[Cite as State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407.]
COURT OF APPEALS ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 23-COA-014 ROBERT S. HAUDENSCHILD : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 22-CRI-249
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 5, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
CHRISTOPHER TUNNELL CHRISTOPHER C. BAZELEY Ashland County Prosecutor 9200 Montgomery Road, Ste. 8A 110 Cottage Street, Third Floor Cincinnati, OH 45242 Ashland, OH 44805 Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 2
Gwin, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert Haudenschild [Haudenschild] appeals his
sentence after a negotiated guilty plea in the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas,
Ashland, Ohio.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On January 13, 2023, the Ashland County Grand Jury returned an
Indictment charging Haudenschild with: 1). Endangering Children in violation of R.C.
2919.22(B)(5) / 2919.22, a felony of the second degree, with a Human Trafficking
specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1422(A); 2). Trafficking in Persons – Commercial Sex
in violation of R.C. 2905.32(A)(1) / 2905.32 (E), a felony of the first degree; 3). Corrupting
Another with Drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(4)(a) / 2925.02(C)(3), a felony of the
fourth degree; 4). Rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a) / 2907.02(B), a felony of the
first degree; 5). Disseminating Matter Harmful to Juvenile in violation of R.C.
2907.31(A)(1) / 2907.31(F), a felony of the fifth degree; 6)., 7). and 8). Sexual Battery in
violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) / 2907.03(B), felonies of the third degree; 9). Importuning
in violation of R.C. 2907.07(D)(1) / 2907.07(F)(5), a felony of the fifth degree; and 10).
Gross Sexual Imposition, in violation of R.C. 2097.05(A)(1) / 2907.05(C)(1), [victim
greater than 13 but less than 16 years old], a felony of the fourth degree.
{¶3} On March 9, 2023, the state filed a Motion to Dismiss count two of the
Indictment [Trafficking in Persons – Commercial Sex] and the Human Trafficking
specification on the Child Endangerment charge to count one of the Indictment. [Docket
Entry No. 25]. The trial judge granted the motion by Judgment Entry filed March 13, 2023.
[Docket Entry No. 27]. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 3
{¶4} On May 17, 2023, Haudenschild, through counsel, filed a motion seeking to
continue the jury trial and schedule a change of plea hearing. [Docket Entry No. 44]. The
trial judge granted the motion by Judgment Entry filed May 19, 2023, and scheduled the
case for a change of plea hearing. [Docket Entry No. 46].
{¶5} On June 22, 2023, Haudenschild appeared with counsel via video and
entered a guilty plea to the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth
counts in the amended indictment; the third count charging appellant with Rape was
dismissed by the state. The trial judge accepted Haudenschild’s guilty pleas, found him
guilty and deferred sentencing pending the completion of a pre-sentence investigation
report. T., Change of Plea, June 22, 2023 at 20-21.
{¶6} On July 31, 2023, Haudenschild appeared with counsel via video for
sentencing. The trial court sentenced him to terms of incarceration for Endangering
Children, eight to twelve years; Corrupting Another with Drugs, eighteen months;
Dissemination, twelve months; Sexual Battery, sixty months for each of the three charges;
Importuning, twelve months; and Gross Sexual Imposition, eighteen months.
{¶7} The trial court ordered that each sentence, the maximum for that
classification, would be served consecutively for a total aggregate term of maximum
incarceration of 32 years. T. Sentencing, July 31, 2023 at 33. In addition, the trial court
ordered that he serve a mandatory term of five years of Post Release Control (PRC).
Assignments of Error
{¶8} Haudenschild raises three Assignments of Error, Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 4
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXPRESS BIAS AGAINST HAUDENSCHILD AT
SENTENCING IS A VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND CONTRARY
TO LAW.
{¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE AGGREGATE
SENTENCE ARISING FROM ITS IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES BUT
RETALIATED AGAINST HAUDENSCHILD FOR EXERCISING A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT.
{¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE
HAUDENSCHILD OF THE CONDITIONS OF PRC AT SENTENCING.”
I.
{¶12} In his First Assignment of Error, Haudenschild contends that the trial court
was improperly biased toward him at the sentencing hearing.
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶13} “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); accord Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009). For
purposes of the due-process guarantee, fairness “requires the absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases” and “a system of law [that] endeavor[s] to prevent even the probability
of unfairness.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Thus, a “trial before a biased judge is
fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.” State v. LaMar, 95
Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, 34, citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242,
100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (“the Due Process Clause entitles a person to an Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 5
impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases”). In fact, “[t]he
presence of a biased judge on the bench is * * a paradigmatic example of structural
constitutional error, which if shown requires reversal without resort to harmless-error
analysis.” State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 278, 750 N.E.2d 90 (2001), citing
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
Structural error typically “is grounds for automatic reversal,” so long as an objection has
been raised in the trial court. State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, 200
N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 21. “Defendants should bring any potential structural errors to the trial
court’s attention so they may be corrected; they should not wait to raise the claim on
appeal with the thought that prejudice will be presumed if a structural error is found.” State
v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316, 2022-Ohio-4150, 212 N.E.3d 880, ¶34 citing State v. Perry,
101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 23.
{¶14} In the case at bar, Haudenschild did not object during the sentencing
hearing and assert that the judge displayed bias. Consequently, “our review is for plain
error only.” Id. Bond, ¶ 28 (“assertions of structural error do not preclude an appellate
court from applying the plain-error standard when the accused has failed to object”)
(citations omitted). State v. Rossiter, 4th District Ross No. 21CA3762, 2023-Ohio-4809,
¶48.
Plain Error
{¶15} Normally, an appellate court need not consider error that was not called to
the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or
1 West established that a plain-error analysis is necessary when a defendant seeks reversal based
on an error to which the defendant did not object at trial. But West left unresolved the extent to which the existence of structural error is relevant to that analysis. State v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316, 2022-Ohio- 4150, 212 N.E.3d 880, ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 6
corrected by the trial court. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 117, 364 N.E.2d 1364
(1977). Accordingly, a claim of error in such a situation is usually deemed to be waived
absent plain error. See Crim.R. 52(B). Haudenschild did not raise plain error with respect
to judicial bias during the sentencing hearing in his assignments of error or argument in
this Court. Because he does not claim plain error on appeal, we need not consider it. See,
State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 17–20
(appellate court need not consider plain error where appellant fails to timely raise plain-
error claim); State v. Gavin, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 13CA3592, 2015-Ohio-2996, 2015 WL
4549872, ¶ 25, citing Wright v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs & Family Servs., 9th Dist. Lorain No.
12CA010264, 2013-Ohio-2260, 2013 WL 2407158, ¶ 22 (“when a claim is forfeited on
appeal and the appellant does not raise plain error, the appellate court will not create an
argument on his behalf”); State v. McCreary, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 21-COA-026, 2022-
Ohio-2899. ¶65; State v. Carbaugh, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2022-0050, 2023-Ohio-
1269, ¶67; State v. Fitts, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD18-092, WD18-093, 2020-Ohio-1154,
¶21; Simon v. Larreategui, 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2021-CA-41, 2022-Ohio-1881, ¶41.
{¶16} However, even if we were to consider Haudenschild’s arguments he would
not prevail.
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed appellate review of cases in which
plain error is alleged in two recent cases. In State v. Bailey, 171 Ohio St.3d 486, 2022-
Ohio-4407, 218 N.E.3d 858, the court noted the heightened standards to be met when
recognizing plain error, stating “intervention by a reviewing court is warranted only under
exceptional circumstances to prevent injustice.” Id. at ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio
St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). In State v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316, 2022-Ohio-4150, Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 7
212 N.E.3d 880, the Court specifically found that a structural error does not require
automatic reversal of a defendant’s convictions if he failed to object to the error in the trial
court. 170 Ohio St.3d 316, 2022-Ohio-4150, 212 N.E.3d 880, ¶43-44. The Ohio Supreme
Court reminded reviewing courts that it has discretion to recognize plain error, even when
a structural error occurs. “The final consideration in the plain-error analysis is whether
correcting the error is required to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice or whether the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
See [United States v.] Olano, 507 U.S. [725], at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508;
Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus.” Id. at ¶ 35.
Judicial Bias
“The inquiry [for judicial bias] is an objective one. The court asks not
whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average
judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an
unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 128 (2009). Moreover,
“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion,” but instead, “[a]lmost invariably are proper grounds for
appeal, not recusal.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct.
1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 174 (1994). Likewise, “opinions formed by the judge on
the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 8
that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. See, State v. Morrow,
5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0053,2022-Ohio-1089, ¶43.
{¶18} Judicial bias is demonstrated by “a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or undue
friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation of a
fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an open
state of mind which will be governed by the law and [the] facts.” State v. Jackson, 149
Ohio St.3d 55, 2016-Ohio-5488, ¶ 33, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio
St. 463 (1956), paragraph four of the syllabus. “A judge is presumed to follow the law and
not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome
these presumptions.” In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-
5489, ¶ 5. Moreover, a party that seeks to establish bias bears the burden of overcoming
that presumption. Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2013).
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether Haudenschild has cited
compelling evidence that the trial judge was biased or whether there is an
unconstitutional “potential for bias” that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the sentencing hearing
{¶19} Haudenschild does not argue that the trial judge failed to make
specific findings which are delineated in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before he imposed
consecutive sentences. Haudenschild does not argue that the trial judge’s decision
to impose consecutive sentences in this case is not supported by the record.
Haudenschild points to several statements made by the trial judge during the
sentencing hearing as evidencing the judge’s bias or predisposition against him.
1. Judge’s statement regarding doing justice. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 9
{¶20} Haudenschild points to the following statement made by the trial
judge,
As I sit here in this position and I'm called upon to do justice,
honestly, I don't know that I can do that in this situation.
T. Sentencing, July 31, 2023 at 24. He argues the trial judge’s bias is corroborated by the
judge’s comments concerning Haudenschild’s parenting.
{¶21} Haudenschild has taken the judge’s remark out of context. The trial judge
actually said,
As I sit here in this position and I'm called upon to do justice, honestly,
I don't know that I can do that in this situation. I know your daughter doesn't
want you to go to prison. But I cannot in good conscious set aside the
seriousness of these actions.
This Court has a duty to protect the public and your daughter from
future crime and that includes protecting people that sometimes don't want
it. There is no doubt in my mind that you are a risk to both of these victims
and to the public.
Id. The trial judge noted that he reviewed the presentence investigation report which
showed that ORAS score was 20, which is moderate. The trial judge reviewed the case
history, considered the statements of counsel, the statements of Haudenschild and the
victims. The trial judge received victim impact statements from both of the victims. The
trial judge also read letters in support of Haudenschild. T. Sentencing, July 31, 2023 at
20. The judge heard from the Ashland County Jobs and Family Services caseworker who
detailed the extreme emotional, mental and physical harm Haudenschild inflicted upon Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 10
his minor children. T. Sentencing, July 31, 2023 at 8-15. The trial judge’s comments
concerning Haudenschild’s parenting skills can fairly be found to be based upon the
evidence. That Haudenschild violated the trust of his children, groomed the children and
continued his activities over a course of years are fair comments that are clearly set forth
in the record, and do not evidence bias in the trial court’s sentencing of Haudenschild.
The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the
evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant, who has been
shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby
recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it
produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the
proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to
completion of the judge’s task. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it:
“Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like
innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-
house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.” In re J.P.
Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (CA2 1943).
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. at 550-551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 174
(1994).
{¶22} The judge also noted that Haudenschild pled guilty, sparing the victims from
enduring a trial and evidencing some acceptance of responsibility by Haudenschild. He
further noted Haudenschild received considerable consideration by the state’s dismissal
of the rape charge. Id. at 21.
2. Maintaining his innocence when questioned by police Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 11
{¶23} Haudenschild next argues that the trial judge punished him for exercising
his constitutional right to maintain his innocence in the face of questioning by the police.
{¶24} Haudenschild mischaracterizes the comments of the trial judge. First,
Haudenschild did not exercise his right to remain silent; rather he told the police that both
of his children were liars when they finally had the courage to come forth and detail the
years of his perverse sexual activities. T. Sentencing, July 31, 2023 at 22. Haudenschild
attempted to say that the sexual relations with his children were consensual and further,
blame alcohol and substance abuse for his behavior. Id. The trial judge is entitled to
consider the fact that Haudenschild lied to the police until he was confronted by massive
evidence of his guilt.
{¶25} We find that Haudenschild has failed to cite compelling evidence that the
trial judge was biased or that there was an unconstitutional “potential for bias” that
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the sentencing hearing.
{¶26} Haudenschild’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶27} In his Second Assignment of Error Haudenschild argues the trial court failed
to consider the aggregate sentence imposed and improperly retaliated against him for
exercising a constitutional right.
{¶28} In support of this position regarding his aggregate sentence, Haudenschild
relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-
Ohio-4607, 2022 WL 17870605 (Dec. 23, 2022) (“Gwynne IV”). However, during the
pendency of this appeal the Ohio Supreme Court reconsidered and vacated the Gwynne
IV opinion in State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851, 2023 WL 7005958 (Oct. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 12
25, 2023 (“Gwynne V”)2. The Court’s decision in Gwynne V held that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
does not require express consideration of the aggregate prison term that results from the
imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. at ¶ 16, 18-24; State v. Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 111927, 2023-Ohio-4119, Gallagher, Eileen T., concurring in judgment only; State v.
White, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-230165, 2023-Ohio-4391, ¶21.
{¶29} Haudenschild’s arguments concerning the exercising of his constitutional
rights are rejected for the reasons explained in our disposition of Haudenschild’s First
Assignment of Error.
{¶30} Haudenschild’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶31} In his Third Assignment of Error, Haudenschild contends the trial judge
failed to properly advise him of post-release control at the sentencing hearing, purportedly
because the judge failed to inform him of all the possible consequences attendant to
potential future violations of post-release control.
{¶32} Crim. R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily. Although literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is preferred, the trial court need
only “substantially comply” with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional elements
of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 115(1981), citing
State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163(1977).
{¶33} The non-constitutional rights that the defendant must be informed of are: (1)
the nature of the charges; (2) the maximum penalty involved, which includes, if applicable,
2 We note that Haudenschild’s brief was filed in this case on October 25, 2023, the same day the
decision in Gwynne V was released. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 13
an advisement on post-release control; (3) if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
for probation or the imposition of community control sanctions; and (4) that after entering
a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed directly to judgment and
sentencing. Crim.R. 11(C)(2). State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897
N.E.2d 621, ¶ 10-13; State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 423 N.E.2d
1224, ¶ 19-26, (post-release control is a non-constitutional advisement).
{¶34} For the non-constitutional rights, the trial court must substantially comply
with Crim.R. 11’s mandates. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474
(1990). “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the
defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is
waiving.” Veney at ¶ 15. Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the
basis that the advisement for the non-constitutional rights did not substantially comply
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) must also show a prejudicial effect, meaning the plea would not
have been otherwise entered. Veney at ¶ 15; State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364
N.E.2d 1163(1977).
{¶35} When reviewing a plea’s compliance with Crim.R. 11(C), we apply a de
novo standard of review. State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108-109, 564 N.E.2d
474(1990); State v. Lebron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108825, 2020-Ohio-1507, ¶9; State
v. Groves, 5th Dist. Fairfield Nos. 2019 CA 00032, 2019 CA 00033, 2019-Ohio-5025, ¶7
Issue for appellate review: Whether the trial judge substantially complied with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2) when advising Haudenschild of post release control.
{¶36} A statutorily compliant imposition of post-release control requires a trial
court to advise a defendant of three things at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 14
entry: “(1) whether post-release control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the duration of
the post-release-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the [APA] will
administer the post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by
the offender of the conditions of post-release control will subject the offender to the
consequences set forth in that statute.” State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-
2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 1, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d
480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248.
{¶37} The Supreme Court of Ohio has instructed that, once a court orally provides
all the required advisements at the sentencing hearing, it must incorporate them into the
sentencing entry. State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197, 2022-Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶
12, citing Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 8, overruled on
other grounds by Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248.
{¶38} In the case at hand, the trial judge informed Haudenschild that he was
subject to five years, mandatory post-release control following his release from prison.
Sent. T., July 31, 2023 at 31. Haudenschild was informed that for a violation of post-
release control, the parole board may impose a prison term as part of the sentence of up
to one half of the stated term or the minimum term originally imposed in nine-month
increments for each rule violation. Id. He was further informed if he were to commit a new
felony while on post-release control, in addition to the sentence on the new felony, the
sentencing Court would have the authority to terminate your post-release control and
impose a consecutive prison term to any new sentence of one year or the time remaining
on post-release control, whichever is greater. Id. These findings were also set forth in the
trial Court’s sentencing entry. Judgment Entry – Sentencing, Aug. 1, 2023 at 5. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 15
{¶39} R.C. 2929.19 has no provision mandating a trial court to notify a defendant
that a violation of post-release control could result in more restrictive sanctions, or a
longer period of supervision. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B), the trial court is not required
to provide these notifications at a sentencing hearing. State v. Vest, 4th Dist. Ross Nos.
22CA32 & 22CA33, 2024-Ohio-62, ¶13. Had the legislature intended for defendants to
be provided with additional notifications about post-release control, it would have included
those notifications and requirements in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). It chose not to do so. State v.
Demangone, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-11-081, 2023-Ohio-2522, ¶ 25
{¶40} The trial judge substantially complied with Crim.R. 11’s mandates for non-
constitutional rights. It appears from the record before this Court that Haudenschild has
not demonstrated any prejudicial effect or that he in fact relied upon any supposed
ambiguity concerning the mandatory nature of his post-release control time, that it will be
monitored by the Adult Parole Authority and the consequences of violating post release
control, including for the commission of a new felony in his decision to plead guilty.
{¶41} Haudenschild’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled. Ashland County, Case No. 23-COA-014 16
{¶42} The judgment of the Ashland County Court of Common Pleas, Ashland
County, Ohio is affirmed.
By Gwin, J.,
Delaney, P.J., and
Wise, J., concur