the

timeliness procedural bar for the first time on appeal).

¶9 Even setting aside the untimeliness of Kuntz’s motion, Kuntz

does not adequately explain how the alleged defects in his case

affected the validity of his guilty plea. See Sanchez-Martinez v.

People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255 (Colo. 2011) (“Because a guilty plea is

an extensive waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights, a

challenge to a conviction based on a guilty plea is usually limited to

whether the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”);

Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶ 8 (a guilty plea waives all

nonjurisdictional errors and precludes review of issues arising

before the entry of the plea); see also People v. Houser, 2020 COA

128, ¶ 24 (declining to consider a bald legal proposition presented

without argument or development); People v. Delgado, 2019 COA

55, ¶ 8 (A court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing

3 “if the claims are bare and conclusory in nature and lack

supporting factual allegations.”).

¶ 10 Furthermore, because the court was statutorily required to

deny the motion, we reject Kuntz’s claim that he was prejudiced by

the court’s speculation that he used artificial intelligence to

generate his Crim. P. 35(c) motion and its admonishment against

doing so. See Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128,

¶¶ 1-4, 25-41.

¶ 11 Finally, Kuntz challenges the court’s order granting his motion

for return of property, asserting that the prosecution’s failure to

timely respond to the motion violated his due process rights.

However, the motion was filed, and the order was issued, after the

notice of appeal in this case was filed. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d

51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (“ A court may take judicial notice of the

contents of court records in a related proceeding.”).

¶ 12 Because Kuntz neither filed a timely notice of appeal of that

order nor moved to amend the notice of appeal here to include an

appeal of that order, we decline to consider it. See C.A.R. 4(b)(1)

(requiring a defendant to file a notice of appeal within forty-nine

days after entry of the order being appealed); People v. Baker,

4 104 P.3d 893, 895 (Colo. 2005) (“Unless notice of appeal is timely

filed, the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”); In

re Estate of Anderson, 727 P.2d 867, 870 (Colo. App. 1986); see also

Woo v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 2022 CO 56, ¶ 4 (“[A]

defendant may file a motion for return of lawfully seized property

following entry of a conviction and imposition of a sentence . . .

once the trial court reacquires jurisdiction following a direct appeal,

during postconviction proceedings, or after any appeal related to

those proceedings.”); People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841, 844 (Colo.

1982) (“[O]nce an appeal has been perfected, the trial court has no

jurisdiction to issue further orders in the case relative to the order

or judgment appealed from.”).

¶ 13 We decline to address any argument asserted for the first time

in Kuntz’s reply brief. See People v. Grant, 174 P.3d 798, 803 (Colo.

App. 2007). And any claim raised in Kuntz’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion

but not reasserted on appeal is deemed abandoned. See People v.

Brooks, 250 P.3d 771, 772 (Colo. App. 2010).

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.