Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson

229 F.R.D. 550, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1159, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14447, 2003 WL 21468573
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedMay 13, 2003
DocketNo. 01-2373-MLV
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 229 F.R.D. 550 (Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1159, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14447, 2003 WL 21468573 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).

Opinion

[552]*552ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MICHELSON’S MOTION TO COMPEL ELECTRONIC MAIL MESSAGES AND DATA AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL MASTER

VESCOVO, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is the January 31, 2003 motion of defendant Gary K. Michelson to compel the plaintiff, Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., to produce approximately 996 network backup tapes, containing, among other things, electronic mail, plus an estimated 300 gigabytes of othbr electronic data that is not in a backed-up format, all of which contains items potentially responsive to discovery requests propounded by Michelson. Medtronic timely responded claiming that the discovery requests are unduly burdensome because extracting the data from backup tapes and reviewing it for relevance and privilege will be astronomically costly. Michelson counters that Medtronic, as the producing party, should bear the cost of disclosure and requests that the court appoint a special master to help the parties establish a discovery protocol. The motion was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge on February 5, 2003, for a determination. For the reasons that follow, this court grants in part and denies in part Michelson’s motion.

ANALYSIS

This case involves trade secrets, patents and trade information in the field of spinal fusion medical technology.1 The instant dispute arises over Medtronic’s obligation to produce electronic data. The parties have not been able to agree on a protocol for production, on the scope of production, or, most importantly, on who should bear the cost of production.

Producing electronic data requires, at minimum, several steps: (1) designing and applying a search program to identify potentially relevant electronic files; (2) reviewing the resulting files for relevance; (3) reviewing the resulting files for privilege; (4) deciding whether the files should be produced in electronic or printed form, and (5) actual production. If, however, the information is contained on backup tapes, a preliminary step must be performed. All data on each backup tape must be restored from the backup tape format to a format that a standard computer can read. In the case of a large volume of data on multiple tapes like this case presents, the restored files from each tape must be compared to the restored files from every other tape and duplicate files eliminated. The restored files that are not duplicates must be converted to a common format so that a search program may seek information within them. The de-duplication and conversion are required so that large volumes of data in different formats may be searched in a reasonable time.

A. Scope of Production and Relevancy

Information is discoverable if “relevant to the claim or defense of any party” or if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Services, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.1998). Nevertheless, discovery does have “ultimate and necessary boundaries,” Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947)). “[I]t is well established that the scope of discovery is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23 F.3d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Guy, 978 F.2d 934, 938 (6th Cir.1992)). The court need not compel discovery if it determines that the request is “unreasonably cumulative ... [or] obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive ... [553]*553[or] the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information ... [or] the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(i)-(iii). Electronic information, if relevant, generally is discoverable under these same guidelines. Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, 1970 Adv. Comm. Note; Anti-Monopoly, Inc, v. Hasbro, Inc., Civil Case No. 94 CIV. 2120, 1995 WL 649934, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995); Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States, 650 F.Supp. 1003, 1006 (C.I.T.1986).

In this case, the parties do not seriously dispute the relevance of the electronic data at issue. Hard-copy printouts of representative e-mails, provided under seal by Michelson, indicate that the backup tapes may contain discoverable material, although neither party can estimate how much. (See Confidential Decl. of Dan P. Sedor in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Comp. Prod, of Electronic Mail Messages and Data and Request for Appointment of Special Master [hereinafter Sedor Confidential Deck] at Exs. A, B.) Medtronic also admits that the backup tapes probably contain discoverable information. (Opp’n to Dr. Michelson’s Mot. to Comp. Electronic Mail Messages and Data and Request for App’t of Special Master [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.] at 15).

Michelson asserts that information it seeks is contained in some 20,000 gigabytes (“gb”)2 of data stored on 515 of Medtronic’s network backup tapes and in approximately 210gb of electronic files from various individuals at Medtronic. Medtronic disagrees, asserting that the backup tapes number 993 with a 61 terabyte3 data volume, (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. at 2, Ex. D), and that the electronic files from individuals total 300gb. (Id. at 6, Ex. E.) Medtronic should be in the better position to know the extent of its electronic data holdings, and the court will therefore use Medtronic’s estimates for its analysis.

Given the volume of data at issue, the court agrees that this process, as a whole, will be burdensome. The court must therefore determine whether the burden on Medtronic, the producing party, is undue, and, if so, whether it should be shifted in whole or in part to Michelson, the requesting party.

B. Undue Burden and Cost-Shifting

Generally the party responding to a discovery request bears the cost of compliance. Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. The William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428-29 (S.D.N.Y.2002)(citing Oppenheimer Fund v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978)). “Nevertheless, a court may protect the responding party from ‘undue burden or expense’ by shifting some or all of the costs of production to the requesting party.” Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2), (c).

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229 F.R.D. 550, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1159, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14447, 2003 WL 21468573, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/medtronic-sofamor-danek-inc-v-michelson-tnwd-2003.