PRELIMINARY PRINT
Volume 604 U. S. Part 1 Pages 305–320
OFFICIAL REPORTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT February 26, 2025
REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions
NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 305
Syllabus
WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit No. 23–971. Argued January 14, 2025—Decided February 26, 2025 Gary Waetzig fled a federal age-discrimination lawsuit against his former employer Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. He later submitted his claims for arbitration, and voluntarily dismissed his federal lawsuit without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). After losing at arbitration, he asked the District Court to reopen his dismissed lawsuit and vacate the arbitration award, asserting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) as the basis for reopening the suit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits relief from a “fnal judgment, order, or proceeding.” The District Court reopened the case, fnding that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding” and that Waetzig made a mistake when he dismissed his case rather than seeking a stay. The District Court separately granted Waetzig's mo- tion to vacate the arbitration award. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Held: A case voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a) counts as a “fnal proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Pp. 310–320. (a) The Court does not address Halliburton's argument regarding ju- risdiction over the motion to vacate. The question whether Rule 60(b) permits reopening a case that was voluntarily dismissed without preju- dice is antecedent to jurisdictional questions about the motion to vacate. The lower courts may address those questions on remand. Pp. 310–311. (b) Text, context, and history support the conclusion that a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a “fnal proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Pp. 311–320. (1) A voluntary dismissal is “fnal” because it terminates the case. This straightforward reading aligns with legal dictionaries from 1946 (when “fnal” frst appeared in the Rule) and is confrmed by Advisory Committee Notes to the 1946 Amendment to the Rule. The word “fnal” underscores that Rule 60(b) does not infringe a court's inherent and distinct power to revise its interlocutory decrees in an ongoing case. Halliburton's request to construe “fnal” consistent with jurisdictional statutes like 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which gives the courts of appeals juris- diction over appeals from “fnal decisions” of district courts, is unpersua- 306 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
sive. The fnality concept in appellate jurisdiction serves a distinct pur- pose—preventing interlocutory appeals from impairing case resolution at the trial level. Finality under Rule 60(b) does not play a similar role. Unlike an appeal fled under the appellate jurisdiction statute, a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary, not a matter of statutory right. Rule 60(b) therefore does not pose the same risk to effcient case resolution before the trial courts. The Court sees no reason to import the understanding of fnality that applies in the feld of appellate juris- diction to the different context of Rule 60(b). Pp. 312–315. (2) A voluntary dismissal counts as a “proceeding” under Rule 60(b). Legal dictionaries from 1938 to present suggest that the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps in an action's progression. Other federal rules similarly treat “proceeding” as including all formal steps in an action. Halliburton and the court below assert that the term “proceeding” should be read in the context of its neighboring terms “judgment” and “order.” And because a “judgment” and “order” both involve some ju- dicial determination of rights, a “proceeding” should at least involve some judicial action or conclusive determination of rights. Although it is true that statutory terms must be read in the context of their neigh- bors, that rule cuts the other way in this case. The proposed alterna- tive reading would strip “proceeding” of independent meaning, as any judicial determination would already be an “order.” When Rule 60(b) authorizes relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding,” the Rule speaks in an ascending order of generality. The structure of the Rule suggests that each term should be read as broader than what came be- fore. Pp. 315–318. (3) The Court's reading is buttressed by historical context, as Rule 60(b) was modeled after a California statute previously interpreted to extend to voluntary dismissals without prejudice. See Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 72–73 (reading Rule 42(a) in light of “its statutory predeces- sor”). Pp. 318–319. 82 F. 4th 918, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Vincent Levy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kevin D. Benish, Jack L. Millman, Spen- cer J. Kontnik, Austin M. Cohen, and Aditi Shah. Matthew D. McGill argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Jonathan C. Bond, Lochlan F. Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 307
Opinion of the Court
Shelfer, Joshua R. Zuckerman, Patrick J. Fuster, and Heather F. Crow.* Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or proceeding.” The question in this case is whether Rule 60(b) permits a district court to reopen a case that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(a). We hold that such a dismissal counts as a “fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,” and thus qualifes for Rule 60(b) relief. I A This case began as an employment dispute. Petitioner Gary Waetzig is a former employee of respondent Hallibur- ton Energy Services, Inc. Following his termination, Waet- zig fled a lawsuit against Halliburton in the U. S. District Court for the District of Colorado. He alleged that he was illegally terminated on the basis of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq. In response, Halli- burton asserted that Waetzig was required to arbitrate his claim. Waetzig acquiesced and submitted his claims for arbitration. At that point, Waetzig could have asked the District Court to stay his federal lawsuit pending the arbitration proceed- ings. See 9 U. S. C. § 3; Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476 (2024). Instead, he elected to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Under that Rule, a plaintiff may dismiss his case “without a court order” if he
*Steven A. Engel, Michael H. McGinley, Jennifer B. Dickey, and Brian A. Kulp fled a brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as amicus curiae urging affrmance. 308 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
serves “a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). Since Halliburton had not yet served an answer or moved for summary judgment, Waetzig's dis- missal was effective without any court action. And given that this was the frst time Waetzig had dismissed these claims, his dismissal was presumptively “without prejudice.” Rule 41(a)(1)(B). That means that Waetzig had preserved his right to refle the same claims in the future. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 505 (2001). Waetzig lost at arbitration. After a telephonic hearing, the arbitrator issued an award granting summary judgment in favor of Halliburton. In Waetzig's view, however, the ar- bitrator failed to follow various procedural rules required by the parties' arbitration agreement. To remedy that alleged error, Waetzig turned back to federal court.
B Waetzig's next move was procedurally creative. Instead of fling a new lawsuit in federal court attacking the validity of the arbitration award, he returned to the lawsuit that he had previously dismissed. He fled a motion under the old docket number and asked the court to reopen that case and vacate the arbitration award. That move created an obvi- ous problem: As we already explained, Waetzig's dismissal under Rule 41(a) terminated his case. So, in theory, fling a new motion in the case was impossible. The District Court was therefore skeptical of Waetzig's gambit. It issued an order asking him to show cause that would justify the court's taking jurisdiction over the motion. In response, Waetzig asserted that the District Court could reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Rule 60(b) permits a court, “[o]n motion and just terms,” to “relieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or pro- ceeding.” A court may do so for six enumerated “reasons,” including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable ne- Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 309
glect.” See Rule 60(b)(1). The general “purpose” of the Rule, we have said, is “to make an exception to fnality.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524, 529 (2005). The Rule “at- tempts to strike a proper balance between the conficting principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be done.” 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2851, p. 286 (3d ed. 2012). Here, the District Court agreed with Waetzig and awarded Rule 60(b) relief. First, it held that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding” and there- fore falls within the ambit of the Rule. App. to Pet. for Cert. 55a–56a. Second, it found that Waetzig had com- mitted a “careless mistake” when he voluntarily dismissed his case instead of moving for a stay pending arbitration or administratively closing the case. Id., at 59a. According to the District Court, Waetzig did so under the false under- standing that the court would retain jurisdiction over the arbitration agreement. Ibid. The court thus found that re- lief was proper under Rule 60(b)(1). Ibid. And after re- opening the case under that provision,1 the court issued a separate order granting Waetzig's motion to vacate the arbi- tration award. Id., at 48a. Halliburton appealed. Among other things, it argued that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice does not count as a “fnal judgment, order, or proceeding,” and therefore falls outside the reach of Rule 60(b). Brief for Appellant in No. 22–1252 (CA10, Nov. 14, 2022), ECF Doc. 25, pp. 23–26. The Tenth Circuit agreed. It reasoned that Waetzig's vol- untary dismissal was not a fnal “judgment” or “order” be- cause the act of dismissal required neither the entry of a
1 The District Court additionally found that relief was warranted under Rule 60(b)(6), which permits relief for “any other reason that justifes re- lief.” In the District Court's view, an intervening precedent from our Court affected Waetzig's right to refle a new case, justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a–62a (citing Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1 (2022)). 310 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
judgment nor the issuance of an order by the court. 82 F. 4th 918, 921 (2023). The Tenth Circuit then concluded that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice could not be a “fnal proceeding” because, in its view, “a fnal proceeding must involve, at a minimum, a judicial determination with fnality.” Id., at 923. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit split from other Circuits that have considered the issue. See Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F. 3d 356, 362–363 (CA5 2013) (“[W]e are satisfed that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) volun- tary dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a `fnal proceed- ing' ”); accord, Nelson v. Napolitano, 657 F. 3d 586, 589 (CA7 2011). We granted certiorari to decide whether a Rule 41(a) dis- missal without prejudice is a “fnal judgment, order, or pro- ceeding” under Rule 60(b). 603 U. S. 948 (2024).
II
Page Proof Before reaching thatPending question, however,Publication we frst address a preliminary issue related to jurisdiction. Halliburton claims that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Waetzig's motion to vacate the arbitration award. In support of its argument, Halliburton points to this Court's decisions in Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1 (2022), and Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375 (1994). We need not address the merits of this argument, however, because it presents no barrier to our deciding the question presented. We granted certiorari to decide whether Rule 60(b) permits a court to reopen a case that was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. That question is separate from, and antecedent to, the question whether the District Court could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig's motion to vacate. The cases Halliburton cites prove the point. In Bad- gerow, we addressed the jurisdiction of the federal courts to consider motions to vacate arbitration awards fled under a provision of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. § 10(a). Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 311
We held that a plaintiff seeking to vacate an arbitration award must point to an “ `independent jurisdictional basis' ” that would authorize a federal court to decide the matter. Badgerow, 596 U. S., at 8 (quoting Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S 576, 582 (2008)). In the other case, Kokkonen, we suggested that Rule 60(b) cannot confer jurisdiction upon a federal court where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist. 511 U. S., at 378. We reasoned that reopening a case under Rule 60(b) would not automati- cally confer jurisdiction over a subsequent motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Ibid. The upshot of our analysis in Kokkonen was that, even though Rule 60(b) might give a court the power to reopen a case, the Rule cannot itself serve as the basis for federal jurisdiction. Although these cases might bear on the District Court's jurisdiction over Waetzig's motion to vacate, they say noth- ing at all about whether the District Court had the power, under Rule 60(b), to reopen Waetzig's case in the frst place. That power is the focus of our decision today, and it must be addressed before any subsequent jurisdictional questions is considered. The procedural history of this case confrms as much. Before the District Court could rule on Waetzig's motion to vacate, it frst needed to reopen his case. Consist- ent with that understanding, the court issued two separate orders: frst, an order reopening the case pursuant to Rule 60(b), see App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a, and second, an order vacating the arbitration award, see id., at 48a. We granted certiorari to address the District Court's power to issue the frst order, not its jurisdiction to issue the second. We leave it to the lower courts to address any subsequent jurisdic- tional questions on remand.
III That brings us to the question presented. Rule 60(b) per- mits a court to “relieve a party . . . from a fnal judgment, order, or proceeding.” We hold that a Rule 41(a) voluntary 312 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
dismissal without prejudice qualifes as a “fnal . . . proceed- ing” under Rule 60(b). Text, context, and history support that interpretation. A 1 To start, we hold that a voluntary dismissal without preju- dice is “fnal” under Rule 60(b). In 1946, when the term “fnal” frst appeared in the Rule, legal dictionaries defned “fnal” to mean “[d]efnitive; terminating; completed; con- clusive; last.” Black's Law Dictionary 779 (3d ed. 1933) (Black's); see Ballentine's Law Dictionary 503 (1930) (“the end, ultimate, or last”). By way of illustration, Black's Law Dictionary defned “fnal order” as an order that “terminates the action itself.” Black's 1298. A voluntary dismissal without prejudice falls comfortably within this defnition. The dismissal is the “conclusive” and “last” fling on the docket, and it “complete[s]” the particular lawsuit at issue. Id., at 779. And, like a “fnal order,” the dismissal “termi- nates the action itself.” Id., at 1298. That straightforward reading of “fnal” is confrmed by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee's Notes, which are “ `a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a rule.' ” Hall v. Hall, 584 U. S. 59, 75 (2018) (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 64, n. 6 (2002)). In the Notes accompanying the 1946 amendments to Rule 60(b), the Committee briefy explained its reason for adding the term “fnal.” According to the Committee, the addition of “fnal” clarifed that “inter- locutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the Rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.” Advisory Committee's 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 289. The term “fnal” was therefore intended to exclude “inter- locutory judgments” from the reach of the Rule. And, as Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 313
the Committee Notes explain, that exclusion makes sense. Rule 60(b) relief from interlocutory judgments is unneces- sary because, with respect to those judgments, “a rehearing may be sought at any time before [the] fnal decree, provided due diligence be employed and a revision be otherwise conso- nant with equity.” John Simmons Co. v. Grier Brothers Co., 258 U. S. 82, 90–91 (1922). In other words, a court presiding over a case is always capable of revising an interlocutory ruling, so long as a revision is “consonant with equity.” Id., at 91. The word “fnal” underscores that Rule 60(b) does not infringe that inherent and distinct power. After a case is fnally terminated, however, a court no longer presides, and a party can no longer seek a “rehearing” on an interlocutory judgment. Ibid. It is at that point that a court's power under Rule 60(b) kicks in, permitting the court to look back at the “fnal” act in a case and provide relief from that act when appropriate. A voluntary dis- missal without prejudice is one such “fnal” act. It termi- nates the case and strips a court of its equitable power to revise its earlier rulings. At that point, Rule 60(b) is the appropriate avenue for relief. A contrary interpretation would place voluntary dismiss- als without prejudice into a procedural no man's land. Such dismissals would not be “interlocutory” in the manner that the Committee Notes discuss because they are outside of a court's “complete power” over an ongoing case. Nor would they be “fnal” and thus subject to Rule 60(b). Halliburton provides no evidence supporting the existence of any third category. If a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not “interlocutory,” then it is hard to imagine that it could be anything but “fnal.” 2 Halliburton nevertheless presses for a narrower defnition of “fnal.” Specifcally, it asks the Court to construe “fnal” in Rule 60(b) to mean essentially what it means in jurisdic- tional statutes like 28 U. S. C. § 1291, which gives the courts 314 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
of appeals jurisdiction over appeals from “fnal decisions” of district courts. This grant of appellate jurisdiction can be traced back to the frst Judiciary Act. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. And long before the adoption of Rule 60(b), this Court had developed a rich jurisprudence explain- ing the meaning of “fnal” as it relates to appellate jurisdic- tion. See Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 3–4 (1882) (citing cases). Halliburton asks us to look to that “ `legal lineage' ” when interpreting Rule 60(b). Brief for Respond- ent 22 (quoting Hall, 584 U. S., at 66). Based on that body of case law, Halliburton contends that a determination is “fnal” principally when it “ `terminate[s] the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case.' ” Brief for Respondent 23 (quoting Bostwick, 106 U. S., at 3; alterations in original; emphasis added). Contrary to Halliburton's suggestion, however, we do not fnd this body of case law helpful in interpreting the meaning of the term “fnal” in Rule 60(b). True, we sometimes look to legal tradition when interpreting a statutory term, but we typically do so only when the term is “ `obviously trans- planted from another legal source.' ” Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. 554, 560 (2019) (quoting Hall, 584 U. S., at 73). Here, there is little reason to think that the term “fnal” in Rule 60(b) was transplanted from statutes governing the ju- risdiction of federal appellate courts. In that feld, the con- cept of fnality plays a distinctive role: It prevents interlocu- tory appeals from unduly impairing the resolution of civil and criminal cases at the trial level. Under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 and predecessor provisions, a party that loses in the district court has a “statutory right” to take an appeal from any “fnal decision.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U. S. 232, 245, n. 19 (1981). Our decisions defning what the term “fnal” means in this context have imposed an important practical limit on such appeals. We have described the f- nality requirement as “the means for achieving a healthy Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 315
legal system.” Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 326 (1940). Without it, too many trial court rulings could be appealed, and “ `the orderly progress of a cause' ” would be halted while the appellate court considered all sorts of “ `question[s] which ha[ve] happened to cross the path of such litigation.' ” Ibid. (quoting Segurola v. United States, 275 U. S. 106, 112 (1927)). Finality under Rule 60(b) does not play a similar role. Unlike an appeal fled under the appellate jurisdiction stat- ute, a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary, not “a matter of statutory right.” Manypenny, 451 U. S., at 245, n. 19. Further, Rule 60(b) relief is unnecessary when a case is ongoing because during that time, a court retains jurisdic- tion to review and modify its decrees. See supra, at 312– 313. Thus, there is no reason to fear that Rule 60(b) will be abused to bring about a “ `halt in the orderly progress of a cause.' ” Cobbledick, 309 U. S., at 326 (quoting Segurola, 275 U. S., at 112). And, even if such abuse were possible, Rule 60(b) provides district courts with ample discretion to pre- vent it. Given these stark contextual differences, it is un- likely that “fnal” as it appears in Rule 60(b) was trans- planted from the appellate jurisdiction statute. We therefore see no reason to import the understanding of fnality that applies in the feld of appellate jurisdiction. In the context of Rule 60(b), a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is “fnal” because it terminates the case.
B Next, we hold that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “proceeding” under Rule 60(b).2 In 1938, when the term “proceeding” frst appeared in the Rule, Black's 2 Waetzig additionally contends that a voluntary dismissal without prej- udice counts as a “judgment.” See Brief for Petitioner 25–29. Because we hold that such dismissals qualify as proceedings, we need not decide whether they qualify as judgments for the purposes of Rule 60(b). 316 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Law Dictionary defned “proceeding” as: “[T]he form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or ju- dicial offcer; regular and orderly progress in form of law; including all possible steps in an action from its commence- ment to the execution of judgment.” Black's 1430. Other dictionaries defned the term similarly. See Ballentine's Law Dictionary, at 1023 (“the form in which actions are to be brought and defended, the manner of intervening in suits [and] of conducting them . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Webster's New International Dictionary 1710 (1927) (“[a]ny step or act taken in conducting liti- gation”). These defnitions suggest that the term “proceed- ing” encompasses all steps in an action, including the fling of papers that are noted on the docket. Even today, Black's Law Dictionary defnes “proceeding” as “[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment.” Black's 1459 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). Other Federal Rules similarly treat “proceeding” as in- cluding all formal steps taken in an action. Take, for exam- ple, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Under that Rule, a court may stay “further proceedings” in a case until a dis- covery order is obeyed. Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(iv). In that con- text, a stay of “proceedings” likely refers to a stay of any further action in the lawsuit, including further docket flings. If read otherwise, the stay would be an ineffective sanction against a party's disobedience. Similarly, Rule 41 permits a court to “stay the proceedings” until a plaintiff pays the costs of a previously dismissed action. Rule 41(d)(2). As with Rule 37, that would be a relatively toothless sanction if “pro- ceedings” did not encompass all further actions in the case. Halliburton and the court below offer an alternative def- nition. They argue that the term “proceeding” is “ `given more precise content by the neighboring words with which Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 317
it is associated.' ” Fischer v. United States, 603 U. S. 480, 487 (2024) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008)). Specifcally, they assert that the term “proceed- ing” should be read to include the characteristics of the terms that come before it: “judgment” and “order.” See Rule 60(b) (“judgment, order, or proceeding”). Since a “judgment” and “order” both involve some judicial determi- nation of rights, they say, a “proceeding” should at least in- volve some judicial action or conclusive determination of rights. See Brief for Respondent 34–37; 82 F. 4th, at 922– 923. Although it is true that statutory terms must be read in the context of their neighbors, that rule cuts the other way here. To read “proceeding” to require a judicial determina- tion would strip it of any independent meaning. Any formal judicial determination of a party's rights is bound to be an “order.” See Black's 1298 (defning “order” as “[e]very di- rection of a court or judge made or entered in writing”). So, if the term “proceeding” covers only judicial determina- tions, it is hard to imagine what the term “proceeding” would encompass that is not already covered by the term “order.” Such a limited reading of “proceeding” is contrary to the general structure of Rule 60(b). When the Rule authorizes relief from a “judgment, order, or proceeding,” it speaks in an ascending order of generality. It starts with the narrow- est category, “judgments,” and then moves to a broader cate- gory, “orders.” Any “judgment” will generally involve an “order,” but not all “orders” are “judgments.” That sug- gests that each term should be read as broader than what came before. Just as “order” encompasses and exceeds “judgment,” “proceeding ” should encompass and exceed “order.” It would be odd, therefore, to read “proceeding” as covering only those acts that are already covered by the term “order.” 318 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
Halliburton intuitively grasps this point. To avoid a com- plete overlap between “order” and “proceeding,” it tries to conjure up examples of what might count as a “proceeding” under its defnition while not being an “order.” But in doing so, Halliburton only reinforces the commonsense conclusion that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a pro- ceeding. For example, Halliburton suggests that a volun- tary dismissal with prejudice may qualify as a “proceeding.” Brief for Respondent 37. But there is no reason why a vol- untary dismissal with prejudice would count as a “proceed- ing” while a voluntary dismissal without prejudice would not. Both consist in the simple fling of a paper on the docket. See Rule 41(a)(1)(A). Halliburton contends that a dismissal with prejudice is different because it “imposes legal burdens.” Brief for Respondent 37. But a volun- tary dismissal without prejudice does so as well. For exam- ple, Waetzig's dismissal apparently precluded him from continuing to pursue his claims—not because his dismis- sal was with prejudice, but because the relevant statute of limitations had already expired. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11, 19–20. In sum, the text, context, and structure of Rule 60(b) show that the term “proceeding” encompasses all steps taken in the action, including a voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
C Finally, our reading of Rule 60(b) is buttressed by the his- torical context in which the Rule was enacted. The original version of the Rule was based on a then-extant provision in the California Code of Civil Procedure, § 473. See Advisory Committee's 1946 Note on subd. (b) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60. That provision permitted a court to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment, order, or other proceeding.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 473 (Deering 1937). And prior to the enactment of Rule 60(b), the Supreme Court of California had read that provision to apply to voluntary dismissals. According to the Cite as: 604 U. S. 305 (2025) 319
California court, a plaintiff who “consented to [a] dismissal to his injury, under a mistake of fact, excusable under the terms of the statute, . . . is not barred of relief.” Palace Hardware Co. v. Smith, 134 Cal. 381, 384, 66 P. 474, 476 (1901). And the California court made clear that the exist- ence of prejudice was immaterial: “Whether . . . a voluntary dismissal . . . bars a future action, need not be considered. If the plaintiff is entitled to relief under the statute, it is not material whether, in its absence, he could have relief either at law or in equity.” Id., at 385, 66 P., at 476. When read in light of this history, it makes sense that Rule 60(b) would likewise extend to voluntary dismissals without prejudice. The provision was “expressly modeled” after a statute that ostensibly permitted such relief. See Hall, 584 U. S., at 72–73 (reading Rule 42(a) in light of “its statutory predecessor”). And although the Rule has been amended substantially since then, the amendments have always re- tained the original candidates for relief: judgments, orders, or proceedings. To be sure, the Rule now specifes that the judgments, orders, or proceedings must be “fnal.” But, as we have already explained, the term “fnal” does not exclude voluntary dismissals without prejudice from the reach of the Rule. See supra, at 312–315. There is no reason to think, then, that such dismissals have since escaped the Rule's coverage. IV For the above reasons, a Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without prejudice counts as a “fnal proceeding” under Rule 60(b). When the requirements of Rule 60(b) are satisfed, a district court may relieve a party from such a dismissal and reopen the case. We express no view on whether that relief was proper in Waetzig's case. Nor do we reach the question whether the court below could exercise jurisdiction over Waetzig's motion to vacate the arbitration award. Those questions are left to the court below on remand, to the extent the relevant arguments have been preserved. 320 WAETZIG v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.
The judgment of the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Reporter’s Note
The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:
None