Martin v. Gold Coast

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 23, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0952
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0952 Martin v Gold Coast 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0952 Boulder County District Court No. 23CV30206 Honorable Nancy W. Salomone, Judge

Mae Martin, Daniel Conroy, and Dannymae, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Gold Coast Bank, an Illinois Banking Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 23, 2026

Berg Hill Greenleaf Ruscitti LLP, George V. Berg, Nicholas L. DeBruyne, Ian W. Carmen, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

MGL Law, LLC, Benjamin P. Wieck, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiffs, Mae Martin, Daniel Conroy, and Dannymae, LLC

(the borrowers), appeal the district court’s order denying their

C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for post-judgment relief, claiming they

entered into a settlement agreement with defendant, Gold Coast

Bank, by mistake. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The borrowers took out two commercial loans and one

residential loan from Gold Coast. The parties later disputed the

loan terms, leading to two different lawsuits. First, in March 2023,

the borrowers filed the lawsuit underlying this appeal (the Colorado

lawsuit), alleging that Gold Coast had breached their contract and

committed various torts by changing certain interest rate terms in

their loan agreements. Second, in November 2023, Gold Coast

demanded payment of the outstanding debt by suing the borrowers

in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois (the Illinois lawsuit).

¶3 The parties attended two settlement conferences as part of the

Illinois lawsuit. At the second conference, the borrowers, in person

and through their counsel, agreed to a global resolution. Under the

settlement terms — memorialized by a written “Agreed Settlement

and Dismissal Order” signed by the judge presiding over the Illinois

1 lawsuit — the parties agreed to “walk away” without exchanging

any money. Among other terms, Gold Coast would forgive the

remaining loan debt and dismiss the Illinois lawsuit, and the

borrowers, for their part, would dismiss the Colorado lawsuit.

Pursuant to the settlement, the Illinois court dismissed the Illinois

lawsuit with prejudice. One of the individual borrowers later

attempted to back out of the settlement agreement, claiming she felt

rushed during the settlement conference, had developed a migraine

after agreeing to settle, and didn’t fully understand the settlement

terms.

¶4 Meanwhile, Gold Coast moved to dismiss the Colorado lawsuit

with prejudice pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.

In addition to attaching the Agreed Settlement and Dismissal Order

signed by the Illinois court, Gold Coast explained in the motion’s

certificate of conferral that the borrowers’ counsel agreed with the

requested relief and had advised his clients to authorize him to file

a stipulation of dismissal; one of the individual borrowers, however,

refused to provide such authorization. The district court granted

Gold Coast’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that, based on its

2 review of the motion’s certificate of conferral and attachment, it was

“satisfied that the parties reached an agreement to settle all claims.”

¶5 The borrowers then filed a motion to vacate or modify the

dismissal order in the Illinois lawsuit based on their purported

mistake in agreeing to settle. The Illinois court set the motion for a

hearing.

¶6 Three days before the hearing, the borrowers filed a motion for

relief from final judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b) in the Colorado

lawsuit. The motion notified the district court of the upcoming

hearing in the Illinois lawsuit and requested relief from the

dismissal order in the Colorado lawsuit “if [the Illinois court]

reverses or vacates [its] Settlement Order” that dismissed the

Illinois lawsuit.

¶7 After the Illinois court declined to reverse or vacate its

dismissal, the borrowers notified the district court in the Colorado

lawsuit that they intended to file an appeal in the Illinois lawsuit.

Nonetheless, the district court denied the borrowers’ C.R.C.P. 60(b)

motion. The court explained that the borrowers’ requested relief

was “based on the factual premise that the settlement order in the

3 parties’ related case will be vacated” and that such premise “ha[d]

not come to pass.”

II. C.R.C.P. 60(b)

¶8 The borrowers contend that the district court erred by denying

their motion for relief from final judgment under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)

and (5).

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶9 As relevant here, C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to

“relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding

for . . . [m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) authorizes the same for “any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” This residuary

provision applies only in situations not covered by the other

enumerated provisions of the rule and “only in extreme situations

or extraordinary circumstances.” Davidson v. McClellan, 16 P.3d

233, 237 (Colo. 2001). We construe the residuary provision

narrowly to “avoid undercutting the finality of judgments.” People

in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 22.

¶ 10 We review a district court’s order denying relief under

C.R.C.P. 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. HCA-HealthONE

4 LLC, 2018 COA 29, ¶ 30 (citing Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP

Mountain Props., LLC, 222 P.3d 310, 314 (Colo. 2010)). A court

abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of the law. Jackson v. Unocal Corp., 262 P.3d 874,

880 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 11 “To properly preserve an argument for appeal, the party

asserting the argument must present ‘the sum and substance of the

argument’ to the district court.” Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

2023 COA 107, ¶ 25 (citation omitted). In civil cases, we generally

will not address for the first time on appeal issues not raised in or

decided by the district court. See id.; Melat, Pressman & Higbie,

L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18.

B. Analysis

¶ 12 The borrowers argue that the district court abused its

discretion by denying their motion for post-judgment relief because

(1) they entered into the settlement with Gold Coast by mistake,

entitling them to relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1); and (2) recent

Supreme Court authority supports their argument that they are

entitled to relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)’s residuary provision.

5 1. Mistake

¶ 13 We conclude the borrowers didn’t preserve their argument that

they mistakenly agreed to the settlement with Gold Coast. And

because we don’t generally address unpreserved arguments in civil

cases, we decline to reach the merits of their contention. See

Gebert, ¶ 25.

¶ 14 In their C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, the borrowers argued only that

the district court should vacate its dismissal order due to mistake if

the Illinois court reversed or vacated its prior dismissal. They didn’t

argue that they would be entitled to relief based on mistake if the

Illinois court declined to reverse or vacate the dismissal. And the

Illinois court so declined.

¶ 15 In their reply brief, the borrowers argue that their ongoing

appeal in the Illinois lawsuit renders their argument preserved. But

the fact of the borrowers’ appeal in the Illinois lawsuit didn’t expand

the nature or scope of the arguments they presented to the district

court in this case. To the contrary, although the borrowers notified

the district court of their intention to appeal the Illinois court’s

denial of their motion to vacate or modify the dismissal order, they

continued to tie their entitlement to post-judgment relief in the

6 Colorado lawsuit to the outcome of their motion in the Illinois

lawsuit. At no point did they argue that the district court should

grant them relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b) regardless of the outcome in

the Illinois lawsuit. See Gebert, ¶ 25. In addition, the borrowers

never asked the district court to stay the Colorado lawsuit or defer

ruling on their C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion pending the outcome of their

Illinois appeal.

¶ 16 The borrowers also make passing arguments that the district

court erred by not analyzing their C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, not

allowing them to submit additional briefing, and denying their

motion before the parties had executed a formal written settlement

agreement. But the borrowers don’t develop or support these

contentions with argument or legal authority, so we decline to

address them. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d

582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (explaining that we don’t address

underdeveloped arguments).

¶ 17 Accordingly, we decline to address the borrowers’ unpreserved

argument that the district court should have granted relief under

C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) based on their alleged mistake in entering the

settlement agreement.

7 2. Residuary Provision

¶ 18 The borrowers also argue, under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)’s residuary

provision, that the district court abused its discretion by denying

their motion because enforcing the settlement would be manifestly

unfair. In support, they cite the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U.S. 305 (2025),

which they also cited in the district court.

¶ 19 As we understand their argument, we should reverse the

district court’s denial of relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) because the

Waetzig court upheld a trial court’s decision granting a plaintiff

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) based on analogous

circumstances — namely, the plaintiff’s mistake in voluntarily

dismissing his case. But we fail to see how Waetzig supports the

borrowers’ position.1 In Waetzig, the Supreme Court held that a

plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) qualified as “a final judgment, order, or

1 Because C.R.C.P. 60(b) is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), we may

consider cases interpreting the federal rule, like Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U.S. 305 (2025), as persuasive authority in interpreting the Colorado rule. See Garcia v. Puerto Vallarta Sports Bar, LLC, 2022 COA 17, ¶ 22.

8 proceeding” that might entitle the plaintiff to post-judgment relief

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Waetzig, 604 U.S. at 310-19. The

Court explicitly refrained, however, from expressing any view on

whether the trial court was correct to grant relief. Id. at 319 (“We

express no view on whether that relief was proper in Waetzig’s

case.”).

¶ 20 Here, no one disputes that the district court’s dismissal order

constituted a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under

C.R.C.P. 60(b), thus permitting the court to grant the borrowers

relief under the rule if it saw fit to do so in its discretion. But it

didn’t. And the borrowers don’t explain how Waetzig or the

residuary provision otherwise renders the court’s denial of their

motion an abuse of discretion.

¶ 21 Moreover, Colorado’s residuary provision permits relief from a

final judgment, order, or proceeding only in “extreme situations or

extraordinary circumstances,” and only in “situations not covered

by the enumerated provisions.” A.P., ¶ 39 n.3 (quoting Davidson,

16 P.3d at 237). Waetzig didn’t change this. Accordingly, we

perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the

borrowers’ motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)’s residuary provision.

9 III. Disposition

¶ 22 We affirm the order.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.