Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

758 F.3d 296, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 105, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20156, 2014 WL 3407665, 36 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 400, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13389
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJuly 15, 2014
Docket13-5315
StatusPublished
Cited by210 cases

This text of 758 F.3d 296 (Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 105, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20156, 2014 WL 3407665, 36 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 400, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13389 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

In March 2012, Appellant Ralls Corporation (Ralls) purchased four American limited liability companies (Project Companies) previously formed to develop windfarms in north-central Oregon. The transaction quickly came under scrutiny from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an Executive Branch committee created by the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170, and chaired by the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department (Treasury Secretary), see 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k). Pursuant to section 721 of the DPA, CFIUS reviews any transaction “which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” Id. § 2170(a)(3). Although Ralls is an American corporation, the transaction fell within the ambit of the DPA because both of Ralls’s owners are Chinese nationals. CFIUS determined that Ralls’s acquisition of the Project Companies threatened national security and issued temporary mitigation orders restricting Ralls’s access to, and preventing further construction at, the Project Companies’ windfarm sites. The matter was then submitted to the President, who also concluded that the transac *302 tion posed a threat to national security. He issued a permanent order (Presidential Order) that prohibited the transaction and required Ralls to divest itself of the Project Companies. Ralls challenged the final order issued by CFIUS (CFIUS Order) and the Presidential Order in district court, alleging, inter alia, that the orders violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because neither CFIUS nor the President (collectively, with Treasury Secretary and CFIUS Chairman Jacob Lew, Appel-lees) provided Ralls the opportunity to review and rebut the evidence upon which they relied. The district court dismissed Ralls’s CFIUS Order claims as moot and its due process challenge to the Presidential Order for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

This case involves Executive Branch review of a business transaction under section 721 of the DPA, also known as the “Exon-Florio Amendment.” 1 As amended, section 721 of the DPA directs “the President, acting through [CFIUS],” to review a “covered transaction to determine the effects of the transaction on the national security of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A). Section 721 defines a covered transaction as “any merger, acquisition, or takeover ..., by or with any foreign person which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” Id. § 2170(a)(3).

Review of covered transactions under section 721 begins with CFIUS. As noted, CFIUS is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and its members include the heads of various federal agencies and other high-ranking Government officials with foreign policy, national security and economic responsibilities. 2 See id. § 2170(k)(2), (3). CFIUS review is initiated in one of two ways. First, any party to a covered transaction may initiate review, either before or after the transaction is completed, by submitting a written notice to the CFIUS chairman. See id. § 2170(b)(1)(C)®; 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(a) (“A party or parties to a proposed or completed transaction may file a voluntary notice of the transaction with the Committee.” (emphases added)); id. § 800.402(c)(1)(vii) (voluntary notice must include “expected date for completion of the transaction, or the date it was completed”); id. § 800.224 (“The term transaction means a proposed or completed merger, acquisition, or takeover.”). 3 Alternatively, CFIUS may initiate review sua sponte. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D). The CFIUS review period lasts thirty days, during which CFIUS *303 considers the eleven factors set forth in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) to assess the transaction’s effect on national security. 4 See id. § 2170(b)(1)(A)(ii), (E).

During its review, if CFIUS determines that “the transaction threatens to impair the national security of the United States and that threat has not been mitigated,” it must “immediately conduct an investigation of the effects of [the] covered transaction on the national security ... and take any necessary actions in connection with the transaction to protect the national security.” Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A), (B). CFIUS is given express authority to “negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national security of the United States that arises as a result of the covered transaction.” Id. § 2170(l)(1)(A). The investigation period lasts no more than forty-five days. See id. § 2170(b)(2)(C). If CFIUS determines at the end of an investigation that the national security effects of the transaction have been mitigated and that the transaction need not be prohibited, action under section 721 terminates and CFIUS submits a final investigation report to the Congress. See id. § 2170(b)(3)(B); 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(d).

If CFIUS concludes at the end of its investigation that a covered transaction should be suspended or prohibited, it must “send a report to the President requesting the President’s decision,” which report includes, inter alia, information regarding the transaction’s effect on national security and CFIUS’s recommendation. 31 C.F.R. § 800.506(b), (c). Once CFIUS’s report is submitted to the President, he has fifteen days to “take such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any covered transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1), (2). The President may exercise his authority under section 721 only if he finds that

there is credible evidence that leads [him] to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security; and ... provisions of law, other than [section 721] and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, do not, in the judgment of the President, provide adequate and appropriate au *304 thority for the President to protect the national security in the matter before the President.

Id. § 2170(d)(4).

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758 F.3d 296, 411 U.S. App. D.C. 105, 44 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20156, 2014 WL 3407665, 36 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 400, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13389, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ralls-corp-v-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cadc-2014.