[Cite as State v. Coppa, 2026-Ohio-786.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT PORTAGE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-P-0043
Plaintiff-Appellee, Criminal Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
NICHOLAS E. COPPA, Trial Court No. 2025 CR 00223 D Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: March 9, 2026 Judgment: Affirmed
Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Nicholas E. Coppa, pro se, Oriana House, P.O. Box 1501, Akron, OH 44309 (Defendant- Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Nicholas E. Coppa (“Coppa”), appeals from the
judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to a prison term
of ten (10) months as a result of his plea and conviction for identify fraud, a fifth-degree
felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.49. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} Coppa raises three main assignments of error for review on appeal. In his
assignments of error relating to his sentence, Coppa contends that his sentence is
contrary to law as he received a harsher sentence than the sentence imposed upon his
codefendant. Coppa also asserts that the trial court relied on materially false information regarding his codefendant’s status in the drug court program when determining his
sentence. Upon review, we find that Coppa’s sentence is not contrary to law. The trial
court’s sentence was within the statutory guidelines for the offense, and the trial court
considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The trial court was not required to impose the
same sentence as Coppa’s codefendant. Additionally, upon review of the record in this
appeal, we determine that the trial court did not rely on materially false information. The
parties do not dispute that the codefendant was sentenced after the trial court imposed
its sentence in the instant case.
{¶3} In his next assignment of error, Coppa claims that the trial court was
disqualified from proceeding in the underlying case, and alleges that the trial court judge
violated due process by failing to recuse. Coppa did not file an affidavit of disqualification
pursuant to R.C. 2701.03, and he did not raise any claim of judicial bias in the court below.
A court of appeals does not have the authority to decide a claim pursuant to R.C. 2701.03.
Our review of Coppa’s judicial bias claim is limited to whether Coppa was denied due
process of law and precluded from having a fair proceeding. State v. Harris, 2025-Ohio-
5438, ¶ 83 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Loudermilk, 2017-Ohio-7378, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.). We
conclude that Coppa was not denied due process of law. Upon review of the record, we
find no evidence of an appearance of bias or prejudice, let alone evidence compelling
enough to overcome the presumption of judicial integrity.
{¶4} Lastly, Coppa contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue
R.C. 2701.03 disqualification or otherwise advise him of the procedure. There is nothing
in the record in this case to support a conclusion that an affidavit of bias would have been
granted had counsel pursued the affidavit or otherwise advised Coppa of the procedure.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 Moreover, Coppa points to no evidence in the record to suggest he was prejudiced by
trial counsel’s failure to pursue the affidavit of disqualification. As such, Coppa has failed
to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective.
{¶5} Therefore, as none of Coppa’s assignments of error are meritorious, the
judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶6} On March 26, 2025, the Portage County Grand Jury returned a single-count
indictment charging Coppa and a codefendant, Nicole Fisher (aka Nicole Trussel), with
theft, a first-degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2913.02. Two days later, on March
28, 2025, the Portage County Grand Jury returned a supplemental indictment charging
Coppa and his codefendant with identity fraud, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.
2913.49. Coppa pleaded not guilty at arraignment, and a personal recognizance bond
was set at $20,000 with the condition that Coppa report to Mid-American Court Services
for random substance abuse testing.
{¶7} On June 5, 2025, Coppa waived his rights and entered a plea of guilty to
the supplemental indictment. A presentence investigation (“PSI”) was ordered, and bond
was continued. The written plea of guilty indicated that the State of Ohio (“State”) would
concur with the PSI and the Victim Impact Statement (“VIS”). As this case was resolved
as a result of a plea, there are limited facts in the record. Transcripts of the plea hearing
were not made part of the record on appeal. Therefore, the only facts in the record were
those discussed during the sentencing hearing and contained within the PSI or VIS.
{¶8} Sentencing was held on June 30, 2025. At the sentencing hearing, the court
below noted Coppa’s prior criminal history. The trial court determined that the
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 presumption for community control was overcome and imposed a prison term of 10
months.
{¶9} On July 7, 2025, Coppa filed his notice of appeal from the trial court’s
sentencing entry. Coppa also filed a motion for stay of execution of his sentence in the
trial court. The trial court denied Coppa’s motion on September 2, 2025. Coppa
subsequently filed a motion to stay execution of sentence pending appeal in this court.
Coppa’s request was overruled on September 22, 2025.
{¶10} On August 29, 2025, Coppa filed his initial merit brief (“initial brief”), prior to
the record being filed. On September 17, 2025, the State sought to supplement the record
with the transcripts of the sentencing hearing and requested to view the PSI. The State’s
requests were granted on September 19, 2025. The record was supplemented and filed
on September 23, 2025. The State filed its answer brief on October 14, 2025. Coppa filed
a motion to strike the State’s brief as untimely. As the State’s brief was timely filed,
Coppa’s motion was overruled on October 24, 2025.
{¶11} On October 28, 2025, Coppa filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental
brief to address “a newly recognized issue essential to the fairness of the proceedings
below.” This court granted Coppa’s motion on November 13, 2025. Coppa subsequently
filed his supplemental merit brief on November 17, 2025. At the request of Coppa, the
November 17, 2025 supplemental brief was stricken from the record and replaced with
Coppa’s November 21, 2025 supplemental brief (“supplemental brief”). The State did not
file a response to Coppa’s supplemental brief.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 The Appeal
{¶12} Coppa raises three assignments of error for review in his initial brief:
[1.] Judicial Bias and Appearance of Impropriety Require Vacatur.
[2.] Sentencing based on Materially False Information Violated Due Process.
[3.] Sentencing Disparity Contravenes R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶13} In his supplemental brief, Coppa also raises three assignments of error:
[1.] The trial court violated due process by failing to recuse where a prior appellate reversal created an appearance of bias and impaired the court’s impartiality.
[2.] Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise Appellant of R.C. 2701.03.
[3.] The trial court relied on materially false information during sentencing in violation of due process.
{¶14} The second assignment of error in the supplemental brief presents a new
issue on appeal. The remaining assignments of error in the supplemental brief relate to
the assignments of error raised in the initial brief. Therefore, we address the following
assignments of error as raised by Coppa in his initial and supplemental briefs in the
following order: 1) sentencing; 2) judicial bias; and 3) ineffective assistance of counsel.
Sentencing
{¶15} Coppa asserts two assignments of error regarding the imposed ten-month
prison sentence. In his second assignment of error in his initial brief and in his third
assignment of error in his supplemental brief, Coppa argues that his sentence is contrary
to law because the trial court relied on materially false information regarding the status of
his codefendant in drug court.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 {¶16} “R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in
relevant part, that after an appellate court's review of the record, it ‘may increase, reduce,
or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the
sentence and remand . . . if it clearly and convincingly finds . . . [t]hat the sentence is . . .
contrary to law.’” State v. Lamb, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), quoting R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b); see State v. Meeks, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.); see also State
v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 13. “‘“A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall
within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes
and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors
set forth in R.C. 2929.12.”’” Lamb at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Shannon, 2021-Ohio-789, ¶
11 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).
The Codefendant’s Status in Drug Court
{¶17} Coppa alleges that the trial court relied upon materially false information
that his codefendant was still a participant in drug court. At the June 30, 2025 sentencing
hearing, the following exchange occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you, Judge.
I did go over the PSI and discuss it with Mr. Coppa. It’s accurate.
As stated in the PSI, he has genuine remorse for his behavior. He wants to apologize to the victim and everybody he’s impacted.
This is all a result of an addiction.
I know you hear it all the time, Judge, but it is an addiction. Mr. Coppa, every time I speak to him, has expressed a desire to beat this addiction.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 I know we discussed Drug Court. I think he was not qualified for that because the codefendant was in it.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It’s my understanding, according to my client, that she’s been removed from that, so that is an option. We would respectfully ask that you consider that.
THE COURT: She’s not been removed.
DEFENDANT: I don’t know for sure, that’s just what I’ve been told.
THE COURT: She hasn’t been removed.
{¶18} Coppa was sentenced on June 30, 2025. According to Coppa’s brief, the
codefendant was sentenced in July, after the trial court imposed his ten-month prison
term. Therefore, by Coppa’s own statements, the codefendant seemingly remained in
drug court until she was officially terminated by the trial court. Therefore, the trial court
did not rely upon any materially false information at Coppa’s sentencing as at the time of
Coppa’s sentencing, the codefendant had not been sentenced or terminated from drug
court.1 Moreover, Coppa does not indicate how the codefendant’s status in drug court
affected the trial court’s sentencing determination. The trial court specifically determined
that the presumption of community control was overcome. As such, Coppa’s claim is
without merit.
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶19} Coppa next argues that his sentence is contrary to law as it runs afoul of
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
1. Coppa attached the trial court’s sentencing entry in the codefendant’s case. While this entry is not part of the record on appeal, an appellate court may take judicial notice of a sentencing entry which is available on the publicly accessible online court docket. See State v. Wagner, 2023-Ohio-1215, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.).
PAGE 7 OF 16
Case No. 2025-P-0043 {¶20} Coppa does not argue that the ten-month sentence is outside of the
statutory range for the offense. Indeed, the record indicates that the trial court's sentence
was within the statutory range for the convicted offense. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). Instead, in
Coppa’s initial brief, Coppa asserts that his sentence is contrary to law because he
received a harsher sentence than his codefendant in violation of R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12. His argument on appeal is one of consistency.
{¶21} “‘For purposes of R.C. 2929.11(B), “consistency” relates to the sentences
in the context of sentences given to other offenders; “proportionality” relates solely to the
punishment in the context of the offender's conduct (does the punishment fit the crime).’”
State v. Hoffman, 2023-Ohio-2645, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-
5135, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
{¶22} “There is no requirement that codefendants receive equal sentences. A trial
court possesses wide discretion to sentence felony offenders, provided it is within the
purview of R.C. 2929.11(B). Thus, as long as an offender's sentence is consistent with
sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders, it is not
discriminatory.” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Lloyd, 2003-Ohio-6417, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.). See
State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-82, ¶ 60 (4th Dist.); State v. Harris, 2020-Ohio-4600, ¶ 40 (5th
Dist.); State v. Williamson, 2024-Ohio-1599 ¶ 22 (10th Dist.). In other words, “‘a sentence
is not contrary to law because the trial court failed to impose a sentence that is the same
as another offender who committed similar conduct.’” Hoffman at ¶ 10, quoting State v.
Graham, 2014-Ohio-1891, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Lee, 2013-Ohio-3404, ¶ 13
(12th Dist.).
PAGE 8 OF 16
Case No. 2025-P-0043 {¶23} Indeed, “‘consistency in sentencing is accomplished by the trial court's
application of the statutory sentencing guidelines and, to show a sentence is inconsistent,
a defendant must show the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory purposes
and factors of felony sentencing.’” Hoffman at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Oliver, 2021-Ohio-
1002, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.); State v. Brody, 2011-Ohio-4884, ¶ 43 (11th Dist.).
{¶24} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:
THE COURT: All right. Well, unfortunately, Mr. Coppa, there are consequences for your behavior.
You’ve already been to NEOCAP. You’ve been ordered into treatment so many times, I can’t even count all the times in your record.
I am going to find that you are not amenable to community control sanctions and that a prison sentence is consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing. Even though there is a presumption for community control for felonies of the fifth degree, I am going to find that you are not amenable to community control sanctions simply due to the fact that your record is atrocious.
You have numerous prior felonies, you’ve previously been to prison and that overcomes the presumption for community control.
So I’m going to sentence you to ten months in the Ohio Department of Corrections. I will not oppose transitional control, however. I think that would be a good thing for you. It would be programming that you could certainly take advantage of while you are in the institution.
{¶25} The trial court noted Coppa’s significant criminal record which included prior
prison terms, prior attempts at rehabilitation, and prior participation in the Northeast Ohio
Community Alternative Program (“NEOCAP”). The PSI supports the trial court’s
characterization of Coppa’s criminal history and prior sentences.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 {¶26} The trial court expressly noted its consideration of the purposes of felony
sentencing enumerated in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness of crime and recidivism
factors delineated in R.C. 2929.12 in its sentencing entry. Thus, the record demonstrates
that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth
in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12. Further, the trial
court’s sentence is not “so unusual as to be outside the mainstream of local judicial
practice.” Hoffman, 2023-Ohio-2645, at ¶ 12 (11th Dist.). Therefore, Coppa’s sentence is
not contrary to law.
{¶27} Accordingly, Coppa’s assignments of error regarding his sentence are
Judicial Bias
{¶28} In his first assignment of error in both his initial and supplemental briefs,
Coppa asserts that the trial court was disqualified from proceeding in the underlying case
and that the trial court judge violated due process by failing to recuse. Specifically, Coppa
alleges that the trial court was biased and imposed a harsher sentence upon him because
he had been successful in a prior appeal of an unrelated case, State v. Coppa, 2021-
Ohio-4570 (11th Dist.).
{¶29} R.C. 2701.03 sets forth the requirements of the affidavit and proper
procedure where a party seeks the disqualification of a common pleas court judge.
If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending before the court or a party’s counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or the party’s counsel may file an affidavit of disqualification with the
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 clerk of the supreme court in accordance with division (B) of this section.
R.C. 2701.03(A).
{¶30} The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio has exclusive jurisdiction
over affidavits filed pursuant to R.C. 2701.03. Therefore, a court of appeals is without
authority to rule on the disqualification of the trial judge or to otherwise void a trial court’s
judgment on those grounds. State v. Sankey, 2018-Ohio-2677, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.), quoting
State v. Russell, 2017-Ohio-7198, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.) quoting State v. Qualls, 2015-Ohio-
2182, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.); State v. Haywood, 2017-Ohio-8299, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). However, “‘a
criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and denies a defendant due
process of law.’” State v. Dean, 2010-Ohio-5070, ¶ 48, quoting State v. LaMar, 2002-
Ohio-2128, ¶ 34. Thus, an appellate court may review a claim of judicial bias on appeal
in the limited scope of whether the defendant was denied due process of law. State v.
Harris, 2025-Ohio-5438, ¶ 83 (1st Dist.); State v. Elkins, 2024-Ohio-5351, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.),
citing State v. McCain, 2015-Ohio-449, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).
{¶31} Judicial bias has been described as “‘a hostile feeling or spirit of ill will or
undue friendship or favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney, with the formation
of a fixed anticipatory judgment on the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an
open state of mind which will be governed by the law and the facts.’” LaMar at ¶ 34
quoting, State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463 (1956), paragraph four of the
syllabus. “‘Judges are presumed not to be biased or prejudiced toward those appearing
before them, and a party alleging bias or prejudice must present evidence to overcome
the presumption.’” State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-2187, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.
Sharp, 2020-Ohio-3497, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.). See Harris at ¶ 84. Therefore, “‘[t]he evidence
PAGE 11 OF 16
Case No. 2025-P-0043 must demonstrate an appearance of bias or prejudice compelling enough to overcome
the presumption of judicial integrity.’” Smith at ¶ 10, quoting Sharp at ¶ 11; see Harris at
¶ 84. The party seeking to establish judicial bias has the burden of overcoming that
presumption. State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), citing Coley v.
Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2013). If the record shows that the defendant did not
receive a fair trial from an impartial judge, the remedy is a new trial. Dean at ¶ 2; Elkins
at ¶ 11.
{¶32} Coppa cites to the Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 and argues that the
trial court judge was required to disqualify herself as her impartiality might be reasonably
questioned. Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) provides in relevant part:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances:
(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.
{¶33} Coppa contends that the fact that he was successful in a prior unrelated
appeal involving a criminal matter handled by the same trial court judge along with the
sentencing disparity between his sentence and that of his codefendant creates the
appearance of bias. We disagree.
{¶34} The Supreme Court of Ohio, in reviewing an affidavit of disqualification,
determined that “without evidence of actual bias, the fact that [a judge] has presided over
previous cases involving [the defendant] is not grounds for disqualification.” In re
Disqualification of Rastatter, 2013-Ohio-4232, ¶ 6. The Court explained that “bias against
a party cannot be presumed merely because a judge was reversed on appeal. See, e.g.,
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 In re Disqualification of Floyd, 135 Ohio St.3d 1249, 2012-Ohio-6336, 986 N.E.2d 10, ¶
10 (that a trial judge’s decision ‘was reversed in a critical opinion by the appeals court
does not imply that she will be biased against [the appellants] or somehow retaliate
against them’).” Id.
{¶35} Upon review of the record, we find no evidence of an appearance of bias or
prejudice, let alone evidence compelling enough to overcome the presumption of judicial
integrity. As discussed above, Coppa’s sentence was within the statutory parameters and
not otherwise contrary to law. At the time of Coppa’s sentencing hearing, his codefendant
had not been sentenced or terminated from drug court. Therefore, the trial court did not
rely on any misstatement regarding the defendant’s status in drug court.
{¶36} Coppa’s “success” in his prior appeal of an unrelated criminal case, without
more, does not support Coppa’s claim that the trial court was biased.2 Neither Coppa nor
the trial court discussed the prior case nor made any comment that would demonstrate
that the trial court harbored any ill will toward Coppa because of the prior appeal. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the prior appeal otherwise influenced the length of
Coppa’s sentence.
{¶37} Because the record is devoid of any evidence of an appearance of bias or
prejudice, we find Coppa’s first assignment of error to be without merit.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶38} In his second assignment of error in the supplemental brief, Coppa
contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserts that
2. In State v. Coppa, 2021-Ohio-4570 (11th Dist.), this court found sentencing errors pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) and Crim.R. 32(A)(1). This court remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with those provisions.
PAGE 13 OF 16
Case No. 2025-P-0043 counsel “failed to inform him of R.C. 2701.03, the exclusive statutory mechanism for
seeking judicial disqualification, leaving Appellant without meaningful ability to protect his
due-process right to an impartial tribunal.”
{¶39} “To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the
proceeding.” State v. Madrigal, 2000-Ohio-448, ¶ 49, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
{¶40} A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent, and judicial scrutiny
of his performance must be highly deferential. Strickland at 689.
“‘Under Strickland as interpreted by Ohio courts, attorneys are presumed competent, reviewing courts must refrain from second- guessing strategic, tactical decisions and strongly presume that counsel’s performance falls within a wide range of reasonable legal assistance.’” State v. Brown, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2013-A-0065, 2014-Ohio-2878, ¶42, quoting State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995). “‘Trial tactics (including a failure to object) do not substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” Brown, supra, at ¶50, quoting Henry, supra, at ¶78.
State v. McAdams, 2016-Ohio-8225, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.).
{¶41} Coppa alleges that counsel’s failure to advise him of the procedure of filing
an affidavit of disqualification of a judge of the common pleas court for prejudice
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. “[A] defendant may assert that defense
counsel’s failure to seek disqualification constitutes ineffective assistance where a
reasonable probability exists that an affidavit of bias would have been granted and
resulting prejudice.” State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-1984, ¶ 74 (12th Dist.), citing State v.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 140, 148. In Smith, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals
concluded that Smith’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to file an affidavit of
disqualification, finding that the record did “not support the conclusion that an affidavit of
bias would have been granted” and that Smith directed the court to “no evidence in the
record that would suggest that he was prejudiced or denied a fair trial. Id. at ¶ 140.” Smith
at ¶ 88-89.
{¶42} Similarly, in the instant case, there is nothing in the record to support a
conclusion that an affidavit of bias would have been granted had counsel pursued the
affidavit or otherwise advised Coppa of the procedure. Moreover, Coppa points to no
evidence in the record to suggest he was prejudiced. Therefore, he cannot meet the
burden under Strickland. Thus, Coppa has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of
counsel, and Coppa’s final assignment of error is without merit.
{¶43} Accordingly, none of Coppa’s assignments of error have merit.
Conclusion
{¶44} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Portage
County Court of Common Pleas.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2025-P-0043