[Cite as State v. Dantz, 2025-Ohio-1609.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Robert G. Montgomery, J. : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs- : : BRADLEY DANTZ, : Case No. 2024 CA 00087 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2023 CR 2755
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: May 5, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KYLE L. STONE D. COLEMAN BOND Prosecuting Attorney 116 Cleveland Ave. NW Stark County, Ohio Suite 600 Canton, Ohio 44702 By: LISA A. NEMES Appellate Division Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, Ohio 44702-1413 Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} The appellant, Bradley Dantz, appeals his conviction on one count of theft
from a person in a protected class and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Appellee
is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On January 10, 2024, the appellant was indicted in Stark County Common
Pleas Court on one count of theft from a person in a protected class in violation of R.C.
2913.02(A)(1) and (B)(3), a felony of the fifth degree. The indictment alleged that on
November 1, 2023, the appellant took “silver/coins” from victim C.B., an elderly person as
defined by the statute, without C.B.’s consent. The appellant appeared for arraignment
with appointed counsel on or about February 9, 2024, at which time he pleaded not guilty.
{¶3} The appellant’s counsel filed a Request for Bill of Particulars and a Demand
for Discovery on February 12, 2024. A pretrial, originally scheduled for February 20, 2024,
was rescheduled a number of times. The matter was scheduled for trial on May 8, 2024.
{¶4} A pretrial proceeded on April 30, 2024, at which time a hearing was
conducted on the appellee’s plea offer; the appellee had offered to reduce the charge
against the appellant from theft from a person in a protected class, a felony of the fifth
degree, to theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, if the appellant agreed to plead guilty
to the amended charge and pay restitution in the amount of $260. The trial court confirmed
the details of the offer on the record, and confirmed that the appellant’s counsel had
communicated the offer to the appellant. The appellant’s counsel confirmed the appellee’s
offer, adding that it also included either 50 hours of community service or a $250 fine, as
well as court costs. The court then addressed the appellant directly, ensuring that he understood the offer and that his counsel had explained to him the consequences of a
potential conviction on the charge of theft from a person in a protected class. In addition,
the trial court explained the potential sentence the appellant faced if he was found guilty
of the charge, asking him “do you understand that that is punishable by 6 to 12 months’
incarceration” and it is “subject to a fine of not more than” $2,500. The appellant stated
that he understood, and desired to go to trial.
{¶5} The matter proceeded to trial on May 8, 2024, on one count of theft from a
person in a protected class, at which time the following evidence was presented to the
jury.
{¶6} Victim C.B. lives in a home in North Lawrence, Ohio, next door to the
appellant. C.B. was 65 years old at all times relevant to the proceedings. Despite being
“retired,” C.B. worked two days a week at a business he co-owns, and “does” flea markets
two days a week. C.B. came to know witness B.H. through the flea market, as B.H. had
purchased tools from C.B. at the flea market for several years. Occasionally, B.H. would
purchase a large tool from C.B. that he did not have at the flea market, and B.H. would
pick it up at C.B.’s home.
{¶7} On November 1, 2023, B.H. happened to be driving down the street on
which C.B. lived. As he approached C.B.’s home, he observed that C.B.’s white van,
which C.B. usually took to the flea market, was not there, but that C.B.’s other vehicle, a
silver pickup truck, was parked in the driveway. B.H. was aware that C.B. took the silver
pickup truck to auctions, and that it was generally full of items such as tools and antiques.
B.H. realized that C.B. was not home because the white van was not there and, because B.H. knew that C.B. lived alone, found it unusual that the driver’s side door of C.B.’s truck
was open and a man was standing at the door with his head inside the vehicle.
{¶8} B.H. observed the man “rummaging around” in C.B.’s truck, and suspected
that he might be stealing C.B.’s property. B.H. turned his vehicle around and drove back
to C.B.’s home, pulling in at the end of C.B.’s driveway and stopping his truck in the front
yard, crossing the driveway. B.H. jumped out of his truck and yelled at the man to “stop.”
He observed that the man was wearing a black Carhart jacket and bibs, and had a clear
view of the man’s big, heavy, “greasy steel-toed work boots.” Initially, B.H. could not see
the man’s face because the man had his hood up and his back towards B.H.
{¶9} B.H. told the man to not go anywhere, but the man started to walk away
from B.H. and down the driveway; however, he paused and turned back around to face
B.H. long enough to tell B.H. “to basically F off,” giving B.H. a chance to see his face. B.H.
testified that at that point, with the appellant no more than 20 to 30 feet away, he got a
good look at the appellant’s face. Based upon this observation, B.H. was able to positively
identify the appellant as the man he saw in C.B.’s truck.
{¶10} B.H. testified that the appellant turned back around and continued down the
driveway, heading towards the corner of the garage and a privacy fence. B.H., who is 6’4”
tall, was able to “watch everything” and could “see overtop the fence.” He could see a
“clear path” where the appellant went through a gap in the privacy fence and entered the
neighboring garage. B.H. was able to see the deck of the neighboring house, and watched
the appellant run onto the deck and into the house.
{¶11} B.H. called the police, and called C.B. While B.H. stood outside waiting for
the police, he saw the appellant come out of his garage and enter his house. The appellant then came back out of the house, no longer wearing the black jacket and bibs,
instead wearing different clothes. The appellant was, however, still wearing the same
greasy work boots. The appellant approached B.H. and asked “if he could help” him,
acting as though he was confused about what was going on. B.H. recognized that this
was “absolutely” the same person he had seen in C.B.’s truck, and noted that, although
the appellant had changed clothes, he was still wearing the same “greasy” work boots.
B.H. told the appellant to “stay right there, wait until the police to get here, I have nothing
to say to you.” The appellant did not wait for police to arrive, and instead left the scene.
{¶12} C.B. arrived home approximately 10 minutes after B.H. called him, and the
police arrived approximately 20 minutes after B.H. called them. Officer Madalyn Klemp of
the Lawrence Township Police Department responded to the call of a suspicious person,
and B.H. relayed what he had witnessed. He told Officer Klemp that the appellant had
been wearing a black Carhart jacket and bibs with work boots when he ran from the truck,
that he was no longer wearing the bibs or jacket when he came back out of the front door,
but that he was still wearing the greasy work boots. The officer learned that the appellant
had left the scene; she nevertheless made contact with a woman at the appellant’s house,
left her business card, and asked the woman to have the appellant contact her.
{¶13} C.B. looked inside his truck after Officer Klemp arrived on scene to
determine if anything had been taken. Although he is a nonsmoker, he noticed the smell
of cigarettes in his vehicle, and remarked that the appellant smokes cigarettes. C.B. also
noticed that a five-ounce silver bar and a bag of 10-20 Indian Head pennies were missing
from his truck. Based upon his experience buying such items from a dealer, C.B.
estimated that the missing items were worth between $150 and $170. In addition, despite the truck door having been open when B.H. arrived, it was locked when C.B. checked for
missing items. There were no obvious signs of forced entry into the vehicle. C.B. testified
that he had lost a set of keys outside somewhere between his home and the post office,
and that the path from his home to the post office runs between his home and the
appellant’s home.
{¶14} Two days after the incident, the appellant contacted Officer Klemp by email.
The appellant attempted to explain why he could not have been at C.B.’s house on the
day and time of the theft, and attached four video clips to his email in support of his
position. One video clip recorded the events just prior to the incident involving C.B.’s truck.
In that video, the appellant is wearing greasy work boots and a black Carhart jacket and
bibs. The next video clip begins at some point after B.H. parked in C.B.’s driveway, and
shows B.H. talking on the phone while standing outside of his truck. Another video clip
shows the front porch of the appellant’s house, and actually corroborates B.H.’s
description of the events. In addition, in this clip the appellant is no longer wearing the
jacket and bibs; however, he had on the same work boots he was wearing in the first
video clip. The video clips provided by the appellant depicted the time period before and
after the incident; the appellant did not, however, provide a video clip for the time period
of the incident itself. Officer Klemp testified that she found the video clips to be consistent
with B.H.’s description of events. After reviewing the videos provided by the appellant,
Officer Klemp concluded that the appellant had in fact committed theft, and charges were
filed against him.
{¶15} The case was submitted to the jury for deliberations on May 9, 2024, and
the jury returned a verdict of guilty the same day. The appellant waived his right to a pre- sentence investigation. The trial court asked appellant’s trial counsel if he wished to say
anything prior to sentencing. The appellant’s trial counsel stated that the appellant wanted
the court to know that his wife was “pretty sick,” that he “is the only one who has the car
right now taking care of her,” and requested that the appellant be able to return the car
back home to his wife and “make sure someone is around to take care of her,” after which
he would report to the jail. The trial court proceeded to sentence the appellant to the
following: community control for a period of three years, with an order to successfully
complete intensive supervised probation; a term of six months in the Stark County Jail,
which the appellant was to begin immediately; 100 hours of community service at the rate
of 10 hours per week; obtain and maintain full-time verifiable employment, have an
assessment for any drug or alcohol problems, and complete treatment recommendations,
if any; pay restitution to C.B. in the amount of $170; and, pay court costs. In addition, the
appellant was ordered to have no contact, directly or indirectly, with the victim, C.B.
{¶16} The trial court asked the appellant, “And do you have any questions about
the terms and conditions of your probation, sir?” The appellant responded that he was
“not even soaking all this in right now.” The trial court repeated the sentence it had
imposed, and asked the appellant a second time: “Do you have any questions about the
terms and conditions of your probation, sir?” The appellant responded “No, ma’am.”
Neither the appellant nor his attorney objected to the sentence imposed by the trial court.
On May 15, 2024, the trial court filed a Judgment Entry confirming the jury’s finding of
guilt and the court’s imposition of sentence.
{¶17} The appellant filed a timely appeal, and sets forth the following three
assignments of error: {¶18} “I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST APPELLANT, AND THE CONVICTION MUST BE
REVERSED.”
{¶19} “II. THE APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE AND MUST BE REVERSED.”
{¶20} “III. APPELLANT’S SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVERSED AS CONTRARY
TO LAW BECAUSE THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S
SENTENCE WAS VINDICTIVE AS APPELLANT WAS SENTENCED MORE HARSHLY
FOR EXERCISING HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL.”
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I AND II
{¶21} The appellant argues in assignments of error numbers one and two that the
decision of the trial court was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the
manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Standard Of Review
{¶22} Sufficiency of the evidence was addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court in
State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-2207:
The test for sufficiency of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492
(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by constitutional
amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,
102, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997), fn. 4, and following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). “ ‘Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt’ is proof of such character that an ordinary person would
be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of the person's own
affairs.” R.C. 2901.05(E). A sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge asks
whether the evidence adduced at trial “is legally sufficient to support the jury
verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-
4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 219.
Id. at ¶57. Thus, a review of the constitutional sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal
conviction requires a court of appeals to determine whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶23} Manifest weight of the evidence, on the other hand, addresses the
evidence's effect of inducing belief. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386–387,
(1997), superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v.
Smith, 1997-Ohio-355. The Court stated:
. . . Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the
issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the
evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible
evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them. Weight
is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in inducing
belief.” (Emphasis added.) Black's, supra, at 1594. Id. at 387. The Court stated further:
When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the
basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate
court sits as a “ ‘thirteenth juror’ ” and disagrees with the factfinder's
resolution of the conflicting testimony. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42, 102 S.Ct. at
2218, 72 L.Ed.2d at 661. See, also, State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175, 20 OBR 215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 (“The court,
reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered. The discretionary power to grant a new trial should
be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs
heavily against the conviction.”).
Id.
{¶24} In addition, as set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in the seminal case of
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77 (1978), it is also important that,
when evaluating whether a verdict is supported by a manifest weight of the evidence, “a
court of appeals be guided by a presumption that the findings of the trier-of-fact were
indeed correct.” Id. at 80. The Court stated further:
“* * * [I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence, every reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the
finding of facts. * * *
“If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with
the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
judgment.”
Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1978) 191-192, Appellate Review, Section
603.
Analysis
{¶25} The appellee presented the testimony of witness B.H., who gave detailed
testimony regarding the events of November 1, 2023. He identified the appellant as the
man he saw rummaging through the victim’s vehicle, leave the scene, go into the house
next door, come back outside, ask if he could help while wearing the same greasy work
boots, and then leave the scene. The appellee also presented the testimony of victim
C.B., as well as that of Officer Klemp, who investigated the matter. The jury was in the
best position to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses and evaluate the evidence
presented. Based upon the evidence presented, the jury found that the appellant was
guilty of theft from a protected person. We find that the evidence adduced at trial “is legally
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law,” and that any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the theft from a person in a protected class
beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the jury lost its way
resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we find appellant’s
assignments of error numbers one and two to be without merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
{¶26} The appellant argues in assignment of error number three that his sentence
was contrary to law because the trial court was vindictive and sentenced him more harshly
because he exercised his right to trial. We disagree.
{¶27} Generally, felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State
v. Goings, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or
vacate and remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the
record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section
2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20
of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise
contrary to law.” State v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶ 7 (6th Dist.), citing R.C.
2953.08(G)(2).
{¶28} However, as discussed by this Court recently in State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-
725 (5th Dist.), the appellant’s failure to object to his sentence while before the trial court
“leaves him with little recourse.” Id. at ¶6. The Bright Court stated:
Bright did not, however, object to the community-control conditions
that were imposed at her sentencing hearing. An error “that was not called
to the attention of the trial court at a time when the error could have been
avoided or corrected by the trial court” is deemed forfeited absent plain
error. State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.). See also
Crim.R. 52(B) and State v. Whitaker, 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 166 (“because Whitaker failed to object to the imposition of consecutive sentences at the
sentencing hearing, he has forfeited this issue, absent plain error”).
To be sure, had the trial judge announced the sentence and then
abruptly left the courtroom without giving the parties a chance to raise
objections to the judge's ruling, Bright could not be faulted now for having
stayed silent then. See, e.g., United States v. Ralston, 110 F.4th 909, 919
(6th Cir. 2024) (noting that federal district courts “are required to ask the
parties during the sentencing hearing whether they have any objections to
the sentence that has been imposed”); U.S. v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872
(6th Cir. 2004) (where a trial court fails to provide the parties with an
opportunity to object to the sentence, the parties “will not have forfeited their
objections and thus will not be required to demonstrate plain error on
appeal[ ]”).
Here, the trial judge — by asking the parties, after the sentence was
announced, if they had “[a]nything further” to say — gave Bright a
meaningful opportunity to express the concerns that Bright now raises here.
Neither Bright's trial counsel nor Bright herself objected to the sentence.
We, therefore, review Bright's community-control sentence for plain error.
Id. at ¶7-9. In the case sub judice, the appellant failed to object to the sentence imposed
by the trial court at the time of sentencing, even when the court asked him, twice, if he
had any questions about his sentence. The appellant had a meaningful opportunity to
address his sentence at that time, and failed to do so. As such, we review for plain error
only. Analysis
{¶29} The Court’s decision in Bright concisely addressed plain error:
To constitute plain error, an error “must be on the record, palpable,
and fundamental, so that it should have been apparent to the trial court
without objection.” State v. Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.).
“Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
Under Ohio law, a sentencing court in a felony case “may directly
impose a sentence that consists of one or more community control
sanctions[.]” R.C. 2929.15(A)(1). As part of those sanctions, a trial court
“may impose any other conditions of release under a community control
sanction that the court considers appropriate[.]” Id. Sentencing courts “thus
[have] broad discretion ... in imposing community-control sanctions.” State
v. Talty, 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 10. Sanctions available to a sentencing court
include “[a] term of drug and alcohol use monitoring[.]” R.C. 2929.17(H).
Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. The appellant was sentenced in conformity with statutory guidelines. The
court has broad discretion in this regard, and did not commit plain error when it sentenced
the appellant. Therefore, we find the appellant’s third assignment of error to be without
merit. CONCLUSION
{¶30} Based upon the foregoing, the appellant’s assignments of error numbers
one, two, and three are overruled, and the decision of the Stark County Court of Common
Pleas is hereby affirmed.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Montgomery, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.