United States v. Robert Kaluza

780 F.3d 647, 2015 A.M.C. 821, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3817, 2015 WL 1056619
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedMarch 11, 2015
Docket14-30122
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 780 F.3d 647 (United States v. Robert Kaluza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Robert Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 2015 A.M.C. 821, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3817, 2015 WL 1056619 (5th Cir. 2015).

Opinion

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

On April 20, 2010, a blowout of oil, natural gas, and mud occurred during deepwater drilling operations at the Macondo well, located on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of the blowout, the Deepwater Horizon, a drilling rig chartered by BP pic (“BP”) from Transocean Ltd. (“Transocean”), was attached to the Macondo well. Eleven men died from the resulting explosions and fires on the Deep-water Horizon. The blowout resulted in the discharge of millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.

Robert Kaluza and Donald Vidrine (“Defendants”) were “well site leaders,” the highest ranking BP employees working on the rig. Defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana on 23 counts, including 11 counts of seaman’s manslaughter in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1115. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to charge an offense because neither defendant fell within the meaning of the criminal statute. The government appeals this determination. Because we agree that neither defendant falls within the meaning of the phrase “[ejvery ... other person employed on any ... vessel,” we AFFIRM.

I

A

In May 2008, BP, through one of its affiliated companies, obtained a lease from the United States to the oil and natural gas reservoirs at a site on the OCS in the Gulf of Mexico. The first well drilled by BP at this site was referred to as the Macondo well, approximately 48 miles from the Louisiana shoreline. The seabed was approximately 5,000 feet below sea level, and the potential reservoirs were located more than 13,000 feet below the seabed. BP and its affiliates entered into contracts with Transocean, whereby Transocean provided, inter alia, a drilling rig and crews to drill.the Macondo well under BP’s supervision. BP began drilling the Macondo well in October 2009 using Transocean’s Marianas drilling rig and 'crew, but that work was halted in November 2009 due to a hurricane. In April 2010, BP resumed drilling the Macondo well using Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon drilling vessel and crew.

The Deepwater Horizon was a mobile offshore drilling rig. It was “a dynamically-positioned semi-submersible deepwater *651 drilling vessel.” 1 The rig floated on two enormous pontoons extending 30 feet below the ocean’s surface that acted as the vessel’s hull, provided stability to the rig, kept the rig afloat, and allowed the drilling floor and other work areas to remain safely above the water’s surface. The Deep-water Horizon employed dynamic satellite positioning technology connected to directional thrusters that allowed the vessel to maintain its place over the wellhead. The rig had no legs or anchors connecting it to the seabed.

When the Deepwater Horizon arrived at the Macondo well, the crew assembled a drilling structure that attached the rig to the wellhead: the structure consisted of the Blow Out Preventer stack (“BOP”) and the marine riser. The BOP, attached directly to the wellhead, was a five-story, 300-ton stack of components designed to close the well in case of an emergency. The BOP was attached to the marine riser, a pipe that was approximately 5,000 feet long and made primarily out of steel, twenty inches in diameter. The marine riser, in turn, was attached to the drill floor on the rig. In order to assemble this drilling structure, a section of the marine riser was joined to the BOP and then, as additional riser sections were added, the BOP was lowered to the seabed; remotely operated vehicles latched the BOP to the wellhead. All materials necessary to drill the well— the drilling tools, drilling mud, and other fluids — passed from the rig through the marine riser down to the wellhead.

The Deepwater Horizon maintained separate crews for different tasks, such as the “marine crew” and the “drill crew.” 2 The marine crew was provided in its entirety by Transocean, and consisted of the master (i.e., the captain), the chief mate, the chief engineer, assistant engineers, dynamic positioning officers, able bodied seamen, the boatswain, and the offshore installation manager. 3 During the time that the vessel was attached to the well, certain marine crew members were responsible for maintaining the location of the vessel over the wellhead. The drill crew was provided in part by BP, .Transocean, and other companies, and consisted of the well site leaders, toolpushers (i.e., drilling managers), the chief engineer, other engineers, drillers, assistant drillers, floorhands, roustabouts, mudloggers, and various other personnel. 4

Although BP did not own the rig nor operate it in the normal sense of the word because daily production involved few BP employees, BP’s engineering team designed the well and oversaw the implementation of the design. Most of BP’s team for the Deepwater Horizon were based on *652 shore. However, there were seven BP employees on the rig on the day of the explosion. Specifically, the two well site leaders were BP employees who were on the vessel at all times, splitting responsibility by 12-hour shifts, to direct the drill crew and contractors in their work while maintaining regular contact with the BP engineers on shore. The well site leaders were “the top BP employees” on the rig, and were known as “the company men.” They were “the company’s eyes and ears,” making “important decisions regarding the course of drilling operations.” According to BP’s Drilling and Wells Operation Practice manual, the well site leaders were accountable for the execution of drilling and well operations in compliance with BP’s health, safety, security, and environmental requirements. Under a different BP guide, in case of a well control incident, the well site leader was “responsible for , ensuring all activities are carried out in a safe and efficient manner at the location, and for proactively promoting the health, safety and welfare of all personnel on the Rig.” Kaluza and Vidrine were the two well site leaders aboard the Deepwater Horizon on the day of the explosion.

Kaluza and Vidrine were industry veterans. Kaluza has a degree in petroleum engineering and 35 years’ experience in the oil and gas industry, including more than eight years as a well site leader. He was ordinarily assigned to another rig, but was serving on the Deepwater Horizon on the day of the explosion. Vidrine had been a well site leader for more than 30 years. He had been working on the Deep-water Horizon since January 2010, and had previously worked on the Macondo well as a well site leader onboard another rig.

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780 F.3d 647, 2015 A.M.C. 821, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3817, 2015 WL 1056619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-robert-kaluza-ca5-2015.