Matter of King

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 23, 2025
• Docket: 25CA0691
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0691 Matter of King 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0691 Arapahoe County District Court No. 25CV77 Honorable Benjamin Todd Figa, Judge

In the Matter of Tyler Hunter King,

Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Dunn and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 23, 2025

The Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Emily L. Olson, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 Petitioner, Tyler Hunter King, appeals the district court’s order

denying his petition for change of name under section 13-15-101,

C.R.S. 2025. We reverse.

I. Background

¶2 King petitioned the district court to change his middle and last

names. The petition included, in relevant part, fingerprint-based

criminal history checks from the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) and the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI).1 The FBI

criminal history listed a sealed 2019 criminal case showing four

sexual assault felony charges. The report reflected that three of the

felony charges were dismissed, and the fourth felony charge,

attempted sexual assault on a child, was deferred and dismissed.

The report also listed twelve sets of “sex offender registration[s],” all

of which were in Colorado. The CBI criminal history stated that no

record existed for King.

1 As required under section 13-15-101(1)(a) and (1.5), C.R.S. 2025,

King’s petition also included his full name, his desired new name, a concise statement of the reason for the name change (“personal preference along with avoiding confusion with someone else with [his] name and date of birth”), and proof of publication of public notice of the petition.

1 ¶3 Four days after King filed his petition, the district court denied

it based on the FBI criminal history report:

Given the results of fingerprint submission to the [FBI], the Court cannot make findings that (I) the name change is not for the purpose of fraud, to avoid the consequences of a criminal conviction, or to facilitate a criminal activity; and (II) the desired name change would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other person. C.R.S. § 13-15-101(3)(d).

King now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶4 King contends that the district court erred by (1) improperly

invoking a provision of the statute that applies only to petitioners

with felony convictions and (2) failing to conduct an evidentiary

hearing. We agree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 A person desiring to change their name under section

13-15-101 must submit to a district or county court a petition that

includes, among other items, fingerprint-based criminal history

checks from the FBI and CBI. § 13-15-101(1)(a)(II), (b), (c). These

criminal histories “shall include arrests, conviction records, [and]

any criminal dispositions.” § 13-15-101(1)(b).

2 ¶6 Generally, a court cannot grant a petition for a name change if

the criminal histories show the petitioner was convicted of a felony.

§ 13-15-101(2)(b). Yet section 13-15-101(2)(b) states that if a

criminal history check reflects a criminal charge without a

disposition, then a court may grant a name change if the petitioner

affirms that they have not been convicted of a felony.

¶7 Furthermore, section 13-15-101(3) contains an exception

permitting a court to grant a petition from a petitioner with felony

convictions “if the court finds that the petitioner must have a legal

name change in order for the [D]epartment of [R]evenue to issue a

driver’s license or identification card.” Before granting a petition

under this exception, the district court must find that the name

change is “not for the purpose of fraud, to avoid the consequences

of a criminal conviction, or to facilitate a criminal activity” and “[t]he

desired name change would be proper and not detrimental to the

interests of any other person.” § 13-15-101(3)(d)(I)-(II).

¶8 We review a court’s decision to deny a petition for a name

change for abuse of discretion. See § 13-15-101(2)(a) (stating the

court “shall order the name change . . . if the court is satisfied” that

the change would be proper and not detrimental to others

3 (emphasis added)); In re Knight, 537 P.2d 1085, 1086 (Colo. App.

1975) (“While a court has wide discretion in matters of [petitions for

name changes], it should not deny the application for a change of

name as being improper unless special circumstances or facts are

found to exist.”). Likewise, a decision not to hold an evidentiary

hearing on a name change petition is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. See § 13-15-101(2)(b); Sharma v. Vigil, 967 P.2d 197,

198 (Colo. App. 1998). “A court abuses its discretion when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based

on a misapprehension or misapplication of the law.” Air Sols., Inc.

v. Spivey, 2023 COA 14, ¶ 50.

¶9 To the extent our review for an abuse of discretion involves a

district court’s application of section 13-15-101, we must strictly

construe the statute because it operates in derogation of the

common law. See Water, Waste & Land, Inc. v. Lanham, 955 P.2d

997, 1003 (Colo. 1998); Knight, 537 P.2d at 1086 (“At common law,

a person could adopt another name at will.”). We review de novo

any questions of statutory interpretation. Roane v. Elizabeth Sch.

Dist., 2024 COA 59, ¶ 23.

4 B. The District Court Erred by Denying the Petition

¶ 10 Here, the district court’s order relied solely on the fraud,

crime, and impropriety language from section 13-15-101(3)(d). But

applying subsection (3) requires the court to first find that the

petitioner was previously convicted of a felony, and no such

conviction is reflected in this record.

¶ 11 King’s FBI criminal history only lists one charge that wasn’t

dismissed outright — the deferred judgment for attempted sexual

assault. That count’s disposition wasn’t a conviction though; it was

“deferred and dismissed.” The court files from that case confirm

that King received a deferred sentence for the charge, the conditions

for the deferred judgment were satisfied, his plea was withdrawn,

and the charge was dismissed. See People in Interest of I.S., 2017

COA 155, ¶ 7 (holding that a court may take judicial notice of court

records in a related proceeding).

¶ 12 As a result, King was not convicted in that case.

See § 18-1.3-102(1)(a), (2), C.R.S. 2025; DePriest v. People, 2021 CO

40, ¶ 13 (“A [deferred judgment] is not a conviction[,] and it is not a

sentence.”); McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶¶ 13-14 (noting that a

defendant who has successfully completed a deferred judgment is

5 not convicted). The absence of any criminal record in the CBI

criminal history further supports the conclusion that King was not

convicted of a felony.2

¶ 13 Therefore, the district court erred by misapplying the statute

because there is no support in the record justifying the court’s

apparent reliance on subsection (3). See Spivey, ¶ 50. Instead, the

district court should have applied subsection (2), which requires

that the court “shall order the name change to be made and spread

upon the records of the court in proper form if the court is satisfied

that the desired change would be proper and not detrimental to the

interests of any other person.” § 13-15-101(2)(a).

¶ 14 We recognize that even if the district court applied

subsection (2) without identifying it, the court may have based its

ruling on the additional “charges” in King’s FBI criminal history for

2 We also note that, even if King had a felony conviction, the district

court did not explain why it applied subsection (3)(d) when nothing in the record shows that King met the criterion under subsection (3) for needing a name change “in order for the [D]epartment of [R]evenue to issue a driver’s license or identification card.” § 13-15-101(3).

6 “sex offender registration[s].”3 Even so, section 13-15-101(2)(b)

states that if a criminal history “reflects a criminal charge for which

there is no disposition shown,” then “the court may grant the name

change” upon the petitioner affirming in court, or stating in a

signed affidavit, that they have “not been convicted of a felony in

this state or any other state or under federal law.” Consequently,

the language of the statute indicates that King should have had an

opportunity to affirm that the charges didn’t result in felony

convictions when a charge was missing a disposition.

¶ 15 Another division of this court has reached the same

conclusion, observing that case law interpreting the statute favors

granting a name change, and a name change petition should

“generally . . . be granted unless made for a wrongful or fraudulent

purpose.” Knight, 537 P.2d at 1086; see also Lanham, 955 P.2d at

3 The FBI records listed the twelve sex offender registration charges

under various “arresting agenc[ies]” around metro Denver. As best we can discern from the report and the case file, these likely reflect the dates when King registered as a sex offender with those agencies as required by the conditions of his deferred judgment rather than being additional charges. But even if they were criminal charges within the meaning of section 13-15-101(2)(b), they are not listed as felony convictions. Regardless, to the extent there are factual uncertainties on this record, they should be resolved by the district court.

7 1003 (strictly construing statute in derogation of the common law).

The division went on to hold that “[b]efore a court denies a request

for a change of name under the statute, it should conduct an

evidentiary hearing to determine if good and sufficient cause exists

to deny the [petition].” Knight, 537 P.2d at 1086.

¶ 16 True, the district court has discretion whether to hold a

hearing in connection with a name change petition. But the statute

certainly contemplates that, before ruling on the petition, the court

will resolve the status of any charges for which there are no

dispositions. See § 13-15-101(2)(b) (If the criminal history check

reflects a criminal charge with no shown disposition, “the court may

grant the name change after affirmation in open court by the

petitioner, or submission of a signed affidavit by the petitioner,

stating he or she has not been convicted of a felony in this state or

any other state or under federal law.”).

¶ 17 In his verified petition, King swore under oath that he had “not

been convicted of a felony or adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for

an offense that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult

in this state or any other state or under federal law.” And nothing

in the record disputes his statement. To the extent the court

8 believed it had good grounds to depart from King’s statement in his

verified petition, its ruling didn’t explain those grounds for us to

review. Cf. Morris v. Belfor USA Grp., Inc., 201 P.3d 1253, 1263

(Colo. App. 2008) (“The [district] court must include in its order

findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to enable [us] to

understand the basis of its order and to determine whether the

[district] court abused its discretion.”).

¶ 18 Therefore, we conclude that the district court abused its

discretion by denying the petition. If it had a question about the

sex offender registration “charges” in the report — particularly in

light of King’s sworn statement that he hadn’t been convicted of a

felony — it should have given King an opportunity to be heard or

present evidence to resolve the question. Cf. Knight, 537 P.2d at

1086 (reversing district court’s denial of petition for name change

because “some substantial reason must exist for denying [a]

petition” and “none appear[ed] in the record”). And as noted above,

to the extent the court denied the petition based on the deferred

judgment in the report, it misapplied the law.

9 III. Disposition

¶ 19 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district

court should make appropriate findings to enable any further

appellate review. See Argo v. Hemphill, 2022 COA 104, ¶ 52.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.