Welborn v. Internal Revenue Service

218 F. Supp. 3d 64, 118 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6448, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151673
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedNovember 2, 2016
DocketCivil Action No. 2015-1352
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 218 F. Supp. 3d 64 (Welborn v. Internal Revenue Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Welborn v. Internal Revenue Service, 218 F. Supp. 3d 64, 118 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6448, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151673 (D.D.C. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION

ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, United States District Judge

Becky Welborn, Wendy Windrich, and Beth DuPree, on behalf of a proposed class, allege that the Internal Revenue Service, IRS Commissioner John A. Koski-nen, and IRS employees, identified as Does 1-100, violated their rights under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.-, and the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6103, by disclosing or failing to prevent the disclosure of their personal identification information to third parties. The Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, which is meritorious. The Complaint will be dismissed.

I.

A. Background

The IRS administers and enforces the U.S. tax code. The Commissioner’s role is *70 to “ensure[ ] that the agency maintains an appropriate balance between taxpayer service and tax enforcement and administers the tax code with fairness and integrity.” Am. Compl. [Dkt. 22] ¶ 29. In that role, the Commissioner is “responsible for establishing and interpreting tax administration policy and for developing strategic issues, goals and objectives for managing and operating the IRS.” Id.

The IRS “maintains a significant amount of personal and financial information” on each taxpayer and is, therefore, obligated to protect the confidentiality of that information. Id. ¶ 36. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3541 et seq., “was enacted to strengthen the security of information and systems within federal government agencies,” such as the IRS. Am. Compl. ¶ 36. FISMA requires federal agencies to evaluate periodically the “agency’s information security programs and practices.” Id. ¶ 37. FISMA specifically requires:

(1) annual agency program reviews; (2) annual Inspector General evaluations; (3) agency reporting to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) the results of Inspector General evaluations for unclassified software systems; and (4) an annual OMB report to Congress summarizing the material received from agencies.

Id. To assist Inspectors General in evaluating agency systems, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) specified eleven (11) information-security program areas and listed the specific attribute(s) within each area that should be evaluated. The eleven areas that were identified for evaluation under FISMA comprised:

(1) continuous monitoring management; (2) configuration management; (3) identity and access management; (4) incident and response reporting; (5) risk management; (6) security training; (7) plan of action and milestones; (8) remote access management; (9) contingency planning; (10) contractor systems; and (11) security capital planning.

Id. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) is responsible for evaluations of the information security programs at the Department of Treasury, including the IRS. In its Fiscal Year 2014 FISMA report, TIGTA “found four security programs that were not fully effective due to one or more DHS guideline program attributes that were not met,” id. ¶ 42, and that two security program areas “did not meet the level of performance specified by the DHS guidelines due to the majority of the specified attributes not being met,” id. ¶ 43.

The President signed the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (“Modernization Act”) into law on December 18, 2014. Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073 (2014). This statute amended FISMA, retaining the authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for oversight and authorizing the Secretary of DHS to administer its implementation by way of improved security policies and practices across the Executive Branch.

B. Breach of the IRS “Get Transcript” On-Line Program

The IRS launched the Get Transcript online application in January 2014 to allow “taxpayers to view and print a copy of their prior-year tax information.” Am. Compl. ¶31. The purpose of Get Transcript was “to provide taxpayers with self-service and electronic service options in the form of web-based tools.” Id. During the 2015 filing season, the Get Transcript software tool was used by taxpayers “to obtain approximately 23 million copies of their recently filed tax information.” Id. ¶ 61. The IRS noticed unusual activity in *71 the Get Transcript system in mid-May 2015, which led to the discovery of “questionable attempts to access the Get Transcript application.” Id. Get Transcript was shut down on May 21,2015.

Upon further investigation, the IRS discovered that 380,000 tax-related documents were stolen during a cyber attack that extended from mid-February to mid-May 2015. Id. Plaintiffs allege that the Commissioner reported to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee on June 2, 2015 that “hackers made 200,000 attempts on the ‘Get Transcript’ page, approximately half of which were successful.” Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis removed). According to reports from the IRS, one or more individuals succeeded in bypassing the program’s authentication process to access taxpayer records. Id. ¶ 62. The information stolen included a wide range of taxpayer information, including personal identification information (identified by the parties as “PH”).

Plaintiffs further allege that TIGTA had recommended greater security on Get Transcript but the IRS chose “to roll out a more simple authentication method to encourage use,” despite knowing that it “was vulnerable and insecure.” Id. ¶¶ 12-13.

C. Plaintiffs’ Private Data

In June 2015, Ms. Windrich learned of fraud arising from the mis-use of her tax records when she received a letter from the IRS informing her that an electronic tax return had been processed and a refund deposited, although Ms. Windrich had submitted her tax return via the U.S. Postal Service. As a result, Ms. Windrich and her husband “spent more than 30 hours dealing with the ramifications.” Id. ¶76. Ms. Windrich “reasonably believes that hér PII was compromised and obtained by the cybercriminals through the IRS systems.” Id. The IRS now prohibits her and her husband from submitting electronic tax returns and she alleges that she “is at a heightened risk of further identity theft requiring her to pay indefinitely for ongoing credit monitoring.” Id.

Over the summer of 2015, Ms, Welborn was alerted to possible fraud through a duplicate joint tax return that an unknown person or persons submitted to the IRS in her name. As a result, Ms. Welborn and her husband also “spent dozens of hours dealing with the ramifications.”

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Bluebook (online)
218 F. Supp. 3d 64, 118 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6448, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/welborn-v-internal-revenue-service-dcd-2016.