:MAY, Judge.
Jason Maraman challenges his citation’ for speeding. As the Carmel city ordinance under which Maraman was ticketed was void, the trial court should have granted Maraman’s motion to dismiss. We must accordingly reverse.1
Facts and Procedural History
Maraman was stopped for speeding in Carmel. The complaint and summons issued to Maraman indicated he was driving 30 miles per hour when the speed limit was 20,2 “[cjontrary to the form of the ... Local Ordinance in such case made and [1220]*1220provided. L.O. No. 8-2.”3 (Appellant’s App. at 10.) The Carmel City Court entered judgment against him and he asked for a trial de novo.
When the cause was moved before the trial court, Maraman fíled a motion to dismiss that alleged, in pertinent part:
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
12. The complaint in the above captioned matter alleged Defendant violated Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 which states:
Unless otherwise provided herein, the provisions set forth in I.C.,[sic] 9-21-1-1 through 9-21-20-3 (Traffic Regulations) are adopted by reference and made a part of this chapter with the same force and effect as though set forth here verbatim. (Carmel City Ordinance 8-2)
13, The powers granted to and specifically withheld from a city are governed by I.C. 36-1-3, commonly referred to as the Home Rule Act.
14. The power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute is a power which is specifically withheld pursuant to I.C. 36—1—3—8(a)(8).
15, Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 simply incorporates by reference the portion of Indiana Code which defines motor vehicle infractions. Therefore, the ordinance is a prima facie violation of I.C. 36-l-3-8(a)(8) rendering the ordinance null and void. As such, the ordinance is unenforceable and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus the complaint should be dismissed.
(Appellant’s App. at 16) (header bolded in original).
The trial court denied Maraman’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court found Maraman “did commit ... the infraction of Speeding under Carmel City Code 8-2,” {id. at 5) (emphasis added), and it entered judgment against him.
Discussion and Decision
We review purely legal issues de novo, and an issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law when it does not require reference to extrinsic evidence, inferences drawn from that evidence, or the consideration of credibility questions. Cunningham v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. This is such a question.
The trial court found Maraman violated “Carmel City Code 8-2.” (App. at 5.) That portion of Carmel’s Code provided that it “adopted by reference and made a part of this chapter with the same force and effect as though set forth here verbatim” chapters 1 through 20 of Indiana Code Article 9-21, which controls traffic regulations.4 Carmel City Code 8-2. In-[1221]*1221eluded in the sections of the Indiana Code that Carmel asserts to have adopted through that ordinance are numerous statutes that define traffic infractions.5
[1222]*1222Maraman notes- Indiana’s “Home Rule” laws, .found in Indiana Code Chapter 36-1-3, provide municipalities do “not have : [t]he power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute.” Ind.Code § 36—1—3— 8(a)(8).- He also cites Mitsch v. City of Hammond, 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21 (1955), feh’g denied, in which our Indiana Supreme Court held an earlier version of our Home Rule law6 meant that an Indiana city could not enforce an ordinance that duplicated a penal statute of Indiana. Id. at 292,125 N.E.2d at 24-25.
In response, Carmel provides a number of arguments- to support the validity of its ordinance despite the Home Rule law.7 .We shall address each individually. - •
Carmel first-argues that its ordinance “does not prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute.” (Appellee’s Br. at 20) (internal citations omitted). However, as Carmel’s one sentence ordinance merely adopted wholesale the very statutes that define traffic infractions, see supra notes 4 and 5, Carmel’s argument is not well taken'8
Carmel also argues it had authority to adopt City Code 8-2 because it “seeks to enforce moving traffic violations which [sic] occur on local City roadways.” (Br. of Appellee at 20.)9 However, as we explained nearly forty years ago:
There is no,question that the State controls all public highways and streets in Indiana. Under such authority,, the State enacted IC 1971, 9-4-1-57 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides for a thirty mile per hour speed 1⅝⅛ in any urban district, and a fifty-five mile per hour [1223]*1223speed limit on interstate roads and other locations.
State, By and Through Indiana State Bd. of Accounts v. Town of Roseland, 178 Ind. App. 661, 667, 38,8 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Ind. Code § 9-21-1-1 (“Except as provided in sections 2, 3, and 3.3 of this chapter, this article applies throughout Indiana.”). Municipalities may “adopt by ordinance additional traffic -regulations,” but such ordinances “may not conflict with or duplicate a statute.” Ind.Code § 9~21-l-2(a).
Carmel next asserts its ordinance is valid, because a speeding ordinance is “deemed effective when signs providing notice of the local traffic regulations are posted upon.or at the entrances to the highway affected.” (Br. of Appellee at 20) (citing Ind.Code § 9-21-l-3(b)). That subsection provides: “An ordinance or regulation adopted under subsection (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(10), (a)(ll), (a)(12), (a)(13), or (a)(14), is effective when signs giving notice of the local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part of the highway that is affected.” Ind.Code § 9-21-l~3(b).
Carmel does not indicate which, if any, of those ten subsections might be relevant to these proceedings or offer explanation why the Carmel ordinance was effective pursuant to that statute. We therefore cannot uphold the ordinance on that ground. See, e.g., Ind. R.App. P. 46 (argument on appeal must be supported by cogent reasoning); and see Daniels v. State, 515 N.E.2d 530
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:MAY, Judge.
Jason Maraman challenges his citation’ for speeding. As the Carmel city ordinance under which Maraman was ticketed was void, the trial court should have granted Maraman’s motion to dismiss. We must accordingly reverse.1
Facts and Procedural History
Maraman was stopped for speeding in Carmel. The complaint and summons issued to Maraman indicated he was driving 30 miles per hour when the speed limit was 20,2 “[cjontrary to the form of the ... Local Ordinance in such case made and [1220]*1220provided. L.O. No. 8-2.”3 (Appellant’s App. at 10.) The Carmel City Court entered judgment against him and he asked for a trial de novo.
When the cause was moved before the trial court, Maraman fíled a motion to dismiss that alleged, in pertinent part:
Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
12. The complaint in the above captioned matter alleged Defendant violated Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 which states:
Unless otherwise provided herein, the provisions set forth in I.C.,[sic] 9-21-1-1 through 9-21-20-3 (Traffic Regulations) are adopted by reference and made a part of this chapter with the same force and effect as though set forth here verbatim. (Carmel City Ordinance 8-2)
13, The powers granted to and specifically withheld from a city are governed by I.C. 36-1-3, commonly referred to as the Home Rule Act.
14. The power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute is a power which is specifically withheld pursuant to I.C. 36—1—3—8(a)(8).
15, Carmel City Ordinance 8-2 simply incorporates by reference the portion of Indiana Code which defines motor vehicle infractions. Therefore, the ordinance is a prima facie violation of I.C. 36-l-3-8(a)(8) rendering the ordinance null and void. As such, the ordinance is unenforceable and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Thus the complaint should be dismissed.
(Appellant’s App. at 16) (header bolded in original).
The trial court denied Maraman’s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court found Maraman “did commit ... the infraction of Speeding under Carmel City Code 8-2,” {id. at 5) (emphasis added), and it entered judgment against him.
Discussion and Decision
We review purely legal issues de novo, and an issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law when it does not require reference to extrinsic evidence, inferences drawn from that evidence, or the consideration of credibility questions. Cunningham v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1075, 1076 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. This is such a question.
The trial court found Maraman violated “Carmel City Code 8-2.” (App. at 5.) That portion of Carmel’s Code provided that it “adopted by reference and made a part of this chapter with the same force and effect as though set forth here verbatim” chapters 1 through 20 of Indiana Code Article 9-21, which controls traffic regulations.4 Carmel City Code 8-2. In-[1221]*1221eluded in the sections of the Indiana Code that Carmel asserts to have adopted through that ordinance are numerous statutes that define traffic infractions.5
[1222]*1222Maraman notes- Indiana’s “Home Rule” laws, .found in Indiana Code Chapter 36-1-3, provide municipalities do “not have : [t]he power to prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute.” Ind.Code § 36—1—3— 8(a)(8).- He also cites Mitsch v. City of Hammond, 234 Ind. 285, 125 N.E.2d 21 (1955), feh’g denied, in which our Indiana Supreme Court held an earlier version of our Home Rule law6 meant that an Indiana city could not enforce an ordinance that duplicated a penal statute of Indiana. Id. at 292,125 N.E.2d at 24-25.
In response, Carmel provides a number of arguments- to support the validity of its ordinance despite the Home Rule law.7 .We shall address each individually. - •
Carmel first-argues that its ordinance “does not prescribe a penalty for conduct constituting a crime or infraction under statute.” (Appellee’s Br. at 20) (internal citations omitted). However, as Carmel’s one sentence ordinance merely adopted wholesale the very statutes that define traffic infractions, see supra notes 4 and 5, Carmel’s argument is not well taken'8
Carmel also argues it had authority to adopt City Code 8-2 because it “seeks to enforce moving traffic violations which [sic] occur on local City roadways.” (Br. of Appellee at 20.)9 However, as we explained nearly forty years ago:
There is no,question that the State controls all public highways and streets in Indiana. Under such authority,, the State enacted IC 1971, 9-4-1-57 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides for a thirty mile per hour speed 1⅝⅛ in any urban district, and a fifty-five mile per hour [1223]*1223speed limit on interstate roads and other locations.
State, By and Through Indiana State Bd. of Accounts v. Town of Roseland, 178 Ind. App. 661, 667, 38,8 N.E.2d 1076, 1080 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Ind. Code § 9-21-1-1 (“Except as provided in sections 2, 3, and 3.3 of this chapter, this article applies throughout Indiana.”). Municipalities may “adopt by ordinance additional traffic -regulations,” but such ordinances “may not conflict with or duplicate a statute.” Ind.Code § 9~21-l-2(a).
Carmel next asserts its ordinance is valid, because a speeding ordinance is “deemed effective when signs providing notice of the local traffic regulations are posted upon.or at the entrances to the highway affected.” (Br. of Appellee at 20) (citing Ind.Code § 9-21-l-3(b)). That subsection provides: “An ordinance or regulation adopted under subsection (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(10), (a)(ll), (a)(12), (a)(13), or (a)(14), is effective when signs giving notice of the local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part of the highway that is affected.” Ind.Code § 9-21-l~3(b).
Carmel does not indicate which, if any, of those ten subsections might be relevant to these proceedings or offer explanation why the Carmel ordinance was effective pursuant to that statute. We therefore cannot uphold the ordinance on that ground. See, e.g., Ind. R.App. P. 46 (argument on appeal must be supported by cogent reasoning); and see Daniels v. State, 515 N.E.2d 530, 530 (Ind.1987) (fail.ure to present , cogent argument operates as waiver of issue on appeal).
Notwithstanding the waiver, whiie placing traffic signs dn the affected roads makes the ordinance “effective,” Ind.Code § 9-21-l-3(b), the ordinance first had to be adopted under Ind.Code § 9-21-l-3(a). To meet the requirements of subsection (a), any action taken by a ’ municipality must occur “in accordance with sections 2 and 3.3(a) of this chapter,” Ind.Code § 9-21-l-3(a), and each of those sections expressly states any ordinance adopted “may not conflict with or duplicate” state law. Ind.Codé § 9-21-l-2(a) (“may not conflict with or duplicate a statute”); Ind.Code § 9-21-l-2(b) (“may not conflict with or duplicate state law”); Ind.Code § 9-21-1-3.3(a) (“may ridt ... conflict with or duplicate another state law”). ■ Thus, Carmel’s reliance on Ind. Code § 9-21-l-3(b) leaves it in the same predicament that caused its ordinance to be invalid under the Home Rule cited by Maraman—Carmel’s wholesale adoption of chapters of Indiana Code resulted in its ordinance being, nothing more than a “duplicate” of already existing State law.
Carmel’s next argument relies on a statute dealing with construction zones.10 Carmel correctly notes one of the adopted statutes permits a local authority tb ’ ■
establish temporary maximum speed limits in their respective jurisdictions and in the vicinity of a .worksite without conducting an engineering study and investigation- required-under this article. The establishing. authority shall post : signs notifying the traveling public of the temporary maximum speed limits established under this section.
Ind.Code § 9-21-5-ll(a). Nevertheless, the fact that the State gave municipalities [1224]*1224the power to modify speed limits in work zones within their municipalities did not, ipso facto, also give the municipalities the authority to collect fines by local ordinance on any such modified speed limit. That the State did not relinquish such authority is evident from .the other ■ subsections of the statute that Carmel cites:
(d) ... a judgment for the infraction of violating a speed limit set under this section must be entered as follows:
(1) If the person has not previously committed the infraction of violating a speed limit set under this section, a judgment for a Class B infraction and a fine of at least three hundred dollars ($300) shall be imposed.
(2) If the person has committed one (1) infraction of violating a speed limit set under this section in the previous three (3) years,' a judgment for a Class B infraction and a fine of at least five hundred dollars ($500) shall be imposed. '•
(3) If the person has committed two (2) or more infractions of violating a speed limit set under this section in the previous three (3) years, a judgment for a Class B infraction and -a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) shall be imposed.
(e) !.. the funds collected as judgments for the infraction of violating a speed limit set under this'' section shall be transferred to the Indiana department of transportation ’ to pay the costs of hiring off duty police officers to perform the duties described in IC 8-23-2-15(b).
Ind.Code § 9-21-5-11. Thus, while a city may modify a speed limit in a construction zone within the city, the recourse for the violation of such speed limit remains an infraction prohibited and punishable according to state statute. See id.
Finally, Carmel directs us to Ind.Code § 36-1-5-4, which provides “[t]he legislative body of a unit may incorporate by reference into an ordinance or code any material.” Carmel does not offer argument or explanation why this section has the effect of nullifying the Home Rule statute, Ind.Code § 36-1-3-8, or the statutes in the Article controlling Traffic Regulation, e.g., Ind.Code § 9-21-1-2, and we decline to hold it nullifies those other statutes. While Carmel may incorporate material by reference, it may not incorporate in a way that duplicates the statutes that create statewide traffic infractions. See, e.g., Ind.Code §§ 9-21-1-2, 36-1-3-8. If a city wishes to establish local speed limits, it may do so in accordance with Ind.Code §§ 9-21-5-3(1), 9-21-5-6, and 9-21-1-3(a)(ll) which gives the city the authority to adopt ordinances altering speed limits within the city; however, it is nevertheless prohibited from simply duplicating state imposed speed limits as Carmel City Code § 8-2 attempts to do.
Conclusion
As the ordinance under which Carmel wished to prosecute Maraman was invalid, Maraman’s motion to dismiss should have been granted. We must therefore reverse.
Reversed.
CRONE, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.