24CA1949 Kuretich v Smith 11-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1949 Fremont County District Court No. 24CV1013 Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge
Tyler Kuretich,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Michelle Smith,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Tyler Kuretich, Pro Se
Michelle Smith, Pro Se ¶1 Tyler Kuretich appeals the district court’s judgment in his
wrongful eviction case against Michelle Smith, on the grounds that
the court did not grant him an adequate remedy. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 At a bench trial, the court heard testimony from the parties,
both of whom appeared pro se, and made factual findings. A
transcript of the hearing is not included in the appellate record,
however.
¶3 Kuretich and Smith orally agreed that Kuretich, who needed a
place to live, could reside on Smith’s property in a camper that she
owned. In exchange, the parties agreed that Kuretich would
perform work for Smith, including property maintenance and
animal care. Smith originally allowed Kuretich to enter her home to
access water and electricity. The parties did not establish a
timeframe or end date for the arrangement. At some point, Smith
told Kuretich that he could keep the camper.
¶4 After a dispute arose between the parties, Smith asked
Kuretich to leave her property. When he refused, Smith restricted
his access to her home. Smith then sold the camper and forced
Kuretich to vacate it without notice, hoping that doing so would
1 cause him to leave her property. But Kuretich slept in his car on
Smith’s property. Kuretich finally left the property after Smith
obtained a temporary protection order against him. He then filed
this wrongful eviction case.
¶5 The court found that the parties entered an oral agreement for
a month-to-month tenancy with an uncertain end date. It
concluded that Smith “wrongfully evicted” Kuretich and ordered her
to return the camper (or its value of $1,200) to Kuretich. It also
ordered her to reimburse Kuretich for a $199 veterinary bill that he
apparently incurred while caring for her animals.
¶6 The court did not, however, award Kuretich the full amount of
damages he requested, which included $1,000,000 and a criminal
fine for Smith’s alleged stalking. He accused Smith of stalking him
because she installed security cameras on her property and
declined to provide him with copies of the security videos. The
court found that the requested damages and fine were “completely
unreasonable and without merit” and that the evidence did not
support them. (The court also rejected Kuretich’s argument that he
was entitled to $5,000 in damages based on Smith’s “outrageous
conduct,” which Kuretich does not challenge on appeal.) Smith
2 complied with the order, reimbursed Kuretich for the veterinary bill,
and relinquished ownership of the camper to Kuretich.
¶7 Kuretich then filed motions for “clarification” of the court’s
order, contending that he was entitled to (1) compensation for
various state and federal crimes and civil offenses that Smith
committed; (2) copies of the surveillance videos; and (3) possession
of Smith’s property and home. The court denied Kuretich’s
motions.
II. Analysis
¶8 On appeal, Kuretich asserts that the court erred by rejecting
his requests for relief in addition to the value of the camper and
reimbursement of the veterinary bill. He asks this court to award
him “possession of the stolen property and bedroom camper along
with restitution in the exact amount of $1,000,000.00 [and] treble
charges applied as legal relief from the crime that [Smith] and
affiliates committed and the hardship the appellant was forced to
deal with.” Kuretich further asserts that, “at the minimum,” he
should have “restoration of the premises and contents including the
bedroom camper and $1,000,000.00 monetary restitution,
3 surveillance and the arrest of all parties involved including judicial
and law enforcement.”
A. Preservation
¶9 Kuretich did not preserve his argument that he was entitled to
“the arrest of all parties involved including judicial and law
enforcement” because he did not present such argument to the
district court. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must bring
the issue to the court’s attention so the court has the opportunity to
rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570
(Colo. App. 2010); see also Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis.,
2019 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600 (“It is axiomatic that in civil
cases, issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally
will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, this
court will not address the contention. (Even if Kuretich had
preserved this argument, he fails to cite any statute authorizing a
private right of action premised on the criminal acts he alleged. See
Winninger v. Kirchner, 2021 CO 47, ¶ 34, 488 P.3d 1091, 1097
(explaining that, “absent any language authorizing a private right of
action,” a criminal statute will not support a claim in a civil action
based on the alleged violation of the statute).)
4 ¶ 10 In contrast, Kuretich preserved his requests for $1,000,000 in
damages, possession of Smith’s property, possession of the camper,
and copies of the surveillance videos.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 11 A plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the fact and the
amount of damages. Veolia Water Techs., Inc. v. Antero Treatment
LLC, 2024 COA 126, ¶ 136, 564 P.3d 1089, 1114.
¶ 12 “The trial court ‘has the sole prerogative to assess the amount
of damages, and its award will not be set aside unless it is
manifestly and clearly erroneous.’” Ute Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Fontanari, 2022 COA 125M, ¶ 52, 524 P.3d 308, 318 (quoting In re
Estate of Chavez, 2022 COA 89M, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d 194, 205). But
whether the court “misapplied the law when determining the
measure of damages presents a question of law that we review de
novo.” Id. (quoting Estate of Chavez, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d at 205).
C. Kuretich Is Not Entitled to His Requested Relief
¶ 13 In his opening brief, Kuretich cites section 38-12-510(1),
C.R.S. 2025, which provides, “It is unlawful for a landlord to remove
or exclude a tenant from a dwelling unit without resorting to court
process . . . .” The statute allows a wrongfully evicted tenant to
5 recover “statutory damages equal to the tenant’s actual damages
and the higher amount of either three times the monthly rent or five
thousand dollars, as well as any other damages, attorney fees, and
costs that may be owed.” § 38-12-510(2). It also gives the court
discretion to “order that possession be restored to a tenant who was
affected by a violation of this section.” § 38-12-510(3).
¶ 14 Kuretich fails to provide any legal basis supporting his request
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24CA1949 Kuretich v Smith 11-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1949 Fremont County District Court No. 24CV1013 Honorable Lynette M. Wenner, Judge
Tyler Kuretich,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Michelle Smith,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Tyler Kuretich, Pro Se
Michelle Smith, Pro Se ¶1 Tyler Kuretich appeals the district court’s judgment in his
wrongful eviction case against Michelle Smith, on the grounds that
the court did not grant him an adequate remedy. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 At a bench trial, the court heard testimony from the parties,
both of whom appeared pro se, and made factual findings. A
transcript of the hearing is not included in the appellate record,
however.
¶3 Kuretich and Smith orally agreed that Kuretich, who needed a
place to live, could reside on Smith’s property in a camper that she
owned. In exchange, the parties agreed that Kuretich would
perform work for Smith, including property maintenance and
animal care. Smith originally allowed Kuretich to enter her home to
access water and electricity. The parties did not establish a
timeframe or end date for the arrangement. At some point, Smith
told Kuretich that he could keep the camper.
¶4 After a dispute arose between the parties, Smith asked
Kuretich to leave her property. When he refused, Smith restricted
his access to her home. Smith then sold the camper and forced
Kuretich to vacate it without notice, hoping that doing so would
1 cause him to leave her property. But Kuretich slept in his car on
Smith’s property. Kuretich finally left the property after Smith
obtained a temporary protection order against him. He then filed
this wrongful eviction case.
¶5 The court found that the parties entered an oral agreement for
a month-to-month tenancy with an uncertain end date. It
concluded that Smith “wrongfully evicted” Kuretich and ordered her
to return the camper (or its value of $1,200) to Kuretich. It also
ordered her to reimburse Kuretich for a $199 veterinary bill that he
apparently incurred while caring for her animals.
¶6 The court did not, however, award Kuretich the full amount of
damages he requested, which included $1,000,000 and a criminal
fine for Smith’s alleged stalking. He accused Smith of stalking him
because she installed security cameras on her property and
declined to provide him with copies of the security videos. The
court found that the requested damages and fine were “completely
unreasonable and without merit” and that the evidence did not
support them. (The court also rejected Kuretich’s argument that he
was entitled to $5,000 in damages based on Smith’s “outrageous
conduct,” which Kuretich does not challenge on appeal.) Smith
2 complied with the order, reimbursed Kuretich for the veterinary bill,
and relinquished ownership of the camper to Kuretich.
¶7 Kuretich then filed motions for “clarification” of the court’s
order, contending that he was entitled to (1) compensation for
various state and federal crimes and civil offenses that Smith
committed; (2) copies of the surveillance videos; and (3) possession
of Smith’s property and home. The court denied Kuretich’s
motions.
II. Analysis
¶8 On appeal, Kuretich asserts that the court erred by rejecting
his requests for relief in addition to the value of the camper and
reimbursement of the veterinary bill. He asks this court to award
him “possession of the stolen property and bedroom camper along
with restitution in the exact amount of $1,000,000.00 [and] treble
charges applied as legal relief from the crime that [Smith] and
affiliates committed and the hardship the appellant was forced to
deal with.” Kuretich further asserts that, “at the minimum,” he
should have “restoration of the premises and contents including the
bedroom camper and $1,000,000.00 monetary restitution,
3 surveillance and the arrest of all parties involved including judicial
and law enforcement.”
A. Preservation
¶9 Kuretich did not preserve his argument that he was entitled to
“the arrest of all parties involved including judicial and law
enforcement” because he did not present such argument to the
district court. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must bring
the issue to the court’s attention so the court has the opportunity to
rule on it. Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570
(Colo. App. 2010); see also Brown v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis.,
2019 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600 (“It is axiomatic that in civil
cases, issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally
will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, this
court will not address the contention. (Even if Kuretich had
preserved this argument, he fails to cite any statute authorizing a
private right of action premised on the criminal acts he alleged. See
Winninger v. Kirchner, 2021 CO 47, ¶ 34, 488 P.3d 1091, 1097
(explaining that, “absent any language authorizing a private right of
action,” a criminal statute will not support a claim in a civil action
based on the alleged violation of the statute).)
4 ¶ 10 In contrast, Kuretich preserved his requests for $1,000,000 in
damages, possession of Smith’s property, possession of the camper,
and copies of the surveillance videos.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 11 A plaintiff bears the burden of proving both the fact and the
amount of damages. Veolia Water Techs., Inc. v. Antero Treatment
LLC, 2024 COA 126, ¶ 136, 564 P.3d 1089, 1114.
¶ 12 “The trial court ‘has the sole prerogative to assess the amount
of damages, and its award will not be set aside unless it is
manifestly and clearly erroneous.’” Ute Water Conservancy Dist. v.
Fontanari, 2022 COA 125M, ¶ 52, 524 P.3d 308, 318 (quoting In re
Estate of Chavez, 2022 COA 89M, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d 194, 205). But
whether the court “misapplied the law when determining the
measure of damages presents a question of law that we review de
novo.” Id. (quoting Estate of Chavez, ¶ 52, 520 P.3d at 205).
C. Kuretich Is Not Entitled to His Requested Relief
¶ 13 In his opening brief, Kuretich cites section 38-12-510(1),
C.R.S. 2025, which provides, “It is unlawful for a landlord to remove
or exclude a tenant from a dwelling unit without resorting to court
process . . . .” The statute allows a wrongfully evicted tenant to
5 recover “statutory damages equal to the tenant’s actual damages
and the higher amount of either three times the monthly rent or five
thousand dollars, as well as any other damages, attorney fees, and
costs that may be owed.” § 38-12-510(2). It also gives the court
discretion to “order that possession be restored to a tenant who was
affected by a violation of this section.” § 38-12-510(3).
¶ 14 Kuretich fails to provide any legal basis supporting his request
for $1,000,000 in damages. To the extent that he argues section
38-12-510(2) entitles him to such an award, he did not prove that
he incurred actual damages in that amount. See Veolia Water
Techs., ¶ 136, 564 P.3d at 1114. The court found that, apart from
the value of the camper and the amount of the veterinary bill,
Kuretich presented “no evidence of any other actual costs owed.”
¶ 15 Because the record does not contain a transcript of the bench
trial, we presume that the court’s findings and conclusions are
supported by the evidence. See Love v. Klosky, 2016 COA 131,
¶ 18, 417 P.3d 862, 864, aff’d, 2018 CO 20, 413 P.3d 1267; see
also People in Interest of I.S., 2017 COA 155, ¶ 11, 415 P.3d 869,
871 (“Where the record is silent the law presumes regularity.”
(quoting McClain v. People, 141 P.2d 685, 686 (Colo. 1943))).
6 ¶ 16 Although section 38-12-510(3) gives a court discretion to order
restoration of a tenant’s possession of the premises from which the
tenant was wrongfully evicted, Kuretich fails to assert any legal
basis for possession of Smith’s property and home. Further, the
court found, “This tenancy was very short in duration and after
such an escalation and exchange of words, regardless of blame, it is
not surprising that [Smith] wanted to end this landlord/tenant
relationship.” The exhibits from the bench trial support the court’s
finding and underlying determination that any restoration of the
previously agreed-upon living arrangement would be inappropriate
under the circumstances. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the
court’s decision not to award Kuretich possession of Smith’s
property or residence.
¶ 17 Kuretich next asks this court to award him “possession of the
bedroom camper.” But the district court already granted Kuretich
this remedy. Moreover, Kuretich appended to one of his “motions to
clarify” a copy of a bill of sale transferring ownership of the camper
from Smith to Kuretich, indicating that Smith complied with the
court’s transfer order. Thus, the record establishes that Kuretich’s
claim for possession of the camper is moot. See DePriest v. People,
7 2021 CO 40, ¶ 8, 487 P.3d 658, 662 (“When an actual controversy
no longer exists, an issue becomes moot because any relief granted
by the court would have no practical effect.”).
¶ 18 Finally, Kuretich did not plead and has not established a
possessory right to the surveillance videos. See Woo v. Baez, 2022
COA 113, ¶ 22, 522 P.3d 739, 747 (Replevin — a “possessory action
in which a claimant seeks to recover both possession of personal
property that has been wrongfully taken or detained and damages
for its unlawful detention” — requires that a plaintiff prove the
“basic element[]” of “the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession.”
(citation omitted)); C.R.C.P. 104. To the extent Kuretich argues that
the videos provide evidence of stalking or any other criminal
offense, Kuretich may contact the district attorney regarding
prosecuting Smith’s alleged crimes. See Kailey v. Chambers, 261
P.3d 792, 798 (Colo. App. 2011) (“[I]n American jurisprudence at
least, a private citizen [ordinarily] lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” (quoting
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973))).
III. Disposition
¶ 19 The judgment is affirmed.
8 JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.