Peo in Interest of CWL

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1526
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1526 Peo in Interest of CWL 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1526 Delta County District Court No. 24JV30005 Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner,

In the Interest of C.W.L., a Child-Appellant,

and Concerning G.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT VACATED

Division II Opinion by JUDGE LUM Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 27, 2025

No Appearance for Petitioner

Debra W. Dodd, Counsel for Youth, Berthoud, Colorado, for C.W.L.

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant G.L. ¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, C.W.L. (the youth) and

G.L. (father) appeal the judgment adjudicating the youth dependent

and neglected. The Department did not file any briefing in this

appeal. We vacate the judgment and, because the juvenile court

has dismissed the dependency and neglect action, we decline to

remand this case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The Delta County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect, alleging that M.L. (mother) left

the youth, then sixteen years old, in a home with substance use

concerns. Father resided in Texas and made plans to come to

Colorado to get the youth but was directed by the Department

caseworker to “hold off.” At the shelter hearing, the caseworker

testified that the Department did not have safety concerns about

father and was not aware of any restriction on father’s family time

with the youth. Nonetheless, the Department requested temporary

custody of the youth because father and the youth did “not have a

well-established relationship.” The juvenile court granted

temporary custody of the youth to the Department for placement in

foster care.

1 ¶3 Beginning with the shelter hearing and at every hearing after,

the youth, father, and mother asked for the youth to be placed with

father in Texas.

¶4 Father denied the allegations in the petition and both father

and the youth requested an adjudicatory jury trial. The

Department moved for summary judgment.

¶5 Three months after the petition was filed, father took the

youth to his home in Texas, where the youth remained throughout

the rest of the dependency and neglect action. The Department

supported this arrangement.

¶6 Approximately one week after the youth began living with

father in Texas, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion

for summary judgment and adjudicated the youth under section

19-3-102(1)(e), C.R.S. 2024. Father and the youth appeal the

adjudication.

II. The Appeal is Not Moot

¶7 We take judicial notice that the juvenile court dismissed the

dependency and neglect action five months after adjudicating the

youth, while this appeal was pending. See People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d

51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004) (an appellate court may take judicial notice

2 of the contents of court records). The court’s order reflects that, at

that time, the youth was still residing with father in Texas and there

were no safety concerns.

¶8 “Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we have

jurisdiction to hear an appeal,” we may raise potential jurisdictional

defects — such as mootness — sua sponte. People v. S.X.G., 2012

CO 5, ¶ 9. A case is moot “only if it is shown that there is no

possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed”

on the basis of the challenged ruling. DePriest v. People, 2021 CO

40, ¶ 9 (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968))

(describing collateral consequences doctrine); see People in Interest

of C.G., 2015 COA 106, ¶¶ 23-30 (applying collateral consequences

doctrine to dependency and neglect proceeding).

¶9 The adjudication of a child as dependent and neglected carries

the possibility of ongoing collateral legal consequences. For

instance, in a future dependency and neglect action, the

adjudication of one child can be considered by a juvenile court

when determining if another child is dependent or neglected and

when determining fitness under the termination criteria. § 19-3-

604(2)(l), C.R.S. 2024; see also People in Interest of S.N., 2014 COA

3 116, ¶ 18 (holding that evidence of a parent’s past treatment of

other children may be considered to determine “whether it is likely

or expected that a parent will fail to provide proper care for another

child”).

¶ 10 Additionally, an adjudicatory order decreeing a child

dependent and neglected overcomes the presumption, established

in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000), that a parent is

acting or will act in the child’s best interests. People in Interest of

N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶¶ 30-31. Because the court dismissed this

case without assessing father’s fitness or allocating parenting time,

there is at least a risk that the adjudication will deprive father of

the benefit of the Troxel presumption in a future proceeding

allocating parental responsibilities.

III. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 11 Generally, whether a youth is dependent or neglected presents

a mixed question of fact and law because it requires the application

of the statute to evidentiary facts. People in Interest of S.N. v. S.N.,

2014 CO 64, ¶ 21. A youth is dependent and neglected if, as

pertinent here, the youth “is homeless, without proper care, or not

4 domiciled with his or her parent . . . through no fault of such

parent.” § 19-3-102(1)(e).

¶ 12 The Children’s Code does not define “domicile.” But Colorado

case law has established a specific meaning for the term “domicile”:

a place where a person intends to reside permanently. Carlson v.

Dist. Ct., 180 P.2d 525, 529 (Colo. 1947); Potter v. State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co., 996 P.2d 781, 783-84 (Colo. App. 2000). A child’s

domicile has long been understood to be that of the parent with

whom he or she lives. Scheer v. Dist. Ct., 363 P.2d 1059, 1060-61

(Colo. 1961); Lyons v. Egan, 132 P.2d 794, 798 (Colo. 1942).

¶ 13 An adjudication of dependency and neglect must be based on

existing circumstances relating to the child’s status at the time of

adjudication. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192

(Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 14 Summary judgment is available in dependency and neglect

cases, but it is a drastic remedy and is only appropriate when there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. S.N. v. S.N., ¶ 15; see also

C.R.C.P. 56(c). A court must give the nonmoving party all favorable

inferences that can be drawn from the record. S.N. v. S.N., ¶ 16.

5 Even if the material facts are undisputed, summary judgment is

only appropriate if “reasonable minds could draw but one inference

from them.” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting Gibbons v. Ludlow, 2013 CO 49,

¶¶ 13, 35).

¶ 15 We review a juvenile court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. People in Interest of M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 11.

IV. Analysis

¶ 16 The juvenile court found that the youth, mother, and father all

admitted that the youth was not living with either parent at the

time of the shelter hearing. The court also found that, as of the

time of the summary judgment ruling, it was “beyond dispute that

[the youth] has been residing in a foster home since the shelter

hearing until last week” when he joined father in Texas. The

juvenile court concluded that the youth “was not and is not

domiciled with either parent and summary judgment on that

ground is appropriate here.”

¶ 17 Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the youth

and father, we conclude that summary judgment was not

appropriate and that the juvenile court erred by adjudicating the

youth dependent and neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(e).

6 ¶ 18 Although it is undisputed that the youth was not living with

either parent at the time of the shelter hearing, it is also undisputed

that, by the time the juvenile court entered the adjudication, the

youth was living with father in Texas. See Scheer, 363 P.2d at

1060-61 (a minor’s domicile is that of the parent with whom he

lives). Moreover, the record reflected that the youth wished to

reside with father permanently. See Potter, 996 P.2d at 783 (a

domicile is that place where a person intends to reside

permanently). Thus, at the very least, there remained genuine

issues of material fact that prevented the court from determining as

a matter of law that the youth was not domiciled with father as of

the date of adjudication. See People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39,

¶ 38 (noting that adjudications relate to “the status of the child as

of the date of the adjudication” (quoting K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d

695, 699 (Colo. 2006))) (emphasis omitted).

V. Other Issues

¶ 19 Because we reverse the summary judgment, we need not

address the youth’s other contentions, including that the

Department submitted improper affidavits with its motion for

summary judgment.

7 VI. Disposition

¶ 20 The judgment adjudicating the youth dependent and neglected

as to father and the subsequent dispositional order are vacated.

See People in Interest of U.S., 121 P.3d 326, 327 (Colo. App. 2005)

(“[A]n order adjudicating a child dependent and neglected is

necessary to vest the court with dispositional remedies.”).

¶ 21 Because the dependency and neglect action has been

dismissed, we decline to remand the matter to the juvenile court for

further proceedings.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.