TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
I.
Petitioner, Larry Eugene Mann, is a Florida death row inmate. In 1981, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping.1 At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury recommended the death penalty. The trial judge followed the recommendation and entered a sentence of death.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding without a jury.2 Mann v. State, 420 So.2d 578 (Fla.1982). The trial court reimposed the death penalty, and, on direct appeal from the resentencing, the supreme court affirmed. Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 940, 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985). Petitioner thereafter moved the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. He also petitioned the supreme court for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion, and the supreme court affirmed, at the same time denying petitioner’s request for habeas relief. Mann v. State, 482 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1986).
Petitioner then instituted this habeas corpus action in the district court. In his petition, he attacked his conviction and sentence on several grounds. As one ground for attacking the sentence, petitioner contended that he was entitled to resentencing under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), because the prosecutor and trial judge had made comments that had likely diminished the sentencing jury’s sense of responsibility with respect to its role in the sentencing process.3 The district court de[1448]*1448nied relief on all grounds. We reverse and hold that petitioner is entitled to relief on the Caldwell claim.4 We accordingly order the district court to grant the writ setting aside petitioner’s death sentence unless the state provides petitioner a new sentencing proceeding before a newly empaneled jury.
II.
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), is best understood in the context of its facts. The case involved a challenge to a death sentence imposed pursuant to the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme. Mississippi affords capital defendants a bifurcated trial. After the jury renders a verdict of guilty, the trial court convenes a sentencing proceeding before the same jury. The jury then renders a verdict of either death or life imprisonment, and the trial court enters a sentence in accordance with the jury’s verdict. If the jury renders a verdict of death, the sentence is automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105; Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1255 (Miss.1976). In conducting its review, that court applies a presumption of correctness to the sentencing jury’s verdict. Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806, 816 (Miss.1983) (Lee, J., dissenting). Under Mississippi law, the supreme court may overturn a death sentence in three situations only: (1) where the sentencing jury’s verdict was so arbitrary as to be “against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,” Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 811 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 803, 83 L.Ed.2d 795 (1985); (2) where the evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances, required for the imposition of the death penalty, was so lacking that a “judge should have entered a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict,” id.; or (3) where the sentence is “excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” Id.
In Caldwell, the petitioner, Bobby Caldwell, contended that his death sentence was invalid under the eighth amendment because the sentencing jurors had been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the sentence rested not with them but with the appellate court that would later review the case. The facts supporting the claim were as follows. In closing argument before the sentencing jury, defense counsel entreated the jurors to show mercy and remarked that “[y]ou are the judges and you will have to decide [Caldwell’s] fate. It is an awesome responsibility, I know — an awesome responsibility.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 324, 105 S.Ct. at 2637. The prosecutor then sought to downplay the effect of counsel's argument by telling the jurors that “your decision is not the final decision ... [y]our job is reviewable.” Id. at 325, 105 S.Ct. at 2637. Defense counsel objected to this statement, but the trial court overruled the objection, commenting that “it [is] proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically [1449]*1449as the death penalty commands.” Id., 105 S.Ct. at 2638.
The United States Supreme Court held that Caldwell’s sentence was invalid under the eighth amendment because it rested on “a determination made by a sentencer who ha[d] been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rest[ed] elsewhere.” Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. The Court reasoned that the eighth amendment’s need for reliability in capital sentencing required that capital sentencers “view their task as a serious one of determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State.” Id. at 329, 105 S.Ct. at 2640. The jurors, having been told that their decision was “automatically reviewable,” were misled into believing that their judgment call on the evidence would be reviewed de novo. Thus, because the jury’s sense of responsibility had likely been diminished as a result of the comments by the prosecutor and the court, the sentencing decision did not meet the standard of reliability required by the eighth amendment. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646.
In the present case, the attorney general argues that Caldwell is inapplicable because the Florida sentencing jury, unlike the Mississippi sentencing jury, is not the actual sentencer under the state capital punishment scheme. Under the Florida statutory scheme, the jury weighs the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented during the sentencing phase of the defendant’s trial, and then makes a recommendation of either life imprisonment or death. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(2) (1985).5 That recommendation, the attor[1450]*1450ney general asserts, is always subject to rejection by the trial judge, who must under Fla.Stat. § 921.141(3) independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances before entering a sentence. Because the trial judge plays this role in sentencing, the attorney general argues, Caldwell error does not occur when the jury is told that sentencing responsibility lies elsewhere.
At first blush, the attorney general’s argument has some appeal. It is true that the trial court independently weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and actually enters the sentence. It is also true that the statute describes the sentencing jury’s function as that of “render[ing] an advisory opinion to the court.” The legislature’s use of the term "advisory,” considered in a vacuum, could be viewed as evincing a legislative intent that the sentencing jury play a role which, in the final analysis, is in fact largely meaningless. In common parlance, we often associate the term “advisory” with the term “nonbinding”; “advice,” in the minds of most people, is something that a decisionmaker may follow or reject as he or she sees fit. In analyzing the role of the jury, however, we cannot operate in a vacuum. Rather,, we must look to how the Supreme Court of Florida, the final interpreter of the death penalty statute, has characterized that role.
A.
A review of the case law shows that the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted section 921.141 as evincing a legislative intent that the sentencing jury play a significant role in the Florida capital sentencing scheme. See Messer v. State, 330 So.2d 137, 142 (Fla.1976) (“[T]he legislative intent that can be gleaned from Section 921.141 [indicates that the legislature] sought to devise a scheme of checks and balances in which the input of the jury serves as an integral part.”); see also Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So.2d 656, 657 (Fla.1987) (“This Court has long held that a Florida capital sentencing jury’s recommendation is an integral part of the death sentencing process.”); Lamadline v. State, 303 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla.1974) (right to sentencing jury is “an essential right of the defendant under our death penalty legislation”). In the supreme court's view, the legislature created a role in the capital sentencing process for a jury because the jury is “the one institution in the system of Anglo-American jurisprudence most honored for fair determinations of questions decided by balancing opposing factors.” Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1140 (Fla.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 239 (1977); see also McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072, 1075 (Fla.1982) (the jury’s recommendation “represents] the judgment of the community as to whether the death sentence is appropriate”); Chambers v. State, 339 So.2d 204, 209 (Fla.1976) (England, J., concurring) (the sentencing jury “has been assigned by history and statute the responsibility to discern truth and mete out justice”).
To give effect to the legislature’s intent that the sentencing jury play a significant role, the Supreme Court of Florida has severely limited the trial judge’s authority to override a jury recommendation of life imprisonment. In Tedder v. State, 322 So. [1451]*14512d 908, 910 (Fla.1975), the court held that a trial judge can override a life recommendation only when “the facts [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” That the court meant what it said in Tedder is amply demonstrated by the dozens of cases in which it has applied the Tedder standard to reverse a trial judge’s attempt to override a jury recommendation of life. See, e.g., Wasko v. State, 505 So.2d 1314, 1318 (Fla.1987); Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 142-43 (Fla.1986); McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Fla.1982); Goodwin v. State, 405 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1981); Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936, 942-43 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925, 102 S.Ct. 1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982); Neary v. State, 384 So.2d 881, 885-88 (Fla.1980); Malloy v. State, 382 So.2d 1190, 1193 (Fla.1979); Shue v. State, 366 So.2d 387, 390-91 (Fla.1978); McCaskill v. State, 344 So.2d 1276, 1280 (Fla.1977); Thompson v. State, 328 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.1976).
The attorney general argues that although the trial court may be required under Tedder to give deference to a jury recommendation of life, it is in no way similarly bound to give deference to a jury recommendation of death. Since a Florida sentencing jury can therefore never play a substantive role in imposing a death sentence, the attorney general contends, Caldwell can never be implicated in a Florida case.
One problem with this argument is that its central premise — that the sentencing jury plays no substantive role in imposing a death sentence — is contradicted by numerous pronouncements by the Supreme Court of Florida. The issue of what deference is due a jury recommendation of death would arise most directly when the jury recommends death and the trial judge rejects the recommendation and imposes life imprisonment. Such cases never appear before the supreme court, however, because the state cannot appeal a sentence of life imprisonment. See State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943, 94 S.Ct. 1950, 40 L.Ed.2d 295 (1974). Nonetheless, the issue has arisen in cases where the jury recommends death, the trial court imposes death, and the defendant contends on direct appeal that the trial court improperly weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In one such recent case, Smith v. State, 515 So.2d 182 (Fla.1987), the supreme court held that “[although we find that one of the five aggravating circumstances relied on by the trial court was invalid, we approve the death sentence on the basis that a jury recommendation of death is entitled to great weight and there were no mitigating circumstances to counterbalance the four valid aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 185 (emphasis added). In LeDuc v. State, 365 So.2d 149 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 175, 62 L.Ed.2d 114 (1979), the supreme court stated that “[t]he primary standard for our review of death sentences is that the recommended sentence of a jury should not be disturbed if all reasonable data was considered, unless there appear strong reasons to believe that reasonable persons could not agree with the recommendation.” Id. at 151 (citing Tedder) (emphasis added). See also Middleton v. State, 426 So.2d 548, 552-53 (Fla.1982) (approving trial court’s imposition of death sentence and reiterating in conclusion that jury had recommended death), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1230, 103 S.Ct. 3573, 77 L.Ed.2d 1413 (1983); Francois v. State, 407 So.2d 885, 891 (Fla.1982) (same), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3511, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982); Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1373 (Fla.1981) (same), rev’d on other grounds, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); cf. Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 839 n. 1, 13 Fla.L.Weekly 127, 133 n. 1 (Fla.1988) (“We have ... held that a jury recommendation of death should be given great weight.”). On one occasion, the supreme court went so far as to suggest that the trial judge’s role in sentencing is merely to articulate findings in support of the jury’s sentencing decision. See Provenzano v. State, 497 So.2d 1177, 1185 (Fla.1986) (“[T]he trial judge does not consider the facts anew. In sentencing a defendant, a judge lists reasons to support a finding in regard to mitigating or aggravating [1452]*1452factors.”), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 5.Ct. 1912, 95 L.Ed.2d 518 (1987).
The issue of what deference is due a jury recommendation of death has also arisen in cases where the jury recommends death, the trial judge imposes death, and the defendant claims on direct appeal that the trial judge gave undue deference to the jury’s recommendation. The Supreme Court of Florida has consistently indicated in such cases that no error occurs when the trial judge gives due weight to the jury recommendation of death. In Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 680, 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986), for instance, the judge stated in his instructions to the jury that their recommendation “would not be overruled unless there was no reasonable basis for it.” Id. at 367. The jury returned a recommendation of death and the trial court entered a sentence of death. On direct appeal, the defendant claimed, citing the trial court’s instructions to the jury, that the judge had mistakenly given weight to the jury’s recommendation of death. The supreme court disagreed and affirmed the death sentence: “There is no error; this is the law. It is appropriate to stress to the jury the seriousness which it should attach to its recommendation and, when the recommendation is received, to give it weight.” Id. (emphasis added). See also Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526, 536 (Fla.1987) (no merit to appellant’s contention that trial court gave undue weight to jury’s recommendation of death where record reflects that “the court has weighed relevant factors and reached its own independent judgment about the reasonableness of the jury’s recommendation.”), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988).6
The supreme court’s understanding of the jury’s sentencing role is illustrated by the way it treats sentencing error. In cases where the trial court follows a jury recommendation of death, the supreme court will vacate the sentence and order resentencing before a new jury7 if it concludes that the proceedings before the original jury were tainted by error. Thus, the supreme court has vacated death sentences where the jury was presented with improper evidence, see Dougan v. State, 470 So.2d 697, 701 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098, 106 S.Ct. 1499, 89 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986), or was subject to improper argument by the prosecutor, see Teffeteller v. State, 439 So.2d 840, 845 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074, 104 S.Ct. 1430, 79 L.Ed.2d 754 (1984). The supreme court has also vacated death sentences where the trial court gave the jury erroneous instructions on mitigating circumstances or improperly limited the defendant in his presentation of evidence of mitigating circumstances. See Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 173, 175 (Fla.1987); Downs v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1987); Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So.2d 656, 659-60 (Fla.1987); Valle v. State, 502 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla.1987); Floyd v. State, 497 So.2d 1211, 1215-16 (Fla.1986); Lucas v. State, 490 So.2d 943, 946 (Fla.1986); Simmons v. State, 419 So.2d 316, 320 (Fla.1982); Miller v. State, 332 So.2d 65, 68 (Fla.1976). In these eases, the supreme court frequently focuses on how the error may have affected the jury’s recommendation. See, e.g., [1453]*1453Riley, 517 So.2d at 659 (“If the jury’s recommendation, upon which the judge must rely, results from an unconstitutional procedure, then the entire sentencing process necessarily is tainted by that procedure.”); Valle, 502 So.2d at 1226 (“[Ujnless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous exclusion of evidence did not affect the jury’s recommendation of death, the defendant is entitled to a new jury recommendation on resentencing.”); Doug-an, 470 So.2d at 701 (death sentence vacated and resentencing ordered where supreme court could not “tell how the improper evidence and argument may have affected the jury”); Teffeteller, 439 So.2d at 845 (death sentence vacated and resentencing ordered where supreme court could not “determine that the needless and inflammatory comments by the prosecutor did not substantially contribute to the jury’s advisory recommendation of death”). Such a focus would be illogical unless the supreme court began with the premise that the jury’s recommendation must be given significant weight by the trial judge. Once that premise is established, a focus on how the error may have affected the jury’s recommendation makes sense: if the jury’s recommendation is tainted, then the trial court’s sentencing decision, which took into account that recommendation, is also tainted.
Finally, we note that the Supreme Court of Florida has ordered resentencing in cases where the trial court excused a prospective juror in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). See, e.g., Chandler v. State, 442 So.2d 171, 173-75 (Fla.1983). Under Witherspoon and its progeny, a state violates a capital defendant’s right to trial by impartial jury when it excuses for cause a prospective juror who has voiced conscientious objections to the death penalty, unless the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433, 105 S.Ct. 844, 857, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Witherspoon assumes, of course, that the jury will play a substantive role in the sentencing decision. By applying Witherspoon to vacate death sentences, then, the Supreme Court of Florida implicitly acknowledges that the jury plays a substantive role under the Florida capital sentencing scheme.
Thus, in various ways, the Florida case law evinces an interpretation of the death penalty statute that requires a trial judge to give great weight to a jury’s sentencing recommendation. As our review of the case law shows, that requirement applies as to both recommendations of life imprisonment and recommendations of death.
B.
In analyzing the role of the sentencing jury, the Supreme Court of Florida has apparently been influenced by a normative judgment that a jury recommendation of death carries great force in the mind of the trial judge. This judgment is most clearly reflected in cases where an error has occurred before the jury, but the trial judge indicates that his own sentencing decision is unaffected by the error. As a general matter, reviewing courts presume that trial judges exposed to error are capable of putting aside the error in reaching a given decision. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, has on occasion declined to apply this presumption in challenges to death sentences. For example, in Messer v. State, 330 So.2d 137 (1976), the trial court erroneously prevented the defendant from putting before the sentencing jury certain psychiatric reports as mitigating evidence. The jury recommended death and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. The supreme court vacated the sentence, even though the sentencing judge had stated that he had himself considered the reports before entering sentence. The supreme court took a similar approach in Riley v. Wainwright, 517 So.2d 656 (Fla.1987). There, the defendant presented at his sentencing hearing certain nonstatutory mitigating evidence. The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider statutory mitigating evidence, but said nothing about the jury’s obligation under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), to consider nonstatutory mitigating [1454]*1454evidence. The jury recommended death and the trial judge imposed the death penalty. In imposing the death sentence, the trial judge expressly stated that he had considered all evidence and testimony presented.8 On petition for writ of habeas corpus, the supreme court ordered the defendant resentenced. The court held that the jury had been precluded from considering nonstatutory mitigating evidence, and that the trial judge’s consideration of that evidence had been “insufficient to cure the original infirm recommendation.” Id. at 659 n. 1.
In light of the disposition of these eases, it would seem that the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized that a jury recommendation of death has a sui generis impact on the trial judge, an impact so powerful as to nullify the general presumption that a trial judge is capable of putting aside error. We do not find it surprising that the supreme court would make this kind of normative judgment. A jury recommendation of death is, after all, the final stage in an elaborate process whereby the community expresses its judgment regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence. The process begins with the legislature, which broadly defines the class of cases for which capital punishment is appropriate. Then, in the particular case, the prosecutor, who is electorally accountable to the community, makes the decision whether to request the death penalty. Finally, the jury, traditionally depicted as the conscience of the community, makes a judgment about the appropriateness of death in light of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, by the time the case comes before the judge for the actual imposition of sentence, it has already been filtered through three levels of community sentiment, each level less porous than the preceding one.9 It would indeed be surprising were the trial judge, who in Florida is also an electorally accountable official, not powerfully affected by the result of that process.
C.
In light of the case law, we conclude that the Florida jury plays an important role in the Florida capital sentencing scheme. The case law reflects an interpretation of the death penalty statute that requires the trial court to give significant weight to the jury’s recommendation, whether it be a recommendation of life imprisonment or a recommendation of death. The case law also reflects, we think, an insightful normative judgment that a jury recommendation of death has an inherently powerful impact on the trial judge.
Because the jury’s recommendation is significant in these ways, the concerns voiced in Caldwell are triggered when a Florida sentencing jury is misled into believing that its role is unimportant.10 Un[1455]*1455der such circumstances, a real danger exists that a resulting death sentence will be based at least in part on the determination of a decisionmaker that has been misled as to the nature of its responsibility. Such a sentence, because it results from a formula involving a factor that is tainted by an impermissible bias in favor of death, necessarily violates the eighth amendment requirement of reliability in capital sentencing. See Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1532 (11th Cir.1986), modified, 816 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir.1987), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1106, 99 L.Ed.2d 267 (1988).
III.
Having determined that the sentencing jury plays a substantive role under the Florida capital sentencing scheme, we turn to the question whether the jury in this case was misled as to its role so as to render petitioner’s sentence invalid under the eighth amendment. We begin with a thorough examination of the trial record.
The first reference to the jury’s role was made as the jury was being selected, during counsel’s voir dire of the venire. The prosecutor said the following:
The recommendation that you make to Judge Federico in [the sentencing] portion of the trial is simply a recommendation, and he is not bound by it. He may impose whatever sentence the law permits. He will have been here and will have listened to all the testimony himself.
A few moments later, the prosecutor repeated this point in stronger terms:
You understand you do not impose the death penalty; that is not on your shoulders .... Again, that decision rests up here with the law, with Judge Federico. You will have the opportunity after you have heard everything there is to hear to make a recommendation to him. But it is not legally on your shoulders, though. It is not your ultimate decision. You act in that regard in an advisory capacity only.
The prosecutor repeated the point again that afternoon, in a dialogue with two veniremen:
You ... understand that the ultimate responsibility rests with the Court; that it’s not the jury’s responsibility?
During closing argument at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor once again informed the jury that “[t]he matter of sentencing ultimately rests with [the] Court.”
After the jury rendered its verdict of guilty, the jurors were temporarily excused from the courtroom while the court and counsel made preliminary preparations for the sentencing phase of the trial. At that time, defense counsel requested that the jury, when it returned, be instructed by the court that its sentencing recommendation would be “entitled to great weight.” The court refused to grant the request:
THE COURT: Well, I think that goes without saying. I don’t know if I need to instruct them that that is so.
[1456]*1456[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it is. The reason we would ask—
THE COURT: That’s something that I need to do after they make their recommendation, and I will give it great weight.
■ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know, but they need to know that so they know we’re not up there just—
THE COURT: I think the standard instructions bring home to them that it is very important that they, you know, [d]o not act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings, that they should carefully weigh and sift and consider the evidence. I think that’s sufficient.
Notwithstanding his apparent understanding of the sentencing jury’s function, the judge informed the jurors when they returned to the courtroom that “[t]he final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court.” The prosecutor repeated the point in the final statement of his closing argument at the conclusion of the sentencing phase:
What I’m suggesting to you is that the ultimate responsibility for the imposition of the sentence rests with Judge Philip Federico. That is his sworn position in the system. He’s heard everything you have heard. He may have the opportunity to learn more before he imposes a sentence. I think this community, as represented by this jury, should give to him the prerogative of imposing the death penalty, if that’s what he ultimately feels is required in this case.
The court then read its instructions to the jury. The instructions included the following statements regarding the jury’s sentencing function:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the Court as to what punishment should be imposed on the Defendant for his crime of murder in the first degree. As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge. However, it is your duty to follow the law which will now be given to you by the Court and render to the Court an advisory opinion based upon your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty, whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist.
The court’s instructions also included the following statements:
The fact that the determination of whether or not a majority of you recommend a sentence of death or sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot, you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that a human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment upon the sole issue which is submitted to you at this time, of whether a majority of your number recommend that the Defendant be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.
After the court finished reading the instructions, it ordered the jury to retire and make a decision. When the jury returned, it announced a recommendation of death. The jury was polled and then dismissed. After the bailiff had declared that “[t]he jury has left the courtroom,” the judge remarked, for the record, that “[t]he court, as required by law, will give great weight to the recommendation of the jury.”
In reviewing Caldwell claims, our task is twofold. First, we must determine whether the prosecutor’s comments to the jury were such that they would “minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death.” Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 2646. Second, if the comments would have such effect, we must determine “whether the trial judge in this case sufficiently corrected the impression left by the prosecutor.” McCorquodale v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.1987).
[1457]*1457When a trial court does not correct misleading comments as to the jury’s sentencing role, the state has violated the defendant’s eighth amendment rights because the court has given the state’s imprimatur to those comments; the effect is the same as if the trial court had actually instructed the jury that the prosecutor’s comments represented a correct statement of the law. See Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1359, 94 L.Ed.2d 529 (1987). When a trial court does make some attempt to correct the prosecutor’s misleading comments, the question becomes whether the corrective statement would, in the mind of a reasonable juror who had been exposed to the misleading comments, correct the misapprehension that the comments would induce. Because our focus is ultimately on the trial court’s actions,11 our mode of review is similar to that used to review claims based on erroneous jury instructions. Cf. Lamb v. Jernigan, 683 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (11th Cir.1982) (court must consider effect of erroneous instruction on reasonable juror “in light of the remainder of the charge and the entire trial”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1024, 103 S.Ct. 1276, 75 L.Ed.2d 496 (1983).
In this case, the comments by the prosecutor were such that they would mislead or at least confuse the jury as to the nature of its sentencing responsibility under Florida law. It bears emphasizing that the prosecutor in Caldwell stated only that the jury’s verdict would be “automatically reviewable.” Technically, this statement was an accurate statement of Mississippi law — death sentences are automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court of Mississippi under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105. The mischief was that the statement, unéx-plained, would have likely been misunderstood by the jurors as meaning that their judgment call on the appropriateness of a death sentence did not really matter. We are faced with a similar situation here. The prosecutor repeatedly told the jury that its task was to render an “advisory” recommendation. As with “automatically reviewable” in Caldwell, this characterization is technically accurate, at least in the sense that the Florida death penalty statute contains the term “advisory.” However, the danger exists that the jurors, because they were unaware of the body of law that requires the trial judge to give weight to the jury recommendation, were misinformed as to the importance of their judgment call. The danger is particularly strong here, because nothing in the common meaning of the term “advisory” would suggest to the layman that the trial judge would in any way be bound by the recommendation; indeed, the common meaning of the term would suggest precisely the contrary.
Moreover, here the prosecutor stated to the jurors twice that the burden of imposing the death penalty was “not on your shoulders.” 12 He repeatedly told the ju[1458]*1458rors that the responsibility for imposing sentence rested with the trial judge. Additionally, we note that the prosecutor suggested to the jurors that the trial judge, because of his position as a legal authority, was more able than the jury to make the appropriate sentencing decision. As the Supreme Court noted in Caldwell, this kind of suggestion induces jurors, who are “placed in a very unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice,” to delegate wrongly their sentencing responsibility. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333, 105 S.Ct. at 2641-42. We conclude that the prosecutor’s statements, considered together, misrepresent the nature of the jury’s critical role under the Florida capital sentencing scheme.13 Such comments, if uncorrected, would undoubtedly minimize a juror’s sense of responsibility, thus creating “a danger of bias in favor of the death penalty.” Adams, 804 F.2d at 1532.
Turning to the second prong of our inquiry, we conclude that the trial judge’s comments did not correct the false impression left by the prosecutor. The trial court specifically denied defense counsel’s request that the jury be properly informed as to its role. Moreover, the judge himself stated that the final sentencing decision rested “solely with the judge of this court.” The trial judge expressly put the court’s imprimatur on the prosecutor’s previous misleading statements by saying to the jurors that “[ajs you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge.” 14
The only potentially corrective statement by the court came when the court instructed the jurors that they should proceed with “due regard to the gravity” of the matter and should “carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that a human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment.” This statement, we conclude, did not cure the harm posed by the court’s other actions. The statement would do little if anything to change a juror’s misapprehension about the effect of the jury’s decision; it only instructs the jurors that they should approach their task with care and deliberation. At best, it likely left some jurors confused as to their proper role. We therefore conclude that the court’s actions, as considered by a reasonable juror who had been exposed to the prosecutor’s misleading comments, did not correct the false impression created by those comments. Cf. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 340 n. 7, 105 S.Ct. at 2645 n. 7 (prosecutor’s later statements did not retract or undermine the misimpression created by the earlier statements). Because the overall effect of the court’s actions was to dimmish the jury’s sense of responsibility with regard to its sentencing role, petitioner’s sentence is invalid under the eighth amendment.
IV.
In conclusion, we reverse the district court’s denial of the writ of habeas corpus with regard to petitioner’s Caldwell claim. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to issue the writ setting [1459]*1459aside petitioner s death sentence unless the State affords petitioner a new sentencing proceeding before a newly empaneled jury.
REVERSED and REMANDED.