OPINION
MATTHEWS, Justice.
This case arises out of a contract dispute between the Native Village of Stevens (Stevens Village) and Alaska Management & Planning (AMP). A jury returned a verdict for AMP, finding that Stevens Village had [33]*33breached the contract. On appeal, Stevens Village raises three grounds on which it believes the verdict should be set aside. First, it claims that this suit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Second, it contends that the contract violated government procurement regulations and was therefore unenforceable. Finally, it contends that the contract was a personal service contract containing no definite term of duration and was therefore terminable at the will of either party. We conclude that Stevens Village does not have sovereign immunity. We further conclude that the second ground Stevens Village raises is meritorious. However, AMP is nonetheless entitled to a quantum meruit recovery. Because we find the contract unenforceable we do not reach the third ground raised by Stevens Village. We therefore reverse and remand for a retrial on the issue of damages.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
Stevens Village is an Alaska Native village organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 et seq. (1982), located on the Yukon River in Interior Alaska. In 1982, Stevens Village received a federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grant for $369,000 to be used to bring electricity to the village. The Tanana Chiefs Conference, Inc.1 (TCC) assisted Stevens Village in obtaining the HUD grant and hiring an engineering and management firm (Marks Engineering) to manage the electrification project.
AMP is a joint venture specializing in Alaskan bush village and community development projects. AMP is owned and operated by David Slaby and James Nims. On March 31, 1983, Stevens Village entered into a contract with AMP pursuant to which AMP would perform “planning and management services, and be established as Architect and Engineer of record for the community of Stevens Village.” AMP was also to provide such services as grant writing, construction administration, budgeting, and construction progress evaluation. In May, 1983, the parties amended the agreement. AMP agreed to provide construction administration, expediting, engineering, and construction services on the electrification project in place of Marks Engineering. Under the original contract, AMP was to be compensated at seven percent of construction costs plus five percent of total costs for financial management services. Under the amendment to the agreement, relating solely to the electrification project, AMP was to receive $35 per hour plus expenses.
By letter dated December 2, 1983, Stevens Village terminated the contract with AMP. Stevens Village claims that HUD and the state had found problems with the electrification project’s administration and the Village’s relationship to AMP. Stevens Village also asserts that AMP failed to provide a status report requested by state officials and that it fired AMP for failing to perform its contractual obligations. AMP, on the other hand, claims that it was fired because Stevens Village learned it could get the same services free from TCC or the federal Public Health Service.
B. Procedural Background
AMP brought suit against Stevens Village for breach of contract. Stevens Village moved to dismiss on the ground that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The trial court denied this motion, concluding that the sovereign immunity defense did not exist on the facts of this case and that, in any event, any immunity had been waived. The court granted AMP’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that a valid contract existed between the parties. It also denied Stevens Village’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the argument that because the agreement was one for personal services which contained no definite period of duration, it was either missing an essential term so that no con[34]*34tract was formed or it was terminable at the will of either party.
Stevens Village’s petition to this court for review of the above rulings was denied.
Stevens Village later moved to dismiss AMP’s claim on the ground that the contract was unenforceable because it was in violation of federal and state procurement regulations. The trial court denied this motion as well.
After trial, the jury returned a verdict for AMP, awarding it $38,891.00.
II. DISCUSSION
A. This Suit is not Barred by the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
1. Summary
American Indian tribes outside of Alaska have long been recognized as sovereign governmental entities immune from suit. See, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 891-92, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313-14, 90 L.Ed.2d 881, 894 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 115 (1978); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13, 60 S.Ct. 653, 656, 84 L.Ed. 894, 898-99 (1940).
The United States Supreme Court Court has reemphasized the importance of the doctrine:
The common law sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US 49, 56 L Ed 2d 106, 98 S Ct 1670 (1978). Of course, because of the particular “quasi-sovereign” status of the Indian tribes, the Tribe’s immunity is not congruent with that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 US 506, 513, 84 L Ed 894, 60 S Ct 653 [656] (1940). Cf. also McClananhan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, supra [411 U.S. 164] 173, 36 L Ed 2d 129, 93 S Ct 1257 [1263]. And this aspect of tribal sovereignty, like all others, is subject to plenary federal control and definition. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, [436 U.S.] at 58, 56 L Ed 2d 106, 98 S Ct 1670 [at 1676]. Nonetheless, in the absence of federal authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty, is privileged from diminution by the States.
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 890-91, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313, 90 L.Ed.2d 881, 894 (1986).
We conclude that Stevens Village does not have sovereign immunity because it, like most native groups in Alaska, is not self-governing or in any meaningful sense sovereign. This conclusion is supported by the decisions of this court, Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977) and Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reservation v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961). Further, the history of the relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives up to the passage of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936) indicates that Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereigns. Finally, neither the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, nor subsequent Congressional acts have signaled a change from non-sovereign to sovereign status.
2. Alaska Supreme Court Cases
We addressed the question of sovereign immunity in Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977). We noted that:
the tribal sovereignty of Indians was first recognized in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557, 8 L.Ed. 483, 499 (1832), in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that the Indian nations were distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
569 P.2d at 157. After a review of many authorities, we concluded that judicial recognition of tribal sovereign immunity turned on whether Congress, or the executive branch of the federal government, had [35]*35recognized the particular group in question as a tribe. 569 P.2d at 161-63.
In Atkinson we held that the Metlakat-lans, located on the Annette Island Reservation, possessed tribal sovereign immunity. We noted that “[t]he interactions of the United States government and the Alaska Native peoples as a whole have been much different from those between the government and the tribes in the other states.” Id. at 154. We observed that a general reservation system was never developed in Alaska and the federal government never attempted to enter into treaties with Alaska Natives. Id. However, we stated that the Metlakatlans were “an exception to the exception,” id., in that Congress had set up a reservation for them.2 “The Metlakatlans’ reservation status sets them apart from other Alaska Natives, making them much more like the tribes of the other states.” Id. at 154-55 (footnote omitted). Further, we noted that the Met-lakatlans have “a strong central tribal organization unlike most Alaska Native groups.” Id. at 155. We noted that in general, “[t]he Native villages and communities of Alaska were not organized on ‘tribal’ lines, and the village rather than the ethnological tribe has been the central unit of organization.” Id. at 155 n. 12.
We concluded our historical discussion in Atkinson as follows:
Thus, based on the foregoing, we conclude that the reservation status of the Metlakatla Indian Community sets them apart from other Alaska Natives and that the status of the Metlakatla Indian Community has always more closely resembled the status of the tribes in other states than the status of other Natives in Alaska.
569 P.2d at 156. Our emphasis on the differences between the Metlakatlans and the other Alaska Native groups suggests that other Alaska Native groups would not be afforded sovereign immunity.
In Metlakatla Indian Community, Annette Island Reserve v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961), rev’d in part, 369 U.S. 45, 82 S.Ct. 552, 7 L.Ed.2d 562 (1962), we had occasion to review in detail the historical relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives. The issue in Metlakatla was whether regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior authorizing fish traps operated by the Indian communities of Metlakatla, Kake, and Angoon were valid. Alaska state law prohibited fish traps. We held that the Secretarial regulations were invalid as to all three communities.3
Our opinion made the following points which are germane to the present case. “The United States has never entered into any treaty or similar type agreement with any group of Indians in Alaska.” Id. at 917. “None of the Indians of appellant communities have ever been exempt from taxation by the Territory or State of Alaska.” Id. at 919. “Crimes committed by Indians in Alaska have always been punished by the territorial and state courts.” Id. at 920. “There is not now and never has been an area of Alaska recognized as Indian country with one possible exception.” Id.4 “There are not now and never have been tribes of Indians in Alaska as [36]*36that term is used in federal Indian law.” Id. at 917-18. “No Indian tribe, independent nation or power has been recognized in Alaska.” Id. at 920.5
As noted, Metlakatla was reversed by the Supreme Court as to the community of Metlakatla and affirmed as to the communities of Kake and Angoon. Thus, the statement in Metlakatla that no tribes have been recognized in Alaska was inaccurate because the Metlakatlans have received Congressional recognition. In all other respects, however, the legal conclusions in Metlakatla are accurate.6
[37]*373. The history of the relationship between the United States Government and Alaska Natives, until the passage of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act in 1936, indicates that Congress intended that most Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereigns.
Federal-Native relationships were examined in detail by a task force appointed to study the subject by the Governor of Alaska. The task force issued a report of impressive scholarship.7 The conclusion of the Report, for the period from the Alaska purchase until passage of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act,8 is as follows:
The language of federal statutes applicable to Alaska, their interpretation by the Courts and their administration and enforcement by the army, the navy, the Secretary of the Interior, and the territorial legislature, and the contemporaneous views of the most knowledgeable Native then living in Alaska indicate that between 1867 and 1936 Congress intended Alaska Natives to be subject to federal and territorial laws generally applicable to all Alaska residents.
Report, supra, note 7, at 100 (footnote omitted).
The events set out in the report which support the conclusion that Congress intended that Alaska Native groups not be treated as sovereign include the following.
First. Soon after the Treaty of Cession, the United States District Court concluded that Alaska was not “Indian country” and thus the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834 did not apply in Alaska. United States v. Seveloff, 1 Alaska Fed. 64 (D.Ore.1872). The court concluded:
If Congress should think it desirable that this or any other provision of the Indian Intercourse Act should be in force in Alaska, it can so provide....
In 1873, Congress responded to the Seve-loff decision in a limited fashion. It extended only the sections of the Intercourse Act9 dealing with alcohol control. This implies that Congress did not intend the comprehensive protection which the Act was meant to afford to Indians to apply in Alaska.
That was the holding of Waters v. Campbell, 1 Alaska Fed. 91 (D.Ore.1876), where the section of the Indian Intercourse Act requiring white traders doing business in Indian country to obtain a federal license was found not to apply in Alaska. Similarly, the court stated in Kie v. United States, 1 Alaska Fed. 125 (D.Ore.1886) with respect to the 1873 amendment: “[t]his legislation, in my judgment, by at least a reasonable, if not a necessary, implication, is equivalent to a declaration that Alaska is not to be considered ‘Indian country,’....” And in In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327, 328 (D.Alaska 1886), the court stated regarding the amendment: “The presumption is clear that by singling out, mentioning, and extending two sections only, the intention was to withhold or exclude from the territory all the other sections of the act.”
Second. In 1884, Congress enacted the Alaska Organic Act, establishing for the first time a civil government for the District of Alaska. 23 Stat. 24 (1884). The Organic Act, with unusual economy, enacted an entire criminal and civil code for Alaska by adopting the laws of Oregon.10 The Report notes:
Nothing in the language of the 1884 Act or its legislative history indicates that Congress intended any area of Alaska to be Indian country or that Alaska Natives in Native villages would not be subject to the civil and criminal laws of Oregon to [38]*38the same extent as the white residents of the District.
Report, supra note 7, at 77.
Alaska Natives were held subject to the general civil and criminal laws of Oregon under the Organic Act, even though Alaska’s second governor recommended in his report to Congress that the Act be amended so that Natives would be exempt from its provisions.11 In Kie v. United States, 1 Alaska Fed. 125 (1886), a Tlingit Indian who had killed his wife in a Tlingit village was held properly subject to prosecution under a provision of the Oregon Criminal Code which was applicable in Alaska rather than under the Federal Indian Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362 (1885) which was applicable to homicides committed by one Indian against another Indian in Indian country.
In In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (1886), a person who was a slave under Tlingit custom filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that his subjugation was illegal. His Tlingit master argued: “[T]hat Alaska is Indian country, and that they as inhabitants are subject to no law, save the usages and customs of Indians.” Id. at 328. The court concluded that Alaska was not Indian country, except for the purpose of control of alcoholic beverages, and that the rule of Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), that the District Court of Dakota Territory lacked jurisdiction to try an Indian who had murdered another Indian because he was subject to the tribal law, did not apply to Alaska Indians:
The United States has at no time recognized any tribal independence or relations among these Indians, has never treated with them in any capacity, but from every Act of Congress in relation to the people of this territory it is clearly inferable that they have been and now are regarded as dependent subjects, amenable to the penal laws of the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction of its courts....
Id.
Third. In 1899, Congress enacted a detailed criminal code12 superseding the criminal laws of Oregon which had been adopted for Alaska by reference in the Organic Act of 1884. In enacting local legislation such as this, “the national government ... acts as the state governments act within their several limits in administering the ordinary rights of person and property.” In re Dana, 68 Fed. 886, 899-900 (D.C.N.Y.1895); United States v. Doo-Noch-Keen, 2 Alaska 624, 626 (1905); Report, supra note 7, at 88-89. Either the Indian Major Crimes Act,13 or tribal law, depending on the nature of the crime, and not the 1899 Alaska Criminal Code would apply to Natives within Native villages if Native villages were sovereign or located in “Indian country.” However, Congress enacted a statute in 190914 which made it quite clear that the 1899 Criminal Code was to be applicable.
The 1909 Act empowered the Attorney General of the United States to appoint “any person employed in the Alaska School Service” as a special peace officer with authority “to arrest ... any Native of the District of Alaska charged with the violation of any provisions of the [1899] Criminal Code of Alaska.” The only schools under the jurisdiction of the Alaska School Service were Native schools in Native villages. Report, supra note 7, at 89. “Therefore, it is obvious that Congress considered the criminal code of Alaska to be applicable to Indians not living in white communities.” United States v. Booth, 161 F.Supp. 269 (Alaska 1958).
Fourth.
In 1900 the Congress replaced the Oregon Civil Code with a detailed Alaska Civil Code. 31 Stat. 321 (1900). Like the 1899 Alaska Criminal Code, nothing in the legislative history of the 1900 Alaska Civil Code indicates that the Congress [39]*39intended to exempt Alaska Natives living in Native villages from the purview of the Civil Code.
Report, supra note 7, at 90 (footnote integrated into text).
Fifth.
In 1912, some 45 years after first asserting jurisdiction over Alaska, Congress established a territorial legislature to which it delegated a significant segment of its criminal and civil jurisdiction over the territory.141 Section 9 of the 1912 Act extended the legislative power of the territorial legislature “to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Section 9 then specifically ex.-empted a list of subjects from the legislature’s criminal and civil jurisdiction.142 Alaska Natives and Native villages were not included on the list and there is no evidence in the legislative history of the 1912 Act that Congress intended to limit the territorial legislature’s civil and criminal jurisdiction over Alaska Natives living in Native villages.
Report, supra note 7, at 90-91.
The territorial legislature did enact laws governing Alaska Natives living in Native villages. “One of the 1913 Legislature’s first enactments was a statute which compelled Native children to attend Bureau of Education Schools and established the failure of a Native parent to send his or her child to school as a criminal offense.”15 The second territorial legislature in 1915 enacted a law authorizing Alaska Natives living in Native villages with forty or more residents to establish “a self-governing village organization for the purpose of governing certain local affairs_” Ch. 11, § 1, SLA 1915. According to the Report:
The 1915 Act is a contemporaneous expression of the territorial legislature’s understanding that Congress had delegated the legislature’s civil jurisdiction over the internal form and powers of self-government in Native villages and that the area within and surrounding such villages was not Indian country.
Report, supra note 7, at 94. Further, the territorial legislature levied and collected taxes from Alaska Natives living in Native villages to the same extent that it levied and collected taxes from other residents. E.g., Ch. 29, § 1, SLA 1919; Report, supra note 7, at 97. Where Indians have sovereign powers, states and territories lack jurisdiction to tax them. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 406 (1982); Report, supra note 7, at 97.
4. Neither the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act of 1936 nor subsequent Congressional legislation has granted or recognized sovereign status to Alaska Native groups.
The Indian Reorganization Act16 (IRA) was designed to encourage Indians to “revitalize their self-government through the adoption of constitutions and bylaws and through the creation of chartered corporations, with power to conduct the business and economic affairs of the tribe.” Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1272, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 121 (1973). Section 16 of the IRA empowers an Indian tribe, “or tribes residing on the same reservation” to adopt a constitution and by-laws subject to approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 476. Section 17 authorized the Secretary to issue charters of incorporation to tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 477.
When the IRA was initially passed in 1934, section 16 but not section 17 was applicable to Alaska. Since section 16 was limited to a tribe or tribes residing on a reservation and Alaska had few reservations, its applicability was quite limited.17 This was changed by the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), which in section 1 extended section 17 and some other sections of the IRA to Alaska with the following proviso:
PROVIDED, That groups of Indians in Alaska not recognized prior to May 1, 1936 as bands or tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined [40]*40neighborhood, community or rural district, may organize to adopt constitutions and by-laws and to receive charters of incorporation and federal loans under §§ 10, 16, and 17 ... of the [IRA],
Section 2 of the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to designate Indian reservations in Alaska and to withdraw public lands “actually occupied by Indians or Eskimos” for that purpose.
The proviso language of section 1 of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act “assumed that Alaska Natives were not members of federally recognized Indian tribes_” Report, supra note 7, at 110-ll.18 It was thus an express Congressional statement applicable to most Native groups in Alaska that they had not been recognized as tribes.
The more controversial section 2 of the Act, which empowered the Secretary to create reservations in Alaska, was regarded by the Interior Department as necessary to protect economic rights of Alaska Natives. Report, supra note 7, at 109, 111. Reservations were also thought to be a necessary precondition to native communities’ exercising local government powers under section 16 of the IRA. As Secretary Ickes stated in his letter to the House Committee on Indian Affairs accompanying the Bill: “[I]f native communities of Alaska are to set up systems of local government, it will be necessary to stipulate the geographical limits of their jurisdictions. Reservations set up by the Secretary of the Interior will accomplish this.”19
Stevens Village does not have a reservation and, insofar as the record shows, never had one. It was organized under section 16 of the IRA and the proviso of section 1 of the Alaska IRA. However, consistent with the legislative history of the Alaska IRA, the constitution of Stevens Village does not give it general police power — the power to keep order — except on “any reserve set aside by the federal government for the village.”20 Withholding the general police power was accomplished under Interior Department instructions which stated in part: “The power to prescribe ordinances for civil government, relating particularly to law and order, may extend only to such lands as may be held as an Indian reservation for the use of the community. ...”21
Since Stevens Village was never granted a reservation, the power of local government has never been extended to it. In our view, the mere approval of a section 16 constitution for Stevens Village by the Secretary of the Interior, which itself withholds the power of local government to the Village, does not suffice to afford the Village tribal status for the purpose of application of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
In summary, the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act is important for two reasons. First, it expressly states that Native groups in Alaska have not been accorded tribal recognition. Second, it sets forth a means by which Native groups might achieve self-governing status. However, in [41]*41the case of Stevens Village that status was not achieved.22
We see nothing in legislation passed subsequent to the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act which constitutes a recognition of tribal sovereign authority. To the contrary, passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)23 evidences Congress’s intent that non-reservation villages be largely subject to state law. The policy of ANCSA is expressed in section 2(b):
the settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property, without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship, and without adding to the categories of property and institutions enjoying special tax privileges or to the legislation establishing special relationships between the United States government and the State of Alaska....
43 U.S.C. § 1601(b).
ANCSA grants fee simple title in Native lands to regional and village corporations which are organized under state law and which are to be treated as any other Alaska corporations, with temporary exceptions as to the alienability of stock. Id. §§ 1606, 1607 (1982). The funds paid under ANCSA are paid to the regional corporations.24 Id. § 1605. After a temporary period, ANCSA lands are subject to state and local taxation. Id. § 1620. ANCSA abolishes all reservations in Alaska except the Annette Island Reserve. Id. § 1618. ANCSA gives either state chartered municipalities or the state itself at least 1,280 acres of the land underlying each village. Id. § 1613. Significantly, this grant does not go to IRA corporations, which would have been logical recipients if they were meant to have a role in local government.25 Indeed, there is nothing in the legislative history of ANC-SA which remotely suggests that IRA villages are to be recognized as having a government role.
5. Conclusion
In a series of enactments following the Treaty of Cession and extending into the first third of this century, Congress has demonstrated its intent that Alaska Native communities not be accorded sovereign tribal status. The historical accuracy of this conclusion was expressly recognized in the proviso to the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act and, although that Act afforded a mechanism by which self-governing status might be achieved by Native communities, the mechanism was not utilized in the case of Stevens Village. No enactment subsequent to the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act granted or recognized tribal sovereign authority in Alaska. For these reasons, and in accordance with our opinions in Atkinson and Metlakatla, we conclude that Stevens Village is not entitled to utilize the defense of tribal sovereign immunity.
[42]*42B. The Lower Court Erred in Finding that the Contract was Enforceable Despite Allegations that it Violated Federal Procurement Regulations
Stevens Village also moved to dismiss AMP’s claim on the ground that the contract was unenforceable because it violated federal and state procurement regulations. The trial court denied this motion, holding that “if in fact there is a violation, any violation has been waived, the Federal government’s waived it, the State government’s waived it, and the Village has — the parties to this action have waived any — any violation.”
Case law is clear that violations of procurement regulations may render a contract unenforceable. Comdisco, Inc. v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 576 (7th cir. 1985); Quinn v. Gulf and Western Corp., 644 F.2d 89 (2d Cir.1981); Schoenbrod v. United States, 410 F.2d 400, 404, 187 Ct.Cl. 627 (1969); New York Mail & Newspaper Transp. Co. v. United States, 154 F.Supp. 271, 276, 139 Ct.Cl. 751 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904, 78 S.Ct. 332, 2 L.Ed.2d 260 (1957). This same rule is applied to cases involving violations of agency regulations that are contained in manuals and circulars, as in this case, rather than statutes. Schoenbrod, 410 F.2d at 402; Chatterton v. Waverly Terminal Co., 49 F.Supp. 545, 547 (D.N.J.1943).
The contract at issue here clearly violated federal procurement procedures required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-102 Attachment O. The contract was not competitively negotiated, and it contained no provision for termination by the grantee. Moreover, there is evidence that the former village chief was given a job on the electrification project by AMP — a job that AMP’s predecessors had refused to give him. Since the former village chief participated in selecting AMP, it appears that the contract was entered in violation of the no-conflict-of-interest provision contained in Circular A-102.
Stevens Village also asserts that the contract violated federal prohibitions against contingent fee contracts. AMP responds that the only federally funded project worked on by AMP was the electrification project, which was governed by the amendment to the contract that provided for hourly rate compensation. AMP’s position is not supported by the record. The lower court found assertions in Daniel Slaby’s affidavit, submitted in support of AMP’s motion for summary judgment, to be true. That affidavit contained the following:
d. Additional project/grants that I worked on included preparation of the .[Stevens Village] capital improvement program submitted to the Alaska State Legislature (item B), a HUD CDBG [Community Development Block Grant] for developing a revolving housing loan program, a HUD jobs project for developing a fisheries cooperative and processing plant on the Yukon River (item C), and two CRA grant requests for logging and fuel storage (items E & F). I worked on these grants based on the contractual agreement which included deferral of fee payment until receipt of the grant.
Thus, in addition to the electrification project, Slaby worked on several federally funded projects for Stevens Village on a contingent fee arrangement in violation of the federal procurement procedures.26
The lower court’s finding of waiver by the federal and state government is not supported by the record. Nor did the court offer any rationale for this finding when it announced its decision. Private parties cannot waive the requirements of such regulations. Chatterton, 49 F.Supp. at 547.
AMP argues that it was Stevens Village’s responsibility under the procurement procedures to advertise for competing bids and to include the required provisions in the contract and that Stevens Village should not be allowed to capitalize on its failure to fulfill that responsibility. But one obvious and important purpose of the [43]*43procurement procedures is to ensure that public funds are spent as the government intended them to be. When faced with a similar case, the Court of Claims held that the United States could not be estopped to deny the validity of contract provisions which violated federal procurement regulations. The court found that the United States could not be bound by those terms. Yosemite Park and Curry Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 552, 560, 217 Ct.Cl. 360 (1978).
Nonetheless, the court also found: “[I]t is equally clear that the Government bargained for, and received the benefit of YPC’s services_ For this reason we hold the plaintiff is entitled to a quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of the services received by defendant.” Id. A similar award is appropriate here.
The jury was instructed solely on breach of contract measures of damages. The case must, therefore, be remanded for a retrial of the damages issue based on a quantum meruit theory.27
AFFIRMED in part, REMANDED in part.