ORDER
On April 3, 1973 this court filed its opinion (62 N. J. 473) in the above captioned cause (which constituted its judgment, R. 2:11-3 (b)) modifying the judgment of the Superior Court, Law Division, Hudson County and affirming said judgment as so modified. Said opinion generally held that the present system of maintaining and supporting public elementary and secondary school education in this state is unconstitutional because it does not conform to the state’s obligation imposed by Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The court reserved decision on the subject of remedies and sought the further views of the parties. After receiving the same, it filed a further opinion on June 19, 1973 (63 N. J. 196), concluding as follows:
* * * It is our view that the Court should not disturb the statutory scheme unless the Legislature fails to enact, by December 31, 1974, legislation compatible with our decision in this case and effective no later than July 1, 1975. We withhold ruling upon the question whether, if such legislation is not so adopted, the Court may order the distribution of appropriated moneys toward a constitutional objective notwithstanding the legislative directions.
We retain jurisdiction. Any party may move for appropriate relief, before or after December 31, 1974, if new circumstances so warrant.
[36]*36No such legislation was enacted, by December 31, 1974, although efforts to that end continued through said date. The matter therefore now returns to this court for the ordering of appropriate remedies to effectuate the court’s original decision.
The above numbered motions have been filed with sundry objects. Some seek injunctions with respect to, and/or redistribution of, some or all of such funds as may be appropriated by the Legislature as various forms of state aid to local school districts for the school year commencing July 1, 1975 (hone have yet been appropriated); others seek leave to intervene or to participate as amici curiae to present their views thereon and still others seek action on miscellaneous matters.
Upon consideration of all said motions and the briefs and accompanying documents, it is on this 23 day of January, 1975, determined and ordered as follows:
1. The motion of defendants The President of New Jersey Senate and the New Jersey Senate for a rehearing of the case (M-475) is denied. The motion of defendants Speaker of the General Assembly and the General Assembly (M-521) for order in aid of judgment is denied.
2. The motions of petitioners Christiansen, et als. “for an extension of time of thirty (30) days to allow petitioners to' intervene and to file a petition for rehearing” (M-453 and 454) are. denied.
3. All school districts must, even under recent legislation extending timetable dates, commence within a very few days the process of adopting budgets for the school year 1975-76, arranging for elections and attending to other matters relevant thereto and must be advised prior thereto of the amount of state aid funds of various categories estimated to be received during said school year. Any injunction against the distribution of said funds, or part thereof, and/or any redistribution of the same, on a different basis than now prescribed by law, while benefitting the local property tax situation in some municipalities, would in the [37]*37case of many others radically increase the amount to be raised by local taxation or require substantial reduction of the educational program. The fact that there will be. no legislation compatible with the court’s decision became certain only a very short time ago and the court considers it would he inequitable and, indeed, chaotic as to many school districts to effect financial changes for the 1975-76 school year at this late date and on such short notice. Therefore, the court will order no changes in the present statutory scheme for the school year 1975-76 and defendant Commissioner of Education may immediately advise all school districts of the amount of estimated state aid funds for said year based on present law.
4. Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for relief (M-448), alternate motion for relief (M-449) and second alternate motion for relief (M-450) are denied and motion of defendant Governor Brendan T. Byrne (successor to defendant William T. Cahill) for order in aid of judgment (M-452) is denied. No further motions for relief need he filed by any party. Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery (M-451) is denied without prejudice to renewal if the subject matter becomes relevant at a later date.
5. The court will hear oral argument on March 18, 1975 at 10:00 a.m. on the following subjects as related to relief with respect to the school year commencing July 1, 1976 and years thereafter:
a. The method of determination of the definition of “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools,” of the translation of that definition into financial terms and of the application thereof (including whether such definition should be administratively applied to each school district separately, to groups of districts based on particular characteristics or equally to all).
b. The extent of the power of the court to order relief from, or changes in, the present statutory financing scheme on a temporary or permanent basis in order to assure the [38]*38meeting of the state’s obligation to implement such system as defined.
c. To what extent and in what particular ways the court should exercise such power.
d. Whether the court should appoint a special master, to hear the views of the parties, including especially those of defendant Commissioner of Education and defendant State .Board of Education, and the amici curiae and receive from the parties any evidence deemed relevant, and to make recommendations to the court as to said definition and its application, the power of the court, and its exercise, in order that a final determination as to remedies may be made by the court in sufficient time that every school district may know by October 1, 1975 what the state aid situation will be as to it, as far as practicable, for the school year 1976-77.
6. In order that said oral argument may be of manageable proportions in view of the large number of parties and movants for intervention or participation as amici curiae, the court will hear oral argument only on behalf of the following :
a. the named parties, i, e., the plaintiffs by one attorney; the Governor pro se or by his attorney; the President of the Senate and the Senate by one attorney; the Speaker of the General Assembly and the General Assembly by one attorney ; the Attorney General for the Commissioner of Education, the Department of Education and the State Board of Education;
b. those amici curiae who have previously .participated in oral argument herein who may wish to be heard and so advise the Clerk;
c. the following present petitioners who are hereby granted permission to participate as amici curiae:
(1) New Jersey School Boards Association, by one attorney (M-463) ;
(2) New Jersey Education Association, et als., by one attorney (M-476);
[39]
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ORDER
On April 3, 1973 this court filed its opinion (62 N. J. 473) in the above captioned cause (which constituted its judgment, R. 2:11-3 (b)) modifying the judgment of the Superior Court, Law Division, Hudson County and affirming said judgment as so modified. Said opinion generally held that the present system of maintaining and supporting public elementary and secondary school education in this state is unconstitutional because it does not conform to the state’s obligation imposed by Art. VIII, § 4, par. 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The court reserved decision on the subject of remedies and sought the further views of the parties. After receiving the same, it filed a further opinion on June 19, 1973 (63 N. J. 196), concluding as follows:
* * * It is our view that the Court should not disturb the statutory scheme unless the Legislature fails to enact, by December 31, 1974, legislation compatible with our decision in this case and effective no later than July 1, 1975. We withhold ruling upon the question whether, if such legislation is not so adopted, the Court may order the distribution of appropriated moneys toward a constitutional objective notwithstanding the legislative directions.
We retain jurisdiction. Any party may move for appropriate relief, before or after December 31, 1974, if new circumstances so warrant.
[36]*36No such legislation was enacted, by December 31, 1974, although efforts to that end continued through said date. The matter therefore now returns to this court for the ordering of appropriate remedies to effectuate the court’s original decision.
The above numbered motions have been filed with sundry objects. Some seek injunctions with respect to, and/or redistribution of, some or all of such funds as may be appropriated by the Legislature as various forms of state aid to local school districts for the school year commencing July 1, 1975 (hone have yet been appropriated); others seek leave to intervene or to participate as amici curiae to present their views thereon and still others seek action on miscellaneous matters.
Upon consideration of all said motions and the briefs and accompanying documents, it is on this 23 day of January, 1975, determined and ordered as follows:
1. The motion of defendants The President of New Jersey Senate and the New Jersey Senate for a rehearing of the case (M-475) is denied. The motion of defendants Speaker of the General Assembly and the General Assembly (M-521) for order in aid of judgment is denied.
2. The motions of petitioners Christiansen, et als. “for an extension of time of thirty (30) days to allow petitioners to' intervene and to file a petition for rehearing” (M-453 and 454) are. denied.
3. All school districts must, even under recent legislation extending timetable dates, commence within a very few days the process of adopting budgets for the school year 1975-76, arranging for elections and attending to other matters relevant thereto and must be advised prior thereto of the amount of state aid funds of various categories estimated to be received during said school year. Any injunction against the distribution of said funds, or part thereof, and/or any redistribution of the same, on a different basis than now prescribed by law, while benefitting the local property tax situation in some municipalities, would in the [37]*37case of many others radically increase the amount to be raised by local taxation or require substantial reduction of the educational program. The fact that there will be. no legislation compatible with the court’s decision became certain only a very short time ago and the court considers it would he inequitable and, indeed, chaotic as to many school districts to effect financial changes for the 1975-76 school year at this late date and on such short notice. Therefore, the court will order no changes in the present statutory scheme for the school year 1975-76 and defendant Commissioner of Education may immediately advise all school districts of the amount of estimated state aid funds for said year based on present law.
4. Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for relief (M-448), alternate motion for relief (M-449) and second alternate motion for relief (M-450) are denied and motion of defendant Governor Brendan T. Byrne (successor to defendant William T. Cahill) for order in aid of judgment (M-452) is denied. No further motions for relief need he filed by any party. Plaintiffs’ motion for discovery (M-451) is denied without prejudice to renewal if the subject matter becomes relevant at a later date.
5. The court will hear oral argument on March 18, 1975 at 10:00 a.m. on the following subjects as related to relief with respect to the school year commencing July 1, 1976 and years thereafter:
a. The method of determination of the definition of “a thorough and efficient system of free public schools,” of the translation of that definition into financial terms and of the application thereof (including whether such definition should be administratively applied to each school district separately, to groups of districts based on particular characteristics or equally to all).
b. The extent of the power of the court to order relief from, or changes in, the present statutory financing scheme on a temporary or permanent basis in order to assure the [38]*38meeting of the state’s obligation to implement such system as defined.
c. To what extent and in what particular ways the court should exercise such power.
d. Whether the court should appoint a special master, to hear the views of the parties, including especially those of defendant Commissioner of Education and defendant State .Board of Education, and the amici curiae and receive from the parties any evidence deemed relevant, and to make recommendations to the court as to said definition and its application, the power of the court, and its exercise, in order that a final determination as to remedies may be made by the court in sufficient time that every school district may know by October 1, 1975 what the state aid situation will be as to it, as far as practicable, for the school year 1976-77.
6. In order that said oral argument may be of manageable proportions in view of the large number of parties and movants for intervention or participation as amici curiae, the court will hear oral argument only on behalf of the following :
a. the named parties, i, e., the plaintiffs by one attorney; the Governor pro se or by his attorney; the President of the Senate and the Senate by one attorney; the Speaker of the General Assembly and the General Assembly by one attorney ; the Attorney General for the Commissioner of Education, the Department of Education and the State Board of Education;
b. those amici curiae who have previously .participated in oral argument herein who may wish to be heard and so advise the Clerk;
c. the following present petitioners who are hereby granted permission to participate as amici curiae:
(1) New Jersey School Boards Association, by one attorney (M-463) ;
(2) New Jersey Education Association, et als., by one attorney (M-476);
[39]*39(3) The following school districts or municipalities claiming to be substantially injured by any redistribution of state aid funds: Township of Livingston (M-470); Montclair, Berkeley Heights, Chatham Township, New Providence, Rumson, Sandyston-Walpack and Summit (M-474); Millburn (M-498); Avon-by-the-Sea and Belmar (M-499); Englewood and the City of Englewood (M — 511); Morris School District (M-512); Lyndhurst (M-514); Mendham Township (M-522), and Mayor of the Borough of Carlstadt (M-523), by one attorney to be selected by the attorneys, for said districts (in the absence of such agreement, there will be no oral argument on' behalf of such districts).
7. All the persons, organizations and entities named in paragraph 6 hereof may, if desired, file and serve on all other parties and amici curiae briefs additional to those already on file by February 24, but limited to the subjects set forth in paragraph 5 hereof. Any briefs in reply thereto shall be filed and similarly served by March 3.
8. Any member or members of the Senate or General Assembly in disagreement with the position taken by counsel for those bodies may, pro se or through attorney, file and serve upon the same persons and by the same date, briefs and statements of his, her or their views upon the same subjects, all in accordance with paragraph 7 hereof. The motions of petitioners Russo, et ais. (M-513) and Greenberg, et ais. (M-515) are granted to such extent.
9. The motions of the following, to the extent only of the allowance of participation as amici curiae, are granted, limited to the filing of briefs on the same basis as set forth in paragraph 7 hereof: City of Newark (M-432); Pleasant-ville Taxpayers Association, et ais. (M-469); New Jersey Education Reform Project of the Greater Newark Urban Coalition (M-471).
[40]*4010. All motions to intervene as a party or otherwise participate are denied except to the extent hereinbefore set forth.
11. No further applications for intervention or participation will be considered.
Eor the Court:
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Justice P ashman disagrees with certain portions of the decretal part of the above order and is filing a memorandum stating his views.