Medicis v. Ally Bank

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 2, 2022
Docket7:21-cv-06799
StatusUnknown

This text of Medicis v. Ally Bank (Medicis v. Ally Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Medicis v. Ally Bank, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USDC SDNY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED ones similarly sated Plaintiff, No. 21 Civ. 6799 (NSR) -against- OPINION & ORDER ALLY BANK and ALLY FINANCIAL, INC., Defendants. NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge: This putative class action alleges that Defendants Ally Bank and Ally Financial, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) negligently disclosed their customers’ account usernames, passwords, and other private information to unnamed third parties through a coding error in Defendants’ website portal (the “Coding Error”). (Compl. §§ 1-11, ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff David De Medicis, on behalf of himself and on all others similarly situated, brings this action against Defendants asserting claims for negligence, negligence per se, breach of implied contract, violations of the Virginia Personal Information Breach Notification Act, and injunctive/declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. (/d. 60-99.) Presently pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (ECF No. 18.) For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background The following facts are derived from the Complaint, which are taken as true and constructed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff for the purposes of this motion. The following

facts are also derived from Defendants’ proffered extrinsic evidence purportedly revealing the existence of factual problems in the assertion of jurisdiction.1 Plaintiff, a Virginia resident, maintains checking, savings, and securities accounts with Defendants, which are a digital financial-services company and its wholly owned subsidiary.

(Compl. ¶¶ 12–14.) On April 12, 2021, during a routine website update, Defendants learned of the Coding Error, which affected certain query strings that transmit information after a customer entered a username and password to access an online account with Defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24; Hall Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 20.) These query strings—which send information across Defendants’ platform to allow customers to access their online accounts—usually do not contain any personally identifiable information. (Hall Decl. ¶¶ 4–5.) The Coding Error, however, resulted in certain query strings that contained usernames and passwords (embedded within the string of code) being sent to a limited group of known entities with which Defendants have ongoing contractual and business relationships. (Id. ¶ 6.) For example, a query string with a customer’s username and password

(both redacted) looked like this: https://www.ally.com,/,/,/?hdmjavascriptdata=&allysf-login-v1- account=aaos&allysf-login-v1-username- 78e30d704ccce8ccc7b8539f0144cb09=[redacted]&allysf-login-v1-password- 78e30d704ccce8ccc7b8539f0144cb09=[redacted]

(Id. ¶ 9.) The Coding Error only occurred in limited circumstances where the user attempted to log in before the page had fully loaded—that is, when the user was using software to automatically

1 As the Court will explain more fully below, “a defendant is permitted to make a fact-based Rule 12(b)(1) motion, proffering evidence beyond the Pleading[,] [such as through ] . . . affidavits submitted [that] . . . reveal the existence of factual problems in the assertion of jurisdiction.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). populate the username and password. (Id. ¶ 6.) Notably, the Coding Error did not result from a sophisticated attack perpetrated by cyber criminals or state sponsored hackers. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Immediately upon learning of the Coding Error, Defendants updated the affected code to eliminate the error. (Id. ¶ 24; Hall Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants also implemented a process that required

all potentially affected customers—whether or not they were actually affected—to change their password. (Hall Decl. ¶ 13.) Defendants also began working with the businesses to which the query strings may have been visible to purge the information. (Id. ¶ 14.) Defendants represent that all of these entities agreed to delete the information, and all subsequently confirmed deletion. (Id.) Defendants also immediately began investigating which customers’ usernames and passwords may have been embedded in the query strings due to the Coding Error. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants represent that they had to parse through millions of website login attempts and, for each login attempt, identify whether the Coding Error had actually occurred during the login attempt and, if so, match the information to a specific customer. (Id.) Defendants represent that they identified each of their customers who could have been potentially impacted by the Coding

Error. (Id. ¶ 17.) Defendants also began fraud-monitoring efforts to assess threats or risks of fraud specific to the Coding Error, including monitoring the accounts of potentially affected customers for fraudulent, suspicious, or anomalous activity. (Id. ¶ 15.) On June 11, 2021, Defendants sent a letter to those customers whose information had been embedded in the query strings as a result of the Coding Error. (Id. ¶ 18.) This letter explained the circumstances of the Coding Error and the remedial steps that Defendants took after discovering it, including (1) updating the code; (2) requiring customers to reset their passwords; (3) confirming that all third parties would delete the information; and (4) monitoring customers’ accounts. (See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12; see also Hall Decl. ¶¶ 18, 20, Ex. A (copy of letter sent to Plaintiff).) By their letter, Defendants also offered all affected customers with free credit monitoring and identity theft insurance coverage for two years. (Compl. ¶ 10; Hall Decl. ¶ 19, Ex. A.) Defendants further represent that, since discovering the Coding Error on April 12, 2021,

their internal cyber risk and fraud teams have monitored the accounts of affected customers for any increase in potential fraudulent or other anomalous activity. (Hall Decl. ¶ 21.) Defendants represent to have identified no instances of account takeovers, identity theft, or similar occurrences attributable to the Coding Error. (Id. ¶ 22.) Additionally, Defendants represent that they have not identified any increased rates of potentially fraudulent activity or other anomalous events attributable to the Coding Error. (Id.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff claims to have suffered “imminent and impending injury arising from the substantially increased risk of future fraud, identity theft, and misuse” as a result of Defendants negligently disclosing his private information through the Coding Error. (Compl. ¶¶ 30, 35.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been “compelled to devote time to deal with the consequences”

of the Coding Error, which includes, “time spent verifying the legitimacy of [Defendants’ letter], exploring credit monitoring and identify theft protection, self-monitoring his accounts,” and changing his passwords and usernames on his accounts, all of which is time he has “lost forever[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 31–32.) He also claims to have suffered “actual injury in the form of damages to and diminution in the value of his Private Information—a form of intangible property” that he entrusted to Defendants for purposes of facilitating his accounts with them. (Id. ¶ 33.) II. Procedural Background On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff filed his operative class action Complaint (Compl., ECF No. 5.) On September 17, 2021, Defendants filed a letter seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss, which the Court subsequently granted and for which it set a briefing schedule. (See ECF Nos.

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Medicis v. Ally Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/medicis-v-ally-bank-nysd-2022.