¶8 We review de novo the question of whether an appeal is moot. See People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 14, 465 P.3d 554, 558. "Colorado courts invoke their judicial power only when an actual controversy exists." People in Int. of Vivekanathan, 2013 COA 143M, ¶ 20, 338 P.3d 1017, 1020. When an actual controversy no longer exists, an issue becomes moot because any relief granted by the court would have no practical effect. Id. If an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it "impossible for the court to grant 'any effectualrelief' . . . to a prevailing party," the appeal must then be dismissed as moot. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)); see also Stell v. Boulder Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 92 P.3d 910, 914 (Colo. 2004) ("[A] case is deemed moot when the relief granted by the court would not have a practical effect upon an actual and existing controversy."). But, "[a]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot." Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307-08 (2012) (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 442 (1984)).
¶9 Under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, a case is moot "only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction." Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Collateral consequences can include prohibitions on a felon's ability to vote and own firearms, potential sentencing as a habitual criminal, possible impeachment based on prior convictions, and proscription from working in certain regulated professions. Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO 79M, ¶ 28, 476 P.3d 734, 740; see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968) (observing various collateral consequences that can stem from a conviction, including the inability to serve as a juror and act as a labor union official).
¶10 Even if a sentence has been fully served, an appeal of the underlying conviction is not moot if there is a possibility that the conviction will give rise to collateral consequences. This is because the disabilities and burdens which may flow from a conviction give the defendant "a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him." Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237 (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946)); see also, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 371 n.2 (1993) (noting that, even though the diversionary sentence was successfully completed and the original charges were dismissed, Minnesota law provided that the record of the charges would be retained and used by courts in determining the merits of subsequent proceedings, and those collateral consequences were sufficient to preclude a finding of mootness); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55 ("Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties, [and] civil rights may be affected." (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1954)).
¶11 An appeal may be moot because the relief sought cannot be afforded through the appeal. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 89 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that, because the defendant appealed a condition of his sentence rather than his conviction, the collateral consequences of his conviction still remained in effect, and therefore his appeal was moot); People v. Garcia, 2014 COA 85, ¶¶ 12, 14, 356 P.3d 913, 916 (holding that the appeal was moot because the defendant hadappealed his probation revocation rather than his conviction, which is what could have affected his immigration status).
¶12 An appeal can also become moot "because of subsequent occurrences." Brown v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 915 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Colo. 1996). In these types of cases, a subsequent occurrence provides a defendant with the relief he or she was seeking on appeal. For example, in Brown, the defendant sought either to be released from confinement or to be transferred back to Colorado. Id. Because, subsequent to the litigation, the defendant was transferred back to the Colorado State Penitentiary, the relief he sought was satisfied, thereby rendering the appeal moot. Id. at 1313-14. Likewise, in Hunt v. State Department of Corrections, 985 P.2d 651, 651-52 (Colo. 1999), this court held that the defendant's claims were moot because the only applicable remedy was for him to be returned to Colorado, and he had already been returned subsequent to filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
2. Deferred Judgment and Sentence¶13 A DJS is not a conviction and it is not a sentence. Instead, it "is a dispositional alternative imposed in lieu of a judgment and sentence." People v. Anderson, 2015 COA 12, ¶ 15, 348 P.3d 491, 494. The deferred judgment statute authorizes a trial court, after acceptance of a defendant's guilty plea and upon consent of all parties, "to continue the case for the purpose of entering judgmentand sentence upon the plea of guilty for a period not to exceed four years for a felony . . . ." § 18-1.3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020). "As a condition of continuing the case, the trial court is empowered to implement probation-like supervision conditions that the defendant must adhere to." Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 16, 20; see also § 18-1.3-102(2). Such conditions are established by a stipulation between the defendant and the prosecution and "shall be similar in all respects to conditions permitted as part of probation." § 18-1.3-102(2).
¶14 Unlike the consequence of a successfully completed probation sentence, when the defendant fully complies with the conditions of the deferred judgment for the prescribed period, "the plea of guilty previously entered shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice." Id.; accord Hafelfinger v. Dist. Ct., 674 P.2d 375, 377 n.3 (Colo. 1984) (After successfully completing a deferred judgment, the defendant "would no longer be 'convicted.'"). And, unlike the consequence of a probation violation, a court generally has no discretion to continue a deferred judgment upon finding a violation of a condition regulating the defendant's conduct. Anderson, ¶ 16, 348 P.3d at 494. Instead, the court must revoke the deferred judgment and "enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty plea." § 18-1.3-102(2). When a defendant successfully appeals the revocation of his DJS and the appellate court reverses the trial court's order, thejudgment of conviction is vacated and the DJS is reinstated. People v. Anzures, 670 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Colo. App. 1983).