Wornick Co. v. Casas

856 S.W.2d 732, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1136, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1058, 1993 Tex. LEXIS 102, 1993 WL 233445

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: June 30, 1993
• Docket: D-1847
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice.

The issue presented is whether the manner in which Diana Casas was discharged by her employer constituted “outrageous conduct” necessary to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We hold that the employer’s conduct was as a matter of law not outrageous. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, 818 S.W.2d 466, and we render judgment that Casas take nothing.

I

We must determine whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the movant establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 675-79 (Tex.1979). A defendant who conclusively negates one of the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action is therefore entitled to summary judgment. See Rodriguez v. Naylor Industries, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.1989). In reviewing a summary judgment, we must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in favor of the non-movant. El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 315 (Tex.1987).

Under that standard of review, the record reflects the following: Diana Casas was employed by Right Away Poods Corporation (“RAFCO”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Wornick Company, from December 1979 until her discharge on April 22, 1986. Casas was assigned to RAFCO’s “M.R.E.” (Meals Ready to Eat) division, which assembled military rations for sale to the United States Department of Defense. Casas was hired as personnel manager for the M.R.E. division, and at the time of her discharge served as its director of human resources. Casas' firing was sudden and unexpected. She was approached by her supervisor, Valerie Hutchins Woerner, in the hall at the RAFCO offices at approximately 3:45 p.m. and asked to come to Woerner’s office. There, Woerner said that she had some “bad news,” that Casas was being terminated. No one else was present at this meeting and the office door was closed. The reasons given by Woerner were that Casas had been disloyal to the company, had exhibited a bad attitude by “snapping at people,” and had failed to perform certain assigned tasks. Prior to this time, however, Casas had received favorable job-performance reviews, and she believed that RAFCO fired her to prevent her from revealing information to government auditors concerning unethical practices of RAFCO employees.¹ Woerner refused Casas’ request for further explanation and told her to leave the property immediately. Although Woerner appeared nervous, her demeanor was normal, and she did not raise her voice. The entire meeting lasted only about four minutes.

Upon leaving Woerner’s office, Casas was approached by a security guard, who explained that he was to escort her off the premises. In the hallway, Casas then saw Bill Barth, president of RAFCO, and asked to speak with him. The two went to Barth’s office, where Casas explained what had just happened. Barth’s door was closed during this meeting, and the security guard waited outside. Barth did not seem surprised, but he asked whether Ca-sas disputed Woerner’s allegations. When Casas replied that she did, Barth advised her not to say or do anything, promising that they would “all” discuss the matter when Barth returned from a trip a few days later. Barth led Casas to believe that she would be on leave of absence, rather than terminated, pending that meeting. Barth was “very pleasant,” and Casas’ conversation with him lasted no more than ten minutes.

Casas and the security guard then proceeded to Casas’ office, where Joe Sepulve-da, the security supervisor, was waiting. Sepulveda, who had been on vacation, told Casas that Woerner had called him at home to come escort Casas off the property. Se-pulveda was “uneasy” with the situation. He gave her a box in which to pack her belongings. Another person then came to the office and told Sepulveda that Woerner wanted Casas off the property within five minutes. They then walked to Casas’ car, with Sepulveda carrying Casas’ box. Se-pulveda placed the box in the car, and, shortly after 4:30 p.m., Casas drove away. Neither Sepulveda nor the original security guard were rude or offensive in any way. It was standard company procedure for security guards to escort terminated hourly employees off the property, but not terminated salaried employees such as Casas.

Barth did not set up the promised meeting to discuss Casas’ termination, and he did not return her phone calls or correspondence. Casas was removed from the payroll soon after her meeting with Woerner, and she was not allowed to return to the company premises.

Casas subsequently sued RAFCO, the Wornick Company, Woerner, Barth, and Ron Wornick, chairman of the board of the Wornick Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as “RAFCO”), alleging 1) a violation of the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, Tex. Const, art. I, § 3a, 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress, 3) wrongful discharge under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.1985), and 4) breach of an alleged duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from the employment relationship. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals reversed as to Casas’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, but otherwise affirmed the judgment of the trial court. As only RAFCO sought review in this Court, the sole issue before us is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding each element of Casas’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

II

We recently recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, adopting the elements set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965). Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.1993). To recover under this tort, the plaintiff must prove that 1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly, 2) the conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” 3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff emotional distress, and 4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Id. at 621.

We conclude that the summary judgment evidence conclusively establishes that RAFCO’s conduct was not “outrageous,” an essential element of the intentional infliction tort. Outrageous conduct is that which “[goes] beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Restatement § 46, cmt. d. “It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recov-ery_” Id., cmt. h.

Subject to certain narrow exceptions, employees in Texas may be terminated at will and without cause. Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex.1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888). The trial court and court of appeals rejected Casas’ contentions that her firing fell within exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, and Casas has not challenged those findings here. RAFCO therefore acted within its legal rights in discharging Casas. Therefore, the fact of discharge itself as a matter of law cannot constitute outrageous behavior. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 462 (6th Cir.1986) (no liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress where an actor does no more than insist on its legal rights).

Casas argues, however, that even if the firing was not outrageous, the manner in which she was fired was outrageous. We have previously observed that there may be instances where a termination is accompanied by outrageous behavior. See Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex.1992). In this case, however, the record conclusively establishes that RAFCO’s conduct fell short of the requisite level of outrageousness.

RAFCO’s summary judgment evidence, consisting primarily of Casas’ own deposition testimony, details the circumstances surrounding her firing. Woerner required Casas to leave the premises immediately and directed security guards to escort her, actions which could reasonably be expected to cause humiliation. In exercising its rights as an employer-at-will, however, RAFCO’s conduct as a matter of law did not “exceed all possible bounds of decency” and was not “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” See Corum v. Farm Credit Servs., 628 F.Supp. 707, 718-719 (D.Minn.1986) (defendant’s conduct not outrageous where it abruptly fired plaintiff after years of loyal service and required him to clean out his desk and leave immediately); Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F.Supp. 1231, 1238 (D.S.C.1989) (discharging long-term employees with no advance notice and escorting them from the plant in the presence of their peers not sufficiently outrageous to support liability); Seneca Knitting Mills Corp. v. Wilkes, 120 A.D.2d 955, 502 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (1986) (escorting plaintiff from the premises upon his termination is not outrageous); Lapidus v. New York City Chapter of the New York State Assoc. for Retarded Children, Inc., 118 A.D.2d 122, 504 N.Y.S.2d 629, 633 (1986) (plaintiff’s allegations that he was humiliated by being fired in the middle of the working day and being told not to go back to this office did not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Even accepting Casas’ contention that she was fired because she possessed incriminating information, this does not constitute an existing exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under Sabine Pilot, and Casas does not argue for extending the Sabine Pilot exception to such conduct. RAFCO, therefore, was exercising its legal rights, which legally cannot constitute outrageous conduct.

Casas relies on Russ v. TRW, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 42, 570 N.E.2d 1076 (1991), to support her claim. In that case the plaintiff, an accountant, participated in fraudulent pricing practices in connection with government contracts after his supervisors led him to believe that the pricing practices were legitimate. When the pricing scheme was later discovered, the plaintiff was discharged, and the employer supplied his name to the federal government for possible criminal investigation and indictment. By firing the plaintiff “under circumstances designed to give the impression that he was responsible for the practices,” 570 N.E.2d at 1082, such that he did in fact became the subject of a federal criminal investigation, the court concluded that some evidence of outrageous conduct by the employer was presented. Such egregious facts are simply not present here.

Amicus curie National Employment Lawyers Association cites several other cases where courts have found outrageous conduct in the employment" setting. See American Medical International, Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d 331, 340-342 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ); Havens v. Tomball Community Hosp., 793 S.W.2d 690, 691-692 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652, 657-658 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 803 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.1991); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1145 (5th Cir.1991); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir.1989); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F.Supp. 994, 1002-03 (W.D.Tex.1990); Sauls v. Union Oil Co. of Calif, 750 F.Supp. 783, 789 (E.D.Tex.1990); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681, 683-688 (1980); Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal.3d 493, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 89-91, 468 P.2d 216, 217-219 (1970); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315, 317-319 (1976). Like Russ, supra, these decisions each involve conduct distinguishable from that of RAF-CO in the present case. In Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., the plaintiffs supervisor intentionally placed some of the employer’s checks in plaintiffs purse to make it appear that she was a thief. In Wilson, an executive manager with thirty years experience, who was protected by the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, was demoted to a position with menial and demeaning duties in the hopes that he would be humiliated and quit. Giurinta-no, Havens, Bushell, Guzman and Sauls each involved repeated or ongoing harassment of an employee. In Alcorn, the plaintiff was subjected to vile and offensive racial slurs by his supervisor. The employer in Counce, after firing the plaintiff, refused to release her back pay until plaintiff passed a polygraph test concerning money missing from a cash register. Even after the plaintiff passed this test, the employer still withheld a portion of her wages until the plaintiff notified the state department of labor. In Agis, a restaurant manager, at a staff meeting of waitresses, informed them that “there was some stealing going on,” 355 N.E.2d at 317, and until he learned the identity of the responsible person he would begin firing all the present waitresses in alphabetical order. He then fired plaintiff Agis. Even if all these decisions are correct, they do not support Ca-sas’ claim that RAFCO’s conduct in this case was outrageous.

Termination of an employee is never pleasant, especially for the employee. But if we accept Casas’ arguments in this case, employers would be subjected to a potential jury trial in connection with virtually every discharge, and “there would be little left of the employment-at-will doctrine.” Mendez, 844 S.W.2d at 202.

We conclude that the conduct of RAFCO in this ease was, as a matter of law, not outrageous. We accordingly reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment that Casas take nothing.

Concurring Opinion by Justice HECHT joined by Justice ENOCH. Concurring Opinion by Justice DOGGETT joined by Justice GAMMAGE.

1 . Casas also suggested in an affidavit filed in the trial court that her sex, age and national origin were motivating factors in the discharge. Ca-sas, however, does not advance these grounds in this Court to support her argument that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.