Riley v. Bondi

606 U.S. 259

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 23-1270
• Status: Published

Opinion

PRELIMINARY PRINT

Volume 606 U. S. Part 1 Pages 259–304

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT June 26, 2025

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2024 259

Syllabus

RILEY v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit No. 23–1270. Argued March 24, 2025—Decided June 26, 2025 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sought to remove Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, from the United States under expedited pro- cedures for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. On January 26, 2021, the DHS issued a “fnal administrative review order” (FARO) di- recting Riley's removal to Jamaica. Under 8 U. S. C. § 1228(b)(3), aliens may petition courts of appeals for FARO review. While Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, he sought relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), telling an immigration offcer that he would likely be killed by a drug kingpin if he returned to Jamaica. The offcer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of per- secution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and concluded that Riley was entitled to relief under the CAT, which prohibits removal to countries where torture is likely. The IJ sent Riley's case to a “withholding-only” proceeding to determine whether he could be re- moved to Jamaica. At that proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. The DHS ap- pealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which vacated the IJ's order and allowed the FARO's enforcement. Three days later, Riley fled a petition for review in the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Cir- cuit dismissed Riley's petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that (1) aliens cannot obtain review of BIA decisions in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings by fling within 30 days of that decision, and (2) § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day fling deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a mandatory claims- processing rule. Held: 1. BIA orders denying deferral of removal in “withholding-only” pro- ceedings are not “fnal order[s] of removal” under § 1252(b)(1). An “order of removal” includes an “order of deportation,” 110 Stat. 3009–627, which, in turn, is defned as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” § 1101(a)(47)(A). The FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021, is “the fnal order of re- moval” under the statute because it held that Riley was deportable and directed that he be removed from the United States. The order was also the Executive's fnal determination on the question of removal. 260 RILEY v. BONDI

An order of removal becomes fnal at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affrming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Because an alien in streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expire[s]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order becomes fnal immediately upon issuance. The Court's decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, buttress this conclusion. In Nasral- lah, the Court noted that CAT orders are not fnal removal orders because they do not conclude that an alien is deportable or order depor- tation. 590 U. S., at 582. The Court held that CAT orders do not “dis- turb” or “affect the validity” of fnal removal orders, so they do not merge into fnal orders because only rulings affecting the validity of a fnal removal order will merge into the fnal order for purposes of judi- cial review. Ibid. Guzman Chavez addressed whether aliens could be released during the pendency of their withholding-only proceedings. The Court held that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively fnal” regardless of their pending CAT proceedings, and “the fnality of [an] order of removal does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” 594 U. S., at 533, 539–540. The Government argues that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “administratively fnal” for purposes of detention, not whether a removal order constitutes “the fnal order of removal” for purposes of fling. But this argument con- fates when a petition for review must be fled with the issues that may be adjudicated in that proceeding. The Government then compares the purposes of fnality in §§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231, arguing that the meaning differs. Although fnality may serve different purposes under different statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of fnality necessarily var- ies. The Government raises legitimate practical concerns about re- moval orders becoming fnal before withholding-only relief is decided, but the Court must follow statutory text and precedent. The text and precedents make clear that the FARO is the fnal order of removal, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the fnality of otherwise fnal removal orders. Pp. 266–272. 2. The 30-day fling deadline under § 1252(b)(1) is a claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. Categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt the orderly and effcient adjudication of cases in the federal courts. Court precedent shows reluctance to label rules “jurisdic- Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 261

tional” unless Congress clearly signals that intent. While Congress need not use “magic words” to indicate that a rule is jurisdictional, Hen- derson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 436, the Court's recent decisions re- quire an exceedingly strong signal for jurisdictional classifcation. That demanding requirement is not met here. Section 1252(b)(1) states petitions “must be fled not later than 30 days after the date of the fnal order of removal.” This language tells aliens what to do to obtain judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It does not reference jurisdiction and lacks any language “demarcat[ing] a court's power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484. The placement of the statute also suggests it is not jurisdictional because neither the particular subsection nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction. Precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying § 1252(b)(1)'s deadline as a claims-processing rule. Before Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, the Court occasionally classifed “non- extendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. Id., at 510 (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229). In Arbaugh, however, the Court made clear that courts should only treat statutory limitations as jurisdictional if Congress “clearly states” that they have jurisdictional consequences. 546 U. S., at 515. The Court's cases since Arbaugh have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue fail this de- manding test. The one exception is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138, where the Court would not overturn a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statute as jurisdictional without clear congressional directive. There, century-old decisions held that the provision was truly jurisdictional. Id., at 134–135. While Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386, 405, characterized § 1252(b)(1)'s predecessor provision as “jurisdictional,” it used the term loosely and did not “atten[d] to the distinction between `jurisdictional' rules (as we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but mandatory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421. Since Stone, the Court has repeatedly found that fling deadlines, including mandatory ones, are not jurisdictional. Section 1252's 30-day fling rule is not jurisdictional, but because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal the Court's holding does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand. Pp. 272–277. Vacated and remanded.

Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined in full, and in which Soto- mayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, JJ., joined only as to Part II–B. 262 RILEY v. BONDI

Thomas, J., fled a concurring opinion, post, p. 277. Sotomayor, J., fled an opinion dissenting in part, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined in full, and in which Gorsuch, J., joined except as to Part IV, post, p. 281.

Keith Bradley argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Christopher F. Haas, Jeffrey Walker, and Samuel Ballingrud. Ephraim A. McDowell argued the cause for respondent in support of petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Harris, Solicitor General Prelogar, Prin- cipal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Boynton, Deputy Solicitor General Gannon, John W. Blakeley, Melissa L. Neiman-Kelting, Dawn S. Conrad, and Elizabeth K. Ottman. Stephen J. Hammer, by invitation of the Court, 604 U. S. 1040, argued the cause and fled a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Allyson N. Ho, Jonathan C. Bond, Robert A. Batista, M. Christian Talley, Lavi M. Ben Dor, and Patrick J. Fuster.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were fled for Administrative Law Professors by Zachary D. Tripp, Joshua M. Wesneski, and Alan B. Morrison, pro se; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association et al. by Sharon K. Hogue; for Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Profes- sors by Jennifer Bennett; for the Constitutional Accountability Center et al. by Elizabeth Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, Trina Realmuto, and Kris- tin Macleod-Ball; for Immigration Legal Service Providers by Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Charles Roth, Aimee Mayer-Salins, Melissa Crow, and Rob- ert Pauw; and for Juan E. Méndez, Former U. N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, by David M. Gossett. Briefs of amici curiae urging affrmance were fled for Former U. S. Attorneys General by R. Trent McCotter and Gene P. Hamilton; and for the Immigration Reform Law Institute by Christopher J. Hajec. Briefs of amici cur iae were filed for the Center for Litigation and Courts by Scott Dodson, Leah Spero, and Joshua P. Davis; and for the Pacifc Legal Foundation by Damien M. Schiff and Allison D. Daniel. Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 263

Opinion of the Court

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in dismissing petitioner Pierre Riley's petition for review on jurisdictional grounds. And in order to make that decision, we must decide two subsidiary questions: (1) whether the 30-day fling deadline for judicial review of a “fnal order of removal,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), is a jurisdictional requirement or simply a mandatory claim- processing rule; and (2) whether an alien can obtain re- view of a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in a “withholding-only” proceeding (i. e., one in which removal from the United States is not at issue) by fling a petition for review within 30 days of that decision. The answers to these questions matter in this case because Riley fled a petition for review within 30 days after a BIA order in his withholding-only proceeding but long after the issuance of a “fnal administrative review order” (FARO) that commanded his removal from the United States. The Court of Appeals held that Riley's petition was fled too late, and because it viewed the 30-day deadline as jurisdictional, it dismissed his petition. We now vacate and remand. Taking the second question frst, we hold that a BIA order in a withholding-only proceeding is not a “fnal order of re- moval,” and therefore the 30-day fling deadline cannot be satisfed by fling a petition for review within 30 days of the BIA's withholding-only order. Second, we hold that the 30- day fling deadline is not jurisdictional. Because the Gov- ernment has chosen not to seek dismissal of Riley's case on that ground, we vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. I In 1995, Pierre Riley, a citizen of Jamaica, entered the United States on a B–2 tourist visa that allowed him to stay for six months, but he did not depart when that time was up. 2 App. 54. He became a member of “a far-reaching and well- organized” drug traffcking gang and was convicted in 2008 264 RILEY v. BONDI

for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to dis- tribute more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, as well as for possession of a frearm in furtherance of a drug-traffcking crime. See United States v. Riley, 2008 WL 2662277, *1–*2 (SDNY, July 7, 2008). He was sentenced to 25 years' im- prisonment but was released in January 2021. Riley v. Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *1 (CA4, Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam). Shortly thereafter, immigration authorities took Riley into custody and sought his removal. Because he had been con- victed of an aggravated felony, his case proceeded along the supposedly streamlined track that Congress created in 1996. See 8 U. S. C. § 1228; Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen- alty Act of 1996, § 440, 110 Stat. 1277–1279. Under this proc- ess, if an immigration offcer concludes that an alien was con- victed of an aggravated felony, the offcer issues a “Notice of Intent” to deport. 8 CFR § 238.1(b)(1) (2024). The alien may challenge that determination in writing within 10 days after the notice of intent is issued. § 238.1(c)(1). If the im- migration offcer fnds that the alien is removable, or if the alien declines to challenge removability, the offcer issues a FARO specifying the country to which the alien must be de- ported. §§ 238.1(d)(1), (f)(2). The alien may then petition a court of appeals for review. See 8 U. S. C. § 1228(b)(3). In this case, it was undisputed that Riley had been con- victed of an aggravated felony, and therefore on January 26, 2021, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a FARO directing that Riley be sent back to Jamaica. Riley did not contest his removal from the United States, but he resisted return to Jamaica under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. Arti- cle Three of the Convention prohibits a signatory state from sending a person to another nation if “there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 265

subjected to torture.” The United States became a full party to the CAT in 1994, see United Nations, General As- sembly, Report of the Committee Against Torture, 55 U. N. GAOR Supp. No. 55, p. 44, U. N. Doc. A/55/44 (2000), and as subsequently required by legislation, see Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681–822, regulations implementing the CAT's requirements were then adopted. As relevant here, these regulations prohibit the removal of an alien to a country where torture is likely. See generally 8 CFR § 208.16. Seeking relief under the CAT, Riley told an immigration offcer that a wealthy and powerful Jamaican drug kingpin had it in for Riley's family, had killed two of his cousins, was infuential with the police and politicians in Jamaica, and would likely kill Riley if he was returned to any place in that country. See 2 App. 66–70. The offcer concluded that Riley did not demonstrate reasonable fear of persecution, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) disagreed and therefore sent Ril- ey's case to what is called a “withholding-only” proceeding— that is, a proceeding at which the only issue is whether the alien may be removed to his home country. At Riley's withholding-only proceeding, the IJ found Riley credible and granted deferral of removal to Jamaica under the CAT. 2024 WL 1826979, *1. The DHS appealed that decision to the BIA, which found that Riley's claim was “not supported by suffcient objective evidence.” 1 App. 50. Accordingly, the BIA vacated the IJ's order and thus allowed the FARO to be enforced. 2024 WL 1826979, *1. Three days after the issuance of that order, Riley fled a petition for review in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, but the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the fnal order of removal in Riley's case was the FARO issued on January 26, 2021, not the later BIA order denying CAT relief. This meant that Riley's petition had not been fled on time, and because the 266 RILEY v. BONDI

court thought that the 30-day fling deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is jurisdictional, it dismissed Riley's petition. Id., at *1–*2. In holding that the 30-day fling deadline is jurisdictional, the Fourth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit, but its holding conficted with decisions of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Compare Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 571–572 (CA4 2023); F. J. A. P. v. Garland, 94 F. 4th 620, 626 (CA7 2024), with Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F. 4th 698, 705 (CA5 2023); Alonso-Juarez v. Garland, 80 F. 4th 1039, 1046–1047 (CA9 2023). And in holding that the 30-day fling deadline begins to run when a FARO is issued, the Fourth Circuit joined the Second Circuit, see Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F. 4th 180, 192–194 (CA2 2022), but its decision was at odds with decisions of numerous other Circuits, most of which were handed down before our decisions in Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573 (2020), and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021), analyzed related issues. See Jimenez- Morales v. Attorney Gen., 821 F. 3d 1307, 1308 (CA11 2016); Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F. 3d 27, 35 (CA1 2017); Bonilla v. Ses- sions, 891 F. 3d 87, 90, n. 4 (CA3 2018); Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F. 4th, at 706; F. J. A. P., 94 F. 4th, at 635–636; Alonso- Juarez, 80 F. 4th, at 1046; Arostegui-Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F. 4th 1132, 1142–1143 (CA10 2023); Kolov v. Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 918–919 (CA6 2023). We granted certiorari to resolve these two splits. Riley v. Garland, 604 U. S. 1007 (2024). Because the Government agreed with Riley's position on both issues, we appointed Stephen J. Hammer as amicus curiae to defend the judg- ment below. 604 U. S. 1040 (2024). He has ably discharged his responsibilities. II A Under 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), a petition for review of a “fnal order of removal” must be fled within 30 days of that order. Riley and the Government argue that Riley's peti- Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 267

tion was fled on time because it was fled within 30 days of the BIA order denying deferral of removal, and we must therefore decide whether that order is a “fnal order of re- moval.” We conclude that it is not.

1 The statutory text speaks directly and clearly to this ques- tion. While the Immigration and Nationality Act does not defne the term “order of removal,” any statutory reference to “an order of removal” is “deemed to include a reference to . . . an order of deportation.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 309(d)(2), 110 Stat. 3009–627. An “order of deportation,” in turn, is de- fned as an order “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). So an “order of removal” must have those same characteristics. We must therefore identify which order concluded that Riley is “deportable” and commanded his deportation, and it is clear that the qualifying order is the FARO issued by DHS on January 26, 2021. That order held that Riley was deport- able and directed that he be removed from the United States. See 1 App. 8. The order was also the Executive's fnal determination on the question of removal. An order of removal becomes fnal at the earlier of two points: (1) “a determination by the [BIA] affrming such order,” or (2) “the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to” petition the BIA for review of the order. § 1101(a)(47)(B). This statutory defnition ties fnality to agency review. Because an alien in streamlined removal proceedings cannot seek review of his FARO before an IJ or the BIA, the period to seek review “expir[es]” as soon as the FARO is issued—meaning that the order be- comes fnal immediately upon issuance. Therefore, under a straightforward reading of the statutory text, Riley's FARO constituted “the fnal order of removal” in this case. 268 RILEY v. BONDI

2 Our decisions in Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez buttress this conclusion. Although the ultimate issue in each of those cases differed from the question now before us, both deci- sions are instructive. In Nasrallah, the question was whether the alien could mount a factual challenge to the denial of relief under the CAT. Because the alien had been convicted of aggravated felonies, § 1252(a)(2)(C) prevented him from challenging the factual fndings on the basis of which his removal had been ordered. See 590 U. S., at 576–577, 581. But the Govern- ment argued that § 1252(a)(2)(C), in combination with § 1252(b)(9) (the so-called “zipper clause,” see Guerrero- Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020)), also barred the alien from raising a factual challenge to his CAT order. See Brief for Respondent in Nasrallah v. Barr, O. T. 2019, No. 18–1432, p. 35. The zipper clause provides that judicial review of any “questions of law and fact” that arise in re- moval proceedings may occur “only in judicial review of a fnal order under this section.” § 1252(b)(9). As the Gov- ernment saw it, the zipper clause merged the disposition of the CAT claim into the fnal order of removal, and since the alien could not challenge the removal decision on factual grounds, the alien should also be unable to challenge the fac- tual basis for the denial of CAT relief. See 590 U. S., at 584–585. We disagreed. See id., at 582–583. We noted that a CAT order is not a fnal order of removal because “it is not an order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering de- portation.' ” Id., at 582. And what is more, we held, a CAT order “does not disturb” or “affect the validity” of a fnal order of removal. Ibid. We therefore held that the BIA's CAT order “d[id] not merge into” a fnal order of removal for purposes of judicial review because only “rulings that affect the validity of the fnal order of removal” merge into that order. Ibid. Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 269

Our reasoning in Guzman Chavez was similar. The ques- tion there was whether the aliens in question could be re- leased during the pendency of their withholding-only pro- ceedings, and the answer to that question hinged on whether the aliens were being detained under § 1226(a)(2), which allows release before an alien is ordered removed, or under §§ 1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2), which make detention mandatory after removal has become “ `administratively fnal.' ” 594 U. S., at 527–528. In Guzman Chavez, the aliens' removal had been ordered by DHS, and that determination was not being challenged, but proceedings in which they were seeking withholding of removal were still in progress. Id., at 532. We held that the aliens were detained under §§ 1231(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) and, as a result, could not be re- leased. Id., at 533. We reasoned that the directive that they be removed had become “administratively fnal” and that the pendency of the withholding-only proceedings did not alter that fact. See id., at 540. Withholding-only pro- ceedings, we said, do not “affec[t]” a removal order's “valid- ity,” and an alien's initiation of such proceedings “does not render non-fnal an otherwise `administratively fnal' . . . order of removal.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit- ted). “[T]he fnality of the order of removal,” we explained, “does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” See id., at 539. For present purposes, the lessons taught by Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez are clear. An order denying relief under the CAT is not a fnal order of removal and does not affect the validity of a previously issued order of removal or render that order non-fnal. That teaching dooms Riley's argu- ment here. 3 Riley and the Government struggle to escape the reason- ing of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez, but their efforts are unconvincing. Riley begins by arguing at length that in a 270 RILEY v. BONDI

case like his, an order denying withholding of removal or CAT relief should be regarded as marking the point in time of a fnal order because it occurs last and enables the FARO to be executed. See Brief for Petitioner 29–34. But as al- ready explained, this argument runs headlong into Nasral- lah and Guzman Chavez. The Government, while agreeing with the court below that a CAT or withholding-only relief order is not itself a fnal order of removal, also contends that a previously issued re- moval order cannot become fnal “until the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings.” Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 42–43. But Guzman Chavez makes clear that “the fnality of [an] order of removal does not de- pend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only pro- ceedings.” See 594 U. S., at 539. The Government responds that the question in Guzman Chavez was whether the removal order in that case was “ad- ministratively final” for purposes of detention under § 1231(a)(1)(B), not whether, as in this case, a removal order constitutes “the fnal order of removal” under § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day fling rule. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 44–45. The Government notes that the language in these two provisions is not exactly the same, and it argues that there are two good reasons why the concept of fnal- ity should be seen as having different meanings under §§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231. The frst of these arguments analogizes review under § 1252(b)(1) to an appeal from a district court's “fnal deci- sio[n]” under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 46. Since an appeal from a fnal district court decision provides the vehicle for reviewing all prior district court rulings, the Government argues that there should be a single review proceeding in a case like this. Ibid. This argument confates two separate issues: (1) when a petition for review must be fled and (2) the issues that may Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 271

be adjudicated in that proceeding. We agree that there can be only one review proceeding in a case like Riley's, and we also agree with the obvious proposition that review of the denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the BIA has de- nied such relief. That does not mean, however, that an order denying CAT relief is the fnal order of removal in a case like Riley's or that a previously issued removal order remains non-fnal until CAT relief is denied. Instead, the only conclusion that the Government's argument supports is that review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding. The Government's second argument regarding the mean- ing of fnality in §§ 1252(b)(1) and 1231 rests on its under- standing of the reasons why fnality is important under those two provisions. Under § 1252(b)(1), the Government as- serts, fnality is important because it marks the point at which judicial review may be sought, whereas under § 1231, the fnalization of administrative review is an event that heightens the risk that an alien, if not detained, will simply disappear. See id., at 47. We appreciate this difference, but just because fnality may serve different purposes under different statutes, it does not follow that the meaning of fnality necessarily var- ies. Here, Riley's argument does not provide an adequate reason to disregard the lessons of Nasrallah and Guzman Chavez. 4 The Government's fnal submission concerns the practical problems that it fears will arise if a removal order becomes fnal before the issue of withholding-only relief is decided. The Government worries that aliens like Riley who wish only to contest removal to their native country will not fle a petition for review until their request for withholding of removal to that destination is denied. And if an alien fles a petition for review before the question of withholding- only relief is settled, the Government fears that the proceed- 272 RILEY v. BONDI

ing in the court of appeals may be wrapped up before the BIA denies withholding-only relief, and the alien may thus be deprived of any judicial review of that denial. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 36–38. These are legitimate practical concerns, but we must nev- ertheless follow the statutory text and our prior precedents. And in any event, these problems are not unavoidable. In a case like this, the Government can inform aliens of the need to fle a petition within 30 days after the issuance of a FARO, and it can alert the court of appeals to the pendency of a withholding-only proceeding so that review there can wait until that issue is decided. And if requests for withholding of removal in cases like Riley's are decided expeditiously— and that was the whole point of the supposedly streamlined procedure adopted by Congress to effect the quick removal of dangerous aliens*—petitions for review of removal orders should not linger long on a court of appeals docket before the withholding issue is ready for review. Finally, if the Government makes a general practice of what it has done in Riley's case, i. e., declining to press for enforcement of the 30-day fling rule, aliens who are mistaken about when a peti- tion for review must be fled will not be hurt. In sum, the statutory text and our precedents make clear that the FARO is the fnal order of removal in this case, and withholding-only proceedings do not disturb the fnality of an otherwise fnal order of removal.

B We turn next to the question whether § 1252(b)(1)'s 30-day deadline for fling a petition for review is “jurisdictional.”

*The Government reminds us that such proceedings have often lasted many months and even years. See Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 37 (citing Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 574 (CA4 2023) (Floyd, J., concurring in judgment); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523, 552 (2021) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). That is surely not what Congress anticipated when it enacted the streamlined procedure. Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 273

This question is important because categorizing a rule as jurisdictional has important consequences that may disrupt the orderly and effcient adjudication of cases in the federal courts. Courts generally decide only the questions that are presented by the parties. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 434 (2011). If a party neglects to raise, concedes, or waives an issue, a court generally has no obligation to consider it. See Wilkins v. United States, 598 U. S. 152, 157–158 (2023); see also Union Pacifc R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 558 U. S. 67, 81–82 (2009) (noting that nonjuris- dictional matters are “ordinarily forfeited if the party assert- ing the rule waits too long to raise the point” (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). True jurisdictional requirements, however, are different. A federal court must always satisfy itself that it has jurisdic- tion. See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 408–409 (2015). Thus, even if the parties fail to spot a juris- dictional issue or agree that the court has jurisdiction, the court cannot proceed unless it makes an independent deter- mination that it has jurisdiction. See Henderson, 562 U. S., at 434; see also 33 C. Wright, C. Koch, & R. Murphy, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8316, p. 50 (2018) (“[A] litigant's fail- ure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable considerations” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Relying on a string of decisions issued during the past 19 years, Riley and the Government argue that the 30-day fling deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is not a jurisdictional rule but is in- stead a “quintessential claim-processing rul[e].” Brief for Petitioner 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Brief for Respondent in Support of Petitioner 18–21. Amicus, on the other hand, maintains that the 30-day deadline is juris- dictional, and because Riley did not fle within 30 days of the fnal order of removal, he agrees with the Fourth Circuit that Riley's petition had to be dismissed. See Brief for Court- 274 RILEY v. BONDI

Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 15–22. Riley and the Government have the better argu- ment on this issue. 1 Because jurisdictional rules have a unique capacity to dis- rupt the orderly adjudication of disputes, we are reluctant to label a rule “jurisdictional” unless Congress has clearly signaled that the rule is meant to have that status. See Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 409–410; Henderson, 562 U. S., at 435–436. We have said that Congress “need not use magic words in order to speak clearly” on the question whether a provision is jurisdictional, id., at 436, but our pat- tern of recent decisions shows that we will not categorize a provision as “jurisdictional” unless the signal is exceedingly strong. And in this case, that demanding requirement is not met. We start with the text of the statute. Section 1252(b)(1) provides that “[t]he petition for review must be fled not later than 30 days after the date of the fnal order of removal.” This language tells aliens what they must do if they want judicial review, but it provides no directives to courts. It makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any language “demarcat[ing] a court's power.” Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U. S. 480, 484 (2024); see Henderson, 562 U. S., at 438; Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 411. The placement of the 30-day fling rule also weighs against amicus's argument. Neither the particular subsection nor the broader section in which the deadline is placed concerns jurisdiction, but there are other sections in which the dead- line could have been housed if it had been meant to have jurisdictional status. One possibility is § 1252(b)(4), which delineates the bounds of an appellate court's review author- ity. Another is § 1252(a)(2), which is entitled “Matters not subject to judicial review.” (Boldface deleted.) But Con- gress eschewed those logical homes for a true jurisdictional provision. Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 275

2 Our precedents extending back nearly 20 years support classifying § 1252(b)(1)'s fling deadline as a claims-processing rule. Prior to our decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500 (2006), we had occasionally classifed “nonex- tendable time limit[s]” as jurisdictional. Id., at 510 (citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, 229 (1960)). And in several other cases, we had issued what we have called “ `drive-by' ” jurisdictional statements—that is, we had loosely stated that “ `jurisdictio[n]' ” was lacking without con- sidering whether the defect really concerned a limitation on the court's capacity to decide as opposed to a threshold re- quirement that a party had to satisfy in order to go forward. 546 U. S., at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better En- vironment, 523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998)). Since Arbaugh, however, we have been more disciplined in our use of the term “jurisdictional.” In that case, we were required to decide whether satisfying Title VII's defnition of a covered “employer,” which turns on the number of em- ployees in a work force, was a jurisdictional requirement. 546 U. S., at 503. In holding that this coverage requirement is not jurisdictional, we made clear that courts should treat a “statutory limitation” as jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” that the provision has jurisdictional conse- quences. Id., at 515–516. And since Arbaugh, our cases have almost uniformly found that the provisions at issue failed to meet this very demanding test. See, e. g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 166 (2010); Hender- son, 562 U. S., at 441–442; Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Med- ical Center, 568 U. S. 145, 154–155 (2013); Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411; Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 211 (2022); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 158–159; Harrow, 601 U. S., at 485. The one exception to this pattern is John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130 (2008)—and, not surprisingly, that decision is the centerpiece of amicus's ar- 276 RILEY v. BONDI

gument. See Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 17–22, 26–30. But the situation in John R. Sand was quite different from the situation here. In John R. Sand, decisions going back more than a century had held that the provision in question and its predecessors were truly jurisdictional. 552 U. S., at 134–135. They did not simply use that term but referred to the unique charac- teristics of jurisdictional provisions. See Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123, 125–126 (1883); Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227, 232–233 (1887). And we held that we will not overturn a “defnitive earlier interpretation” of a statute as jurisdictional unless Congress has provided a clear contrary directive. See John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137–138. Here, amicus argues that Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386 (1995), is like the earlier jurisdictional decisions on which we relied in John R. Sand. In Stone, the Court characterized § 1252(b)(1)'s predecessor as “jurisdictional,” 514 U. S., at 405, and amicus argues that this is a “defnitive interpreta- tion” that should be accepted, see Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 11. But we see critical differences between Stone and the established precedents in John R. Sand. Stone, to be sure, did describe a predecessor provision's fling deadline as “jurisdictional.” 514 U. S., at 405; see also Henderson, 562 U. S., at 437. As we later explained, how- ever, Stone used the term “jurisdictional” loosely and did not “atten[d] to the distinction between `jurisdictional' rules (as we understand them today) and nonjurisdictional but manda- tory ones.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411, 421 (2023). Stone suggested that all mandatory fling require- ments are jurisdictional, see 514 U. S., at 405, but since that time, we have repeatedly found that fling deadlines, includ- ing some couched in mandatory terms, are not jurisdictional. In Henderson, we unanimously held that 38 U. S. C. § 7266(a)—which provides that “a person adversely affected” by a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals “shall fle a Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 277

Thomas, J., concurring

notice of appeal . . . within 120 days”—is not a jurisdictional time bar. 562 U. S., at 441–442. We reached the same con- clusion in Boechler, where the provision at issue, 26 U. S. C. § 6330(d)(1), set the deadline for fling a petition for review in the Tax Court. 596 U. S., at 211. And most recently, in Harrow, we held that 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1)(A), which pro- vides that “any petition for review” of an order of the Merit Systems Protection Board “shall be fled within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the fnal order or decision,” is non- jurisdictional. 601 U. S., at 485. In these cases, like the present case, the statutes imposed requirements on litigants, not the courts; but even when the relevant statutory language was not litigant-focused, we have found that our clear statement rule was not satisfed. See, e. g., Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S., at 410–411 (holding that 28 U. S. C. § 2401(b), which provides that “[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented . . . within two years after such claim accrues,” is non-jurisdictional); Wilkins, 598 U. S., at 159 (holding man- datory time bar non-jurisdictional). In sum, we hold that § 1252's 30-day fling rule is not juris- dictional, but because the Government does not wish to press that ground for dismissal, it does not preclude this case from proceeding on remand.

* * * For these reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

Justice Thomas, concurring. The Court today holds that the Fourth Circuit erred in treating the 30-day deadline in 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1) as juris- dictional. Ante, at 263. I agree and join the Court's opinion 278 RILEY v. BONDI

in full. I write separately to note that the Fourth Circuit may nevertheless lack jurisdiction over this suit for a differ- ent reason. Petitioner Pierre Riley sought review of an “Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). Today's opinion makes clear that this May 31 order is not a “ `fnal order of removal.' ” Ante, at 267. Instead, it is an order denying relief under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish- ment (CAT). Congress has specifed that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review CAT orders “except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1231 (emphasis added). Thus, on remand, the Fourth Circuit should con- sider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order when the court is not conducting that review “as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” Ibid.

Page Proof Pending I Publication Through a series of statutory enactments, Congress has established a comprehensive framework for “[j]udicial re- view of a fnal order of removal.” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(1). “[A] `fnal order of removal' is a fnal order `concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.' ” Nasral- lah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi- bility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) grants the federal courts of ap- peals jurisdiction to review an alien's “fnal order of re- moval.” § 1252(a)(1). The statute makes the fling of a “petition for review” in accordance with the procedures out- lined in IIRIRA the “sole and exclusive means” for an alien to obtain judicial review of such an order. § 1252(a)(5). IIRIRA contemplates that an alien facing removal may bring a “claim” under the CAT. § 1252(a)(4). The CAT is an international human rights treaty that, as relevant here, Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 279

prohibits the removal of an alien to a country where the alien is likely to be tortured. CAT claims are addressed in the frst instance by an immigration judge. The immigration judge's decision is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals, an administrative body within the Executive Branch. This Court has made clear that “CAT orders are not the same as fnal orders of removal.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 582 (emphasis deleted). “An order granting CAT relief means only that, notwithstanding the order of removal, the [alien] may not be removed to the designated country of re- moval, at least until conditions change in that country.” Ibid. “A CAT order is not itself a fnal order of removal because it is not an order `concluding that the alien is deport- able or ordering deportation.' ” Ibid. While IIRIRA acknowledges that an alien may bring a “claim” under the CAT, see § 1252(a)(4), jurisdiction for judi- cial review of CAT claims comes from a different statute— the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), see § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681–822, note following 8 U. S. C. § 1231. FARRA specifes that no federal court shall have “jurisdiction to consider or review claims raised under the [CAT] except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal pursuant to [8 U. S. C. § 1252].” § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–822; see also 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) (stating that the fl- ing of “a petition for review fled with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with [§ 1252]” is the “sole and exclu- sive means for judicial review” of any CAT claim). IIRIRA also contains a “zipper clause,” which provides for consolidation in judicial review. The zipper clause states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” judicial review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” shall be “available only in judicial review of a fnal order under this section.” § 1252(b)(9). The upshot is straightforward: Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over all questions 280 RILEY v. BONDI

of law and fact that arise from removal proceedings unless the court is reviewing “a fnal order” under § 1252(a)(1) or exercising jurisdiction “otherwise provided” in § 1252. § 1252(b)(9). The zipper clause plainly covers CAT claims because CAT claims “aris[e] from” removal proceedings. Ibid.; see also Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 585. It follows that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review CAT claims “unless they are re- viewing `a fnal order' under § 1252(a)(1) or exercising juris- diction `otherwise provided' in § 1252.” Jennings v. Rodri- guez, 583 U. S. 281, 316 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Section 1252 does not contain “a specifc grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 591–592 (Thomas, J., dissenting). FARRA—not § 1252—“provides for judicial review of CAT claims.” Id., at 580 (majority opinion). Thus, on my read- ing of the relevant statutes, courts cannot review CAT claims unless they are reviewing a fnal order of removal. II Riley has never petitioned for judicial review of a fnal order of removal. See Brief for Petitioner 10–12. He peti- tioned the Fourth Circuit only for “review of the Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . entered on May 31, 2022.” 1 App. 42 (emphasis deleted). And, as the Court today holds, this May 31 order addressing Riley's CAT claim is not a fnal order of removal. Ante, at 267. I do not see how the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction to review a CAT order in isolation when the petitioner does not seek review of a fnal order of removal. Congress has provided that federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review an order denying CAT relief “except as part of the review of a fnal order of removal.” § 2242(d), 112 Stat. 2681–822 (emphasis added). “In other words, a fnal order of removal is required if a court is to review a CAT order at all.” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 281

Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part

Riley has undoubtedly received a fnal order of removal. But, he has never sought judicial review of that order pursu- ant to the procedures outlined in § 1252. This Court has held that “CAT orders may be reviewed together with fnal orders of removal in a court of appeals.” Id., at 581 (empha- sis added). But, as far as I am aware, we have never held that judicial review of CAT orders is available when an alien does not petition for review of a fnal order of removal. “[W]e can address jurisdictional issues in any order we choose.” Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U. S. 1, 4 (2023); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999) (there is no mandatory “sequencing of juris- dictional issues”). In this case, we decide only the issue on which we granted certiorari: the correctness of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction based on the timing of Riley's petition for review. We do not decide whether Riley's case is otherwise free of jurisdictional defects. On remand, the Fourth Circuit must assure itself of its jurisdiction before it can proceed to the merits of Riley's pe- tition. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 101–102 (1998). I encourage the Fourth Circuit to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review a CAT order—and only a CAT order—when the petitioner does not seek review of a fnal order of removal.

Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Kagan and Justice Jackson join, and with whom Justice Gorsuch joins as to all but Part IV, dissenting in part. Sometimes, to ask a question is to answer it. When peti- tioner Pierre Riley received an order from the Department of Homeland Security notifying him it would seek to deport him to Jamaica, he timely sought deferral of that removal on the ground that he would likely be killed upon his return there. After initially winning such relief from an Immigra- tion Judge, Riley lost before the Board of Immigration Ap- 282 RILEY v. BONDI

peals. The question is when Riley should have petitioned for judicial review of the Board's order. Was his petition due 30 days after the Government frst notifed him he would be deported, well over a year before the Board issued the order Riley sought to challenge? Or was it instead due 30 days after the order denying his claim for deferral of re- moval? The answer is clear: One should not be required to appeal an order before it exists. Incomprehensibly, the Court disagrees. It acknowledges that the immigration laws required Riley to appeal the De- partment's decision that he was “deportable” together with the Board's (much later) order denying him relief from re- moval to Jamaica. It admits that the only way to review both orders is to do so after the latter of the two issues. Yet it concludes Riley's appeal was due before the Board issued the second order. Because Congress did not write so inco- herent a judicial-review provision, I respectfully dissent.*

Page Proof Pending I Publication A Petitioner Pierre Riley grew up in Kingston, Jamaica. In 1995, at age 16, he entered the United States on a visitor's visa to live with his father, a U. S. citizen. Riley overstayed his visa, because (he says) he thought his father had ar- ranged for his naturalization. Eventually, Riley got in- volved in marijuana traffcking, and in 2008, a federal jury convicted him of conspiring to distribute marijuana and pos- sessing a frearm in furtherance of that conspiracy. For those offenses, a Federal District Court sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. In January of 2021, after serving nearly 15 years of his sentence, Riley moved for compassionate release, arguing that his Type 2 diabetes and the COVID–19 pandemic consti-

*The majority correctly holds that the deadlines in this case are not jurisdictional, ante, at 272–277, so I join Part II–B of its opinion. Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 283

tuted extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying his re- lease. The District Court agreed. A few days later, the Department of Homeland Security served Riley with notice that it would seek to remove him from the United States. Because Riley had been convicted of an aggravated felony, the Government could pursue his removal “without a hearing before an immigration judge.” 8 CFR § 238.1(b)(2)(i) (2024); 8 U. S. C. § 1228(c). Instead, after providing Riley an opportunity to contest his remov- ability in writing, an immigration offcer simply issued a “Final Administrative Removal Order,” fnding him “deport- able” and ordering him “removed from the United States t[o] Jamaica.” 1 App. 7–8. Riley received this removal order on January 28, 2021. B The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu- man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113, categorically prohibits signatory states from returning any person “to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The United States has been a party to the Convention since 1994, and federal statutes and regu- lations implement its requirements. See ante, at 265; 8 CFR § 208.16(c). “A conviction of an aggravated felony has no effect on CAT eligibility” and “the Attorney General has no discretion to deny relief to a noncitizen who estab- lishes his eligibility.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 188, n. 1 (2013). That is why even noncitizens like Riley, who are statutorily ineligible for administrative hearings on removability, are nonetheless entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge if they express a credible fear of torture in their country of removal. Such hearings are known as withholding-only or CAT proceedings, and their result can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 CFR § 208.31(e). 284 RILEY v. BONDI

After receiving his removal order, Riley told an asylum offcer that a powerful drug dealer affliated with the Jamai- can Government had been targeting his family and had mur- dered two of his cousins. 2 App. 66. Riley feared that he, too, would be killed upon his return to Jamaica. The offcer found Riley “credible,” but nonetheless concluded he was in- eligible for CAT relief. Id., at 59. At a subsequent hearing before an Immigration Judge, Riley again testifed that he feared removal to Jamaica. Riley explained that, following his compassionate release, “a big drug kingpin” who functioned as a major political leader in his Kingston neighborhood and was “tied in with all facets of law enforcement” had threatened repeatedly to kill him. Administrative Record in Riley v. Garland, No. 22–1609 (CA4), p. 194; see id., at 204–207. In 2008, Riley said, the same kingpin had ordered the killing of his cousin, Oneil Spencer, after Spencer stopped “donat[ing]” money “to fund political campaigns and pay off government offcials.” Id., at 201. When another cousin, Darrel Scott, was deported from the United States to Jamaica two years later and urged the local police to investigate Spencer's murder, he too was shot and killed. Id., at 203–204. After Riley's release made the Jamaican news, his mother, sister, and brother each began receiving a constant stream of death threats directed at Riley. Id., at 207–209, 280–289. His mother reported the threats to the police, but (Riley tes- tifed) she was told that “the reason why your son is getting threats is because it's payback,” that Riley was a “criminal,” and that he would have to “pay for protection.” Id., at 208. Riley also explained that he could not evade these threats by moving elsewhere in Jamaica. As a deportee with a criminal record, Riley would be required under Jamaican law to register his address upon his return, meaning he would be easily located. Along with his CAT application for deferral of his removal to Jamaica, Riley submitted letters from his mother, sister, Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 285

brother, and stepfather corroborating his testimony. See id., at 280–289. Riley also submitted Spencer's death cer- tifcate, which lists “multiple gunshot wounds” as the cause of death. Id., at 292. The Immigration Judge found Riley's testimony credible, concluded that he was more likely than not to face torture or death upon his return to Jamaica, and granted CAT defer- ral of removal. C The Department of Homeland Security appealed the Immi- gration Judge's deferral order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board discerned “no clear error in the Immi- gration Judge's credibility determination.” 1 App. 47. Nevertheless, it concluded that Riley's claim was “based on the stringing together of a series of suppositions.” Id., at 50. Accordingly, the Board once again ordered Riley re- moved to Jamaica. The Board fled its order on May 31, 2022, 16 months after the frst administrative removal order. Three days after the Board denied relief, Riley petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review. On its own motion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court recognized that an order “denying CAT relief is reviewable `as part of the re- view of a fnal order of removal.' ” Riley v. Garland, 2024 WL 1826979, *2 (Apr. 26, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Nas- rallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. 573, 582 (2020)). By statute, noncit- izens must fle their “petition[s] for review” of such fnal re- moval orders “not later than 30 days,” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(1), a deadline the Fourth Circuit believed to be “ `jurisdictional and . . . not subject to equitable tolling,' ” 2024 WL 1826979, *1. The court concluded this 30-day window began to run on the date the original order of removal issued in January 2021, regardless of whether the associated CAT proceedings had concluded. By that logic, Riley would have been re- quired to fle his appeal of both the January 2021 fnal order of removal and the Board's May 2022 order denying CAT 286 RILEY v. BONDI

relief in February of 2021. Because he did not, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. Ibid.

II Should Riley have appealed the Board's order denying de- ferral of removal before the Board issued it? The answer ought to be easy. Yet the majority today renders the stat- ute incoherent, holding that Riley should have appealed the order one year and three months before the Board entered it. According to the majority, “statutory text and our prior precedents” require this absurd result. Ante, at 272. Our Nation's immigration laws may be complex, but the irrational scheme the Court endorses today is a product entirely of its own creation. Statutory text and precedent overwhelm- ingly confrm what common sense tells us: Riley's appeal was timely. A Page AlthoughProof Pending the majority purports to bePublication bound by the stat- ute, its cursory analysis elides all but one of the relevant provisions. Ante, at 267. Background on the statutory scheme is accordingly necessary to understanding why the question in this case arises. Early versions of the Immigration and Nationality Act granted the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review “all fnal orders of deportation,” Act of Sept. 26, 1961, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, an undefned term this Court interpreted to include “order[s] denying suspension of deportation,” Foti v. INS, 375 U. S. 217, 222 (1963). Under that framework, a noncitizen who received an order denying relief from re- moval (such as the Board's order denying Riley's CAT claim) could have appealed it as a standalone order of deportation, regardless of whether a prior order had resolved the issue of removability. Cf. Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U. S. 206, 211 (1968) (allowing separate petitions for review of “denials of discretionary relief ” following an initial removal order). Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 287

A number of amendments intended to streamline the immigration laws changed that analysis. See Kolov v. Garland, 78 F. 4th 911, 922–924 (CA6 2023) (Murphy, J., concurring) (describing these developments). Specifcally, Congress “ `consolidate[d] judicial review of immigra- tion proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U. S. 221, 230 (2020) (quot- ing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 313 (2001)). It did so by enacting the so-called zipper clause, ibid., which channels ju- dicial review of all claims “arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States” into a single appeal: the appeal of a “fnal order [of removal],” 8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(9); see also § 1252(a)(1). The zipper clause does not change the substance of what nonciti- zens may appeal. Monsalvo Velázquez v. Bondi, 604 U. S. 712, 724, and n. 1 (2025). Rather, it ensures that “a nonciti- zen's various challenges arising from the removal proceed- ing” are “ `consolidated in a petition for review and consid- ered by the courts of appeals.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580. “Importantly,” the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc- turing Act of 1998 expressly “provides for judicial review of CAT claims.” Id., at 580. Thus, noncitizens (including those whose opportunities for judicial review are otherwise limited on account of criminal convictions) can obtain judicial review of orders denying CAT relief. Id., at 580–581. Be- cause such challenges “aris[e]” out of the removal proceed- ings, however, the zipper clause applies to them. § 1252(b)(9). And the zipper clause would not achieve its goal, of “[c]onsolidat[ing]” the relevant appeals, ibid., if non- citizens had to appeal each issue separately. That is why, as the Act directs, “a petition for review fled with an appro- priate court of appeals in accordance with” the statute gov- erning fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the 288 RILEY v. BONDI

[CAT].” § 1252(a)(4). A petition for review under § 1252, in turn, “must be fled not later than 30 days after the date of the fnal order of removal.” § 1252(b)(1). All this explains why, though Riley seeks to appeal the denial of CAT relief and not the fnding that he is removable, the appellate deadline in his case nonetheless depends on identifying the “order of removal” and determining when it became “fnal.” Ibid. An “order of removal” is the same as an “ `order of depor- tation.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 579, 584. Along with the other 1990s amendments, Congress enacted a statutory defnition of that term, defning it as the order “conclud- ing that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” § 1101(a)(47)(A). Subsequently, this Court held that a CAT order “is not itself a fnal order of removal” as defned in the statute. Id., at 582. In light of that holding, the majority correctly identifes the relevant “order of removal” as the January 2021 administrative order holding Riley removable. The only question, then, is when that order became fnal for purposes of the 30-day appeal window. B Riley's order of removal did not became fnal, for purposes of appeal, until the Board issued its order denying CAT relief. Congress expressly provided for judicial review of “any cause or claim” under CAT. § 1252(a)(4). Self- evidently, such review “cannot take place until the [Board] has denied . . . relief.” Ante, at 271. Meanwhile, Congress directed that CAT orders must be appealed alongside the underlying order of removal. The only way to adhere to both instructions is to hold that removal orders do not be- come fnal until withholding-only proceedings are complete. Centuries of precedent on fnality confrm that conclusion. 1 Immigration laws defne fnality, but only with respect to orders of removal subject to direct Board review. Congress Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 289

provided that orders of removal “shall become fnal upon the earlier of . . . (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affrming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals. ” § 1101(a)(47)(B). Sensibly, then, the statute ties fnality to the close of the relevant agency proceedings. In the mine run of cases, an immigration judge hears claims about removability together with claims about protec- tion from or deferral of removal (such as CAT claims) in a single proceeding, which ends in a consolidated appeal to the Board. The fnality provision makes clear that, in those cases, the underlying removal order becomes fnal once the Board has concluded its review. Expedited removal orders like the one issued in Riley's case, however, are not subject to Board review at all. § 1228(b). Rather, a noncitizen subject to expedited removal can appeal only a withholding claim to the Board, and not the removal order itself. By its plain terms, the statute's fnality provision does not apply to such removal orders. That is because, in such cases, there will never be “a determi- nation by the Board” affrming the removal order, nor is there any “period in which the alien is permitted to seek review” of it. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Thus, the statutory defni- tion alone does not resolve this case. The majority claims the statutory defnition renders the order of removal fnal immediately upon its issuance. That is so, the majority says, because when a removal order is not appealable, “the period to seek review [of it] `expir[es]' as soon as the [order] is issued.” Ante, at 267. In other words, the majority treats a nonexistent appeals period as if it were merely an infnitesimally short period, one so short as to “expir[e]” instantaneously. That makes no sense. “Expiration,” after all, means the “conclusion [or] termination of a limited time.” See Web- ster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 645 (2d ed. 1979); 290 RILEY v. BONDI

Black's Law Dictionary 579 (6th ed. 1990) (“Cessation; termi- nation from mere lapse of time, as the expiration date of a lease, insurance policy, statute, and the like”); Black's Law Dictionary 722 (12th ed. 2024) (“The ending of a fxed period of time”). A period of time cannot “expire” if it never be- gins in the frst place. For example, a statute fning those who apply for a driver's license after “the expiration of the period” for which they hold the license plainly would not apply to a frst-time applicant. As to that applicant, there is no “period” (much less a limited or fxed one) that could “expir[e].” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). So too here. The majority gives no argument for reaching the opposite conclusion. It stands alone, moreover, in asserting that a “straightforward reading of the statutory text” resolves this case. Ante, at 267. Even the courts of appeals that have attempted to defend the majority's position admit that “[t]he defnition of fnality in § 1101(a)(47)(B) does not squarely apply” to expedited orders of removal because noncitizens “may not appeal [those] decision[s] to the BIA (or even to an immigration judge).” Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F. 4th 180, 192 (CA2 2022); Martinez v. Garland, 86 F. 4th 561, 568 (CA4 2023) (“An alien cannot appeal an immigration off- cer's reinstatement decision to the Board, so at frst blush this defnition appears inapposite”).

2 Absent an unambiguous answer in the statute's defnition of fnality, the Court should turn to tools of statutory con- struction: the “ `ordinary or natural' meaning” of the term “fnal,” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004), “ ` “the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice” ' ” associated with fnality, Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U. S. 192, 200 (2025), and the relevant provisions' “ `place in the overall statutory scheme,' ” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U. S. 697, 721 (2022). Beginning with the ordinary meaning of “fnal,” this Court has previously recognized that term “clearly denotes some Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 291

kind of terminal event.” Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U. S. 471, 479 (2019). Thus, an order becomes “final” when it “ `leav[es] nothing to be looked for or expected,' ” when it “ `leav[es] no further chance for action, discussion, or change.' ” Ibid., and n. 8 (quoting 5 Oxford English Diction- ary 920 (2d ed. 1989) and Webster's New World College Dic- tionary 542 (5th ed. 2016)). Of course, an order can be terminal in one sense and not another. Consider a conviction. Once a jury delivers, and the court enters, a guilty verdict, nothing remains “to be looked for or expected” from that court with respect to the conviction. In that sense, a conviction is as fnal as its gets. Nevertheless, “appellate review” is prohibited “until convic- tion and imposition of sentence.” Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 263 (1984). So for purposes of appeal, a conviction remains nonfnal until sentencing is complete as well. Yet another rule of fnality applies to the availability of collateral review. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U. S. 113, 119 (2009) (noting that, under 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), a state-court conviction is not fnal for purposes of federal collateral review until the end of direct review or of the time for seeking such review). This multiplicity of fnality rules makes clear that it is not enough to muse about fnality in the abstract. Rather, the Court must focus on the specifc sense of fnality relevant here, which (all agree) is fnality for purposes of appeal. Be- cause “ `[f]inality as a condition of review is an historic char- acteristic of federal appellate procedure,' ” Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263, centuries of precedent and practice inform that analysis. As a general matter, an order is fnal for purposes of ap- peal “when the district court disassociates itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of frst instance save execution of the judgment.” Clay v. United States, 537 U. S. 522, 527 (2003). That understanding of fnality serves one central purpose: preventing piecemeal litigation. As 292 RILEY v. BONDI

this Court put it long ago, “[f]rom the very foundation of our judicial system,” rules of fnality have ensured that “the whole case and every matter in controversy in it” is “decided in a single appeal.” McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 665–666 (1891). That is why this Court's fnality jurisprudence is grounded “not in merely technical conceptions of `fnality,' ” but rather in the policy “against piecemeal litigation.” Cat- lin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233–234 (1945). The reason for that focus is simple: The only way to ensure that orders are appealed together is to have them become fnal together as well. Otherwise, an expiring deadline on an earlier order (say, a conviction) would force individuals to appeal that order before the remaining issues in the case (say, a criminal sentence) have been resolved. So when two orders must be consolidated into the same appeal, it follows inescapably that they become final together, as well. Whether a ruling is fnal for purposes of appeal therefore depends principally on whether that ruling can, consistent with the policy against piecemeal review, be appealed inde- pendently. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U. S. 148, 152–153 (1964) (collecting cases). An example illustrates the point. Sometimes, a dispute over an award of attorney's fees follows the conclusion of litigation on the merits. At present, “[t]here is no question that awards of attorney's fees may be appealed separately as fnal orders after a fnal determination of liability on the mer- its.” García-Goyco v. Law Environmental Consultants, Inc., 428 F. 3d 14, 18 (CA1 2005). Thus, for example, when a party loses a civil case at trial, it may appeal the jury verdict before the fee litigation has concluded. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 168–169 (1939). Be- cause separate appeals are permitted, the fnality of the mer- its judgment does not depend on the status of the attorney's fees dispute. Suppose, now, that Congress passed a law providing that an appeal from fnal judgment “shall be the sole and exclu- Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 293

sive means for judicial review of ” an order awarding attor- ney's fees. Cf. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). That law should have the effect of overruling the courts' present assessment that such orders are best appealed separately. Courts would un- doubtedly recognize that merits judgments could no longer become fnal while fee litigation remained pending, because a statute now directs otherwise. The perceived need for separate appealability was, after all, the basis for the prior fnality rule. Keeping the old fnality rule in place in the face of the hypothetical statute, moreover, would force liti- gants to choose between appealing the merits judgment on time, thus forgoing their appeal of any eventual fee award, or fling their only appeal late. No court would adopt such a scheme. Yet that is precisely what the Court does today with re- spect to appeals from CAT orders. Recall that withholding- only decisions (which now include CAT orders) once were independently appealable as orders of deportation. See supra, at 286. Congress then enacted § 1252(a)(4), which says that “a petition for review” under the section governing fnal orders of removal “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” In other words, Congress directed that appeals from orders of removal and CAT orders be “ `consolidated in a [single] petition for review.' ” Nasrallah, 590 U. S., at 580. That should only mean one thing. Because a statute ties appeals of the CAT order to appeals of the removal order, their fnal- ity should be tied together, too. Accordingly, the order of removal in this case should become fnal, for purposes of ap- peal, only after the Board issued its order denying CAT relief. 3 That the majority nonetheless adopts the opposite posi- tion, contrary to every one of this Court's fnality precedents, might suggest there is reason to doubt that CAT orders are appealable at all. Yet statutory text and this Court's prece- 294 RILEY v. BONDI

dent are crystal clear on this point: Congress provided for judicial review of CAT claims. Section 1252(a)(4) provides that “a petition for review” under that section “shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under the [CAT].” No “exclusive means” for review would be possible if review were unavailable. That is why this Court held in Nasrallah that “a noncitizen may obtain judicial review of . . . CAT orders,” 590 U. S., at 583, even as the dissent complained that the Court wrongly “view[ed] § 1252(a)(4) as a specifc grant of jurisdiction over CAT claims.” Id., at 591 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Perhaps the idea is that noncitizens may seek judicial re- view of their CAT claims only if, by luck or happenstance, they also have a challenge to the underlying order of re- moval. The majority's fnality rule, however, prevents CAT appeals even under those circumstances. After all, courts will likely fnish reviewing the removal order before the Board ever hears the associated CAT claim. Section 1252(a)(4) also does not direct courts to limit review of CAT claims in this way; it simply requires that review of the two kinds of orders be consolidated. Nor would this reading make any sense. Consider its effect on the attorney's fees hypothetical, where that reading would mean litigants could appeal a fee award only if, by luck or happenstance, they also had a meritorious challenge to the unrelated merits judgment. Importantly, this Court rejected a nearly identical argu- ment about § 1252 just months ago. In Monsalvo Velázquez, the Government argued that noncitizens seeking judicial re- view of questions arising out of their orders of removal could do so only by challenging their removability. 604 U. S., at 721–722; see also id., at 760 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (“[J]u- dicial review is available under § 1252(a)(1) only if there is a challenge to a `fnal order of removal' ”). This Court held that, “[i]nstead, § 1252 authorizes courts to review `fnal Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 295

order[s] of removal' and address `questions of law . . . arising from' them.” Id., at 722 (quoting §§ 1252(a)(1), (b)(9); em- phasis added). Nasrallah, the zipper clause, and § 1252(a)(4) each make clear that questions about one's eligibility for CAT relief are questions “arising from” the order of removal. Thus, “§ 1252 authorizes courts to review” such questions. 604 U. S., at 722. Under the “ `well-settled' and `strong presumption' ” favor- ing judicial review, “when a statutory provision `is reason- ably susceptible to divergent interpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understandings and basic principles: that executive determinations generally are subject to judicial review.' ” Guerrero-Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229. “The presumption can only be overcome by `clear and convincing evidence' of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.” Ibid.; see also Bowen v. Michigan Acad- emy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986) (“ `[J]u- dicial review of a fnal agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress' ” (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967))). It is hard to imagine any plausible reading of § 1252(a)(4) on which it cuts off judicial review of CAT claims (either com- pletely or in the arbitrary sense rejected in Monsalvo Veláz- quez), much less a “ `clear and convincing' ” one. Guerrero- Lasprilla, 589 U. S., at 229; see also Parrish v. United States, 605 U. S. 376, 384 (2025) (reiterating this Court's con- sistent holdings “that `decisions on the merits' ought not be `avoided on the basis of . . . mere technicalities' ” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962))). The majority, perhaps aware of precedent's constrains, does not dispute any of this. It acknowledges, as it must, that CAT claims are reviewable. Ante, at 271–272. Yet once the majority accepts that premise, it is left with no way to justify its construction of the judicial-review provision as requiring petitions for review to be fled well before the rele- 296 RILEY v. BONDI

vant CAT orders are issued. If judicial review is available, then it must be available after the relevant order is issued and not before. And if review is available after the relevant orders issue, then there is no conceivable reason to require applicants to fle their petitions beforehand.

III A Besides its halfhearted attempt to invoke the inapplicable statutory defnition, the majority offers a single thought about the dispositive issue of fnality. The original order, it says, “was . . . the Executive's fnal determination on the question of removal,” so it “constituted `the fnal order of removal' in this case.” Ante, at 267. The implication is that, because this order was a “fnal determination,” ibid., it became fnal the moment it was issued. This argument confates two different questions: when the agency made its fnal decision on the question of removabil- ity, and when the “order of removal” became fnal for appel- late purposes. This Court explained just months ago that “a fnding of `removability' ” is only “one term in a fnal order of removal.” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. That the agency's removability fnding is fnal therefore does not mean that the order containing it is fnal for purposes of appeal. The majority's skewed reasoning betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the fnal-judgment principle. Every in- terlocutory order fnally determines the limited question it decides, but of course that does not mean every order be- comes instantly fnal for purposes of appeal. When a dis- trict court declines to certify an expert witness, that is its fnal word on the matter, yet the order remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the entire case has been litigated to judgment. When a district court disqualifes a litigant's counsel, that order is the court's “fnal determination on the question” of disqualifcation, ante, at 267; counsel could not Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 297

show up to trial again the next day. Yet the order remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the underlying case is over. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424, 430 (1985); Flanagan, 465 U. S., at 263. Few decisions, moreover, are more fnal than a guilty verdict, yet a convic- tion remains nonfnal for purposes of appeal until the district court has pronounced a sentence. See supra, at 291. In failing to recognize as much, the majority breaks with basic principles of fnality and appellate review, holding (seemingly for the frst time) that two orders that statutorily must be appealed together nonetheless do not become fnal together. Inexplicably, the majority admits that “review of removability and withholding of removal should occur in a single appellate proceeding,” and that “review of the denial of CAT relief cannot take place until the [Board] has denied such relief.” Ante, at 271. Yet it refuses to accept the inev- itable conclusion: If the orders must be reviewed “in a single appellate proceeding,” ibid., then they become fnal for pur- poses of appeal together as well. The result: Noncitizens facing expedited removal will be forced to fle immediate ap- peals of their removal orders in every case, simply to protect their right to judicial review in the event they lose their on- going withholding-only proceedings. Across a wide variety of statutory contexts, courts have recognized that protective appeals are “procedural hoops” that “serve no function.” West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F. 2d 581, 585, 586 (CA3 1988) (explaining, in Clean Air Act case, the need “to avoid a de facto requirement of protective appeals”); Outland v. CAB, 284 F. 2d 224, 227–228 (CADC 1960) (declining to read the Administrative Procedure Act to require protective appeals while reconsideration is pending); Newark, New Castle and Seaford, Del. v. FERC, 763 F. 2d 533, 544–545 (CA3 1985) (same, in Federal Power Act case); Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 245–246 (1991) (ex- plaining, in Veterans' Judicial Review Act case, that reading protective appeal requirement into statute “would . . . pose 298 RILEY v. BONDI

a substantial administrative problem” and cause “many” claimants to “lose their right to judicial review”). Protec- tive appeal requirements “set a trap for the unwary, who, if they are not intimately familiar with the intricacies of the fnality doctrine, may inadvertently lose their right to judi- cial review.” West Penn Power Co., 860 F. 2d, at 585. For that reason, too, this Court has rejected statutory readings that would result in similar protective-appeal re- quirements, even in the face of seemingly contrary textual commands. Consider § 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: “Except as otherwise expressly re- quired by statute, agency action otherwise fnal is fnal for purposes of this section whether or not there has been pre- sented or determined an application . . . for any form of re- consideration.” 5 U. S. C. § 704. Taken literally, “[t]his would seem to mean that the pendency of reconsideration motions does not render [agency] orders nonfnal for pur- poses of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period.” ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 284 (1987). Yet “[t]hat language has long been construed by this and other courts merely to relieve parties from the requirement of pe- titioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review . . . but not to prevent petitions for reconsideration that are actually fled from rendering the orders under reconsideration nonf- nal.” Id., at 284–285; see also American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532, 541 (1970). By contrast, in Stone v. INS, 514 U. S. 386 (1995), we held that motions to reopen orders of removal did not render nonfnal the underlying removal order, precisely because petitioners “[c]ould fle a separate petition to review that second fnal [reconsideration] order.” Id., at 395. More recently, this Court has twice refused to read a protective-appeal requirement into § 1252. In Santos- Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U. S. 411 (2023), the Government advanced a reading of that section that would “food the Board with reconsideration motions that noncitizens other- Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 299

wise would not fle” and “food the courts with pointless pre- mature petitions,” fled simply to preserve the right to review. Id., at 429. This Court declined to “render the statutory scheme incoherent” in that way. Id., at 428. And earlier this year, the Government argued that, under the zip- per clause, noncitizens could challenge the terms of their removal order only if they “press[ed] a challenge to [the] fnding of `removability.' ” Monsalvo Velázquez, 604 U. S., at 722. This Court rejected that argument, too, noting it would have put noncitizens to the choice of “either adorn- [ing] their judicial petitions with a pointless challenge . . . or forfeit[ing] the right to review altogether.” Ibid. Mere months later the Court seems to have forgotten all these lessons. B The Court overlooks Santos-Zacaria, Monsalvo Veláz- quez, and the wealth of precedent on fnality, claiming in- stead that two other cases are “instructive” and require a different outcome here. Ante, at 268. Neither case sup- ports the majority's conclusion. First, the majority points to Nasrallah's holding that “a CAT order is not a fnal order of removal,” does not disturb or affect the validity of a fnal order of removal, and does not merge into such an order. Ante, at 268. The majority does not explain, however, why this holding supports its conclu- sion. An order need not “ `affect the validity' ” of a decision (or merge into it) to impact its fnality for purposes of appeal. Ibid. As noted, a sentence does not affect the validity of a conviction (and the two do not “merge”), yet a conviction cannot be fnal for purposes of appeal until the sentence is fnal as well. Notably, Nasrallah itself compared the rela- tionship between removal and CAT orders to that between a criminal conviction and sentence. 590 U. S., at 583. Nas- rallah is therefore hardly dispositive here. In any event, it should be clear by now that the majority's discussion of Nasrallah misses the point. Whether CAT or- 300 RILEY v. BONDI

ders disturb or affect the substance of removal orders would certainly be relevant if the Court conducted its fnality anal- ysis without guidance from Congress, as it did in the case of fee awards. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 531 (1882) (fee orders are “so far independent” of the merits “as to make the decision substantially a fnal decree for the pur- poses of an appeal”). But here, Congress dictated that the two orders must be consolidated for purposes of appeal. 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4). The Court is required to respect that decision and move on. The majority next points to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S. 523 (2021), as supporting its conclusion. Ante, at 269. That case concerned the 90-day removal period follow- ing an order of removal, during which the Government is required to detain noncitizens. See § 1231(a)(2). The point of such detention is to provide the Government with a rea- sonable period of time to “secure [the noncitizen's] removal.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 699 (2001). The removal period does not begin, Congress has specifed, until the re- moval order is “administratively fnal.” § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). The question was whether ongoing withholding-only pro- ceedings prevented a removal order from being administra- tively fnal for purposes of the mandatory detention period. This Court held that the administrative fnality of an order of removal “does not depend in any way on the outcome of the withholding-only proceedings.” Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at 539. Thus, the detention period begins after the agency has fnalized its removability fnding, not after fur- ther proceedings over the specifc country of removal have concluded. Id., at 534–535. Yet whether an order is “ad- ministratively fnal” for purposes of detention and whether it is “fnal” for purposes of appeal are two entirely different questions. “Finality is variously defned; like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.” Clay, 537 U. S., at 527. That is why this Court recognized in Guzman Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 301

Chavez that § 1252 “uses different language than § 1231 and relates to judicial review of removal orders rather than de- tention.” 594 U. S., at 535, n. 6. The Court thus “ex- press[ed] no view on” the question of fnality for purposes of appeal. Ibid. Nor is it at all surprising that “administratively fnal” in § 1231 and “fnal” in § 1252 should have different meanings. “In a given statute, the same term usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different mean- ings.” Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U. S. 124, 149 (2024). Because the point of detention is to ensure that a noncitizen does not fee pending his deportation, moreover, arguably all that matters for purposes of the detention statute is that the noncitizen is removable from the United States, not whether he is removable to any particular country. Guzman Chavez, 594 U. S., at 536, 539. There is “no reason to import the understanding of fnality that applies” to detention into the separate “feld” of appellate review. Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 604 U. S. 305, 315 (2025) (majority opinion of Alito, J.) (discussing the different “role[s]” of f- nality across contexts). Indeed, precisely the same two senses of fnality apply to criminal convictions. A conviction becomes fnal for purposes of presentencing detention once the jury has delivered its verdict. 18 U. S. C. § 3143(a). Yet it does not become fnal for purposes of appeal until the dis- trict court has imposed a sentence. The majority claims to “appreciate th[e] difference” be- tween the two sorts of fnality. Ante, at 271. But, the ma- jority explains, “the meaning of fnality” is not “necessarily” different, even when Congress uses different words to serve different purposes. Ibid. That truism hardly helps. The majority gives up shortly afterward, simply asserting by ipse dixit that the differences do not matter here. In light of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(4) and our fnality precedents, they clearly should. 302 RILEY v. BONDI

IV Today's holding deals untold damage to basic principles of fnality and judicial review. Time will tell whether the Court will extend its illogic beyond politically disfavored noncitizens. Cf. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 604 U. S. 146, 158, n. 5 (2025) (recognizing “unfairness . . . potentially ris[ing] to the level of a constitu- tional due process problem,” of rule that would require regu- lated businesses to seek judicial review before the applicabil- ity of an agency order to them was “reasonably foreseeable”). As it stands, the chaos the majority causes to our system of immigration appeals is considerable. The effects on non- citizens subject to expedited removal proceedings should by now be clear enough. The majority suggests a number of workarounds for that chaos, including by allowing protective appeals and notice about the need to fle such appeals long before CAT proceedings have concluded. See ante, at 271– 272. To be clear, the Government is obligated by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to provide noncitizens with adequate notice about the need for an immediate appeal to preserve the right to judicial review of CAT claims. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U. S. 91, 94 (2025) (per curiam) (“ `[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings' ” (quoting Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U. S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam); altera- tion in original)). That guarantee includes “notice that is `reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,' ” to enable “ `interested parties' ” to “pursue appropriate relief.” A. A. R. P., 605 U. S., at 94–95 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950)). So too, courts of appeals should not arbitrarily decline to hold in abeyance any premature appeals of yet-to-be-decided withholding claims. See ante, at 271–272. In addition, the courts of appeals should consider applying standard principles of equitable tolling, which are likely available now that the Court has recognized that Cite as: 606 U. S. 259 (2025) 303

§ 1252(b)(1)'s appeal deadline is not jurisdictional. See ante, at 272–277. Today's decision may have consequences beyond expedited removal proceedings, too. Recall that, in the typical case, an immigration judge decides all questions related to both removal and withholding in the same proceeding. See supra, at 289. The Board of Immigration Appeals then re- views all aspects of the immigration judge's decision. As things stand today, the noncitizen may petition for review of the Board's decision once agency review has completed. See ibid.; § 1101(a)(47)(B). Yet what if the Board affrms “an im- migration judge's removability fnding but remand[s] for fur- ther consideration of withholding claims”? Kolov, 78 F. 4th, at 927 (Murphy, J., concurring). Would the majority hold as well that such fndings become fnal before the remand is concluded, requiring noncitizens to fle premature protective appeals whenever a CAT claim is remanded? As with so much else, the majority does not say. To avoid further chaos, the Board would be well counseled to remand cases in their entirety. Finally, lest one think today's decision will at least allow the Government to conduct its immigration policies more cheaply or effciently, even that is not the case. It is not by accident that the Government, across the past and present administration, stands frmly with Riley here, even as it rarely fails to press colorable jurisdictional objections. See D iamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U. S. 100, 108 (2025). As the Government knows, “[a] whole train of unnecessary consequences” follows from requiring nonciti- zens to appeal in every expedited removal case, simply to protect their eventual right to appeal future withholding- only decisions. Outland, 284 F. 2d, at 228. In each of these unnecessary appeals, “the Board and other parties may be called upon to respond and oppose the motion for review; when the Board acts, the petition for review must be amended to bring the petition up to date,” or dismissed if 304 RILEY v. BONDI

the Board grants the noncitizen's CAT claim. Ibid. All the while, courts must manage countless cases that otherwise might never have been opened. The Government recog- nizes all these consequences. Brief for Respondent 36–38. This Court is blind to them. Today's decision is the rare holding that benefts no one. * * * Not long ago, this Court described delays in regulatory approvals of construction projects as “ `borde[ring] on the Kafkaesque.' ” Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, 605 U. S. 168, 184 (2025). In holding that Riley was required to fle his appeal 16 months before the order he sought to challenge existed, the Court surely moves from the border well into the heartland of illogic and absur- dity. Respectfully, I dissent.

Reporter’s Note

The attached opinion has been revised to refect the usual publication and citation style of the United States Reports. The revised pagination makes available the offcial United States Reports citation in advance of publication. The syllabus has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court. A list of counsel who argued or fled briefs in this case, and who were members of the bar of this Court at the time this case was argued, has been inserted following the syllabus. Other revisions may include adjustments to formatting, captions, citation form, and any errant punctuation. The following additional edits were made:

p. 266, line 8: “Argueta-Herandez” is changed to “Argueta-Hernandez” p. 272, line 18: “the” is inserted before “Government” p. 290, line 24: “the” is changed to “this”