[Cite as State v. Hollenback, 2026-Ohio-2784.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2026-0014
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, CHARLES O. HOLLENBACK, Case No. CR2025-0366
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: July 20, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Andrew J. King, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Joseph A. Palmer (Muskingum County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), Zanesville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher D. Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Charles Hollenback challenges in this appeal the sentence that he
received for several felony charges in Muskingum County. He was in effect sentenced twice,
but only the second sentence was journalized, so that is the one before us. More than two
weeks passed between the date when the trial judge first announced a sentence in court and
when the judge reconvened the sentencing hearing and announced the final — and lengthier
— aggregate prison term that he ended up imposing in the case. That process was unfair,
Hollenback argues, and the trial judge should not have altered the initial sentence once it had
been announced in court, he says. Hollenback claims, too, that the trial judge failed to state
at the second sentencing hearing the kind of factual findings that might have justified the
consecutive prison terms that the judge ultimately imposed. {¶2} Because the initial sentence was never journalized after it was orally announced
by the trial judge at the first sentencing hearing, we conclude that the judge not only could
take the unusual step of reconvening the sentencing hearing but also could lengthen the
aggregate prison term beyond the length initially announced. Though not an ideal situation,
the one this case presents is also not impermissible. As for the consecutive-sentence findings,
we readily conclude that the trial judge did in fact state those at both sentencing hearings. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The Key Facts
{¶3} In 2025, Hollenback pled guilty in the trial court to multiple felony sex-offense
charges, to two sexually-violent-predator specifications, and to several felony charges under
R.C. Chapter 2950 that were tied to his registration and verification obligations as a registered
sex offender.
{¶4} The trial judge held a sentencing hearing in January 2026. At that hearing, the
judge orally imposed an aggregate prison term of — in the judge’s words — “22 and a half
years to life.” No sentencing entry documenting that sentence was ever journalized.
{¶5} More than two weeks later, the trial judge reconvened the sentencing hearing.
He explained at the outset that the sentence he had announced at the first hearing “was not
the right sentence” and that he “couldn’t sleep” because that first sentence was “not fair to
the victim or to our community.” After giving defense counsel and Hollenback himself a
fresh opportunity to offer any statements that they wished to make, the judge announced that
the aggregate sentence in the case would now be a life sentence with parole eligibility for
Hollenback once he had served 55.5 years in prison. {¶6} The judge ordered that Hollenback serve some of the prison terms in the case
consecutively, and the judge explained the findings that supported his imposition of
consecutive sentences using words that tracked those that appear in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶7} Soon thereafter, the trial judge prepared and filed a sentencing entry
documenting the new lengthier aggregate prison term in the case. Hollenback now appeals.
The Initial Oral Pronouncement of a Sentence Was Not a Final Order
{¶8} Hollenback first contends that the trial court was bound by the sentence
announced at the first hearing and that — by convening a second hearing and increasing that
sentence — the court reconsidered a final judgment and subjected him to a second punishment
for the same offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and U.S.
Constitutions. Because Hollenback did not raise this objection in the trial court at a time
when any error could have been avoided or corrected, we review it only for plain error. State
v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 15 (5th
Dist.). We find no error here, plain or otherwise.
{¶9} Hollenback’s argument rests on the premise that the sentence announced at the
first hearing was a final sentence. It was not. “A court of record speaks only through its
journal and not by oral pronouncement.” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109 (1953),
paragraph one of the syllabus. A criminal sentence is no exception: a sentence announced
from the bench does not become a final order until a written entry documenting that sentence
has been filed in the clerk’s office. State v. Trammell, 2016-Ohio-1317, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). Until
that happens, there is no final judgment in the case.
{¶10} It follows that a trial court retains authority to revisit, and even to increase, an
orally announced sentence so long as that sentence has not yet been journalized. The Ninth District confronted a similar situation in State v. Hensley, 2023-Ohio-2910 (9th Dist.). There,
as here, the trial court announced a sentence at one hearing, never journalized that sentence,
and then imposed a considerably harsher sentence at a later hearing. The court of appeals
explained that “[w]here there has been no journalization of [a criminal] sentence, a sentence
announced in open court may be amended without formal judgment entry,” and therefore a
court “may increase sentences when the sentence does not constitute a final order.” Id. at ¶
12 (citation and quotations omitted). The same is true of the first sentence pronouncement in
this case. The initial orally announced aggregate sentence of life in prison with parole
eligibility after 22.5 years was not a final order, and the trial court was therefore free to alter
that sentence by announcing and journalizing a harsher one.
{¶11} To be sure, trial courts have no authority to reconsider their own valid final
judgments. State v. Raber, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 20. But the rule of Raber, by its own terms,
guards against the reconsideration of only a valid final judgment, and the double-jeopardy
protection attaches if and only if a defendant has acquired a legitimate expectation of finality
in his or her sentence. Id. at ¶ 24-25. In Raber, the trial court had entered a final judgment of
conviction and then, more than a year later, reopened it to add a sex-offender classification.
Here, by contrast, no final judgment existed until a sentencing entry — the one and only
sentencing entry ever prepared and filed in the case — was journalized after the second
sentencing hearing. Because the initial oral sentence pronouncement was never journalized,
Hollenback never acquired the expectation of finality that Raber protects.
{¶12} The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bryant explains that point well. The
Court there recognized that a sentence not yet journalized is not final and so remains subject
to revision. State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 23. The Court did overturn the trial court’s imposition of a harsher sentence in that case, but the high court did so for a reason that has
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[Cite as State v. Hollenback, 2026-Ohio-2784.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2026-0014
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, CHARLES O. HOLLENBACK, Case No. CR2025-0366
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: July 20, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Andrew J. King, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Joseph A. Palmer (Muskingum County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney), Zanesville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Christopher D. Brigdon, Thornville, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Charles Hollenback challenges in this appeal the sentence that he
received for several felony charges in Muskingum County. He was in effect sentenced twice,
but only the second sentence was journalized, so that is the one before us. More than two
weeks passed between the date when the trial judge first announced a sentence in court and
when the judge reconvened the sentencing hearing and announced the final — and lengthier
— aggregate prison term that he ended up imposing in the case. That process was unfair,
Hollenback argues, and the trial judge should not have altered the initial sentence once it had
been announced in court, he says. Hollenback claims, too, that the trial judge failed to state
at the second sentencing hearing the kind of factual findings that might have justified the
consecutive prison terms that the judge ultimately imposed. {¶2} Because the initial sentence was never journalized after it was orally announced
by the trial judge at the first sentencing hearing, we conclude that the judge not only could
take the unusual step of reconvening the sentencing hearing but also could lengthen the
aggregate prison term beyond the length initially announced. Though not an ideal situation,
the one this case presents is also not impermissible. As for the consecutive-sentence findings,
we readily conclude that the trial judge did in fact state those at both sentencing hearings. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The Key Facts
{¶3} In 2025, Hollenback pled guilty in the trial court to multiple felony sex-offense
charges, to two sexually-violent-predator specifications, and to several felony charges under
R.C. Chapter 2950 that were tied to his registration and verification obligations as a registered
sex offender.
{¶4} The trial judge held a sentencing hearing in January 2026. At that hearing, the
judge orally imposed an aggregate prison term of — in the judge’s words — “22 and a half
years to life.” No sentencing entry documenting that sentence was ever journalized.
{¶5} More than two weeks later, the trial judge reconvened the sentencing hearing.
He explained at the outset that the sentence he had announced at the first hearing “was not
the right sentence” and that he “couldn’t sleep” because that first sentence was “not fair to
the victim or to our community.” After giving defense counsel and Hollenback himself a
fresh opportunity to offer any statements that they wished to make, the judge announced that
the aggregate sentence in the case would now be a life sentence with parole eligibility for
Hollenback once he had served 55.5 years in prison. {¶6} The judge ordered that Hollenback serve some of the prison terms in the case
consecutively, and the judge explained the findings that supported his imposition of
consecutive sentences using words that tracked those that appear in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
{¶7} Soon thereafter, the trial judge prepared and filed a sentencing entry
documenting the new lengthier aggregate prison term in the case. Hollenback now appeals.
The Initial Oral Pronouncement of a Sentence Was Not a Final Order
{¶8} Hollenback first contends that the trial court was bound by the sentence
announced at the first hearing and that — by convening a second hearing and increasing that
sentence — the court reconsidered a final judgment and subjected him to a second punishment
for the same offenses in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Ohio and U.S.
Constitutions. Because Hollenback did not raise this objection in the trial court at a time
when any error could have been avoided or corrected, we review it only for plain error. State
v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Haudenschild, 2024-Ohio-407, ¶ 15 (5th
Dist.). We find no error here, plain or otherwise.
{¶9} Hollenback’s argument rests on the premise that the sentence announced at the
first hearing was a final sentence. It was not. “A court of record speaks only through its
journal and not by oral pronouncement.” Schenley v. Kauth, 160 Ohio St. 109 (1953),
paragraph one of the syllabus. A criminal sentence is no exception: a sentence announced
from the bench does not become a final order until a written entry documenting that sentence
has been filed in the clerk’s office. State v. Trammell, 2016-Ohio-1317, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). Until
that happens, there is no final judgment in the case.
{¶10} It follows that a trial court retains authority to revisit, and even to increase, an
orally announced sentence so long as that sentence has not yet been journalized. The Ninth District confronted a similar situation in State v. Hensley, 2023-Ohio-2910 (9th Dist.). There,
as here, the trial court announced a sentence at one hearing, never journalized that sentence,
and then imposed a considerably harsher sentence at a later hearing. The court of appeals
explained that “[w]here there has been no journalization of [a criminal] sentence, a sentence
announced in open court may be amended without formal judgment entry,” and therefore a
court “may increase sentences when the sentence does not constitute a final order.” Id. at ¶
12 (citation and quotations omitted). The same is true of the first sentence pronouncement in
this case. The initial orally announced aggregate sentence of life in prison with parole
eligibility after 22.5 years was not a final order, and the trial court was therefore free to alter
that sentence by announcing and journalizing a harsher one.
{¶11} To be sure, trial courts have no authority to reconsider their own valid final
judgments. State v. Raber, 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶ 20. But the rule of Raber, by its own terms,
guards against the reconsideration of only a valid final judgment, and the double-jeopardy
protection attaches if and only if a defendant has acquired a legitimate expectation of finality
in his or her sentence. Id. at ¶ 24-25. In Raber, the trial court had entered a final judgment of
conviction and then, more than a year later, reopened it to add a sex-offender classification.
Here, by contrast, no final judgment existed until a sentencing entry — the one and only
sentencing entry ever prepared and filed in the case — was journalized after the second
sentencing hearing. Because the initial oral sentence pronouncement was never journalized,
Hollenback never acquired the expectation of finality that Raber protects.
{¶12} The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bryant explains that point well. The
Court there recognized that a sentence not yet journalized is not final and so remains subject
to revision. State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 23. The Court did overturn the trial court’s imposition of a harsher sentence in that case, but the high court did so for a reason that has
no application here: the trial judge had lengthened the defendant’s orally announced sentence
to punish him for a disrespectful courtroom outburst, thereby basing the final sentence on
impermissible factors outside the scope of Ohio’s sentencing statutes. Id. at ¶ 22. The trial
court here increased Hollenback’s sentence for no such improper purpose. Rather, the judge
at the second sentencing hearing noted that Hollenback had sexually victimized multiple
children, that he posed a continuing danger of reoffending, and that the community ought to
be protected from him, all of which are concerns consistent with the seriousness and
recidivism considerations that R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 direct trial courts to weigh. The
increase in the aggregate sentence was therefore consistent with what the law permits.
{¶13} We add a word of caution, though it does not change the result. Our finding
that no error took place flows from the fact that the first sentence was never journalized, but
we certainly do not endorse the process that led to the imposition of the final sentence. An
open-court pronouncement of a sentence in any criminal case — but particularly a case like
this one involving such serious charges — is a solemn act, and both the defendant and any
victims rightly expect to depart from a sentencing hearing feeling certain about the final
outcome of the case. This unfortunate episode perhaps serves as a helpful reminder that a
trial judge’s deliberations about the appropriate sentence in any given case should ideally be
completed before the judge begins to speak rather than after.
{¶14} Hollenback’s first assignment of error is overruled.
The Trial Court Made the Necessary Consecutive-Sentence Findings
{¶15} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) guides our review of any challenge to the imposition of
consecutive sentences. The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he plain language” of that provision requires an appellate court to “defer to a trial court’s consecutive-sentence
findings,” and those findings “must be upheld” unless they are “clearly and convincingly not
supported by the record.” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
{¶16} A trial court may order consecutive service of prison terms in a felony case if
the court finds that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
or to punish the offender, that they are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s
conduct and to the danger that he or she poses to the public, and that one of the three
predicates set out in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a) through (c) applies. The court must make those
findings both at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry, though it has no obligation
to state reasons in support of them. State v. Hinkle, 2026-Ohio-1857, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.).
{¶17} The sentencing-entry requirement is satisfied here. The judgment entry
memorializing the sentence sets out each of the required findings: that consecutive service is
necessary to protect the public and to punish Hollenback, that the imposition of consecutive
prison terms is not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct or the danger that he
poses to the public, and that the language in both R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) (a course of conduct
with great or unusual harm) and R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c) (a history of criminal conduct that
necessitates consecutive sentences to protect the public from future crime) applies.
{¶18} The hearing requirement is satisfied as well. A word-for-word recitation of the
statutory language at the hearing is not required, so long as a reviewing court is “able to
discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis.” State v. Nelson, 2022-Ohio-4308,
¶ 10 (6th Dist.). The trial court in Nelson had imposed consecutive sentences on a defendant
for multiple gross-sexual-imposition offenses against his own children, and the court of
appeals affirmed because the trial judge’s remarks — addressing the danger the defendant posed, the seriousness of his conduct, and the great or unusual harm to his victims — reflected
the substance of the required findings. Nelson at ¶ 11-20.
{¶19} The trial court’s remarks here do the same. In explaining why Hollenback’s
sentences would run consecutively, the trial judge spoke — at both sentencing hearings —
about Hollenback’s having sexually victimized multiple children, of the likelihood that he
would offend again if given the opportunity, and of the need to protect the community. The
judge also made findings that closely track the requisite consecutive-sentence findings in R.C.
2929.14(C)(4), and the findings stated by the judge match the ones later listed in the
sentencing entry. From this record, we can readily discern that the trial court engaged in the
analysis that R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) demands.
{¶20} Hollenback’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas
of Muskingum County is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by appellant Charles Hollenback.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur.