State v. Miller

2025 Ohio 141

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 21, 2025
• Docket: 14-24-22
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-141.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 14-24-22 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

AARON SCOTT MILLER, OPINION

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2022-CR-0291

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: January 21, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Alison Boggs for Appellant

Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee Case No. 14-24-22

ZIMMERMAN, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Aaron Scott Miller (“Miller”), appeals the

February 8, 2024 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case stems from the traffic stop of Miller initiated by Deputy Wyatt

Payton (“Deputy Payton”) of the Union County Sheriff’s Office. On Thanksgiving

evening of 2022, Deputy Payton observed Miller driving a red pickup truck

eastbound on US 33. As Miller approached Deputy Payton sitting in the median,

Deputy Payton saw Miller “abruptly hit his brakes” and travel “into the right lane

pretty quickly.” (Apr. 4, 2023 Tr. at 16). In response, Deputy Payton entered the

highway and followed Miller.

{¶3} While following Miller, Deputy Payton observed Miller drift toward the

right edge line of the highway and repeatedly look back in the mirrors. Deputy

Payton ran a license plate check on the red truck. The computer check revealed the

license plate as being registered to a gray vehicle—not a red truck. Deputy Payton

activated his overhead lights to initiate a traffic stop based on his suspicion of

fictitious license plates.

{¶4} During the traffic stop, Miller was unable to provide the vehicle’s

registration and gave false information regarding his identity. While Deputy Payton

investigated Miller’s true identity, a canine free-air sniff alerted to the presence of

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contraband in the red truck. Deputy Payton advised Miller of his Miranda rights.

Shortly thereafter, Miller attempted to flee on foot but was quickly apprehended.

Following his apprehension, Miller admitted to possessing methamphetamine with

the intent to sell and further admitted to having firearms in the red truck.

{¶5} On December 2, 2022, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Miller on

Count One of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(3), (B), a third-degree felony; Count Two of improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B), (I), a fourth-degree

felony; Count Three of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A),

(C), a fourth-degree felony; Count Four of assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A),

(C)(5), a fourth-degree felony; Count Five of obstructing official business in

violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), (B), a fifth-degree felony; and Count Six of resisting

arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(B), (D), a first-degree misdemeanor. Miller

appeared for arraignment on December 22, 2022 and entered pleas of not guilty to

the counts alleged in the indictment.

{¶6} On March 2, 2023, Miller filed a motion to suppress evidence. In

support of his motion, Miller argued that Deputy Payton did not have probable cause

to initiate the traffic stop because “the license plates displayed on the truck were

proper and legal.” (Doc. No. 16). Following a suppression hearing on April 4,

2023, the trial court denied Miller’s motion after concluding “that Deputy Payton

had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the red truck. The information

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available to the deputy was that the license [plates] belonged to a gray vehicle not a

red truck.” (Doc. No. 49).

{¶7} On April 21, 2023, under a superseding indictment, the Union County

Grand Jury indicted Miller on two additional counts: Count Seven of aggravated

trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a second-degree

felony; and Count Eight of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), (C)(1)(c). Counts Seven and Eight included one-year firearm

specifications. Miller appeared for arraignment on April 25, 2023 and entered pleas

of not guilty to the counts alleged in the new indictment.

{¶8} On September 11, 2023, Miller withdrew his pleas of not guilty and

entered pleas of no contest to all eight counts. The trial court accepted Miller’s

pleas of no contest, found him guilty, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.

{¶9} On February 8, 2024, the trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate

minimum term of 11 years in prison to a maximum of 14 years in prison.

{¶10} On March 7, 2024, Miller filed his notice of appeal. He raises a single

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The Trial Court Erred When It Denied Appellant’s Suppression Motion.

{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Miller argues that the trial court erred

by denying his motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, Miller argues that Deputy

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Payton did not have probable cause to enter the highway and follow him. Miller

further argues that Deputy Payton did not have any reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity to run a license plate check on the red truck. Miller contends that “[t]he

Fourth Amendment is designed to stop this type of governmental intrusion in an

individual’s life.” (Appellant’s Brief at 11).

Standard of Review

{¶12} Appellate review of a suppression ruling involves a mixed question of

law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “An appellate court must

accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible

evidence.” State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 16. “[T]he appellate court must

then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,

whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Burnside at ¶ 8.

Analysis

{¶13} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable

searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); State v. Mays, 2008-

Ohio-4539, ¶ 7. Any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure

will be excluded from being used against the defendant. State v. Womack, 2021-

Ohio-98, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.).

{¶14} “[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about

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to commit a crime.” Mays at ¶ 7. “‘The propriety of an investigative stop by a

police officer must be viewed in light of the totality of the surrounding

circumstances.’” Id., quoting State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980),

paragraph one of the syllabus. “Therefore, if an officer’s decision to stop a motorist

for a criminal violation, including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable

and articulable suspicion considering all the circumstances, then the stop is

constitutionally valid.” Mays at ¶ 8.

{¶15} On appeal, Miller argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when Deputy Payton entered the highway and followed him, and when

Deputy Payton ran a license plate check on the red truck. Miller further argues that

“Deputy Payton did not have any reasonable, articulable reason to believe Mr.

Miller had committed or was committing any traffic offense.” (Appellant’s Brief at

10).

{¶16} Initially, we note that Miller has provided no case law authority to

support his claim that an officer must have probable cause or a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity to enter the highway and follow a vehicle. We posit that no such

authority exists because an officer’s decision to leave the median and enter a lane

of traffic to follow a vehicle does not constitute a “search” or “seizure” under the

Fourth Amendment. Thus, we reject Miller’s contention that his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when Deputy Payton entered the highway and

followed him.

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{¶17} As to Miller’s argument concerning the license plate check performed

by Deputy Payton, it is well established that an officer does not need a reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a random check of a license

plate. Rocky River v. Saleh, 139 Ohio App.3d 313, 327 (8th Dist. 2000). “While

random stops of vehicles without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may

be constitutionally invalid, random computer checks of vehicle license plates are

not.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Bates, 1987 WL 15817, *1 (9th Dist. Aug.

12, 1987).

One does not have any expectation of privacy in a license plate number which is required to be openly displayed on his vehicle. R.C. 4503.21. Moreover, a scan of a computer data bank, in order to obtain information relevant to the license number, involves no intrusion. Such a “search” does not interrupt a driver in his travel, nor restrain his person or detain him. In sum, it does not even constitute a “stop” under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Bates at *1. Accordingly, we reject Miller’s claim that his Fourth Amendment

rights were violated when Deputy Payton ran a license plate check on the red truck.

{¶18} In this case, Deputy Payton testified that he “ran the license plate

through the BMV records on LEADS on [the] mobile computer” in his patrol car

and the plates returned as being registered to a gray vehicle—not a red truck. (Apr.

4. 2023 Tr. at 17). Deputy Payton further testified that he initiated the traffic stop

and spoke “to the driver who claimed to be Jason Miller along with the passenger

and advised them that the license plate is coming back to a different colored vehicle.

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I requested documentation to either confirm or deny my suspicion of the fictitious

plates to which they stated they didn’t have.” (Id. at 25).

{¶19} Ohio law prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle on public

highways if the vehicle displays a license plate that is fictitious, counterfeit, or

belongs to another motor vehicle. R.C. 4549.08. A violation of R.C. 4549.08 is a

misdemeanor of the fourth degree on the first offense, and a misdemeanor of the

third degree on each subsequent offense. R.C. 4549.08(C). Moreover, the Supreme

Court of Ohio has determined that

when an officer encounters a vehicle the whole of which is painted a different color from the color listed in the vehicle-registration records and the officer believes, based on his experience, that the vehicle or its displayed license plates may be stolen, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and is authorized to perform an investigative traffic stop.

Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, at ¶ 25. Thus, at the time of the traffic stop, Deputy

Payton had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity in that he

suspected fictitious license plates on Miller’s vehicle in violation of R.C. 4549.08.

Furthermore, Deputy Payton was justified in stopping the red truck to investigate

whether a violation of R.C. 4549.08 had in fact occurred, or if Miller could provide

documentation showing that the license plates were valid. Hawkins at ¶ 25.

Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the traffic stop was

constitutionally valid.

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{¶20} Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err by

denying Miller’s motion to suppress evidence. Miller’s assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/hls

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