Morton v. Ruiz

415 U.S. 199, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 99
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedFebruary 20, 1974
Docket72-1052
StatusPublished
Cited by1,214 cases

This text of 415 U.S. 199 (Morton v. Ruiz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 99 (1974).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a narrow but important issue in the administration of the federal general assistance program for needy Indians:

Are general assistance benefits available only to those Indians living on reservations in the United States (or in areas regulated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Alaska and Oklahoma), and are they thus unavailable to Indians (outside Alaska and Oklahoma) living off, although near, a reservation?

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona answered this question favorably to petitioner, the Secretary of the Interior, when, without opinion and on cross-motions for summary judgment, it dismissed the respondents’ complaint. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, reversed. 462 F. 2d 818 (CA9 1972). We granted certiorari because of the significance of the *202 issue and because of the vigorous assertion that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was inconsistent with long-established policy of the Secretary and of the Bureau. 411 U. S. 947 (1973).

I

The pertinent facts are agreed upon, although, as to some, the petitioner Secretary denies knowledge but does not dispute them. App. 45-48. The respondents, Ramon Ruiz and his wife, Anita, are Papago Indians and United States citizens. In 1940 they left the Papago Reservation in Arizona 1 to seek employment 15 miles away at the Phelps-Dodge copper mines at Ajo. Mr. Ruiz found work there, and they settled in a community at Ajo called the “Indian Village” and populated almost entirely by Papagos. 2 Practically all the land and most of the homes in the Village are owned or rented by Phelps-Dodge. The Ruizes have lived in Ajo continuously since 1940 and have been in their present residence since 1947. A minor daughter lives with them. They speak and understand the Papago language but only limited English. Apart from Mr. Ruiz’ employment with *203 Phelps-Dodge, they have not been assimilated into the dominant culture, and they appear to have maintained a close tie with the nearby reservation. 3

*204 In July 1967, 27 years after the Ruizes moved to Ajo, the mine where he worked was shut down by a strike. It remained closed until the following March. While the strike was in progress, Mr. Ruiz’ sole income was a $15 per week striker’s benefit paid by the union. 4 He sought welfare assistance from the State of Arizona but this was denied because of the State’s apparent policy that striking workers are not eligible for general assistance or emergency relief. 5

On December 11, 1967, Mr. Ruiz applied for general assistance benefits from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). He was immediately notified by letter that he was ineligible for general assistance because of the provision (in effect since 1952) in 66 Indian Affairs Manual 3.1.4 (1965) that eligibility is limited to Indians living “on reservations” and in jurisdictions under the BIA in Alaska and Oklahoma. 6 An appeal to the Superintend *205 ent of the Papago Indian Agency was unsuccessful. A further appeal to the Phoenix Area Director of the BIA led to a hearing, but this, too, proved unsuccessful. The sole ground for the denial of general assistance benefits was that the Ruizes resided outside the boundaries of the Papago Reservation.

The respondents then instituted the present purported class action against the Secretary, claiming, as a matter of statutory interpretation, entitlement to the general assistance for which they had applied, and also challenging the eligibility provision as a violation of Fifth Amendment due process and of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution.

The Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court’s summary judgment for the Secretary was on the ground that the Manual’s residency limitation was inconsistent with the broad language of the Snyder Act, 25 U. S. C. § 13, “that Congress intended general assistance benefits to be available to all Indians, including those in the position” of the Ruizes, 462 F. 2d, at 821, and that subsequent actions of Congress in appropriating funds for the BIA general assistance program did not serve to ratify the imposed limitation. The dissent took the position that the Secretary’s policy was within the broad discretionary authority delegated to the Secretary by Congress with respect to the allocation of limited funds.

II

The Snyder Act, 7 42 Stat. 208, 25 U. S. C. § 13, approved November 2, 1921, provides the underlying con *206 gressional authority for most BIA activities including, in particular and importantly, the general assistance program. Prior to the Act, there was no such general authorization. As a result, appropriation requests made by the House Committee on Indian Affairs were frequently stricken on the House floor by point-of-order objections. See H. R. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); S. Rep. No. 294, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); 61 Cong. Rec. 4659-4672 (1921). The Snyder Act was designed to remedy this situation. It is comprehensively worded for the apparent purpose of avoiding these point-of-order motions to strike. Since the passage of the Act, the BIA has presented its budget requests without further interruption of that kind and Congress has enacted appropriation bills annually in response to the requests.

The appropriation legislation at issue here, Department *207 of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968, Pub. L. 90-28, 81 Stat. 59, 60 (1967), recited:

“BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS “Education and Welfare Services
“For expenses necessary to provide education and welfare services for Indians, either directly or in cooperation with States and other organizations, including payment (in advance or from date of admission), of care, tuition, assistance, and other expenses of Indians in boarding homes, institutions, or schools; grants and other assistance to needy Indians; maintenance of law and order, and payment of rewards for information or evidence concerning violations of law on Indian reservations or lands; and operation of Indian arts and crafts shops; $126,478,000.”

This wording, except for the amount, is identical to that employed in similar legislation for prior fiscal years 8 and, indeed, for subsequent ones. 9

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Bluebook (online)
415 U.S. 199, 94 S. Ct. 1055, 39 L. Ed. 2d 270, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 99, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morton-v-ruiz-scotus-1974.