Robinson v. Cahill

287 A.2d 187, 118 N.J. Super. 223
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJanuary 19, 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 287 A.2d 187 (Robinson v. Cahill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 118 N.J. Super. 223 (N.J. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

118 N.J. Super. 223 (1972)
287 A.2d 187

KENNETH ROBINSON, AN INFANT BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ERNESTINE ROBINSON AND ERNESTINE ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY; PAUL JORDAN, ARTHUR DWYER, FRANK H. BLATZ, AND WILLIAM S. HART. INDIVIDUALLY AND AS MAYORS RESPECTIVELY OF JERSEY CITY, PATERSON, PLAINFIELD AND EAST ORANGE; THE CITIES OF JERSEY CITY, PATERSON, PLAINFIELD AND EAST ORANGE; THE BOARDS OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS OF JERSEY CITY, PATERSON, PLAINFIELD AND EAST ORANGE; THE BOARD OF SCHOOL ESTIMATE OF JERSEY CITY; AND RICHARD F. McCARTHY; ALL INDIVIDUALLY AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS OF CLASSES, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; JOSEPH M. McCRANE, JR., TREASURER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; GEORGE F. KUGLER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; RAYMOND H. BATEMAN, PRESIDENT OF THE NEW JERSEY SENATE AND THE NEW JERSEY SENATE; WILLIAM K. DICKEY, SPEAKER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; CARL L. MARBURGER, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; ALL IN THEIR OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, DEFENDANTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.

Decided January 19, 1972.

*226 Mr. Harold J. Ruvoldt, Jr., for plaintiffs (Messrs. Ruvoldt and Ruvoldt, attorneys).

Mr. Stephen G. Weiss (Mr. Weiss was an Assistant Attorney General when this action was commenced and has continued with the case as special counsel.) for defendants (Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Mr. William J. Bender and Mr. Frank Askin filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of the Education Committee of the *227 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Newark Chapter, and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Mr. David G. Lubell and Mr. Paul Tractenberg of the New York Bar, of counsel).

Mr. Melville D. Miller, Jr., Staff Attorney, State Office of Legal Services, Department of Community Affairs, filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of the poor of New Jersey (Mr. Carl Bianchi, attorney).

Mr. Robert A. Coogan filed a brief amicus curiae on behalf of Gerald K. Loeb (Messrs. Saling, Moore, O'Mara and Coogan, attorneys).

BOTTER, J.S.C.

This action challenges the constitutionality of the system of financing elementary and secondary public schools of New Jersey. The case is similar to cases in other states, such as California, Minnesota and Texas, where conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause was asserted recently.[1] Also present are questions of state constitutional law, namely, whether the equal protection and education clauses of the State Constitution are violated by New Jersey's statutory financing scheme.

Plaintiffs in this action include residents, taxpayers and officials of Jersey City, Paterson, Plainfield, East Orange and the Township of Berlin (Camden County).[2] They assert claims on behalf of all persons in New Jersey who have similar interests. Defendants include branches of the state *228 Government and state officials who have or may have functions to perform in the enactment or administration of laws dealing with education and state financing.

The system of financing public education in New Jersey relies heavily on local property taxes. It produces wide disparities in educational expenditures. Plaintiffs contend that public school education is a state function which must be afforded to all pupils on equal terms. They contend that a "thorough" education is afforded to some pupils but denied to others, and that the system discriminates also against property owners who are taxed at different rates throughout the state for the same public purpose.[3]

The Attorney General, defending the constitutionality of our state statutes, concedes that differences in expenditures exist, and that inadequacies are present in some schools. He contends, however, that the statutory system is constitutional; that the "State School Incentive Equalization Aid Law," commonly known as the Bateman Act,[4] will increase state aid for certain deprived districts and will greatly reduce discrepancies caused by district wealth variations, that unequal expenditures do not necessarily prove unequal education, and that local control and responsibility to meet *229 various interests justify the present system of shared funding. The court is urged to defer to the Legislature's judgment in an area as complex as education.

Public schools are financed primarily by local real property taxes augmented by various forms of "state aid," such as "formula aid," transportation aid, school building aid, lunch aid, etc., and federal aid. When this action was commenced in 1970, the State School Aid Law of 1954, as amended, was in effect. L. 1954, c. 85, as amended; N.J.S.A. 18A:58-1 et seq. This law included a "foundation program" consisting principally of minimum aid plus equalization aid, referred to as "formula aid" because it is based on a formula.

Under the foundation program formula each district received equalization aid of $400 per pupil less its "local fair share," and in any case not less than $75 (minimum aid) per pupil. N.J.S.A. 18A:58-5. Cities with population over 100,000 (Newark, Jersey City, Paterson, Camden, Trenton and Elizabeth) received an additional $27 per pupil L. 1966, c. 31; N.J.S.A. 18A:58-6.1; and by virtue of L. 1968, c. 301; N.J.S.A. 18A:58-6.2 all districts received another $25 per pupil. Local fair share was defined as the equivalent of the amount of revenue that could be raised locally with a tax rate of $1.05 per $100 of equalized valuations (10 1/2 mills per dollar). N.J.S.A. 18A:58-4.

Equalized valuations is the term applied to the true market value of taxable real property in a district as determined by the State Director of the Division of Taxation through studies of recent sales. N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.1 et seq. Under this law, aggregate assessments in each taxing district are adjusted to produce an equalized or true market value for the district. See In re Appeals of Kents 2124 Atlantic Ave., Inc., 34 N.J. 21, 26-27 (1961). Equalized valuations are used to establish uniformity in the distribution of state aid despite unequal assessing practices. See Switz v. Middletown Tp., 23 N.J. 580, 586 (1950).

*230 Thus, under the foundation program, every district received $100 per pupil, plus the difference, if any, between $325 and the local fair share (plus $27, if the district was one of the six largest cities). By 1969-70, however, every school district in the State had annual budgets which exceeded the level "guaranteed" by the foundation program. The statewide average was over $800 per pupil. Today, two years later, the statewide average current expense per pupil is $1,009. All districts, therefore, had to finance the excess expenditure by local taxes, in addition to the local fair share. Some districts, of course, whose local fair share was high, received only the minimum aid of $100 per pupil.

Our principal concern is the Bateman Act, which was passed while this action was pending. The complaint was amended to bring that act under attack.

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Bluebook (online)
287 A.2d 187, 118 N.J. Super. 223, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/robinson-v-cahill-njsuperctappdiv-1972.