Worcester v. Georgia

31 U.S. 515, 8 L. Ed. 483, 6 Pet. 515, 1832 U.S. LEXIS 489
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 18, 1832
StatusPublished
Cited by1,070 cases

This text of 31 U.S. 515 (Worcester v. Georgia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 8 L. Ed. 483, 6 Pet. 515, 1832 U.S. LEXIS 489 (1832).

Opinions

[536]*536Mr Chief Justice Marshall

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest.

The defendant is a state, a member of the union, which has exercised the powers of government over a people who deny its jurisdiction, and are under the protection of the United States.

The plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Vermont, condemned to hard labour for four' years in the penitentiary of Georgia; under colour of an act which he alleges to be repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.

The legislative power of a state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have any; the political existence of a once numerous and powerful people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered.

It behoves this court, in every case, more especially in this, to examine into its jurisdiction with scrutinizing eyes; before it proceeds to the exercise of a power which is controverted.

The first step in the performance of this duty is the inquiry whether the record is properly before the court.

It is certified by the clerk of the court, which pronounced the judgment of condemnation under which the plaintiff in error is imprisoned; and is also authenticated by the seal of the court. . It is returned with, and annexed to, a writ of error issued in regular form, the citation being signed by one of the associate justices of the supreme court, and served on thegovr ernor and attorney-general of the state, more than thirty days before the commencement of the term to which the writ of error was returnable.

The judicial act (sec. 22, 25, 2 Laws U. S. 64, 65), so far as it prescribes the mode of proceeding, appears to have been literally pursued.

In February 1797, a rule (6 Wheat Rules) was made on this subject, in the following words: “It is ordered by the court, that the clerk of’the court to which any writ of error shall be directed, may make return of the same by transmitting a true [537]*537copy of the record, and of all proceedings in the same, under his hand and the seal of the court.”

This.has been done. But the signature of the judge has not been added to that of the clerk. . The law does not require it. The rule doés not require it.

In the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 361, an exception was taken to the return of the refusal of the state court to enter a prior judgment of reversal by this court; because it was .not made by the judge of the state court to which the' writ was directed: but the exception was overruled, and . the return was held sufficient. In Buel v. Van Ness, 8 Wheat. 312, also a writ of error to a state court, the record was authenticated in the same manner. No exception was taken to it. These were civil cases. But it has been truly said at the bar, that, in regard to this process, the law makes no distinction between a criminal and civil case. The same return is required in both. If the sanction of the court cpuld be necessary for the establishment of this position, it has been, silently given.

M’Culloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, was a qui tam action, brought to recover a penalty, and the record was authenticated by the seal of the court and the signature of the clerk, without that of a judge; Brown et al. v. The State of Maryland, was an indictment for a fine and forfeiture. The record in this case, too, was authenticated by the seal of the court and the certificate of the clerk. The practice is both ways.

The record, then, according to the judiciary act, and the rule and. the practice of the court, is regularly before us. The more important inquiry is, does it exhibit a case cognizable by this tribunal ?

The indictment charges the plaintiff in error, and others, being white persons, with the offence of “ residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license,” and “without having takén the oath to support and defend the' constitution and laws of the state of Georgia.”

The defendant in the state court appeared in proper person, and filed the following plea:

“ And the said Samuel A. Worcester, in his own proper person, comes and says, that this court ought not to take fur[538]*538ther cognizance of the action and. prosecution aforesaid, because, he says, that, on the 15th day of July in the year 1831, he .was, and still is, a resident in the Cherokee nation; and that the said supposed crime or crimes, and each of them, were committed, if'committed at all, at the town of New Echota, in the said Cherokee nation, out of the jurisdiction of this court, and not'in the county Gwinnett, or elsewhere, within the jurisdiction of this'court: and this defendant saith, that he is a citizen of the state of Vermont, one of the United States of America, atid that he entered the'aforesaid. Cherokee nation in the capacity of a duly authorised missionary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, under the authority of the president of the United. States, and has not since been required by him to leave it: that he was, at the time of his arrest, engaged in preaching the gospel to the Cherokee Indians, and in translating the sacred scriptures into their language, with the permission and approval .of the said Cherokee nation, and in accordance with the humane policy of the government of the United States for the civilization and improvement of the Indians; and that his residence there, for this purpose, is the residence charged, in the aforesaid indictment: and this defendant further saith, that this prosecution the state of Georgia ought not to haye or maintain, because, he saith, that several treaties have, from time tó time, been entered into between the United States and the Cherokee nation of Indians,- to wit, at Hopewell, on the 28th day of November 1785; at Holston, on the 2d day of July 1791; at Philadelphia, on the 26th day of June 1794; at Tellico, on the 2d day of October 1798; at Tellico, On the 24th day of October 1804; at Tellico, on the 25th day of October 1805; at Tellico, dn the 27th day of October 1805'; at Washington city, on the 7th day of January 1805; at Washington city, on the 22d day of. March 1816; at the Chickasaw Council House, on the 14th day of September 1816; at the Cherokee Agency, on the 8th day of July 1817; and at Washington city, on the 27th day of February 1819: all which trealiés have been duly ratified by the senate of the United States of America; and, by which treaties, the United Stales of .America'.asknowlédge the 3aid Cherokee nation to be a sovereign nation, authorised io govern themselves, and all persons- who have- settled within their territory, free from any right of legislative interference by the several states composing [539]*539the United States of America, in reference to acts done within their own territory; and, by which treaties, the whole .of the territory -now occcupied by the Cherokee nation, on the east of the Mississippi, has been solemnly guarantied to them; all of which treaties are existing treaties at this day, and in full force.

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Bluebook (online)
31 U.S. 515, 8 L. Ed. 483, 6 Pet. 515, 1832 U.S. LEXIS 489, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/worcester-v-georgia-scotus-1832.