UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL D. JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 22-1680 (EGS)
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Michael D. Jones (“Mr. Jones”) brings this action
against Defendant Association of American Medical Colleges
(“AAMC”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., arising out of the
termination of his employment. Mr. Jones, a Caucasian male,
alleges that AAMC discriminated against him because of his race
and retaliated against him for taking opposing views to AAMC’s
official diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DE&I”) policies. See
Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2. 1 Pending before the Court is AAMC’s
Motion to Dismiss. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4. Upon careful
consideration of Mr. Jones’ complaint, the pending motion, the
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Memorandum Opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page number of the filed document. 1 opposition, the reply thereto, and the applicable law, the Court
GRANTS AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss.
II. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts reflect the allegations in the
Complaint and the documents incorporated by reference therein, 2
which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of deciding
this motion and construes in Mr. Jones’ favor. See Baird v.
Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
2 AAMC includes, as Exhibit A to its motion, Mr. Jones’ Charge of Discrimination that he filed with the D.C. Office of Human Rights and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2-4. “Although a court generally cannot consider matters beyond the pleadings at the motion-to-dismiss stage, it may consider ‘documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the complaint, or documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to dismiss[.]’” Patrick v. Dist. of Columbia, 126 F. Supp. 3d 132, 135-36 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation omitted). The Court can thus review Mr. Jones’ charge “without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment[,] as it is necessarily incorporated into the complaint.” Holston v. Yellen, No. 20-3533 (EGS), 2022 WL 4355289, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2022) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5 (incorporating by reference Mr. Jones’ charge). To the extent Mr. Jones seeks to argue that the present motion should be converted into a motion for summary judgment, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 5-6; the Court rejects that argument, see Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 373 F. Supp. 3d 174, 182 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Because administrative complaints are public document[s] of which a court may take judicial notice, courts accordingly may consider an EEOC complaint and Notice of Charge without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 2 From July 29, 2002 until June 1, 2021 when he was
terminated, Mr. Jones—a Caucasian male identifying as Christian
and Republican—worked for AAMC as Manager of the Service
Management Information Technology Team. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3
¶¶ 9-10, 7 ¶ 34. With approximately 800 employees and an office
based in Washington, D.C., id. at 3 ¶ 8; AAMC is a non-profit
organization “dedicated to transforming health care through
medical education, health care, medical research, and community
collaborations[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 4. Mr. Jones worked
for AAMC for almost twenty years as an Information Technology
(“IT”) subject matter expert in AAMC’s organization process
areas, where he was responsible for reporting on process area
performance, making area performance improvements, and leading
and developing a team within AAMC’s IT Department. Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 2 ¶ 7, 3 ¶¶ 9, 11. Mr. Jones maintained a satisfactory
employment record during his time with AAMC. Id. at 3 ¶ 11.
AAMC maintains DE&I policies that commit it to “speaking
out against all forms of racism and discrimination; employing
antiracism and unconscious bias training; and moving from
rhetoric to action.” Id. at 4 ¶ 15. AAMC’s values include
“accepting responsibility for the oppression of minorities and
eradicating racism from society.” Id. at 7 ¶ 35. As a manager
with leadership responsibilities, Mr. Jones was required by AAMC
to complete various training programs regarding problem solving,
3 diversity, and Title VII. Id. at 3 ¶ 12. Between 2018 and 2019,
Mr. Jones completed one such training program titled “Crucial
Conversations,” and as was expected of him as a team manager, he
disseminated the knowledge and tools from the training back to
his team members. Id. at 3-4 ¶ 13.
On June 1, 2020, AAMC published a press release on its
website titled “AAMC’s Statement on Police Brutality and Racism
in America and Their Impact on Health.” Id. at 4 ¶ 14. The press
release indicated AAMC’s “determination to end racism.” Id. at 4
¶ 15. Following media reports of police brutality, AAMC held two
townhall meetings where staff “were encouraged to express their
feelings regarding the brutality and deaths.” Id. at 4 ¶ 16.
According to Mr. Jones, these meetings were “raw” and “emotions
ran high.” Id. At one of these meetings, an employee “made a
comment which compared anyone not out in the streets rioting to
Nazis.” Id. at 4 ¶ 17. This comment made Mr. Jones “extremely
uncomfortable,” causing him to leave the meeting. Id. at 4-5 ¶
17. Following these townhalls, Mr. Jones alleges that “the
workplace had become politicized” and that he continued to do
his job but was “reticent to share his point of view” because he
did not want his co-workers “thinking that he is a Nazi because
he was not out in the streets rioting.” Id. at 5 ¶¶ 19, 21. In
October 2020, AAMC publicly released on its website its “AAMC
Framework for Addressing and Eliminating Racism at the AAMC, in
4 Academic Medicine, and Beyond.” Id. at 5 ¶ 22. This framework
outlined AAMC’s goal of becoming an “anti-racist, diverse,
equitable, and inclusive organization.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4
at 4 (citing to AAMC’s website). Mr. Jones alleges that AAMC did
not provide training sessions for managers on this new
framework. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶ 23.
In December 2020, Mr. Jones participated in a meeting with
several co-workers, including a colleague named Angelique
Johnson (“Ms. Johnson”), and a subordinate member of his IT team
named Dami Sotande (“Mr. Sotande”). Id. at 5 ¶ 24. The purpose
of the meeting was to discuss an IT change request, which used
the words “master and slave” as “industry terms.” 3 Id. After the
meeting, Ms. Johnson emailed Mr. Jones and Mr. Sotande to
explain that she was “shocked” by the use of these terms and
asked Mr. Jones to “help [her] understand the naming
convention[,]” which she viewed as “non-inclusive and off-
putting.” Id. at 6 ¶ 25. Although Mr. Jones did not partake in
the naming convention or have authority to change it, he
responded “by stating his understanding of the term[s] outside
of the racial connotations as he had used and understood the
term[s] in the context of IT and his religion.” Id. at 6 ¶¶ 26-
3 Mr. Jones explained in his Charge of Discrimination that the terms “master” and “slave” are “known term[s] used to describe a relationship between two servers in the IT industry.” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. 5 27; see Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2 (“I explained that the
term has been widely used not only in the IT world but in
religion and sex.”). Ms. Johnson complained to AAMC’s Human
Resources (“HR”) Department about Mr. Jones’ response. Def.’s
Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
Following Ms. Johnson’s HR complaint, AAMC, specifically
John Coleman—the Senior Director of IT Operations—issued Mr.
Jones a counseling memorandum regarding his response, which
stated:
Your response to this business partner and your employee was insensitive, unprofessional and tone deaf. In your communication, you went on several tangents to support your opinion while not recognizing the fact that this business partner had shared that she was disturbed by the language and felt it was non- inclusive. Additionally, you shared other inappropriate comparisons of master/slave relationships that should have never been included in a professional email to a colleague.
Id.; Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 28. Mr. Jones was required to
write an apology email to Ms. Johnson and was given the verbiage
to be included in the email. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 29. AAMC
also told Mr. Jones not to contact Mr. Sotande. Id. at 6-7 ¶ 29.
Soon thereafter, in January 2021, AAMC’s Chief Information
Officer emailed the entire IT Department requesting that
“outdated and disrespectful” industry terms like “master, slave,
blacklist, whitelist, and man-hour” be replaced with “more
6 agreeable, inclusive, and respectable terms[,]” a directive with
which Mr. Jones complied. Id. at 7 ¶ 30.
In the spring of 2021, Mr. Sotande transferred from Mr.
Jones’ team, and Mr. Jones recruited from within AAMC to replace
him. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 31-32. On May 4, 2021, Mr. Jones introduced the
new employee during a team meeting and stated that “he had
stolen the employee from another team.” Id. at 7 ¶ 33; see
Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2 (“I made a joke about getting one
of my team members stolen from my department and stealing
another to join my team.”). This comment led an employee to file
a complaint with HR, stating that “they were offended by [Mr.
Jones’] joke because the phrase stealing employees . . . implied
[he] was talking about slavery.” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
As a result of this second HR complaint, AAMC immediately placed
Mr. Jones on paid leave. Id.
On June 1, 2021, Jaynee Jones, an HR representative, and
Steve Harris, the Director of IT Service Management, held a
conference call with Mr. Jones, during which they informed him
that AAMC had terminated his employment. Id. On that call, they
read Mr. Jones his termination letter, which stated that he had
violated AAMC’s Ethical Principles and Conduct Policy, requiring
“[a]n ethical workplace culture” where “management lead[s] by
example and exemplif[ies] AAMC’s values.” Id.; Compl., ECF No. 1
7 at 7 ¶ 34. He requested to appeal this decision but was informed
that the decision was final. Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.
Based on these facts, Mr. Jones claims AAMC “discriminated
against him because of his race (Caucasian/White),” and
retaliated against him “for taking opposing views to
management[’]s official [DE&I] policies by counseling him for
the use of industry terms and firing him.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at
1 ¶ 2. Specifically, Mr. Jones alleges that because of AAMC’s
policies “that promote discrimination against non-minorities,”
“the interpretation of those policies, the condonation of
comparing someone to a Nazi, and the condemnation of using
industry terms [that may be disrespectful to minorities],” he
was “vilified for the color of his skin” and “subjected to the
adverse employment action of being terminated.” Id. at 5 ¶ 19, 8
¶¶ 39-43. Following his termination, on February 8, 2022, Mr.
Jones filed a Charge of Discrimination with the D.C. Office of
Human Rights (“DCOHR”), which was cross-filed with the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See Def.’s Ex.
A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. On June 1, 2022, the EEOC elected not to
proceed with an investigation and issued Mr. Jones a notice of
right to file suit. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 5.
B. Procedural Background
On June 11, 2022, Mr. Jones filed this action, asserting
Title VII claims against AAMC. See id. at 1 ¶¶ 1-2. On August
8 16, 2022, AAMC filed the present Motion to Dismiss. See Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 4 at 1. Mr. Jones filed his opposition brief on
August 30, 2022, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 1; and AAMC filed
its reply on September 6, 2022, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at
1. AAMC’s motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
III. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a
complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir.
2002). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in
order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion
to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow
the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not
9 amount to a “probability requirement,” but requires “more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss [pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v.
Dist. of Columbia Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “In determining whether a
complaint fails to state a claim, [the Court] may consider only
the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In
addition, the Court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v.
MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
However, the Court may not accept as true “the plaintiff’s legal
conclusions or inferences that are not supported by the facts
alleged.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758
F.3d 296, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
IV. Analysis
AAMC advances three arguments for dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 7-11. First, AAMC argues
that Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim should be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as Mr. Jones never
10 alleged that AAMC retaliated against him in his Charge of
Discrimination. Id. at 7-8. Second, AAMC argues that even if Mr.
Jones has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to
his retaliation claim, alternatively this claim should be
dismissed for failure to allege that Mr. Jones engaged in any
statutorily protected activity. Id. at 9. Finally, AAMC contends
that Mr. Jones has not stated a discrimination claim because his
complaint only pleads conclusory allegations, rather than
sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that race was a
motivating factor in AAMC’s decision to terminate him. Id. at 9-
11. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Mr. Jones’ Retaliation Claim Cannot Withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss
Title VII “both prohibits employers from engaging in
employment practices that discriminate on the basis of
race, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), and bars them from retaliating
against an employee ‘because he has opposed any [such]
practice,’ id. § 2000e–3(a).” Harris v. Dist. of Columbia Water
& Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted). “In order to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between
the two.” Jackson v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. 18-1978,
11 2019 WL 3502389, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019). “[A] plaintiff
need not plead each element of his prima facie retaliation case
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. However, for the reasons
explained below, Mr. Jones has failed to state a claim for
retaliation that can withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss.
1. Mr. Jones’ Retaliation Claim Was Not Administratively Exhausted
Title VII requires that an aggrieved employee timely
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit in a
district court. See Headen v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
741 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010); Harris v. Gonzales, 488
F.3d 442, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Act “provides detailed
procedures for bringing administrative charges, and . . .
‘specifies with precision’ the prerequisites that a plaintiff
must satisfy before filing suit.” Dudley v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 924 F. Supp. 2d 141, 154 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.
Ct. 2061 (2002)). Specifically, Title VII requires an aggrieved
employee to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” but extends
this period to 300 days if the individual “initially instituted
proceedings with a State or local agency.” Dieng v. Am. Insts.
for Rsch. in the Behav. Scis., 412 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C.
2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
12 The employee’s administrative complaint must allege that
the employer engaged in unlawful conduct within the applicable
time period, see Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263,
276 (D.D.C. 2011); as the “charge requirement serves the
important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the
claim and ‘narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication and
decision[,]’” Park v. How. Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (quoting Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 472
n.325 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). While not “a heavy technical burden,”
“it is also true that the requirement of some specificity in a
charge is not a mere technicality.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In meeting this requirement, “[a]
claimant is not necessarily limited to the boxes selected in the
administrative complaint as the basis for the claim if his
written explanation can provide a basis for identifying the
nature of his claims.” Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (citing
Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 532 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13
(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 417 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also
Maryland v. Sodexho, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 160, 162 (D.D.C.
2007) (explaining that an employee “can merely check” the
applicable “boxes” on the charge form, but if he is “uncertain
of the cause of discrimination . . . , he need only describe it
in the text” of the form); Johnson-Parks v. D.C. Chartered
Health Plan, 806 F. Supp. 2d 267, 270 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that
13 employees are not required to use “magic words” to make out a
proper charge but instead must “alert the EEOC and the charged
employer with the nature of the alleged wrongdoing”).
Additionally, the employee may amend the administrative
charge “at any time prior to the conclusion of the agency’s
investigation,” but is required to sue in federal court within
ninety days following notice of the agency’s final action. Mount
v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74, 83 (D.D.C. 2014). The theories
advanced in the employee’s lawsuit are thereafter “limited to
the theories contained in the EEOC Charge he filed[,]” and
“[a]ny other theories are barred unless the claim is ‘like or
reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing
out of such allegations.’” Marcelus v. Corr. Corp. of Am./Corr.
Treatment Facility, 540 F. Supp. 2d 231, 236 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citation omitted); Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (“At a minimum, the
Title VII claims must arise from the administrative
investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the
charge of discrimination.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Moreover, “as a general rule, a Title VII
plaintiff must timely exhaust administrative remedies for each
discrete act [of discrimination or retaliation] alleged[,] even
if the acts are related.” Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 83-84
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Morgan, 536
U.S. at 113. Courts are prohibited from “allow[ing] liberal
14 interpretation of an administrative charge to permit a litigant
to bypass the Title VII administrative process[,]” and
“[d]ismissal is required when a plaintiff fails to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to particular claims.”
Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 276-77.
Here, AAMC argues that Mr. Jones failed to administratively
exhaust his retaliation claim because his charge only checked
the boxes for discrimination based on race and age and did not
allege that AAMC retaliated against him, or that he had engaged
in any protected conduct, “such as complaining to the [HR]
Department or filing reports against his supervisors.” Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 4 at 6-8. Mr. Jones claims he has exhausted his
administrative remedies because his retaliation claim “arises
from two incidents which are described in the particulars
[section] of his EEOC complaint form[:]” (1) his response in
“opposition to” Ms. Johnson’s email about the “non-inclusive”
“master/slave” industry terminology; and (2) “the resulting
corrective action by AAMC’s [HR Department] requiring [him] to
issue a formal apology for his response[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
6 at 9-10. Mr. Jones claims that these “particulars” should
support “a finding of retaliation at [ ] least to defeat a
motion to dismiss” since they are “factually similar” to his
discrimination claims and “would be discovered during the
agency’s investigation[,]” even though the box for retaliation
15 “was unchecked.” Id. at 10 (citing Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 85-
88). In considering these arguments, the Court notes that
“[w]here, as here, the defendant alleges a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under Title VII[,]” it may consider, “in
addition to the pleadings, . . . [the] [p]laintiff’s EEOC
Complaint and Notice of Charge . . . without converting the
motion[] to dismiss” into one for summary judgment because these
are “public document[s] of which [the C]ourt may take judicial
notice[.]” Latson v. Holder, 82 F. Supp. 3d 377, 386 (D.D.C.
2015) (citation omitted); see also Holston v. Yellen, No. 20-
3533 (EGS), 2022 WL 4355289, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2022).
“Presuming the truth of the allegations in [Mr. Jones’]
complaint and drawing all inferences in his favor,” the Court
concludes that he has failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to his retaliation claim. See Rattigan v. Gonzales,
503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 68 (D.D.C. 2007). While Mr. Jones could have
properly exhausted his retaliation claim by “either checking the
box on the charge for retaliation or describing conduct
constituting retaliation[,]” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 7 (citing
Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 13-14); his charge does not
check the retaliation box and only indicates that he “was
discriminated against on the basis of [his] race (White) in
violation of Title VII” and “on the basis of [his] age (53 years
old)[,]” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 3. Nowhere in the factual
16 allegations of his charge does Mr. Jones “express or event hint
at” a retaliation claim, as he merely summarizes the series of
events that led to his termination, noting that: (1) AAMC’s HR
Department “met with [him] to discuss [Ms. Johnson’s complaint]”
and asked him to send a written apology, “which [he] did[;]” and
(2) he was placed “on paid leave” and later “terminated”
following a coworker’s complaint to HR regarding his joke about
stealing a new team member from another department. Park, 71
F.3d at 907; Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. Not only does Mr.
Jones’ charge “lack[] the words” “retaliation” or “retaliatory,”
but this summary of the “particulars” does not “provide the
slightest hint” that Mr. Jones viewed any of these incidents as
retaliatory acts, as opposed to discriminatory acts, which he
does specify in his charge. See Park, 71 F.3d at 908; Robinson-
Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 13. Thus, “[a] fair characterization
of [Mr. Jones’] EEOC Charge does not incorporate a charge of
retaliation.” Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14; see also
Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 251 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162 (D.D.C.
2003) (dismissing retaliation claim for failed exhaustion when
the plaintiff “checked only the boxes” for discrimination based
on race and disability, and there was “absolutely no indication”
of retaliation allegations in her charge); Hunt v. Dist. of
Columbia Dep’t of Corr., 41 F. Supp. 2d 31, 36 (D.D.C. 1999)
(finding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative
17 remedies when she “specifically checked the boxes for age
discrimination and retaliation,” but not gender discrimination,
and did not otherwise indicate that “she was alleging gender
discrimination”); Latson, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 387 (dismissing age
discrimination claim for failure to exhaust when the plaintiff
neither checked that box on the charge, “nor provided any
factual details in her written explanation to suggest that she
intended to assert” that claim); Sisay v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
34 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding failed exhaustion
when there was no “indication of a claim of national origin
discrimination either in the form of express words or factual
allegations that would support such a claim”); Park, 71 F.3d at
908 (same conclusion for a hostile work environment claim).
Moreover, as AAMC argues, “[d]iscrimination claims are
distinct from retaliation claims under Title VII,” Def.’s Mot.,
ECF No. 4 at 8; as that Act requires plaintiffs to timely
exhaust their administrative remedies for “each discrete act” of
discrimination and retaliation alleged, Mount, 36 F. Supp. 3d at
83-84; see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (holding that “[e]ach
incident” of discrimination and retaliation “constitutes a
separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’” for which an
administrative charge must be filed). “[R]aising discrimination
claims before the EEOC is [therefore] not sufficient to warrant”
exhaustion of a retaliation claim because these two discrete
18 claims “must be raised independently if the retaliation occurred
prior to the filing of the administrative charge.” Ndondji, 768
F. Supp. 2d at 278-79 (dismissing the plaintiff’s retaliation
claim when he “never expressed or described any belief” in his
charge that his employer had engaged in retaliatory behavior and
prohibiting the addition of retaliation claims for the first
time in a Title VII suit); see also Ponce v. Billington, 652 F.
Supp. 2d 71, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed
to exhaust his retaliation claim when he did not allege that
claim in his charge, and retaliation is not “like or reasonably
related to” a discrimination claim); Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d
at 236 (noting that the “only theories mentioned in [the
plaintiff’s] EEOC charge . . . were age and national origin[,]”
and absent any indication of a retaliation theory, such as
“making past complaints about discrimination, or filing prior
incident reports against co-workers and supervisors[,]” his
retaliation claim was “not ‘like or reasonably related to’ the
allegations in his EEOC Charge”); Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at
69 (concluding that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies for his retaliation claim, which was not
“within the scope of ‘the administrative investigation that
[could] reasonably be expected to follow’” his charge); Payne v.
Salazar, 619 F.3d 56, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal
of the plaintiff’s retaliation claim since this claim “could not
19 possibly have ‘arisen from the administrative investigation’
that followed” the filing of her charge).
Because of the absence of allegations in Mr. Jones’ charge
positing a theory of retaliation, or any facts indicating he
complained to HR about retaliation or filed reports against co-
workers or supervisors, the Court concludes that Mr. Jones has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrete
retaliation claim. 4 See Ndondji, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 279;
Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 236; Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.
Accordingly, Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim under Title VII cannot
withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss and must fail.
4 Mr. Jones attempts to argue that “his retaliation claim arises from factually similar allegations” in his charge, and so, “regardless if it was separately alleged[,]” it should satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 2. To support this argument, he cites to language from Mount v. Johnson, 36 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2014) indicating that allegations “put before the agency” and “new allegations” can both proceed if they “are factually similar such that they would be discovered during the agency’s investigation.” 36 F. Supp. 3d at 85-86. However, this language is inapposite here, as Mount was comparing claims “based on events that occur [before and] after the filing of an administrative charge.” Id. at 85. In Mr. Jones’ case, none of his claims are based on events that occurred after the filing of his charge, and thus, “at a minimum, he must have raised his pre-charge retaliation allegations with the EEOC to exhaust his administrative remedies[.]” See Ndondji v. InterPark Inc., 768 F. Supp. 2d 263, 278 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Retaliation claims that occurred prior to the filing of a claim must be administratively exhausted.”); Pyne v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2002) (labeling it a “prerequisite” to bring a retaliation charge before the EEOC if the retaliation occurred prior to the filing of the charge). 20 2. Mr. Jones Has Not Alleged That He Engaged in Statutorily Protected Activity Under Title VII, As Is Required to State a Retaliation Claim
AAMC next argues that even if Mr. Jones has exhausted his
administrative remedies as to his retaliation claim, this claim
should still be dismissed “for failure to allege that he engaged
in a statutor[ily] protected activity.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4
at 9. In contrast, Mr. Jones argues that he engaged in protected
activity by sending a response email to his colleague, Ms.
Johnson, in which he “express[ed] his opposition to cancel
culture interpretation of industry standard terms as a practice
of his [Republican] political affiliation,” which he claims is a
“protected trait” under the District of Columbia Human Rights
Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01, et seq. 5 See Pl.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 6 at 10-12. He adds that his affiliations as “a
conservative Christian and member of the Republican party” were
“known to his coworkers” and that “his opposition [in his email]
to adopting the subjective view of the [master/slave] term[s] as
non-inclusive was an expression of his concern about the
5 Under the DCHRA, it is “an unlawful discriminatory practice to coerce, threaten, retaliate against, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected under this chapter.” D.C. Code. § 2- 1402.61. In addition, the DCHRA makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate based on an employee’s “political affiliation,” id. § 2-1402.11(a); defined as “the state of belonging to or endorsing any political party[,]” id. § 2-1401.02(25). 21 politicized cancel culture within AAMC.” Id. at 9-11. Mr. Jones
claims that this opposition was “protected conduct” under the
DCHRA and that he was “punish[ed]” for not adopting “the dynamic
subjective view” of these terms when AAMC issued him a
“corrective action” counseling memorandum following his email to
Ms. Johnson and required him to formally apologize to her. Id.
at 10-12. AAMC replies by noting that Mr. Jones “devotes the
bulk of his Opposition to explaining how he has a viable claim
for retaliation on the basis of political affiliation under the
[DCHRA]—a claim not alleged in either the Complaint or the EEOC
Charge[,]” and therefore “fails to explain his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation
claim under Title VII.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 1. Instead,
AAMC claims that Mr. Jones improperly “attempts to convert his
race retaliation claim into a political affiliation claim under
the [DCHRA,]” a claim which is “time-barred.” Id.
As an initial matter, the Court rejects Mr. Jones’ attempt
in his opposition brief to supplement his existing Title VII
claims with “a brand new theory of liability and new facts[,]”
Hawkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94,
109 (D.D.C. 2018); namely a political affiliation retaliation
claim under the DCHRA, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 9-12.
First, Mr. Jones failed to plead such a claim, as his complaint
includes just one count for race discrimination and retaliation
22 under Title VII. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 1, 8 ¶¶ 37-44. As
such, the Complaint does not, on its face, state a claim under
the DCHRA, and “[t]hat omission is fatal because a ‘plaintiff
cannot add a new claim through an opposition brief.’” Billups v.
Lab’y Corp. of Am., 233 F. Supp. 3d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2017)
(quoting Williams v. Spencer, 883 F. Supp. 2d 165, 181 n.8
(D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases)); see also BEG Invs., LLC v.
Alberti, 85 F. Supp. 3d 13, 26 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Because ‘a
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a
motion to dismiss,’ Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 94
F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 n.8 (D.D.C. 2000), the Court was unable to
consider those new facts when ruling on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.”). Here, Mr. Jones’ opposition brief contains new facts
not appearing in the Complaint about his email response to Ms.
Johnson that allegedly included reference to “his opposition to”
“cancel culture[’s] interpretation of industry standard terms”
as part of his political affiliation and beliefs as a
Republican—all new facts which the Court may not now consider.
See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 10-12. Mr. Jones “cannot overcome
a 12(b)(6) motion by adding new information, much less a new
cause of action, in a brief[,]” and should he wish to add a
claim under the DCHRA, the proper course of action is to move
for leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). Hawkins, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 109.
23 Even considering Mr. Jones’ new claims and factual
allegations proffered in his opposition briefing, a DCHRA
political affiliation claim would nonetheless fail. The DCHRA
requires that “[a] private cause of action . . . be filed . . .
within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the
discovery thereof,” but “[t]he timely filing of a complaint with
the [DCOHR] . . . toll[s] the running of the statute of
limitations while the complaint is pending.” D.C. Code § 2–
1403.16(a). Here, Mr. Jones claims that AAMC issued him “a
corrective action memorandum on or about December 23, 2020, in
response to [his] email sent on December 17, 2020.” See Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 10, 12 (alleging a “clear causal nexus”
between his “opposition” email to Ms. Johnson and AAMC’s
issuance of a counseling memorandum that he argues should
support his retaliation claim). Yet, Mr. Jones did not file his
charge until February 8, 2022—more than a year after the alleged
“unlawful discriminatory act”—and thus any political affiliation
claims relating to these events are time-barred under the DCHRA.
See D.C. Code § 2–1403.16(a); Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 6.
As such, the Court proceeds with analyzing whether Mr.
Jones engaged in statutorily protected activity as defined by
Title VII, which does not include “political affiliation” as a
protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting
discrimination based solely on “race, color, religion, sex, or
24 national origin”). The Court also agrees with AAMC that the only
relevant documents in this analysis are Mr. Jones’ complaint and
his Charge of Discrimination, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4;
neither of which include factual allegations about Mr. Jones’
email response expressing “his opposition to the subjective
interpretation of the Master/Slave term[,]” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
6 at 11. To the extent Mr. Jones seeks to reference details from
this email exchange and incorporate new factual allegations as
to his political affiliation, the Court is “unable to consider
those new facts” when ruling on AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss. 6
Alberti, 85 F. Supp. 3d at 26; see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 9,
11 (incorporating specific wording from Mr. Jones’ email to Ms.
Johnson, along with outside data regarding “cancel culture”—both
of which the Court must disregard). Thus, the only remaining
question as to Mr. Jones’ Title VII retaliation claim is
whether, presuming the truth of the allegations in his complaint
6 As AAMC notes, Mr. Jones references his email response to Ms. Johnson as “Exhibit B (Email Exchange),” although no such exhibit “was attached to either the Complaint or the Opposition.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4 n.1; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 9-11. Even if Mr. Jones meant to in fact attach this exhibit, the Court could not consider such a matter “outside the pleadings” without converting AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, which the Court declines to do. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 4 (noting that the proposed exhibit was also not incorporated by reference in the Complaint or relied upon in the Complaint but was “absent” from it); Patrick, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 135-36. 25 and charge and drawing all inferences in his favor, he has
alleged that he engaged in statutorily protected activity.
To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Mr. Jones
must allege that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected
activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action by AAMC;
and (3) a causal link connects the two. See Carter-Frost v.
Dist. of Columbia, 305 F. Supp. 3d 60, 73 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). While no
“magic words” are required to allege a statutorily protected
activity, “the complaint must in some way allege unlawful
discrimination, not just frustrated ambition.” Broderick v.
Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision specifically outlines what
constitutes a “protected activity.” Robinson-Reeder, 532 F.
Supp. 2d at 14. The first prong, known as “the opposition
clause,” makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee “because he has opposed” an unlawful
employment practice. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The
second prong, known as “the participation clause,” makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee for
his “participation in a discrimination charge, investigation, or
proceeding.” Id.; Burton v. Batista, 339 F. Supp. 2d 97, 114
(D.D.C. 2004) (citing § 2000e-3(a)). In sum, “[a]n activity is
protected if it involves opposing alleged discriminatory
26 treatment by the employer or participating in legal efforts
against the alleged treatment[,]” Globus v. Skinner, 721 F.
Supp. 329, 334 (D.D.C. 1989), aff’d, No. 90-5020, 1990 WL 123927
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 1990); and objections or complaints
“unconnected to any asserted violation of the antidiscrimination
laws” do not suffice, Liu v. Geo. Univ., No. 22-157, 2022 WL
2452611, at *8 (D.D.C. July 6, 2022).
Because Mr. Jones does not allege discrimination based on
participation in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
Title VII, his claims are properly assessed under the opposition
clause. To come within that clause, “one must demonstrate an
objectively reasonable belief that the practice ‘opposed’
actually violated Title VII[.]” Burton, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 114.
However, nowhere in his complaint or charge does Mr. Jones claim
that he opposed an unlawful employment practice. Regarding his
email to Ms. Johnson, Mr. Jones only alleges that he “responded
by stating his understanding of the [master/slave] term[s]
outside of the racial connotations as he had used and understood
[them] in the context of IT and his religion.” Compl., ECF No. 1
at 6 ¶ 27. 7 According to these factual allegations, Mr. Jones
simply stated his beliefs regarding the master/slave terminology
7 The language in Mr. Jones’ charge is similar: “I explained that the term has been widely used not only in the IT world but in religion and sex. Ms. Johnson complained to [HR] about my response.” Def.’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1 at 2. 27 and did not allege the existence of unlawful conduct by AAMC.
For example, Mr. Jones does not claim that he “voiced any
concerns about any discriminatory actions” by AAMC based on his
race, either in his response to Ms. Johnson, or afterwards by
filing a complaint of discrimination with AAMC’s HR Department.
Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14; see also Ndondji, 768 F.
Supp. 2d at 279 (dismissing a retaliation claim when the
plaintiff did not allege that he complained to management or
HR); Marcelus, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (same for an employee who
did not make a past complaint about discrimination).
Nor does Mr. Jones contend that AAMC acted in a retaliatory
manner following the email incident, Robinson-Reeder, 532 F.
Supp. 2d at 14; as he merely indicates that he “was counseled
for his response[,]” which involved an “insensitive,
unprofessional” tone and “inappropriate comparisons of
master/slave relationships that should never have been included
in a professional email to a colleague[,]” Compl., ECF No. 1 at
6 ¶ 28. At most, Mr. Jones appears to be complaining about being
forced to write an apology to Ms. Johnson, id. at 6 ¶ 29; or
expressing “frustrated ambition” with AAMC’s cultural values and
policies, but “without mentioning discrimination or otherwise
indicating that [race, or another Title VII protected ground,]
was an issue, [this] does not constitute protected activity,”
Broderick, 437 F.3d at 1232; see also Liu, 2022 WL 2452611, at
28 *8 (dismissing retaliation claim where the plaintiff made email
comments to his employer that equated “to little more than
‘frustrated ambition’” rather than opposition to “any type of
unlawful discrimination”); Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at
14 (same for a plaintiff who seemed to be only “complaining
about the effects of nepotism” at her company); King v. Jackson,
468 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 487 F.3d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (same where the plaintiff did “not allege that his
opposition was directed at any act of employment discrimination
allegedly taken by the defendant”); Logan v. Dep’t of Veteran
Affs., 404 F. Supp. 2d 72, 77 (D.D.C. 2005) (same for a
plaintiff who wrote a letter about her employer’s management
practices and filed a grievance regarding her medical care but
did not “include a claim of discrimination based upon” a
protected ground under Title VII).
Therefore, Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim, in addition to
being dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
is also subject to dismissal because Mr. Jones “has not alleged
a sufficient protected activity to provide the foundation for a
retaliation claim.” 8 Robinson-Reeder, 532 F. Supp. 2d at 14.
8 In its reply brief, AAMC argues that Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim should also fail because he “does not allege [that] he suffered an adverse action due to emailing Ms. Johnson.” Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 7 at 5. Because the Court has already concluded that Mr. Jones’ retaliation claim must be dismissed, it need not discuss this additional argument. Moreover, the Court does not 29 B. Mr. Jones’ Discrimination Claim Cannot Withstand AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss
To bring an actionable discrimination claim under Title
VII, Mr. Jones must allege that: “(1) [he] is a member of a
protected class; (2) [he] suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (citation omitted). “Although it is well-established that
an employment discrimination plaintiff is not required to plead
every fact necessary to establish a prima facie case to survive
a motion to dismiss, [he] must nevertheless plead sufficient
facts to show a plausible entitlement to relief.” Jones v.
Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 185, 191 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Even at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, conclusory allegations . . . ‘are not
entitled to the presumption of truth.’” See Johnson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 49 F. Supp. 3d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679) (dismissing a plaintiff’s Title VII claim when
the court was left with “wholly conclusory” allegations after
“presuming [the] (limited) factual allegations to be true”).
It is undisputed that Mr. Jones’ complaint alleges the
first two elements of a prima facie discrimination case by
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. Carter v. Geo. Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 30 asserting that he is “Caucasian/White” and that he “received a
termination letter” and was “fired.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2,
7 ¶ 34, 8 ¶ 36; see Douglas v. Donovan, 559 F.3d 549, 552 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“An adverse employment action is a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring[ or] firing[.]”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). However, AAMC
contends that Mr. Jones’ discrimination claim must be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because he has not alleged facts that give rise to an inference
of discrimination and has instead only stated “conclusory
statements and legal conclusions.” Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 9-
11. Mr. Jones argues that the Complaint sets forth enough facts
establishing that he was terminated “because of his race as a
Caucasian” by alleging that “[o]ne can infer that had a non-
Caucasian employee of the same position” joked about stealing a
team member from another department like he did, “their words
would not be interpreted as ‘talking about slavery’ and a
demonstration of a lack [of] self-awareness in violation of
AAMC’s policy.” See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 12-13 (noting that
his termination letter accused him of violating the AAMC Ethical
Principles and Conduct Policy). The Court disagrees with Mr.
Jones that he has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly suggest
that AAMC’s actions “taken against [him] were motivated by
31 racial animus.” See Harris v. Mayorkas, No. 21-cv-1083, 2022 WL
3452316, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2022).
“[A]n inference of discrimination can be established
through allegations that the plaintiff was ‘treated differently
from similarly situated employees who are not part of the
protected class.’” Id. (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405,
412 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In cases, like here, “[w]here a plaintiff
seeks an inference of discrimination based on ‘disparate
treatment,’” Budik v. How. Univ. Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7
(D.D.C. 2013); he “must plead sufficient facts to raise a
plausible inference that all of the relevant aspects of [his]
employment situation were nearly identical to those of the other
employees who did not suffer similar adverse employment
actions[,]” Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *5 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neuren v. Adduci,
Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(concluding that the plaintiff “offered no evidence to
demonstrate” similarity of situations between her and a male
employee and “thus failed to demonstrate disparate treatment”).
Here, Mr. Jones’ claim fails to meet these standards, as
his complaint is “devoid of any [ ] factual material” supporting
“a plausible inference of race discrimination.” Harris, 2022 WL
3452316, at *6. Nowhere in his complaint does he proffer factual
allegations describing “any comparator employees [outside of his
32 race], how they were similarly situated, or how they were
treated differently than [him].” Id. Only in his opposition
brief does he seek to make comparisons to “a non-Caucasian
employee of the same position,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13;
but he does not actually identify any such employees and
certainly does not allege specifics about their job titles,
experiences, levels of seniority, or even their exact races, see
Budik, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (“Because the plaintiff[, an African
American,] has alleged no facts other than the ambiguous job
title of ‘co-worker’” to compare her employment situation to
that of her former Caucasian co-worker, “she has failed to state
a claim for disparate treatment discrimination, and the Court
must therefore dismiss that claim.”). Instead, Mr. Jones
generally states that “[o]ne can infer that had a non-Caucasian
employee of the same position” used his exact phrasing about
stealing a team member from another department, they would have
been treated differently than him, and “their words would not
[have been] interpreted as ‘talking about slavery[.]’” Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13. He then writes: “For that reason, there
is an inference that AAMC has taken adverse action against Mr.
Jones on the basis of his race.” Id. However, by offering no
facts to support these statements and simply concluding that
“[o]ne can infer” racial discrimination from comparing him to an
unspecified “non-Caucasian employee of the same position[,]”
33 id.; Mr. Jones has rendered his discriminatory allegations “just
[ ] legal conclusion[s]—and a legal conclusion is never
enough[,]” Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *6 (citation omitted);
see also SS & T, LLC v. Am. U., No. 19-721, 2020 WL 1170288, at
*5 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2020) (calling the plaintiff’s race-based
discrimination claim “too threadbare to state a claim” when it
failed “to identify any of the other businesses . . . or the
race of the other business owners,” and did not “explain how
those businesses were similarly situated yet treated
differently”); Bekkem v. Wilkie, 915 F.3d 1258, 1275 (10th Cir.
2019) (noting that a plaintiff’s bare assertion of “differential
treatment of similarly situated employees” is “too conclusory to
permit a reasonable inference of” discrimination). Such
conclusory allegations, along with inferences not supported by
the factual allegations, “are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; cf. Williams v. Dist. of
Columbia, 317 F. Supp. 3d 195, 200 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding
that the plaintiff’s discrimination claim could survive a motion
to dismiss when he “provide[d] considerable detail” in his
complaint, “pointing to specific dates on which purportedly
discriminatory interactions occurred and naming specific
individuals involved”).
Most of Mr. Jones’ allegations are “wholly conclusory.”
Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 121. For example, he states in the
34 Complaint and Opposition that “AAMC’s leadership used phrases
and ideology that required nonminority employees to accept their
role in racism, including the privilege that comes with being a
nonminority.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13 (citing Compl., ECF
No. 1 at 5 ¶ 18). He also alleges that AAMC “has developed” and
“interpreted policies to promote discrimination against non-
minorities.” Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶¶ 39-40. Yet, Mr. Jones
“does not specify what those allegedly discriminatory policies
are, or how [they] related to his termination[,]” nor does he
offer factual allegations regarding how any such policies,
including AAMC’s Ethical Principles and Conduct Policy, were
applied differently to employees of differing races. Def.’s
Mot., ECF No. 4 at 10. Instead, he merely alleges that one can
“interpret[]” that his termination resulted from “a lack of
self-awareness of his race as a Caucasian” because AAMC’s
policies held him, as a “non-minorit[y,] to impossible standards
and foster[ed] a culture of overwhelming White Guilt.” Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 6 at 13; see also Compl., ECF No. 1 at 8 ¶¶ 41-43
(claiming Mr. Jones was terminated because of AAMC’s “support of
minorities” that “created a work environment that condoned . . .
comparing someone to a Nazi” and “condemned the use of industry
terms that may be disrespectful to minorities”). These are all
conclusory allegations that Mr. Jones fails to causally tie to
his termination and thus do not support an inference of racial
35 discrimination. As AAMC notes, that Mr. Jones may have “personal
disagreement” with AAMC’s policies and his co-workers’ comments
in townhalls is insufficient to establish a race discrimination
claim under Title VII. Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 4 at 4, 10-11; see
Harris, 2022 WL 3452316, at *7-8 (noting that “courts have
recognized that [ ] generalized statements of racial friction
are insufficient to sufficiently allege discriminatory intent”
and concluding that “a generalized opinion” about “racial and
social tension” in the plaintiff’s office did not create an
inference of discrimination). Thus, “stripping away [Mr. Jones’]
conclusory allegations,” and presuming the remaining “(limited)
factual allegations to be true,” the Court concludes that Mr.
Jones has failed to state a racial discrimination claim under
Title VII. Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d at 121. Accordingly, Mr.
Jones’ discrimination claim under Title VII cannot withstand
AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss and must fail.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, AAMC’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 4, is GRANTED. An appropriate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge March 2, 2023