GINSBURG, Circuit Judge:
The Professional Pilots Federation and two individual pilots petition for review of two decisions of the Federal Aviation Administration: not to institute a rulemaking to relax the FAA Rule that requires commercial airline pilots to retire at age 60, and to extend application of the Rule to commuter airline operations. The Pilots contend, first, that the Rule unlawfully requires airlines to violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and, second, that the FAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, when it decided to retain and expand the scope of the Rule. Finding merit in neither contention, we deny the petitions for review.
I. Background
The FAA first promulgated the Age 60 Rule in 1959 pursuant to its mandate under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to ensure air safety. 24 Fed.Reg. 9767 (December 5, 1959). See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(4) (authorizing Administrator to promulgate “regulations in the interest of safety for the ... periods of service of airmen”); 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c) (requiring Administrator to regulate “in a [761]*761way that best tends to reduce or eliminate the possibility or recurrence of accidents in air transportation”); 49 U.S.C. § 44702(b)(1)(A) (requiring Administrator to consider “the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety” when issuing an airman, air carrier, or other certificate); Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 897-98 (2d Cir.1960). The agency concluded that the Rule would promote air safety after finding “that available medical studies show that sudden incapacitation due to heart attacks or strokes becomes more frequent as men approach age sixty and present medical knowledge is such that it is impossible to predict with accuracy those individuals most likely to suffer attacks.” Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898. The Second Circuit, reasoning that it was not for a court to substitute its own “untutored judgment for the expert knowledge” of the agency, accepted this conclusion and dismissed an early challenge to the Rule. Id.
The FAA has reconsidered the Rule on several occasions. In the early 1960s, the agency began, but never completed, a study to determine the feasibility of testing individual pilots over the age of 60 in order to determine whether they remained fit to fly. See Aman v. FAA, 856 F.2d 946, 948 (7th Cir.1988). In 1970 the Air Line Pilots Association called upon the FAA to replace the blanket prohibition of the Age 60 Rule with a regime of individualized performance tests and medical evaluations, but the agency decided to retain the Rule because “an increase in the number of medical examinations administered to a given pilot ... would not be an effective deterrent to incapacitation inasmuch as the indices of such incapacitation are not now sufficiently developed.” See O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 61 (D.C.Cir. 1974).
In 1979 the Congress directed the National Institutes of Health to determine whether the Rule was still medically warranted. See Pub.L. No. 96-171, 93 Stat. 1285; see also Pilots Rights Ass’n v. FAA, 86 F.R.D. 174, 176 (D.D.C.1980). In its final report, the NIH concluded that there was “no special medical significance to age 60 as a mandatory age for retirement of airline pilots” but recommended that the age 60 limit be retained nonetheless because there was still no “medical or performance appraisal system that can single out those pilots who would pose the greatest hazard because of early, or impending, deterioration in health or performance.” Report of the National Institute on Aging, Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study 1 (August 1981).
In 1982 the FAA considered relaxing the Rule in order to allow a small group of pilots to continue flying until age 62 in order to generate data on their performance under actual operating conditions. 47 Fed.Reg. 29,-782 (July 8, 1982). The FAA ultimately determined, however, that “no medical or performance appraisal system can be identified that would single out pilots who would pose a hazard to safety.” 49 Fed.Reg. 14, 692, 14,-695 (April 12, 1984). Unable “to distinguish those pilots who, as a consequence of aging, present a threat to air safety from those who do not,” the agency decided not to experiment with changing the Rule. Id.
The present litigation was stimulated, at least in part, by a 1993 study of the Age 60 Rule that was performed by Hilton Systems, Inc. for the FAA’s Civil Aeromedical Institute. The Hilton Study correlated accident data for the period from 1976 to 1988 with pilot age and flying time. This analysis revealed “no support for the hypothesis that pilots of scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of 60.” Hilton Study at 6-2. On the contrary, the study found a “slight downward trend” in accident rates as pilots neared the age of 60. The authors cautioned, however, that this decrease might have resulted from “the FAA’s rigorous medical and operational performance standards screening] out, over time, pilots more likely to be in accidents.”
Shortly after publication of the Hilton Study the FAA announced that it was again considering whether to institute a rulemaking concerning the Age 60 Rule and invited comments from the public on various aspects of the Hilton Study. 58 Fed.Reg. 21,336 (April 20, 1993). The agency held a public hearing in September 1993 at which 46 members of the public made presentations. The [762]*762agency also received more than a thousand written comments.
In July 1993 the Professional Pilots Federation filed with the FAA a rulemaking petition to repeal the Rule. The Pilots maintained that “time and empirical evidence have shown that the blanket elimination of the country’s most experienced pilots is not justified in the interests of safety and, therefore, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates this country’s policy of prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of age.”
In early 1995 after a series of accidents involving commuter airlines, the FAA proposed in a separate rulemaking to bring certain commuter operations, previously conducted under Part 135, under Part 121. 60 Fed.Reg. 16,230 (March 29, 1995). These operations would then become subject to the more stringent safety standards of Part 121, including the Age 60 Rule, relaxation of which the agency was still considering in the wake of the Hilton Study.
In December 1995 the FAA denied the Pilots’ petitions to repeal the Age 60 Rule and decided not to institute a rulemaking in response to the Hilton Study. 60 Fed.Reg. 65,977 (December 20, 1995). The agency determined that the “concerns regarding aging pilots and underlying the original rule have not been shown to be invalid or misplaced,” and concluded that the Rule was still warranted as a safety measure. Id. at 65,-980. The FAA therefore retained the Rule, which provides that:
No certificate holder may use the services of any person as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under [Part 121] if that person has reached his 60th birthday. No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under [Part 121] if that person has reached his 60th birthday.
14 CFR § 121.383(c) (1996). In addition the FAA adopted its proposed rule bringing under Part 121 certain commuter operations previously conducted under Part 135. 60 Fed.Reg. 65,832 (December 20, 1995). As a result, these commuter operations became newly subject to the Age 60 Rule. The Pilots petitioned this court for review of both rulemaking decisions.
II. Analysis
The Pilots challenge the FAA’s decision not to institute a rulemaking to repeal the Age 60 Rule and its decision to apply the Rule to commuter airlines as violations of both the ADEA and the APA. First, the Pilots assert that by requiring the airlines to discriminate on the basis of age the Rule is in “direct conflict” with the ADEA. Second, they claim that the agency violated the APA by: (1) not affording adequate consideration to the reasonable alternatives proposed by various eommenters; (2) reaching a decision that is against the weight of the evidence; and (3) failing to provide any reasoned basis for treating older pilots differently than other groups of pilots who create as great or greater a safety risk.
A. The ADEA
The Pilots argue that the Age 60 Rule violates the ADEA because it requires the airlines to discriminate against older pilots and because the FAA need not have relied upon an age-based Rule in order to achieve its objective of air safety. The agency, we are told, could instead have implemented a scheme of medical evaluations and individualized testing in order to determine whether each pilot remains fit to fly. In any event, in the ADEA the Congress spoke directly to the role that age may play in employment decisions and the FAA cannot—as a matter of logic if not of statutory interpretation— countermand that clear statutory command through an exercise of its rulemaking authority.
The FAA responds that the ADEA speaks only to employers—including federal agencies acting in their role as employers—and therefore places no substantive limitation upon the agency’s power to regulate airline safety pursuant to the mandate of the Federal Aviation Act. In the alternative, the FAA contends that if the ADEA does apply to the air safety rules it promulgates, then the Age 60 Rule comes within the exception in § 623(f)(1) of that statute for a bona fide occupational qualification. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1).
[763]*763The FAA bases its first point upon the central provision of the ADEA itself, which states that “it shall be unlawful for an employer” to discriminate in employment upon the basis of age. § 623(a). The FAA argues that it promulgated the Age 60 Rule in its capacity not as an employer but as a regulator; in that capacity the agency is specifically authorized, inter alia, to prescribe “regulations in the interest of safety for the maximum hours or period of service of airmen.” 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(4); see also id. at § 44702. Absent a provision in the ADEA comparably specific or otherwise capable of overriding the authorization of § 44701—“not withstanding any other provision of law” comes to mind—the ADEA places no limitation upon the rulemaking authority of the FAA.
The FAA also contrasts the ADEA with the Rehabilitation Act, in which the Congress expressly subjected the programmatic activities of the Government to the stricture against discrimination. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (providing that no qualified person shall be discriminated against for a disability “under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency”); see also Buck v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 56 F.3d 1406, 1408-09 (D.C.Cir.1995). Absent a similarly plain and unequivocal expression of intent, the FAA urges that we ought not lightly infer that the Congress intended to compromise its single-minded pursuit of safety in the air.
We agree with the FAA that the ADEA places no substantive limitation upon the agency’s authority to act as a regulator of the airline industry. The statute prohibits both an employer in the private sector and an agency of the federal government from discriminating upon the basis of age in making employment decisions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 633(a). Nothing in the Act can plausibly be read to restrict the FAA from making age a criterion for employment when its acts in its capacity as the guarantor of public safety in the air. The general prohibition of the ADEA, addressed as it is to employers, should not be read by mere implication to override the specific grants of authority to the FAA in 49 U.S.C. § 44701. If the Congress intends to limit the means available to the FAA in its pursuit of air safety, we trust it will say so rather than leave the matter to the courts to infer. Therefore, we conclude that the ADEA does not limit the authority of the FAA to prescribe a mandatory retirement age for pilots; as a result, we need not reach the question whether the Age 60 Rule constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification within the meaning of § 623(f)(1) of that Act.
B. The APA Challenges
We will defer to the FAA’s decisions to retain the Age 60 Rule and to bring commuter airlines under the Rule unless those decisions are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2865-66, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). More particularly, the agency must have offered a reasoned explanation for its chosen course of action, see FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1986), responded to “relevant” and “significant” public comments, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 n. 58 (D.C.Cir.1977), and demonstrated that it afforded adequate consideration to every reasonable alternative presented for its consideration. See Public Citizen v. Steed, 733 F.2d 93, 103-04 (D.C.Cir.1984).
With respect to its decision not to convene a rulemaking in order to repeal or modify the Age 60 Rule, the FAA argues that the appropriate standard of review is the even more deferential standard we apply to an agency’s decision not to institute a rulemaking proceeding. Cellnet Communication, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (D.C.Cir.1992). That more deferential standard of review is indicated, however, only when the agency has clearly shown that “pragmatic considerations” would render the usual and somewhat more searching inquiry problematic because “the agency has chosen not to regulate for reasons ill-suited to judicial resolution, e.g., because of internal management considerations as to budget and personnel or for reasons made after a weighing of competing policies.” See Bargmann v. [764]*764Helms, 715 F.2d 638, 640 (D.C.Cir.1983) (reviewing FAA decision not to institute rule-making to require first-aid kits on commercial aircraft). In the case now before us the decision not to institute a rulemaking looking toward repeal of the Age 60 Rule was purportedly based upon the merits of the existing Rule. We see no need, therefore, to afford the agency more than the usual—and considerable—deference we show an agency when it adopts a rule implementing a statute it is charged with administering. We shall therefore apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of the APA.
1. Consideration of alternatives
Various parties filing comments before the FAA proposed two alternatives to the present Rule. First, they suggested periodic performance checks designed to determine, on an individual basis, whether a pilot remains fit to fly. Second, they proposed allowing a group of pilots over the age of 60 to continue flying commercial passenger aircraft in order to gather the data that the FAA would need to make a reasoned decision about whether the current retirement age of 60 could safely be moved up to perhaps age 62 or 63. The Pilots now press both alternatives upon us.
a. Periodic performance checks
The FAA rejected periodic performance checks on the ground that they only “verify the state of a pilot’s performance at the time of the checks.” They do not detect “early or subelinical cognitive defects that may subtly degrade performance” and “do not predict whether an individual pilot’s performance will degrade at any time in the future as a result of age.” The Pilots assert that rather than afford adequate consideration to this proposal the agency blindly relied upon its 1984 determination that there are no valid tests capable of screening out pilots likely to suffer from age-related impairment. The FAA, we are told, did not even acknowledge that a detailed testing protocol had been presented to the agency during a 1985 hearing before the House Select Committee on Aging. The FAA also purportedly failed adequately to respond to the EEOC’s observation that several non-Part 121 operators, most notably the Boeing Corporation, have adopted individualized testing in order to settle various suits brought against them under the ADEA. The Pilots fault the FAA for responding to the EEOC’s detailed comment with the simple assertion that it had “not been apprised of the testing protocols or of the results of any such testing, ha[d] not seen them discussed in the medical literature, and ha[d] not been party to the agreements.”
The FAA responds by pointing out that it did evaluate the specific testing regimens proposed by the commenters before finally concluding that testing individual pilots is an inadequate substitute for the Age 60 Rule. In the final rule document the agency observed that available tests: (1) evaluate only a pilot’s present performance and cannot be used to predict the sudden onset of an age-related impairment, such as early or subelinical cognitive defects; (2) cannot measure the subtle degradation of skills that may prove serious in the cockpit; and (3) do not evaluate how a pilot responds to stress and fatigue.
The FAA contends that its response to the comment submitted by the EEOC was entirely adequate in light of the purely anecdotal evidence that the EEOC offered in support of its assertion that individualized testing has proven to be a viable substitute for a bright-line rule based upon age. The EEOC’s principal evidence is that it reached a settlement agreement with Boeing under which that company’s pilots were for a time allowed to continue flying until the age of 63. The FAA acknowledges as much but is quick to point out that: (1) the EEOC lawyer who oversaw the Boeing litigation observed in a 1991 article published by the Flight Safety Foundation that the full impact of the agreement upon safety remained to be assessed; (2) no account of Boeing’s experience has yet been published; (3) Boeing pilots are corporate pilots who do not fly under Part 121; and (4) a Boeing representative had testified before the agency that “neither the information uncovered as a result of this effort nor subsequent Boeing ... experience with our medical and neuropsychological protocols ... gives us confidence that means are cur[765]*765rently available to detect or predict age-related problems which may have [an] adverse [effect] on safety.”
The Pilots also claim that the agency’s rejection of individualized testing for pilots over the age of 60 is inconsistent with its acceptance of monitoring and testing for younger pilots with certain known medical conditions. The FAA maintains that it did in fact offer an adequate explanation for the apparent inconsistency when it specifically found that, although a younger pilot with a diagnosed medical condition may be monitored,
such is not the case in aging, since there are no generally applicable medical tests that can, at this time, adequately determine which individual pilots are subject to incapacitation secondary to either acute cardiovascular or neurological events or to more subtle adverse conditions related to decline of cognitive functioning.
60 Fed.Reg. at 65,984. For example, a pilot with a diagnosed heart condition can be tested and monitored in order to determine whether there is a significant risk that he will suffer a heart attack. The FAA allows this pilot to continue flying provided that his doctors have determined that the risk of his suffering a sudden unexpected impairment due to his heart condition is de minimis. There are no tests, however, that can accurately determine the risk of an apparently healthy but older pilot suddenly being stricken by any one of the many potentially disabling conditions that may accompany advancing age.
We conclude that the FAA afforded adequate consideration to the alternative of individualized testing. The FAA explained that even state-of-the-art testing cannot screen out potentially risky pilots. The EEOC did not offer any data in support of its assertion that allowing pilots to fly until the age of 63 would not compromise safety; the FAA simply cannot be faulted for failing to explain away data that are not part of the record.
Finally, we conclude that the FAA adequately explained the difference in treatment it affords to pilots over the age of 60 who have no known medical condition and to younger pilots who do have a known medical condition. The risk of allowing the younger pilot to continue flying is negligible provided—and it is this critical proviso that our colleague in dissent seems to ignore—that “the agency has been able to develop a means of assessment and surveillance specifically designed to demonstrate the individual’s capabilities and to identify any adverse changes.” Doctors are not only unable to determine whether an older but apparently healthy pilot will be afflicted with a dangerous condition; they are also unable to predict with which of the myriad conditions that accompany advancing age an individual pilot is likely to be afflicted.
b. Selecting a group of pilots over the age of 60.
The FAA also rejected the suggestion that a group of pilots over the age of 60 be permitted to continue flying under Part 121 in order to generate the data needed for the FAA to make an empirical judgment about whether the Age 60 Rule is reasonable. The Pilots contend, without elaboration, that the FAA failed to offer adequate consideration to this alternative. The FAA responds that it rejected this proposal because it did not have confidence that it could identify a cohort of vintage pilots who would not be susceptible to subtle impairments or to sudden incapacitation:
The FAA withdrew [a similar plan] in 1984 because valid selection tests for the group did not exist. The FAA was concerned [766]*766that, without valid selection tests, these pilots would create an unacceptable safety risk in part 121 operations. The coramenter does not suggest any data that indicates [sic] that a group described [sic] would be able to identify any such tests. The FAA has the same concerns today.
60 Fed.Reg. at 65,984.
As long as the FAA cannot identify good candidates for the experiment that the Pilots propose, we can hardly conclude that its refusal to run the experiment is arbitrary and capricious. On the contrary, it would be unreasonable for the court to require that the FAA periodically suspend its safety regulations in order to determine anew, upon the basis of (potentially disastrous) experience, whether they are still needed. Nor have the Pilots shown that such experimentation with the safety of passengers is permitted by the Federal Aviation Act. Indeed, the Congress arguably forbade it by requiring the FAA to “consider the duty of an air carrier to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.” 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(A).
Nothing in the record suggests that the FAA has, but refuses to act upon, the “valid selection tests” it would need in order to identify a group of low-risk pilots over the age of 60 who might safely continue to fly. Therefore we must conclude that the FAA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously-—and was quite possibly acting as required by law—when it refused to waive the Rule in order to allow a selected group of pilots to fly commercial passenger aircraft after attaining the age of 60.
2. The rationality of age-based risk assessment
The Pilots assert that, in the course of defending the Age 60 Rule, the FAA drew several distinctions that reveal a “ ‘basic inconsistency in its reasoning’ by applying similar concepts differently in parallel situations.” See Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. FAA, 3 F.3d 449, 453 (D.C.Cir.1993). In particular, the Pilots maintain that the FAA’s treatment of younger pilots, of pilots who do not fly under Part 121, and of foreign pilots cannot be reconciled with its treatment of Part 121 pilots over the age of 60.
a. Younger pilots
The Pilots claim that it is arbitrary and capricious for the FAA to ground older and more experienced pilots while allowing younger pilots to fly even though a younger pilot is more likely than an older pilot to cause an accident. To the commenters who argued that this is a contradiction, the FAA responded (in essence) that, however valuable experience may be, it is no match for a heart attack. Implicit in the FAA’s decision is the view that a 40-year-old pilot with 15 years of experience is a safer bet than a 61-year-old pilot with 36 years of experience. The 61-year-old pilot’s additional experience is outweighed, that is, by the heightened probability that he will lose his ability to fly safely—whether through gradual wear and tear or a sudden episode—and the disastrous consequences if he does. The FAA also maintains that the Pilots’ argument is fundamentally flawed because it assumes that the FAA based its decision to retain the Age 60 Rule solely upon accident data. Accident data are one consideration, among many, that influenced the FAA’s decision to select age 60 as the cut off; other data, such as the percentage of pilots suffering sudden heart failure, or a significant loss of vision or hearing, were also considered, and those data provide ample grounds for drawing a distinction between younger and older pilots. Indeed, according to the agency, all studies of the subject come to the conclusion that some mandatory retirement age for pilots is appropriate. The studies diverge only with regard to the precise age at which retirement should be mandated.
Finally, the FAA questions the assumption, implicit in the Pilots’ argument, that relatively inexperienced pilots are replacing more experienced pilots as a result of the Age 60 Rule. Young pilots are rarely if ever given command of an aircraft before they have had significant experience. Older pilots, therefore, are typically “replaced by pilots who have substantial experience as pilots in the first officer position, and often as flight engineers before that.”
[767]*767We conclude that the FAA adequately justified its decision to distinguish between younger pilots and those over the age of 60. The agency reasonably concluded that the risk inherent in allowing an older pilot to fly outweighs the benefit of having a more experienced person in command. In contrast, the risk of allowing a younger pilot to serve in a noncommand role is negligible while the benefit of allowing him to gain experience is high.
b. Younger pilots with known medical conditions
The Pilots observe that the FAA sometimes will allow a younger pilot with a serious medical problem to continue flying even if his problem is characterized by a high rate of recurrence. It is arbitrary and capricious, the Pilots assert, to forbid an apparently healthy pilot over the age of 60 to fly because of the risk that he might have a first heart attack while, at the same time, allowing a younger pilot to fly in spite of the dramatically higher statistical risk that he might suffer a second heart attack.
The FAA defends its policy of granting exemptions to pilots who have experienced a serious medical problem on the ground that it does so only when the risk of a recurrence can be assessed adequately. A known condition can not only be monitored but also, as in the case of alcoholism and some heart conditions, controlled:
When a special issuance medical certificate is granted, the condition in question has been clearly identified, and the agency has been able to develop a means of assessment and surveillance specially designed to demonstrate the individual’s capabilities and to identify any adverse changes. If that is not possible, certification is not granted.
60 Fed.Reg. at 65,984. Meanwhile, the subtler forms of physical and mental decline that may accompany aging often cannot be detected, let alone monitored or controlled.
In sum, the FAA determined that there are techniques for monitoring the health of pilots with certain medical conditions but that there is not yet any way of predicting whether and when an older pilot is likely to develop a condition with a potentially serious impact upon his ability to fly an airplane safely. This difference between the two groups is fully adequate to warrant the distinction that the FAA has drawn between them.
e. Corporate aircraft and air taxis.
The Pilots next assert that the FAA has applied the Age 60 Rule arbitrarily without regard for either the type of aircraft being flown or the type of service being provided. Thus, the Rule applies to cargo carriers, where no passengers are at risk, but not to corporate aircraft and air taxis, where passengers are at risk. The Pilots claim that this is utterly irrational.
The FAA responds that the distinction between common carriers of passengers and cargo, which are subject to the Age 60 Rule, and private carriers of passengers and cargo, which are not, is found in the governing statute. The Congress directed the FAA to consider the differences between “air transportation,” defined as the transportation of passengers or property by a common carrier, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(5), (24), & (25), and “other air commerce.” See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(B). The Congress also specifically required the FAA to consider the duty of air carriers, defined elsewhere as common carriers, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(2), (5), (24), & (25), “to provide service with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.” See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, the agency considers it appropriate to regulate common carriers more stringently than it regulates “other air commerce.” Insofar as that leaves corporate aircraft and air taxis beyond the reach of the Rule, the distinction is not unreasonable, says the agency: corporate pilots do not serve the public as do common carriers; and while air taxis do serve the public, unlike commuter airlines their safety record has not been a source of concern for the FAA or the NTSB, perhaps because their operations—typically involving only a few short haul passengers and less sophisticated equipment—place lesser demands upon their pilots.
[768]*768We conclude that the FAA adequately explained its decision to apply the Age 60 Rule to pilots of commuter aircraft but not to pilots of corporate aircraft and air taxis. The Congress clearly left the FAA free to regulate corporate aircraft operations at less than the “highest possible degree of safety.” See Quesada, 276 F.2d at 898 (“The Administrator did not act unreasonably in placing greater limitations on the certificates of pilots flying planes carrying large numbers of passengers who have no opportunity to select a pilot of their own choice. The Federal Aviation Act contemplates just such distinctions between the regulations governing ‘air commerce’ and those governing other air transportation”).
As for excluding air taxi operations while extending the Rule to commuter operations, we accept the FAA’s point that the NTSB had asked the agency specifically to consider extending the Rule to commuter operations. 60 Fed.Reg. at 16,235. In responding to the NTSB’s request, the FAA was not obliged— contrary to our colleague in dissent, see dissent at 6—to consider whether the Rule might further improve safety if applied to still other operations. Nor, we note, could such an extension of the Rule in any way benefit the petitioners; indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has observed, it would foreclose them from a source of post-60 employment. See Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 313 (1978).
d. Foreign pilots
Finally, the Pilots claim that it is arbitrary and capricious for the FAA to allow a foreign carrier operating in U.S. airspace to employ pilots who are over the age of 60 while prohibiting a U.S. common carrier from employing even the healthiest of pilots beyond that age. The FAA responds that as a signatory of the Chicago Convention, see 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. 1591 (December 7, 1944) the United States is required to recognize as valid any license issued by any other signatory, provided that the requirements underlying such licenses are “equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established from time to time pursuant to this convention.” See 61 Stat. at 1189; see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 40105(b)(1)(A) & (B) (FAA must “act consistently with obligations of the United States Government under an international agreement,” and “shall consider applicable laws and requirements of a foreign country”). The standards that have been established under the Chicago Convention permit (but do not require) a country to allow commercial pilots to fly beyond the age of 60. For this reason, the FAA maintains, it must as a matter of law allow foreign pilots to fly notwithstanding the Age 60 Rule.
We agree with the FAA that the mandate of § 40105 requires this inconsistency in the treatment of domestic and foreign carriers and their pilots. Perhaps, however, experience with foreign pilots over the age of 60 flying commercial aircraft in U.S. airspace will provide the FAA with the comparative data it needs in order to evaluate empirically the continuing need for the existing rule.
3. The weight of the evidence
The Pilots assert that the FAA not only placed unwarranted emphasis upon evidence that supports retaining the Rule but also downplayed significant evidence tending to undercut that support. Thus, the FAA stressed that an NIH panel had found in 1981 that pilot performance deteriorates with age while ignoring the same panel’s recommendation that selected pilots over the age of 60 be allowed to fly in order to generate data about the performance of older pilots.
The FAA responds that it did not give short shrift to the NIH’s recommendation that a limited number of older pilots be allowed to fly in order to generate data. The FAA remains unwilling to act upon this proposal because it knows of no method for selecting a group of low-risk pilots over the age of 60.
We agree with the FAA that it did not ignore the recommendations contained in the 1981 report of the NIH. As we have seen, see § II.B.l above, the FAA decided not to allow pilots to continue flying past the age of 60 because it did not know then, as it does not know now, of any way to identify a group of pilots over the age of 60 who are less likely than other equally venerable aviators to experience some loss of their faculties.
[769]*769The Pilots also fault the FAA for failing to acknowledge that the NIH has withdrawn its support for the Rule. The Pilots here refer to the declaration of a former director of the National Institute on Aging, Dr. T. Franklin Williams, that he had testified in 1985 before the House Select Committee on Aging “that it was the official position of the NIA that testing of pilots after age 60 was feasible and desirable.”
The FAA counters that it did not acknowledge that the Institute had withdrawn its support for the Rule because the record does not establish any such change of position. The only Institute report in the record is the one prepared in 1981. Neither the NIH nor the NIA has conducted another similar study since that time. Only Dr. Williams’ declaration, submitted in litigation to which the FAA was not a party and reproduced in the present rulemaking record, is offered in support of the proposition that the NIA “formally abandoned” its earlier position. Moreover, that declaration is in some tension with Dr. Williams’ statement before the House Committee on Aging that he did not intend “to speak for or against the retirement age rule,” and with his somewhat hesitant assertion that “we can probably reliably test cardiac functioning and with reasonable reliability identify risk for coronary events in older as well as younger persons.”
We conclude that the FAA was under no obligation to acknowledge Dr. Williams’ post hoc characterization of testimony that was never submitted to the agency. In any event, Dr. Williams did not state in his testimony that the NIH had formally abandoned the earlier study, nor did he give any explanation as to why the NIH would do so. The declaration of Dr. Williams contained no new evidence bearing upon the validity of the Age 60 Rule.
The Pilots also criticize the FAA for rejecting the proposed alternative of screening older pilots through performance checks without acknowledging that the NIH advocates that approach. As discussed above, see § II.B.l, the FAA afforded adequate consideration to the merits of this alternative and concluded that medical science has not yet advanced to the point of being able to predict who will experience age-related deterioration. We see no reason why the FAA should be faulted for failing to name the supporters of the proposal as long as the agency adequately considered the merits of the idea. See Brae Corp. v. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1067 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Although the Commission has an obligation to identify and ponder all relevant issues, it need not mention by name every commentator whose grievance it examines”).
The Pilots also question the FAA’s use of the Hilton Study. That study concluded that the available data reveal no increase in the accident rate of pilots nearing age 60, but cautioned that there are no data available with respect to pilots over the age of 60. Acknowledging that the question of when a pilot should be required to retire must be answered “very conservatively because of the possibility of catastrophic results,” the study concluded that “one could cautiously increase the retirement age to age 63.” The Pilots claim that the FAA did not adequately explain its failure to adopt this recommendation.
The FAA maintains that it regarded the Hilton Study as an inadequate basis upon which to change its policy because the study considered only accident data; a change of policy would have to take account of “data on vision, reaction time, judgment, circadian rhythm and many other neurobehavioral and physiological measures.” The FAA also questioned whether it was appropriate to draw an inference about pilots who fly commercial passenger aircraft from statistics pertaining to pilots who fly cargo transports, and therefore have a different flying pattern that may subject them to lesser levels of fatigue and stress; Hilton drew the inference because it lacked more relevant data pertaining to commercial passenger pilots over the age of 60 (a null set).
The FAA may seem to have created something of a Catch-22 by announcing that it will not allow older pilots to fly until it has experiential data demonstrating the continued ability of such pilots to fly safely. On the other hand, it hardly seems reasonable to require that the Administrator periodically put his hand into the fire in order to ensure that he [770]*770has precisely assessed the danger that it poses. If the FAA was justified in imposing the Rule in the first place then we cannot say that, simply because it is the Rule itself that blocks the generation of data necessary to reconsider the Rule, it was unreasonable for the FAA to find that it lacks those data. In sum, we hold that the FAA’s decision not to convene a rulemaking to revise the Age 60 Rule was not arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.
III. Conclusion
We hold that the ADEA does not limit the authority of the FAA to regulate air carriers in the interest of safety. Because we also conclude that the FAA was not arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA, in deciding not to conduct a rulemaking for the purpose of amending the Age 60 Rule, the petitions for review are
Denied.
Contrary to the impression created by the dissent, the FAA did not suggest "that it is more difficult to monitor known medical conditions in an older pilot than in a younger pilot.” Dissent at 771, n.3. Rather, the agency's concern was that it is more difficult to detect an unknown medical condition than to monitor a known medical condition.