State v. Kovach

2026 Ohio 171

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 2025CA00038
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Kovach, 2026-Ohio-171.]

COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025CA00038

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, DOUGLAS SCOTT KOVACH, Case No. 2024CR1685

Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment: January 20, 2026

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Andrew J. King; David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Vicki L. DeSantis, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Canton, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; George Urban, Canton, Ohio, for Defendant- Appellant.

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Douglas Kovach appeals his convictions for strangulation and assault that

resulted from an altercation with K.W., who was his former girlfriend. Kovach raises three

assignments of error, arguing that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the

evidence, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the trial court

erred by imposing certain community-control conditions. For the reasons explained

below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Key Facts

{¶2} During a visit to Kovach’s home in August 2024, K.W. noticed that a

computer there was logged onto her account on Chaturbate, which is a pornographic

website offering live-streamed webcam performances by models and couples. At the time, K.W. was earning some income through that site, which collects money from

persons willing to pay to see certain sex acts.

{¶3} K.W. testified at Kovach’s jury trial, and she told the jurors that she and

Kovach argued after she asked why he was logged onto her account. During their

argument, she said, Kovach placed both of his hands around her neck and strangled her,

which inhibited her breathing. When she dropped to the ground to escape, Kovach kicked

her. Then, she told jurors, Kovach grabbed her cellphone and broke it when she tried to

call for help. He also slammed a door on her legs when she was trying to leave his home,

she testified.

{¶4} K.W. was able to call for help, and the police officer who came to the home

could see some injuries on her. When questioned by the officer, Kovach admitted that

he had shut K.W.’s leg in the door while pushing her out of the house.

{¶5} K.W. was then examined at a hospital by a sexual-assault nurse examiner.

That nurse documented extensive injuries consistent with strangulation and physical

assault. K.W. had bruising on both sides of her neck and on her arms, back, and legs.

Her voice was raspy, and she reported difficulty breathing.

{¶6} At his trial, Kovach testified in his own defense. He claimed that K.W. had

attacked him while he was asleep and that he had acted in self-defense. He denied

strangling K.W. or touching her neck. He characterized himself as a peacemaker and

testified that he pushed K.W. and shut her leg in the door while trying to get her out of his

home.

{¶7} The jury found Kovach guilty on both the felony strangulation charge and

the misdemeanor assault charge. {¶8} A presentence investigation followed, and the resulting report indicated that

Kovach at the time described himself as a daily user of marijuana, which he said helped

him to manage chronic pain. A urine-screen drug test administered at his presentence

interview found THC but no other drugs or alcohol. The presentence report also

documented minimal alcohol use, with Kovach reporting that he drank on rare occasions

and that his last alcohol use had been in May 2024. (The presentence report was

prepared in February 2025.)

{¶9} The trial court sentenced Kovach to three years of community control with

conditions that directed him to abstain from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol and to not

enter any bars or other businesses where the sale of alcohol is the primary source of

revenue. Kovach now appeals.

Kovach’s Convictions Were Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Kovach argues that his convictions were

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶11} In determining whether a conviction was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, an appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror, and “after ‘reviewing the entire

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be [reversed] and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Hane, 2025-Ohio-120, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.),

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). The reversal of a conviction

on manifest-weight grounds should occur only in “the ‘exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id. {¶12} “Weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.

It indicates clearly to the jury that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to

their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount

of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them.”

Thompkins at 387 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). “[A]n appellate

court will leave the issues of weight and credibility of the evidence to the factfinder, as

long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.” State v. Sheppard, 2025-

Ohio-161, ¶ 66 (5th Dist.).

{¶13} We find that the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial and credible

evidence in the record and that the jury did not lose its way in finding Kovach guilty on

the two charges.

{¶14} The alleged victim, K.W., testified that Kovach had strangled her by placing

both of his hands around her neck and inhibiting her breathing. She testified that when

she dropped to the ground to escape, he kicked her. She also told jurors that when she

tried to call 9-1-1, Kovach took the phone from her and broke it, and he then pushed her

and slammed her legs in a door as she tried to leave the home.

{¶15} K.W.’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence. The police officer

who came to the scene saw that K.W. had visible injuries. Kovach admitted to that officer

that he had shut K.W.’s leg in a door as he was shoving her out of his house. The nurse

examiner testified, too, and she described for the jury the extensive injuries that she

observed on K.W. at the hospital and explained how those injuries were consistent with

K.W.’s account of the alleged crimes. {¶16} The jury was entitled to weigh the credibility of the various witnesses and to

resolve any conflicts in the evidence. The jury heard testimony from K.W., the police

officer, the nurse, and Kovach himself. The jury had the opportunity to observe those

persons’ demeanor and to assess whether their testimony was consistent with the

physical evidence, the medical records, and the photos presented during the trial. The

jury was free to believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.

{¶17} A rational basis exists in the record for the jury’s decision. The jury did not

clearly lose its way in crediting the State’s case over Kovach’s testimony. This is not an

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against conviction. Kovach’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

Kovach’s Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective

{¶18} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must

demonstrate both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a reasonable

probability that, but for the errors, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

{¶19} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the failure to make objections is

not alone enough to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v.

Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815, ¶ 103. Further, “debatable trial tactics do not constitute

ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id. at ¶ 111. We must “‘indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Id. at ¶ 101, quoting Strickland at 689. {¶20} As we have previously observed, trial counsel may reasonably choose not

to object as part of his or her trial strategy. State v. Gill, 2025-Ohio-2181, ¶ 40 (5th Dist.).

And trial counsel is not ineffective for electing not to pursue every possible objection.

State v. Helmondollar, 2024-Ohio-2077, ¶ 30 (5th Dist.) (where the court reasoned that

trial counsel tactfully chose not to object to testimony in an effort to avoid calling attention

to it). Indeed, objections tend to disrupt the flow of a trial and may be considered — by a

juror — to be technical and bothersome. State v. Scott, 2007-Ohio-303, ¶ 71 (5th Dist.).

{¶21} Kovach first argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to

what he describes as testimony about an uncharged sexual assault. The record reveals,

however, that the jury heard no testimony suggesting that Kovach had committed such a

crime. Rather, K.W. reported that Kovach made her uncomfortable by using her

Chaturbate account without her permission to publish some photos online. Both the nurse

and the police officer who testified at the trial clarified that no sexual assault had occurred.

When potential confusion arose, the trial court provided curative instructions. Defense

counsel’s decision not to object to those clarifications was reasonable, as objecting and

requesting further instructions would have drawn additional attention to matters

unflattering to Kovach and might have emphasized the subject in jurors’ minds. See

Helmondollar at ¶ 30.

{¶22} Kovach also contends that his attorney was ineffective in responding to

testimony about the Chaturbate website. The record demonstrates, though, that

counsel’s approach served legitimate strategic purposes. First, Kovach’s trial counsel did

not object when the State elicited testimony about Chaturbate during its case in chief.

That decision not to object was reasonable because doing so would have drawn additional attention to the subject. Further, defense counsel may have anticipated using

that testimony as a foundation for a defense strategy. See Gill at ¶ 40.

{¶23} Indeed, counsel later elicited testimony from Kovach himself to establish

that Chaturbate operates as a live-streaming platform and does not permit uploading of

photos or pre-recorded videos. This testimony contradicted K.W.’s claim that Kovach

was uploading content to her account. Counsel also used cross-examination of K.W. to

suggest that Kovach did not possess her account password. That effort was likely aimed

at trying to undermine K.W.’s assertion that Kovach was stealing money from her through

her Chaturbate account. Defense counsel’s approach reflected a reasonable trial

strategy rather than deficient performance. We see no evidence of ineffective assistance

in these efforts.

{¶24} Moreover, even were we to view defense counsel’s work as deficient,

Kovach has not shown any prejudice. The State presented substantial evidence of

Kovach’s guilt independent of the challenged testimony. K.W. testified that Kovach

strangled her with both hands, making it difficult for her to breathe, and she said that he

kicked her when she fell to the ground, smashed her phone when she tried to call for help,

and slammed her legs in the door as she was leaving. Jurors heard, too, from the police

officer about Kovach having admitted to shutting K.W.’s leg in the door while shoving her

out of the house. And the nurse examiner documented extensive injuries that were

consistent with the described strangulation and assault.

{¶25} Given the evidence presented by the State, Kovach cannot demonstrate a

reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the challenged

aspects of counsel’s performance. Kovach’s second assignment of error is overruled. No Plain Error Is Reflected In the Community-Control Restrictions Imposed on Kovach by the Trial Court

{¶26} In his third assignment of error, Kovach claims that the trial court abused its

discretion by ordering — as a condition of Kovach’s community-control sentence — that

he not use alcohol or any illegal drugs and that he stay out of any bars or other businesses

where alcohol sales are the primary source of revenue.

{¶27} Notably, Kovach did not raise in the trial court any objections after the trial

judge explained the various community-control conditions that Kovach was obligated to

follow while under supervision in the case. An error “that was not called to the attention

of the trial court at a time when the error could have been avoided or corrected by the trial

court” is deemed forfeited absent plain error. State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶

15 (5th Dist.). Therefore, we review Kovach’s community-control sentence solely for plain

error.

{¶28} To constitute plain error, an error “must be on the record, palpable, and

fundamental, so that it should have been apparent to the trial court without objection.”

State v. Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R.

52(B) is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only

to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978),

paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶29} Under Ohio law, a sentencing court in a felony case in which a prison term

is not mandated may impose a sentence that consists of “one or more community control

sanctions.” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). As part of that kind of sentence, a trial court may impose

conditions “that the court considers appropriate.” Id. Sentencing courts “thus [have]

broad discretion . . . in imposing community-control sanctions.” State v. Talty, 2004-Ohio- 4888, ¶ 10. And a sanction available to a sentencing court in a felony case includes “[a]

term of drug and alcohol use monitoring.” R.C. 2929.17(H).

{¶30} The authority to impose community-control conditions is not absolute. Talty

at ¶ 11. Restrictions imposed as part of a community-control sentence “cannot be overly

broad so as to unnecessarily impinge upon the probationer’s liberty.” State v. Jones, 49

Ohio St.3d 51, 52 (1990), citing State v. Maynard, 47 Ohio App.3d 76, 77 (6th Dist. 1988).

In determining whether a community-control condition is appropriate, courts must

“consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2)

has some relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates

to conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the

statutory ends of probation.” Id. at 53.

{¶31} Ohio courts have generally required some nexus between an offender’s

crime and substance abuse to uphold drug- or alcohol-related community-control

conditions. State v. Lynn, 2023-Ohio-4429, ¶ 48-49, 54 (5th Dist.) (reversing as an abuse

of discretion a marijuana ban where nothing in the record indicated that drugs or alcohol

were involved in the crime). See, e.g., State v. Chavers, 2005-Ohio-714, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.)

(finding that a trial court had abused its discretion by imposing a no-alcohol term of

supervision where the record contained no evidence that alcohol had played a role in the

defendant’s current or past crimes).

{¶32} The record before the trial court included a presentence report documenting

that Kovach uses marijuana daily to manage pain. That report also quoted Kovach as

saying that he rarely uses alcohol and had not done so for nine months. As for the alleged

crimes, nothing in the record suggests that drugs or alcohol played any role in the events described by K.W., and the police officer who came to the scene did not testify about

having seen any signs of impairment in Kovach.

{¶33} Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the seeming lack of a nexus

between the crimes and the use of alcohol or drugs by Kovach might very well prompt us

to second-guess the trial judge’s decision. Yet, here, with our review focusing solely on

any plain error because Kovach did not object to the conditions that he now decries, we

see no plain error and so defer to the lines drawn by the trial court.

{¶34} That court had broad discretion to impose community-control conditions

reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation, administering justice, and ensuring good

behavior. City of Cleveland v. Pentagon Realty, LLC, 2019-Ohio-3775, ¶ 10, 13 (8th

Dist.). And our review of Kovach’s drug-and-alcohol provisions “must be conducted ‘with

the understanding that the court will act reasonably at a revocation hearing, aware of the

practicalities and fundamental goals of probation.’” State v. Ice, 2024-Ohio-5341, ¶ 27

(7th Dist.), quoting Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d at 55.

{¶35} The sentence imposed by the trial court may be inconvenient at times for

Kovach, but “a trial court can impose community-control sanctions that limit the offender’s

fundamental rights, provided that such limitations further the statutory goals of community

control and are not overbroad.” State v. Chapman, 2020-Ohio-6730, ¶ 16.

{¶36} The trial court’s decision to include the no-alcohol-or-drugs restriction and

the ban on entry into businesses where alcohol sales are the focus did not trample on

Kovach’s substantial rights or impose a manifest injustice on him. Kovach’s professed

voluntary avoidance of alcohol and illegal drugs that he described to the preparer of the

presentence report suggests that the substance-use restriction is of little practical consequence to him. As for the condition limiting his freedom to visit bars and liquor

stores, we see no manifest injustice that could rightly be viewed as plain error. The

restriction is not so exceptional or so inequitable as to require us to upend it. Kovach’s

third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶37} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Court of Common

Pleas of Stark County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Douglas Kovach.

By: Gormley, J.;

Hoffman, P.J. and

King, J. concur.