McGovern v. City of New York

202 A.D. 317, 195 N.Y.S. 925, 1922 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4899
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided July 14, 1922·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

Laughlin, J.:

This action was brought to recover a balance claimed to be owing under a contract in writing made between the plaintiff McGovern and the defendant by the Public Service Commission, First District, on the 13th day of February, 1912, for the construction of section 9, route 5, of the Lexington Avenue subway in the borough of Manhattan between a point fifty feet north of the center line of East Sixty-seventh street and a point seventy feet south of the center line of East Seventy-ninth street, and for damages for breaches thereof. The contract was duly assigned to the plaintiffs under the firm name of Patrick McGovern & Co. Proposals were not invited for the construction of the subway for a gross sum, but on a unit basis for the different classes of work and material, and the contract accordingly provided for payment for the work and labor performed and the materials furnished according to the unit basis of prices contained in the proposal of the bidder, and for work not coming within the specified classifications at cost plus ten per cent.

The avenue is seventy-five feet in width and the fee thereto was owned by the city, and the width of the carriageway between the curbs is thirty-seven and one-half feet leaving a sidewalk and areaways on each side of the width of eighteen feet nine inches. The plans provided for an open cut from the surface for the construction of two local tracks and for the construction of two express tracks in tunnels underneath the local, tracks, and for local stations at Sixty-eighth and Seventy-seventh streets; and at those streets the surface of the street was to be excavated for the entire width of the avenue and for some distance beyond in the intersecting streets. The center line of the avenue was made the center line of the subway. From the intersecting streets at which stations were to be constructed the width of the cut became gradually narrower, and between the second and third blocks therefrom it attained the minimum width of thirty-three feet.

One of the units for which the bidders were invited to submit proposals was underpinning, and they were required to specify the amount per lineal front foot of building underpinned for which [321]*321they would do the work; and the blank in the specifications was filled in in accordance with the bid at $82. The plaintiffs were allowed on this basis for underpinning the front walls of buildings on premises abutting on the street. They, however, claim to be entitled to recover in addition thereto on the perimeter measurement of certain stoops, some of which were appurtenant to dwellings the front walls of which were underpinned, and some of which were appurtenant to dwellings no wall of which was underpinned. That claim was disallowed by the chief engineer representing the defendant. The claim made by the plaintiffs for underpinning which was so disallowed is with respect to sixty-seven stoops and aggregates the sum of $148,153.50; and it constitutes the first cause of action. On the issues arising with respect to that claim the court, over the defendant’s objections that the determination of the engineer was conclusive and that the contract did not permit the recovery for the work, and its exception, permitted the plaintiffs to present the testimony of experts to the effect that the work performed in supporting the stoops was underpinning; and also permitted the plaintiffs to show, over the city’s objection and exception that the evidence was incompetent, that in preparing their proposal they considered that the work which they might be required to do or which it might become necessary to do in supporting the stoops was underpinning. They were also permitted to show, over like objections and exception, that on a prior advertisement in 1910 for proposals for this work the proposal of another bidder of $150 per foot was prepared on the same theory, and that an assistant engineer, then in the employ of the Public Service Commission but who was not in its employ when the bids on which the contract was let were received, was consulted and advised the bidder that, inasmuch as there was no item in the contract for stoops, the stoops, as well as the walls of the buildings, would be included in the bid for underpinning. Over like objection and exception, the plaintiffs were permitted to show that after the making of this contract and after the claim had been made that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for underpinning, the chief engineer, preliminary to inviting proposals on another section of the work, changed the phraseology of. the specifications with respect to the underpinning so as to make it perfectly clear that the payment for underpinning work would be limited to underpinning the front walls of the buildings. The court having received expert testimony on behalf of the plaintiffs with respect to whether the work in supporting the stoops constituted underpinning, the city called several engineers who took the opposite view and sustained [322]*322the chief engineer of the Public Service Commission in rejecting the claim. Upon this evidence and the provisions of the specifications, the court left it to the jury as a question of fact to determine whether this work was underpinning, or was restoration for which, under the specifications, the contractor was to be compensated by the payment which he received for excavation work.

There is no evidence or claim that any representation was made to bidders by any one representing the defendant concerning the construction of the contract and specifications with respect to underpinning; and if there had been, at most it might have afforded a basis for a suit in equity to be relieved from the contract, but on no theory would it be binding in an action predicated on the contract as this is. No authority has been cited and we know of none authorizing the receipt of evidence with respect to the construction which a bidder in preparing a proposal placed upon the contract which, if successful, he was to be called upon to execute, or upon the plans or specifications which were to form a part thereof, or which sustains the rulings of the court with respect to such construction by a former bidder or a declaration made to him by a subordinate employee of the Public Service Commission or of the city with respect to the construction of the contract and specifications. On the assumption that there was a question of fact for the determination of the jury on this point, the evidence to which reference has been made was not only incompetent but' was most prejudicial, and the recovery, which was for the full amount claimed on the first cause of action, could not be permitted to stand. We are of opinion, however, that even the expert testimony was improperly received, and that the contract plainly limited the right of recovery for underpinning ■ to the lineal feet front of the main walls of the buildings underpinned; and recently this court so held in construing a contract and specifications which were similar in all material respects to those in the case at bar for the construction of another section of the' same subway. (Daniels Co. v. City of New York, 196 App. Div. 856.) The theory and basis upon which the plaintiffs here make a claim for underpinning the stoops are the same as those upon which a like claim was made in Daniels Co. v. City of New York (supra), but the learned counsel for the respondent has here presented them more elaborately, and he contends that our former decision is not controlling.

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McGovern v. City of New York, 202 A.D. 317, 195 N.Y.S. 925, 1922 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4899 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1922).

202 A.D. 317 (McGovern v. City of New York) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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