Pee Curiam.
The earlier history of this protracted litigation appears elsewhere in our reports.1 It need not be restated here. On September 29, 1D75, there was enacted into law a statute known as the Public School Education Act of 1975, c. 212, L. 1975, N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-1 et seq.). Immediately following its passage, motions were addressed to this Court by a number of different parties in the cause. The various forms of relief sought by these motions all implicated one underlying issue: was or was not the Act of 1975 constitutional? We hesitated to entertain the motions. No lower court determination of this underlying issue was before us for review; the parties had had no opportunity to avail themselves of an evidentiary hearing at which a record could be made; a judgment by us might savour somewhat of an advisory opinion. These considerations, however, were felt to be outweighed by the desirability of reaching a speedy decision as to the constitutionality of the enactment —- at least when examined facially2 We thought it would [455]*455be possible — and if so, highly desirable — to decide at once whether the statute, on its face, did or did not meet constitutional requirements. Parenthetically, we note that whether it may or may not pass constitutional muster as applied in the future to any individual school district at any particular time, must quite obviously await the event. Only in the factual context then presented and in the light of circumstances as they may then appear could such a determination be made.
Accordingly we address ourselves to the issue as to whether, on its face, the 1975 Act is or is not constitutional.
I
It is, initially, of vital importance to note that this is the first time in the course of this litigation that we have had an opportunity to consider a plan intended to meet all aspects of a thorough and efficient education. Robinson I, as the opening sentence of the opinion makes clear, involved only “the constitutionality of statutes providing for the financing of elementary and secondary schools.” [62 N. J. 473, 480; emphasis supplied]. It is of course true that the opinion says much that bears significantly upon aspects of the problem of public education other than the fiscal one. And although we have not hitherto been asked to examine the adequacy of the educational system in this State in other than financial terms, we have been constantly mindful that money is only one of a number of elements that must be studied in giving definition and content to the constitutional promise of a thorough and efficient education. Thus in Robinson IY we said,
[456]*456[A] multitude of other [non-fiscal] factors play a vital role in the educational result — to name a few, individual and group disadvantages, use of compensatory techniques for the disadvantaged and handicapped, variation in availability of qualified teachers in different areas, effectiveness in teaching methods and evaluation thereof, professionalism at every level of the system, meaningful curricula, exercise of authority and discipline, and adequacy of overall goals fixed at the policy level. [69 N. J. 133, 141]
We are now called upon to examine a legislative proposal that at once seeks to define the constitutional promise, identify the components of which it consists, establish a procedural mechanism for its implementation and afford the financial means necessary for its fulfillment. We approach our 'analysis having in mind the presumption of validity which accompanies the legislative act.
II
In Robinson I we pointed out that the State had never defined or spelled out the content of the educational opportunity required by the Constitution, and we indicated that this must be done so that “in some discernible way” the scope of this obligation would be made apparent. 62 N. J. at 516, 519. This, as we have noted, the Legislature has now undertaken to do. The goal of a thorough and efficient education 'and the principal elements of which it must consist are explicitly stated:
The goal of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools shall be to provide to all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location, the educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and socially in a democratic society. [N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-4]
A thorough and efficient system of free public schools shall include the following major elements, which shall serve as guidelines for the achievement of the legislative goal and the implementation of this act:
a. Establishment of educational goals at both the State and local levels;
b. Encouragement of public involvement in the establishment of educational goals;
[457]*457c. Instruction intended to produce the attainment of reasonable levels of proficiency in the basic communications and computational skills;
d. A breadth of program offerings designed to develop the individual talents and abilities of pupils;
e. Programs and supportive services for all pupils especially those who are educationally disadvantaged or who have special educational needs;
f. Adequately equipped, sanitary and secure physical facilities and adequate materials and supplies;
g. Qualified instructional and other personnel;
h. Efficient administrative procedures;
i. An adequate State program of research and development; and
j. Evaluation and monitoring programs at both the State and local levels. [N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-5]
To the “major elements” listed above should be added the requisite of sufficient fiscal support. Perhaps this is implied in what is quoted above. In any event it is dealt with at length in a later portion of the statute3 and is discussed below.
Together with these legislative statements of educational aims and of the ingredients of which a thorough and efficient education must consist, attention should be directed to one of the findings appearing in a prefatory portion of the Act. This reads as follows:
Because the sufficiency of education is a growing and evolving concept, the definition of a thorough and efficient system of education and the delineation of all the factors necessary to be included therein, depend upon the economic, historical, social and cultural context in which that education is delivered. The Legislature must, nevertheless, make explicit provision for the design of State and local systems by which such education is delivered, and should, therefore, explicitly provide after 4 years from the effective date of this act for a major and comprehensive evaluation of both the State and local systems, and the sufficiency of education provided thereby; [N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-2, subd. a(4)]
This statement reveals a perceptive recognition on the part of the Legislature of the constantly evolving nature of the [458]*458concept being considered. It manifests an awareness that wbat seems • sufficient today may be proved inadequate tomorrow, and even more importantly that only in the light of experience can one ever come to know whether a particular program is achieving the desired end.
While the Constitution squarely places the responsibility for the maintenance and support of free public schools upon the Legislature, the administrative aspect of this obligation has in fact historically been delegated in large part to a system of local school districts, operating chiefly through local school boards. Purthermore the fiscal aspect of the obligation has long been met in significant part by taxes raised by these same districts. All of this is well known and discussed at length in Bobinson I, 62 N. J. at 505-12. This sharing of the financial responsibility as between the State and these local districts was there held to be constitutionally permissible. 62 N. J. at 510. The Act of 1975 continues this plan of large delegated responsibility with the resultant sharing of administrative duties and fiscal support.
In furtherance of the Legislature’s obvious commitment to the belief that a sound educational system will be more or less constantly changing and growing, provision is made in the Act for a rather elaborate monitoring arrangement. The responsibilities are here again shared by State and local authorities. N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-8 to 12. We draw especial attention to N. J. 8. A. 18A :7A-10, which reads as follows:
For the purpose of evaluating the thoroughness and efficiency of all the public schools of the State, the commissioner, with the approval of the State board and after review by the Joint Committee on the Public Schools, shall develop and administer a uniform, Statewide system for evaluating the performance of each school. Such a system shall be based in part on annual testing for achievement in basic skill areas, and in part on such other means as the commissioner deems proper in order to (a) determine pupil status and needs, (b) ensure pupil progress, and (c) assess the degree to which the educational objectives have been achieved. [Emphasis supplied]
[459]*459This is an important and potentially far-reaching provision. It recognizes that in seeking to achieve educational excellence and in attempting to gauge the success of any such effort, each school district must be examined as a separate unit. As we have seen above, the Legislature has enumerated the components of which it believes a thorough and efficient education must consist, these, including implementation at the local level, N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-7, to be used as guidelines for the achievement of the legislative goal. In thus providing that local boards shall establish particular educational goals, objectives and standards, and that the system of monitoring and evaluation shall treat school districts as individual units, the Legislature is implicitly acknowledging the diversity that will inevitably exist among these separate establishments. The configuration of the components mentioned above, considered both qualitatively and quantitatively, that will produce a sufficiently fine educational opportunity in one district, will inevitably be different from that required in others. Hot alone for this reason, we think that the legislative provisions for evaluating achievement — here set forth in broad outline — have been well and thoughtfully formulated.
Crucial to the success of the legislative plan, as well as to the argument that the statute is facially constitutional, are three particular sections of the Act: N. J. S'. A. 18A: 7A-14, 15 and 16. These provisions allocate to the Commissioner of Education and to the State Board of Education a two-fold continuing responsibility: first, to maintain a constant awareness of what elements at any particular time find place in a thorough and efficient system of education, as this concept evolves through the inevitably changing forms that it will take in the years to come; second, to insure that there be ever present, sufficiently competent and dedicated personnel, adequately equipped, to guarantee functional implementation, so that over the years and throughout the State each pupil shall be offered an equal oppor[460]*460tunity to receive an education of such excellence as will meet the constitutional standard.
Pursuant to this allocation of responsibility, the Commissioner is required to review the results of the monitoring and evaluation system mentioned above. Upon detecting an inadequacy he must direct the local board of education to prepare forthwith a plan designed to correct and remedy the failure that has been identified. Such plan will be submitted to him for approval. If approved, the plan will be implemented "in a timely and effective manner.” N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-14. Should the proposal not be approved, the Commissioner is directed to order the local board to show cause why there should not bé a plenary hearing held before him to determine whether or not corrective action is necessary. If such a hearing is held, and the Commissioner decides that in fact such action is needed, he is then authorized "to order necessary budget changes within the school district,” or "in-service training programs for teachers and other school personnel, or both.” N. J. 3. A. 18A:7A-15. If these steps in turn prove insufficient, the Commissioner may then formally bring the matter to the attention of the State Board in order that it may take further action. The statutory power and obligation of the Board upon such an occasion is stated thus:
The State board, on determining that tbe school district is not providing a thorough and efficient education, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the. contrary, shall have the power to issue an administrative order specifying a remedial plan to the local board of education, which plan may include budgetary changes or other measures the State board determines to be appropriate. IN. J. S. A. 18A :7A-15]
Should the local board fail or refuse to comply with such an administrative order, then the State Board shall apply to the Superior Court by action in lieu of prerogative writ for an order directing such compliance.
What we have said maybe summarized. The Constitution imposes upon the Legislature the obligation to ". . . provide [461]*461for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools . . . The imposition of this duty of course carries with it such power as may be needed to fulfill the obligation. The statutory language quoted and discussed above constitutes a delegation of this power to the State Commissioner- of Education as well as to the State Board of Education to see that the constitutional mandate is met. They have, for this purpose, been made legislative agents. They have received a vast grant of power and upon them has been placed a great and ongoing responsibility.
It has been suggested that the power, given both to the Commissioner and to the State Board of Education, to direct “budgetary changes” does not include the power to compel an increase in a local school budget above that fixed by the local authorities. We cannot accept this limitation; to do so would be to emasculate, perhaps fatally, what we believe to have been the legislative scheme. It would thwart the State Board’s authority to compel a local district to meet the financial commitments necessary to satisfy the thorough and efficient standards. Cases such as Board of Education, East Brunswick Township v. Township Council, East Brunswick Township, 48 N. J. 94 (1966) and Board of Education of Elizabeth v. City Council of Elizabeth, 55 N. J. 501 (1970) are readily distinguishable. In those cases we examined, respectively, Type I and Type II school districts (N. J. S. A. 18A:9—2 and 3), and in each ease suggested — although the point was not really argued in either suit — that the budget determination reached by the Commissioner should not exceed what had been first fixed by the local board of education. But these cases are in no event controlling precedents as to the matter now before the Court. They dealt with the problem of fixing and adopting the school budget for a particular year. In such cases the Commissioner acts somewhat as an arbitrator reviewing competing claims. Depending upon the type of district involved, he may be called upon to evaluate the conflicting [462]*462claims and assertions of the local board of education, the municipal governing body, the board of school estimate and the voters of the school district. He is required to act speedily; there is little time for deliberation.
On the other hand, under the Act of 1975 the Commissioner does not in any sense stand as an arbitrator among local groups, nor does he wait for the matter to be presented to him. Directly or indirectly, he is the initiator. His study and review of the results of the tests and other monitoring procedures that are prescribed, and his consequent action pursuant to such study and review are vastly different from the task he undertakes in putting into final form the terms of an annual budget. These are separate and quite distinct responsibilities that have been allocated to the Commissioner. They call upon' him to follow quite separate procedures. Eor example, his function under the new Act is by no means confined to budget analysis. A failure to meet minimal educational standards may, perhaps more often than not, lie elsewhere than in matters of finance. Thus the Commissioner’s study and review are not to be confined to a school district’s financial support. There must also be included a consideration of the other elements set forth by the Legislature in N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-5. Account must be taken, as well, of such other factors as may from time to time emerge and assume significance as the result of ongoing study and further experience. But where it is clear that an inadequacy stems from a failure of fiscal resources, then the power given the Commissioner and the State Board to effect changes in local budgets does include the power to increase such budgets beyond the amounts locally determined. Such power must of course be wisely exercised and any such exercise will always be subject to judicial review, but there is no doubt that under the terms of the Act of 1975 such power exists.
This grant of power is responsive to Rolinson I, where we pointed out that if the State chose, either in whole or in part, to assign its constitutional obligation to local gov[463]*463ernment, it must then afford some mechanism by which local school districts could be compelled to raise the necessary funds. 62 N. J. at 513, 519. The present enactment, as we interpret it, makes adequate provision to meet this requirement. State v. Zito, 54 N. J. 206, 218 (1969).
Ill
This brings us to a consideration of the portion of the Act dealing with state school aid, N. J. 8. A. 18A.-7A-17 et seq. As we sought to emphasize at the beginning of this opinion, unlike the pxevious occasions during the course of this litigation when this issue has been presented, it is now before us in the context of a full and complete plan designed to provide a thorough and efficient education. Accordingly the state school aid provisions embodied in this Act must be considered, not in comparative isolation, but as a part of the whole proposal formulated by the Legislature. The components of this proposal that are most significant for this purpose are these:
1. What is meant by a thorough and efficient education has now been defined; the goal of such an education has been stated; the elements of which it is to consist have been enumerated.
2. The Legislature has chosen to continue to share fiscal as well as administrative responsibilities with local school districts.
3. Provision has been made for an elaborate system of continuous monitoring and evaluation.
4. The results of this process of evaluation are to be studied and reviewed by the Commissioner, treating the school districts as separate entities, in order to detect any inadequacies or failures.
5. The iCommissioner, in coordination with the State Board of Education, is empowered to take all necessary steps to correct such defects, including, where necessary, the increase in amount of local budgets.
[464]*464The fiscal provisions of the Act are to be judged as adequate or inadequate depending upon whether they do or do not afford sufficient financial support for the system of public education that will emerge from the implementation of the plant set forth in the statute. We are no longer considering the needs of the public system as it existed before the 1975 Act. We assume the Legislature had this in mind when preparing the state aid clauses of this statute.
This fiscal aid generally falls into three categories. The State is to bear the cost of categorical programs which consist of financial support for pupils who fall into special groups such as visually and auditorially handicapped, neurologically impaired, or emotionally disturbed. Aid is based on a per pupil weighted basis. Transportation costs for students who live beyond specified distances from school are to be paid in full by the State. Lastly, the State must pay each school district certain equalization support for its current expenses. The amount of support paid varies depending in part on the relationship of the assessed valuation of the local school district to the State average assessed valuations of all school districts, the general effect being to bring up districts with less than the average nearer to that level.
Each of these financial supports reflect legislative recognition that the “discordant correlations between the educational needs of the school districts and their respective tax bases”, 62 N. J. at 520, could not be met by exclusive reliance upon local taxation. We cannot say that under these circumstances the dollar input per pupil, keeping in mind that there may be and probably are legitimate differences between and among districts and students, will not be sufficient to offer each pupil an equal educational opportunity as required by the Constitution.
We do foresee a pattern of perhaps quite considerable change coming about as the procedures of this new legislation are brought to bear upon the system as a whole. How much state aid will be needed in any particular district at any particular time to supplement the local levy is some[465]*465thing we cannot forecast. We must assume, as we do, that the state aid provisions in the Act before us represent the Legislature’s best effort to prophesy as to what this need will be. Comparison between the provisions of this Act and the State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law, N. J. 8. A. 18A:58-1 ei seq., which Robinson I struck down, while perhaps useful, certainly cannot be given significant weight.4 The power which this new Act gives the Commissioner and the State Board of Education to increase local budgets, would, in and of itself, suggest the dubious value of any such comparison.
This power on the part of state administrative bodies to increase local school budgets requires that thought be given to another factor. As we stated above, Robinson I warned that if the State’s obligation were delegated to local bodies, provision must be made to compel, if necessary, such local units to raise such funds as might be deemed essential. We have found that the present statute does make such provision. But Robinson I went on to say that “if the local government cannot carry the burden, the State must itself meet its continuing obligation.” 62 N. J. at 513.
Piscal inability on the part of a local district may conceivably stem from one or more of several causes. One reason would be the lack of an adequate tax base for educational purposes as indicated by the gross disparities shown in per pupil tax resources in the various school districts. The 1975 Act has taken a positive step to more nearly equalize per pupil tax resources by establishing a guaranteed [466]*466valuation per pupil for the school year 1976-1977 of 1.3 times the state average of equalized assessed valuations per pupil. Thereafter the figure is 1.35. N. J. 8. A. 18A:7A-3. Only actual experience with this formula will demon strate whether it adequately serves the purpose intended.
Upon occasion fiscal inability may be due to "municipal overburden.” This phrase has come to be used to describe non-educational municipal expenses which must be largely financed from the same source — property taxes —■ as affords fiscal support for education.5
The 1975 Act is silent as to how this contingency of local fiscal inability is to ■ be met. It does not say, in so many words, where the money is to come from in the event of a showing that a local school district is performing inadequately due to a fiscal insufficiency, together with a further showing of inability at the local level to make up this monetary lack. This omission is not fatal to the facial constitutionality of the Act since State school aid may obviate that predicament. Though such eventuality may never occur, the State must be prepared to meet this contingency if it does arise. We think it would be wise were the Legislature to address itself to this potential problem. It would be helpful and expedient were there to be guidelines — legislative or administrative ■— as to what kind of showing must be made by a school district asking for state assistance due to local inability to recruit needed funds.
N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-25 places a limit upon annual budget increases. We are not sure what purpose is sought [467]*467to be served by this provision. It may be the Legislature feared that immoderate increases might unduly add to already excessively high tax burdens. It may have had other aims in mind. In any event the Commissioner is authorized to approve requests for larger increases where the level of spending would be insufficient to meet the goals, objectives and standards established to satisfy the requirements of a thorough and efficient education. How many districts and what amount of dollars are involved is of course unknown at this time; but certainly this escape valve is at least adequate to satisfy facial constitutional requirements.
The 1975 Act makes no mention of the weighting of pupils. This does not mean, however, that the concept is no longer viable under the new statutory scheme. Certainly the Commissioner, in determining “pupil status and needs” and ensuring “pupil progress” would, in all likelihood, take this concept into account.
In Robinson IY we ordered the reallocation of educational funds which were to be appropriated for minimum aid on a per pupil basis to the end that the average valuation per pupil throughout the state would more nearly be equalized. However, we did not hold that minimum aid was per se unconstitutional. We found it improper in the light of the gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and tax resources existing in the school funding program there under review.
The 1975 Act continues to make some provision for minimnm aid upon a per pupil basis; but, when viewed in the context of the over all act which, as heretofore noted, has taken positive steps to eliminate gross disparities in per pupil expenditures and tax resources, such provision cannot be said to be unconstitutional. Only actual experience with the Act will demonstrate whether there is need for further adjustment or modification.
It is our conclusion that the Public School Education Act of 1975 is in all respects constitutional on its face, again assuming it is fully funded. The order of this Court contained in our opinion of May 23, 1975, (Robinson IV) [468]*46869 N. J. at 165, enjoining certain state officials from disbursing appropriated funds except in the manner there set forth is hereby vacated. The Act of 1975 is in full force and effect.
IV
The Court retains jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of effectuating the following directions. If the Legislature does not bjr April 6, 1976 enact a provision for the funding in full of the State aid provisions of the 1975 act for the school year 1976-1977 the Court will, on notice to the parties and to all the school districts of the State, who shall be given an opportunity to be heard, issue an order to show cause returnable before the Court on April 15, 1976 why the Court should not forthwith order one or more of the following, to become effective unless the Legislature thereafter but on or before June 30, 1976, enacts a provision for such full funding:
A. direct a redistribution of such monies for State aid to schools as are appropriated by the Legislature for the school year 1976-1977 in such manner, generally, as to give priority to the satisfaction in full, so far as said funds may permit, of the provisions of the 1975 act for payment of current expense equalization support (exclusive of the 10% minimum support) and for debt service and budgeted capital outlay equalization support, pursuant to Sections 18 and 19 of the act respectively, pro rata; and should any excess of such State aid monies thereafter remain, then to the satisfaction pro rata of the other State aid provisions of the 1975 act;
.B. order such injunctive relief as may be appropriate and necessary; and
C. order such different or other relief as may be appropriate and necessary.