Connecticut Statutes
§ 52-192a — Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest.
Connecticut § 52-192a
This text of Connecticut § 52-192a (Offer of compromise by plaintiff. Acceptance by defendant. Amount and computation of interest.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-192a (2026).
Text
(a)Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, after commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action for a sum certain. For the purposes of this section, such plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under section 8-132. The plaintiff shall give notice of the offer of compromise to the defendant's attorne
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Legislative History
(P.A. 76-316, S. 2; P.A. 77-269, S. 1, 2; P.A. 79-60; 79-250, S. 1; P.A. 81-315, S. 3; P.A. 82-160, S. 94; 82-228; P.A. 83-295, S. 9; P.A. 92-110, S. 1; P.A. 94-20; P.A. 01-71, S. 1; P.A. 05-275, S. 4; P.A. 07-141, S. 16; P.A. 11-77, S. 1.) History: P.A. 77-269 amended Subsec. (c) to specify that provisions apply to “all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976” rather than to claims “accruing after October 1, 1976”; P.A. 79-60 raised annual interest on offer of judgment from 6% to 12% in Subsec. (b); P.A. 79-250 authorized court to award attorney's fees not exceeding $350 and specified that provisions do not abrogate contractual rights concerning recovery of attorney's fees in Subsec. (b); P.A. 81-315 amended provisions in Subsec. (b) concerning computation of interest on judgments in actions commenced on or after October 1, 1981; P.A. 82-160 made minor technical changes to Subsecs. (a) and (b) and deleted Subsec. (c) which had provided “This section shall apply to all claims, except claims which were assigned for trial on or before October 1, 1976”; P.A. 82-228 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting the provision allowing a plaintiff to file a new offer of judgment after rejection and to continue to file offers up until trial, and amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on the amount of the verdict rather than on the amount “contained in such offer” and by deleting a provision concerning what constituted the largest offer of judgment for purposes of computing interest; P.A. 83-295 amended Subsec. (b) by providing that interest is to be computed on and added to the “amount so recovered” rather than the “verdict”; P.A. 92-110 amended Subsec. (a) to authorize a plaintiff to file an offer of judgment in any civil action “seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought” rather than in any civil action “for the recovery of money only”; P.A. 94-20 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be accepted prior to the rendering of a verdict by the jury or an award by the court; P.A. 01-71 amended Subsec. (a) to require an offer of judgment to be filed not later than 30 days before trial and increase from 30 to 60 days the time period for filing an acceptance of the offer of judgment and made technical changes throughout section for purposes of gender neutrality; P.A. 05-275 replaced “offer of judgment” and “offer of settlement” with “offer of compromise” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to provide that the offer of compromise may be filed no earlier than 180 days after service of process is made upon the defendant, delete provision that plaintiff is offering “to stipulate to a judgment”, decrease from 60 days to 30 days the time period for the defendant to accept the offer, provide that when a defendant accepts an offer the defendant is agreeing “to settle the claim underlying the action for the sum certain stated in the plaintiff's offer of compromise” rather than “agreeing to a stipulation for judgment as contained in plaintiff's offer of judgment” and replace “Upon such filing, the clerk shall enter judgment immediately on the stipulation” with “Upon such filing and the receipt by the plaintiff of such sum certain, the plaintiff shall file a withdrawal of the action with the clerk and the clerk shall record the withdrawal of the action against the defendant accordingly”, added new Subsec. (b) re requirements for the filing of an offer of compromise in an action to recover damages for an injury or death resulting from the negligence of a health care provider, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c) and amended said Subsec. to decrease the rate of annual interest from 12% to 8% and delete obsolete provision re computation of interest in actions commenced before October 1, 1981, effective October 1, 2005, and applicable to actions accruing on or after that date; P.A. 07-141 amended Subsec. (a) to provide for purposes of section that a plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under Sec. 8-132, and amended Subsec. (c) re calculation of interest for a counterclaim plaintiff under Sec. 8-132 and added references to applications under Sec. 8-132, effective June 25, 2007, and applicable to applications filed on or after that date; P.A. 11-77 amended Subsec. (a) to add “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section” and amended Subsec. (b) to add provisions re written offer of compromise filed by plaintiff not earlier than 365 days after service of process on defendant and re when such offer shall be considered rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled, and to delete requirements re statement of damages, authorization to disclose medical records, disclosure of expert witnesses and filing of certification with the court. Cited. 188 C. 213. In the context of statute, reference to “verdict” incorporates a recovery awarded by the court; prejudgment and postjudgment interest discussed with reference to Sec. 37-3a. 192 C. 301. Does not apply to state; sovereign immunity not expressly waived. 205 C. 542. Cited. 206 C. 100. Is applicable to court as well as jury trials. 208 C. 82. Cited. 211 C. 648; 225 C. 146; 227 C. 914; 228 C. 206; 229 C. 525; 231 C. 745; 234 C. 169; 239 C. 144; Id., 708; Id., 769; Id., 802; 240 C. 49; Id., 287; Id., 799; 241 C. 319. Statute permits plaintiff to offer only one offer of judgment as to each defendant. 249 C. 339. Since intent of statute is to promote settlement and preserve judicial resources, contractual policy limitations on damages have no effect on section and its mandatory punitive provisions cannot be avoided. 256 C. 667. Relevant figure for determining whether to award interest under statute is amount of the jury verdict, not amount of the postapportionment judgment rendered pursuant to Sec. 31-293. 264 C. 314. Under 2005 revision, the legislative grant of authority to courts under section to award offer of judgment interest after a trial reasonably cannot be construed to mean “after a settlement” even if the parties agree to treat settlement as a verdict and judgment in plaintiff's favor for purposes of section. 294 C. 719. Amendment to section in 2007 evidences legislature's understanding that an amendment was necessary to bring condemnation appeals within the ambit of section, and prior to 2007, legislature did not intend for section to be applicable to condemnation appeals. Id., 803. Substitution of plaintiff under Sec. 52-109 did not render previously filed offers of judgment invalid and unenforceable, rather, the seemingly divergent principle of this section, which is punitive in nature, and Sec. 52-109, which is highly remedial, must be reconciled and leads to conclusion that substitution of plaintiff validated the offers of judgment such that interest began to accrue as of date of substitution. 297 C. 105. Cited. 3 CA 111; Id., 570; 8 CA 254; 13 CA 712; 21 CA 366; Id., 549. Imposes penalty for wasting Connecticut judicial resources; court will not permit defendant to avoid consequences of his decision to ignore plaintiff's offer of judgment merely because his contract obligations were made in another state. 22 CA 640. Cited. 25 CA 67; 26 CA 231; Id., 322; 30 CA 664; 31 CA 806; 32 CA 118; 33 CA 662; Id., 842; 35 CA 504; 36 CA 653; 38 CA 685; 42 CA 239; Id., 712; 43 CA 645; 44 CA 154; 45 CA 165; Id., 543; 46 CA 37. Nothing in Subsec. (a) or (b) indicates that the offer of judgment must not include interest pursuant to Sec. 37-3a. 67 CA 100. Court correctly interpreted language of section in this unique case to hold that amended complaint became equivalent of original complaint for purposes of calculation of interest. 81 CA 419. Claim that court improperly awarded plaintiff interest pursuant to offer of judgment statute could not be properly reviewed because defendant failed to file motion for articulation seeking an explanation from the court as to basis for finding that renewed offer of judgment was still valid. 96 CA 294. Court properly awarded offer of compromise interest on basis of defendants' having rejected plaintiff's offer; defendants' offered no authority for proposition that inadequate performance of the party making an offer of compromise precludes the statutorily prescribed remedy. 102 CA 23. The court upheld award of judgment interest in accordance with 1999 revision of section and rejected defendant's argument that defendant's conditional acceptance of plaintiff's offer of judgment is an exception permitted under statute, since such conditional acceptance was a counteroffer and defendant's interpretation ignores the punitive aspect of section. 111 CA 287. Plaintiff failed to meet “sum certain” and “equal to or greater than” requirements of Subsecs. (a) and (c) where relief requested was $500,000 with interest, appraisal and other fees expended up to $20,000 and all necessary land use certificates and approvals, and relief recovered was $899,480 with interest and no such certificates and approvals. 163 CA 190. Although marital dissolution action is civil action, it is not an action based on contract or an action seeking money damages and section does not apply to marital dissolution cases. 222 CA 560. Subsec. (a): Although the required attorney's signature on an offer of judgment was inscribed by the attorney's law partner with attorney's permission, the document is in substantial compliance with the law and such irregularity does not disadvantage defendant. 68 CA 596. Plaintiff is not required to state in an offer of judgment the period of time that defendant has to accept the offer; including reference to the acceptance period in offer of judgment is a courtesy, done in order to save defendant from having to consult language of statute. 103 CA 20. Subsec. (b): Requirements, purpose, de novo review, and application to unified offers of judgment. 245 C. 1. Where trial court granted defendant's motion for remittitur due to limit of plaintiff's underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to Sec. 38a-336, interest awarded pursuant to section is to be based on judgment amount, rather than verdict amount. 288 C. 38. Trial court exceeded statutory authority by trebling award of attorney's fees. 47 CA 517. Calculation of interest under Subsec. discussed. 88 CA 459. Subsec. (c): Where jury award of $4.2 million in dram shop action was reduced by court to $250,000 pursuant to Sec. 30-102, trial court properly found that plaintiff had “recovered” $250,000 for purposes of calculating interest under this Subsec., and interest award under this Subsec. did not undermine legislative purpose of limiting recoverable damages under Dram Shop Act. 136 CA 805. Trial court properly awarded interest under section to plaintiffs because the combined jury verdict exceeded the unified offer of compromise and, where there are two plaintiffs and the claim of one of them is derivative of the other, offer of compromise interest based on the full jury award achieves the purpose of section. 156 CA 453.
Nearby Sections
15
§ 52-109
Substituted plaintiff.Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Bluebook (online)
Connecticut § 52-192a, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/statute/ct/52-192a.