Raytheon Co. v. United States

96 Fed. Cl. 549, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 25
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJanuary 26, 2011
DocketNo. 05-448C
StatusPublished

This text of 96 Fed. Cl. 549 (Raytheon Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Raytheon Co. v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 549, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 25 (uscfc 2011).

Opinion

[551]*551ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART AND DENYING-IN-PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

NANCY B. FIRESTONE, Judge.

Pending before the court is the motion of the defendant, the United States, seeking summary judgment on the following four issues: 1) whether the plaintiffs (“Ray-theon’s”) claims for recovery of a segment closing adjustment following the closing of its Optical, Printed Wire Fabrication (“PWF”), Aerospace, and Aircraft Integration Systems (“AIS”) segments are barred in their entirety because Raytheon did not fund the subject segment closing adjustments before seeking payment; 2) whether the Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds clauses limit Ray-theon’s recovery because Raytheon did not provide notice under these clauses; 3) whether Raytheon waived its segment closing claims relating to the Optical and AIS segments in the novation agreements Raytheon signed when Raytheon sold these segments; and 4) whether the defendant is entitled to an equitable adjustment with regard to a portion of the closed segments’ deficit that is greater under the revised Cost Accounting Standards (“CAS”) than it would have been for contracts entered into under the original CAS.

For the reasons that follow, the defendant’s motion is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The following facts are not disputed. Ray-theon has submitted four claims for a segment closing adjustment under CAS 413.50(c)12 relating to its closing of four segments: (1) Optical Systems on March 1, 2001, for $13,816,382; (2) PWF on April 21, 2001 for $1,124,366; (3) Aerospace on June 8, 2001 for $2,901,507; and (4) AIS on March 8, 2002 for $68,570,448. Raytheon does not dispute that it has not fully pre-funded all of the amounts it seeks to recover from the government. Raytheon contends that as a matter of law it was not obligated to pre-fund the pension costs it seeks. In addition, Ray-theon does not dispute that it never gave the government notice under the provisions of the Limitation of Cost clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-20(b), or Limitation of Funds clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.232-22(c), regarding the segment closing adjustment amounts it now seeks from the government. Raytheon contends that as a matter of law it was not obligated to provide such notices. Further, it is not disputed that the government never allotted any additional funds to any Raytheon contract to cover all or part of the amounts of any of the subject segment closing adjustments.

Finally, it is not disputed that novation agreements were entered into in connection with the Raytheon sale of the Optical segment to B.F. Goodrich Company on March 7, 2001 and the Raytheon sale of the AIS segment to L-3 Communications Integrated Systems on March 8, 2002. (“Optical No-vation Agreement” and “AIS Novation Agreement,” respectively). The novation agreements covered all contracts between Raytheon and the United States relating to the Optical and AIS segments, both the contracts that were transferred and those that had been completed.1 Each novation agreement included a proviso that stated, “Raytheon ... waives any claim and rights against the Government that it now has or may have in the future in connection with the [completed and transferred] contracts.” [552]*552Optical Novation Agreement 3; AIS Novation Agreement 1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(e)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims. A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 269, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. DISCUSSION

A.The Funding Requirements of the FAR and CAS Do Not Apply to a Segment Closing Adjustment Claim.

The government argues that all of Raytheon’s claims are barred because Ray-theon failed to fully fund the segment closing adjustments as required by FAR Pension Cost Rules and CAS 412. This court has previously considered and rejected the government’s argument that funding is a prerequisite to a segment closing adjustment claim in General Motors Corp. v. United States, 66 Fed.Cl. 153 (2005) and Viacom, Inc. v. United States, 70 Fed.Cl. 649 (2006). In these prior rulings, the court held that because the CAS 413 segment closing adjustment is not a pension cost, the FAR cost principles for pension costs and CAS 412 regarding the funding of pension costs do not apply.

The government has not provided the court with any reason to revisit its previous rulings. Rather, it has repeated the same arguments that this court has previously rejected in the other CAS 413 eases involving a deficit following a segment closing adjustment. The court rejects the government’s motion for summary judgment based on this argument for the reasons set forth in General Motors and Viacom.

B. The FAR’s Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds Clauses Do Not Limit Raytheon’s Recovery of Its Segment Closing Claim.

In General Motors and Viacom this court also rejected the same arguments regarding the applicability of the Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds clauses that the government makes in this ease. In those cases, the court determined that these clauses do not bar recovery, because the CAS 413 segment closing adjustment represents an adjustment of previously determined pension costs and does not increase contract-specific costs. See General Motors, 66 Fed.Cl. at 160; Viacom, 70 Fed.Cl. at 661. In addition, the court held that even if those clauses were deemed to apply, there are well-recognized exceptions to the application of these rales that would apply in these CAS 413 segment closing adjustment cases. Viacom, 70 Fed. Cl. at 658.

Once again the government has not provided the court with any new arguments that would lead it to reconsider its prior rulings. Thus, the government’s motion for summary judgment based on the FAR’s Limitation of Cost and Limitation of Funds clauses is denied for the same reasons that summary judgment was denied in General Motors and Viacom.

C. Disputed Issues of Fact Preclude Summary Judgment on Whether Raytheon Waived Its Claims for the Optical and AIS Segment Closing Adjustments Based on the Novation Agreements Raytheon Entered into with the Government and the Buyers of Each Segment.

It is not disputed that in the Optical and AIS novation agreements, signed by Raytheon, B.F. Goodrich, L-3 Communications (respectively), and the government, Raytheon agreed to waive “any claim and rights against the Government that [Ray-theon] now has or may have in the future in connection with the contracts,” the government had with each segment.

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Bluebook (online)
96 Fed. Cl. 549, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 25, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/raytheon-co-v-united-states-uscfc-2011.