Marvin Edwin Johnson v. Harry K. Singletary, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections

938 F.2d 1166

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: September 4, 1991
• Docket: 89-3195
• Status: Published

Opinions

COX, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Marvin Edwin Johnson, a Florida death row inmate, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A panel of this court concluded that Johnson was entitled to an opportunity to prove the ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim contained in his second federal habe-as petition. This is so, the panel concluded, notwithstanding the fact that the claim is procedurally defaulted because Johnson did not present the claim to Florida courts under Florida’s procedural rules, notwithstanding the fact that there was no “cause” for his having failed to do so, and notwithstanding the fact that he did not present the claim in his first federal habeas petition. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 440, 444 (11th Cir.), vacated, 920 F.2d 721 (1990). He is entitled to pursue the claim, the panel majority concluded, because he “has proffered evidence which if true would establish that he probably was actually innocent of the death sentence he received.” Id. at 477. The en banc court decided to review the case primarily to address the question of what it means to be “actually innocent” of a death sentence. We conclude that Johnson is not actually innocent of the sentence he received and affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1978, Warrington Pharmacy in Pensacola, Florida, was robbed. In the course of that robbery Woodrow Moulton, a pharmacist and the owner of the pharmacy, was shot and killed. Marvin Edwin Johnson was indicted for first-degree murder and armed robbery. The Supreme Court of Florida summarized the State’s evidence at trial as follows:

Gary Summitt, an employee of War-rington Pharmacy and an eyewitness to the robbery and the murder, testified that while working at the pharmacy on the evening of June 7, 1978, he went to the back of the store to ask the pharmacist, Woodrow Moulton, a question. There he saw the defendant Johnson holding a gun on Moulton who was at the pharmacy safe putting articles in a bag, and he heard Johnson order Moulton to put certain drugs and money from the safe into the bag. After obtaining the drugs and money, Johnson started towards the front of the store. Moulton then grabbed a gun from behind the prescription counter. There was an exchange of gunfire, and Moulton continued to fire at Johnson until his gun was emptied. No longer able to defend himself, Moulton stood up with his hands in the air. Johnson then walked up to within a foot and a half of the defenseless pharmacist, said “You think you’re a smart son-of-a-bitch, don’t you?”, and shot him in the chest.

Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1071 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981).

On December 8, 1978, a jury found Johnson guilty of first-degree murder and armed robbery.¹ The next day, the same jury, acting in an advisory role, recommended Johnson be sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder conviction. About one month later, at the close of a sentencing hearing before the trial judge, the judge overrode the advisory jury’s recommendation and sentenced Johnson to death.² In his written findings, the judge found five statutory aggravating circumstances and no statutory mitigating circumstances.³

Johnson appealed his convictions and sentence to the Supreme Court of Florida.⁴ That court unanimously affirmed his convictions. Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981). The court also affirmed Johnson’s sentence, by a vote of four justices to three.⁵ Id. The governor of Florida signed a death warrant in May 1982.

Rather than seeking habeas relief in the state courts pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, Johnson petitioned the district court for the Northern District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson’s counsel in that proceeding later told the state supreme court that “they elected to raise only certain claims and assumed that they could always come back to state court and raise others.” Johnson v. State, 536 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla.1988).⁶ The State did not raise the defense of failure to exhaust state remedies⁷ and thus waived that defense. See Pennington v. Spears, 779 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir.1986). The district court, after initially granting a stay of execution, denied the petition and thereafter denied Johnson’s motion to alter or amend the district court’s judgment.

Johnson appealed to this court, raising seven issues: (1) whether the state trial court’s refusal to consider lingering doubt about the certainty of proof violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) whether the state trial court improperly refused to consider or weigh nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (3) whether the state trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony on factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification was unconstitutional; (4) whether prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of Johnson at trial rendered the trial fundamentally unfair; (5) whether the district court improperly denied discovery regarding Johnson’s claim of a due process violation by the Supreme Court of Florida; (6) whether the imposition of a death sentence by a trial court following a jury recommendation of life is unconstitutional; and (7) whether an alleged error of fact in the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision, relating to Johnson’s use of the term son-of-a-bitch, improperly affected the determination of aggravating circumstances in this case.

Three claims asserted in the district court were not argued on appeal and were deemed abandoned. See Johnson v. Wainwright (Johnson I), 806 F.2d 1479, 1481 n. 5 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). Those claims were: the claim that the trial judge erred in the application of the Tedder standard (an issue Johnson is raising in the present proceeding); the claim that photographs of the interior of the pharmacy were improperly admitted; and the claim that the Supreme Court of Florida erred in not remanding the case for resentencing after it struck one of the aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge. This court addressed all of Johnson’s other claims on the merits, and we affirmed the district court’s denial of relief. Johnson I, 806 F.2d at 1482-87. Johnson’s second death warrant was signed in March 1988.

On April 10, 1988, three days before his scheduled execution, Johnson petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of execution. The court denied the requested relief the next day, reaching the merits of all of Johnson’s claims. Johnson v. Dugger (Johnson II), 523 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988).⁸ On the same day Johnson petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for habeas relief, he also filed a motion in the state trial court for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.⁹ There, Johnson for the first time claimed that his sentencing counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of Johnson’s good character and by failing to present and develop available psychological evidence at sentencing.¹⁰ The trial court denied the motion for post-conviction relief on April 11, 1988, because the motion had not been filed prior to January 1, 1987, as required by rule 3.850. The Supreme Court of Florida stayed Johnson’s impending execution and reviewed the trial court’s judgment. The supreme court agreed that the motion had not been timely filed and consequently the court ruled that it was procedurally barred. Johnson v. State (Johnson III), 536 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla.1988). Two justices dissented; they believed that despite the procedural bar, the court should have reached what they believed was a potentially meritorious issue (the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing issue) and remanded for an evi-dentiary hearing. See Johnson III, 536 So.2d at 1012-13 (Barkett, J., dissenting).

The governor of Florida signed a third death warrant in February 1989. On March 10, 1989, six days before Johnson’s scheduled execution, Johnson filed his second federal petition for habeas relief — the one we confront today.¹¹ In his petition, Johnson presents five claims: (1) that his sentencing hearing violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), because the trial judge, in overriding the advisory jury’s recommendation, failed to consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances; (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective in not challenging on direct appeal the denial of his motion to suppress an allegedly unreliable and suggestive photographic identification procedure; (3) that the Florida courts, by permitting the trial judge to override the jury’s recommendation in this case, have applied their reviewing standard in such a manner as to result in an arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death sentence, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) that his trial counsel, by failing to prepare a rebuttal to the state’s ballistics and crime-scene reconstruction evidence, was ineffective; and (5) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance both by not ensuring that a proper mental health examination was conducted prior to his sentencing hearing before the advisory jury and by failing to conduct any additional investigation between the initial sentencing hearing and the sentencing hearing before the trial judge.

On March 14, 1989, the district court, without an evidentiary hearing, denied Johnson’s petition. The court rejected on the merits Johnson’s Hitchcock claim and his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. The court further held that Johnson’s challenge to the jury override constituted an abuse of the writ and that his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and sentencing counsel were procedurally barred. The next day, the court rejected Johnson’s motion to alter or amend judgment but granted Johnson’s request for a certificate of probable cause. This court granted Johnson’s motion for a third stay of execution.

Johnson appealed the district court’s denial of relief on all five claims. A panel of this court affirmed the district court’s denial of relief on all claims except the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 480. With regard to that claim, a two-judge majority vacated the district court’s denial of relief and remanded the claim to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. It is the resolution of that claim that is the primary force behind the en banc court’s decision to revisit this case. We disagree with the panel majority’s resolution of Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim, and we will devote our analysis to explaining why the district court’s decision to deny relief on that claim should be affirmed. We will then briefly address Johnson’s other claims.

II. JOHNSON’S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING: CONTENTIONS

Johnson argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. He contends that his court-appointed counsel at sentencing and the court-appointed psychologist who assisted counsel and testified at the sentencing hearing were unprepared to put on an effective defense. He further asserts that counsel should have and inexplicably failed to inform the psychologist of Johnson’s long history of drug abuse and addiction. Had this evidence been developed, he argues, sentencing counsel would have been able to create a record that probably would have influenced the sentencing judge to agree with the jury that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. Even if the judge did override the jury verdict, Johnson charges, the Supreme Court of Florida would have reversed that decision pursuant to Florida’s Tedder standard. That standard requires that “[i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.” Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975).

The State argues the claim is procedurally barred and even if the claim is not procedurally barred, the decision not to develop the drug abuse evidence was a strategic one and thus cannot constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court agreed that the claim is procedurally barred. The court noted that Johnson sought to raise the claim in his Florida Rule 3.850 proceedings. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, rejected the claim because Johnson had not filed his rule 3.850 petition within the rule’s time constraints. Therefore, the supreme court refused to review the claim on the merits. Johnson III, 536 So.2d at 1011.

III. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT¹²

The federal courts’ authority to review state court criminal convictions pursuant to writs of habeas corpus is severely restricted when a petitioner has failed to follow applicable state procedural rules in raising a claim, that is, where the claim is procedurally defaulted. Federal review of a petitioner’s claim is barred by the procedural default doctrine if the last state court to review the claim states clearly and expressly that its judgment rests on a procedural bar, Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), and that bar provides an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief. See id. at 262, 109 S.Ct. at 1042-43; Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1987, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). The doctrine serves to ensure petitioners will first seek relief in accordance with state procedures, see Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567, 1578-79 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050, 109 S.Ct. 882, 102 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989), and to “lessen the injury to a State that results through reexamination of a state conviction on a ground that a State did not have the opportunity to address at a prior, appropriate time.” McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991).

The procedural default doctrine implicates “concerns flowing from the significant costs of federal habeas corpus review. To begin with, the writ strikes at finality.” Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1468. Finality has added significance in the context of a federal attack on a state conviction. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). “Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the state’s sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1572, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Federal collateral review also “places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.” McCleskey v. Zant, — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1469. Finally, federal habeas review “may give litigants incentives to withhold claims ... and may establish disincentives to present claims when evidence is fresh.” Id. Far more severe are the disruptions when a state’s procedural rules are bypassed and a claim is presented for the first time in federal court. Cf. id., — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1469.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim in Johnson III, 536 So.2d 1009 (Fla.1988). Johnson first asserted the claim in the trial court in April 1988, more than nine years after the conclusion of his trial and sentencing. The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for post-conviction relief because it had not been filed prior to January 1, 1987, as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.¹³ This is an adequate and independent state ground for refusing to consider this claim, Whiddon v. Dugger, 894 F.2d 1266, 1267-68 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 102, 112 L.Ed.2d 73 (1990), and the supreme court clearly and expressly rested its judgment on rule 3.850’s procedural bar, see Johnson III, 536 So.2d at 1011. The state of Florida has a significant and legitimate interest in enforcing the provision in rule 3.850 that limits the time within which challenges to criminal convictions may be brought, and no one argues otherwise.¹⁴ We conclude, as did the panel, that federal review of the claim is barred unless Johnson can show that we should apply an exception to the procedural default doctrine.

IV. THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PROCEDURAL DEFAULT DOCTRINE

There are two exceptions to the procedural default bar. A federal court may still review the merits of Johnson’s claim, despite the procedural bar, if Johnson can establish that he meets one of these exceptions. First, a procedural default may be ignored by a federal court if the petitioner can show both “cause for the default and prejudice attributable thereto.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2644, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The Supreme Court has created a narrow second exception: “in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal ha-beas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649.

A. Cause and Prejudice

We begin our analysis by examining whether Johnson has demonstrated cause to excuse his procedural default. Johnson asserts that he instructed his lawyers who were handling the state post-conviction proceeding to raise all possible grounds for relief, including any potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim.¹⁵ Johnson argues that the failure of his attorneys to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim within the two-year limit imposed by rule 3.850, despite his instructions to do so, constitutes cause for his procedural default. Johnson does not tell us what standard should be applied to determine when post-conviction attorney error will amount to cause. Instead, he argues that in a situation where a prisoner specifically advises his counsel regarding what steps to take in pursuing a habeas corpus petition, and counsel fails to heed those instructions, we should not hold the prisoner to any decisions of his attorney that result in a procedural default.

After this case was briefed and argued, however, the Supreme Court decided precisely this issue adversely to Johnson. In Coleman v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), the Court held: “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Id., at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2566 (citations omitted). The Court went on to conclude that because errors of post-conviction counsel cannot be constitutionally ineffective, a petitioner “must ‘bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.’” Id. (quoting Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645). Thus, because Johnson had no constitutional right to counsel during his post-conviction proceedings,' his attorneys’ errors during those proceedings cannot constitute cause to excuse his procedural default. Because Johnson has failed to establish one element of the cause and prejudice exception, he cannot show the exception applies. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1575 n. 43 (1982). To obtain review of his ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim, then, Johnson must establish that the second exception to the procedural default doctrine applies.

B. The Second Exception to the Procedural Default Doctrine: Actually Innocent

In certain extraordinary circumstances, a federal court has the equitable power to consider an issue notwithstanding the existence of a procedural bar. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96, 106 S.Ct. at 2649. A federal court may do so “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id. at 496, 106 S.Ct. at 2649. In addition, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging that “the concept of ‘actual’ as opposed to ‘legal’ innocence does not translate easily into the context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital offense,” has concluded that one may be actually innocent of the death penalty. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2668, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). The actually innocent exception is alternatively known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. Johnson argues that even if we decide he has not established cause for his failure to abide by Florida’s procedural rules, the facts of this case demand that we invoke this second exception to the procedural default doctrine. He asserts that but for the procedural bar, his sentence of death would be vacated in favor of a sentence of life imprisonment. Therefore, according to Johnson, we must exercise our equitable powers and consider his claim on the merits in order to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The State counters that this is not an appropriate case for the invocation of the second exception to the procedural default doctrine and that to do so would be contrary to Supreme Court precedent.

It has been years since the Supreme Court’s delineation of the “actually innocent” exception to the procedural default doctrine. In the context of the sentencing phase of a capital trial, however, we still have no workable definition of the exception, either from the Supreme Court or this court. A workable definition is essential to our jurisprudence because we are often faced with procedurally-defaulted claims, and many petitioners claim they meet this second exception. It is crucial that we know when to apply the exception, so as to limit our interference with the states’ criminal justice systems and promote finality while simultaneously recognizing the truly extraordinary case in which a petitioner’s claim must be reviewed despite a procedural bar in order to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice.¹⁶

The panel attempted to define the “actually innocent” exception. We reject that definition, however, for reasons which will become apparent. First we must delve a bit deeper into Johnson’s allegations regarding why the exception applies here. Next we must describe the panel’s holding that those allegations, if true, establish the need to invoke the actually innocent exception and the panel’s proposed definition of when a petitioner is actually innocent of the death penalty. Finally, we must propose a workable definition of this exception. In so doing, we will describe why the panel’s proposed definition is unacceptable.

1. Johnson’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing

Johnson alleges his attorneys at sentencing and his court-appointed psychologist failed to conduct a competent investigation of his psychological state. Had they done so, he asserts, they would have discovered psychological problems resulting from a long history of drug abuse and addiction. Johnson contends such an investigation would have enabled sentencing counsel to demonstrate the existence of three statutory mitigating factors, which would have precluded the jury override.¹⁷

The testimony presented by Johnson’s counsel at the sentencing hearing before the advisory jury consisted of the following. A prison official from Tennessee, who had previously been called by the State, was recalled. He testified regarding Johnson’s medium security classification in the Tennessee prison system before his escape from that system.¹⁸ Next, sentencing counsel called a local religious leader to testify regarding the morality of the death penalty. The State objected and the judge sustained the objection and refused to allow the witness to testify.¹⁹ Sentencing counsel’s principal witness, court-appointed psychologist Ronald Yarbrough, was then called.

Yarbrough had interviewed Johnson the night before for about two and one-half hours.²⁰ During the interview he conducted several psychological tests, and he later analyzed the results of those tests.²¹ From this information, Yarbrough testified, he could “draw some strong hypotheses” regarding Johnson’s “behavior in various situations.” ²² The psychologist testified that Johnson had a “high average range of intelligence” and “an extremely high level of commonsense,” but that if Johnson didn’t want to apply himself to a task, he wouldn’t.²³ Yarbrough believed Johnson to be “in contact with reality,” and not schizophrenic or psychotic.²⁴ He found “no evidence of organic brain damage,”²⁵ that Johnson probably had problems with authority figures,²⁶ that he had a good relationship with his family,²⁷ and that Johnson perceived himself as “cool” and was probably perceived as a leader within his peer group.²⁸ Finally, Yarbrough opined that Johnson’s ability to think and make decisions “deteriorates dramatically” in stressful situations, that in “extremely demanding emotional situation^ Johnson] breaks down his normal mode of thinking, ... decision making ... [and] responding,”²⁹ but that there was nothing to indicate that on the day of the crime Johnson did not appreciate the criminality of his conduct.³⁰

The next witness was Johnson’s sister, who testified regarding Johnson’s disadvantaged background.³¹ Johnson’s sister also testified that whatever happened to Johnson would have an effect on her;³² the final witness, Johnson’s daughter, testified to the same effect.³³ The advisory jury and sentencing judge were also of course free to consider the fact that Johnson did not initiate the gun battle, and were free to consider Johnson’s counsels’ argument at the advisory sentencing hearing (and at the second sentencing hearing before the trial judge) that Johnson’s decision to shoot the pharmacist was the product of, among other things, his extreme emotional disturbance after being shot at by Moulton.

Johnson’s sentencing counsel made an effort to exclude evidence regarding the details of Johnson’s past and his record of violent crime. Counsel made a motion in limine to exclude such evidence, including evidence of Johnson’s recent attempted escape from prison.³⁴ Also, counsel stated that he wished to foreclose impeachment by not relying on character evidence;³⁵ thus testimony from Johnson’s sister was limited to showing his background, not his character.

Johnson now claims that Yarbrough’s psychological evaluation was seriously flawed by sentencing counsel’s failure to instruct Yarbrough to ask Johnson about his long history of drug abuse (and by implication, Yarbrough’s failure to ask Johnson about any history of drug abuse and Johnson’s failure to mention that history to Yarbrough during the interview) as well as the failure to conduct any further investigation regarding Johnson’s psychological state during the month between the advisory jury hearing and the final sentencing hearing before the trial judge.

Attached to Johnson’s second federal ha-beas petition is an affidavit in which Yar-brough indicates that when he testified he was unaware of Johnson’s drug problem or the role that problem played in the murder and robbery. After examining affidavits of friends and family members regarding the severity of Johnson’s drug addiction, as well as the affidavit of Dr. Peter Macaluso, an addictionologist who interviewed Johnson, Yarbrough’s opinion of Johnson’s psychological state is now different. He now believes that at the time of the murder Johnson “was under the influence of a totally controlling, extreme drug addiction,” ³⁶ and that Johnson’s “capacity to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or to conform to the requirements of law were [sic] substantially impaired.”³⁷ Also attached to the petition are the affidavits of two doctors (including Dr. Macaluso) who interviewed Johnson in 1988. Their conclusion is similar to that of Yarbrough, that is, that at the time of the murder Johnson was consumed by an overwhelming desire to obtain drugs to feed his drug habit.

2. The Panel Majority’s View

Johnson argues, and the panel majority agreed, that if these more recent psychological evaluations are true, they demonstrate that Yarbrough’s preliminary conclusions as testified to in the advisory jury sentencing hearing were inaccurate. The panel majority concluded that

[t]his evidence, if true, suggests the existence of three statutory mitigating circumstances under Florida law. See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) (“The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.”); § 921.141(6)(e) (“The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.”); § 921.141(6)(f) (“The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.”).

Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 462. The panel majority was of the opinion that “were this case before us unencumbered with concerns of procedural default, we think it is clear that the proffered evidence would support a conclusion that Johnson was prejudiced by his sentencing counsel’s failure to develop and present this evidence during sentencing before the trial judge.” Id. The majority concluded that “there is a high degree of certainty that the sentencing court would not have overridden the jury verdict,” id., and that under the Ted-der standard, “there is a high degree of certainty that the Florida Supreme Court would not have permitted such an override had the evidence now before us been timely presented.” Id. at 463.

The panel majority considered the meaning of the actually innocent exception. It proposed the following test:

[I]n order to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, [a petitioner] must prove that as a result of the alleged constitutional error the sentencing body’s deliberative process was affected to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error. In most cases, we envision that this will necessitate proof that as a result of the alleged constitutional error (1) the sentencing body was under a misperception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and (2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death.

Id. at 468-69 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).³⁸

The panel majority noted that one method of meeting the actually innocent exception is to establish that absent an alleged constitutional violation, the sentencing body would not have found any aggravating factors. The majority “declined to hold, however, that a petitioner must establish that the constitutional error implicates all of the existing aggravating factors before a federal court should entertain a proeedurally defaulted constitutional claim.” Id. at 469 (emphasis in original).

Applying its newly-developed test to Johnson’s case, the panel majority held that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to prevent a potential fundamental miscarriage of justice. Johnson, the majority decided, has “proffered evidence which if true would establish that he was probably actually innocent of the death sentence.” Id. at 477. The dissenting judge offered quite a different view of what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty, a view with which we agree.³⁹

3. The Death Penalty Prior to Furman v. Georgia

The Supreme Court’s treatment of the relationship between sentencing discretion, the death penalty, and the Eighth Amendment has resulted in an almost perfect jurisprudential circle.⁴⁰ Prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), many states authorized the death penalty for any defendant found guilty of what we reluctantly refer to as “simple murder.” The death penalty was not mandatory; the jury or other sentencing authority had unlimited discretion to grant the defendant mercy and impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. The Supreme Court unequivocally denounced such discretion in Furman, concluding that unguided sentencing led to the discriminatory, arbitrary, and capricious imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In short, the Court found no merit in discretion.

At least thirty states enacted new death penalty statutes in response to Furman’s concern for unguided discretion. One group of states interpreted Furm,an to require the removal of all discretion in the capital sentencing context. These states passed laws that mandated the death penalty for certain statutorily defined crimes. The other group of states opted to provide guided discretion in the sentencing process by listing certain statutorily defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These latter states undertook to confine the sentencing body’s discretion within the statutory factors.

The Supreme Court reviewed these two distinct types of statutes during the same term in 1976 and struck down mandatory death penalty statutes,⁴¹ but upheld statutes that provided for discretion.⁴² Limited discretion, according to the Court, was both consistent with, and necessary to, the constitutional requirement of an individualized evaluation of the death penalty’s appropriateness. So began the arc back toward discretion. The Furman Court announced a retreat from discretion in capital sentencing; in Woodson, Roberts, Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, that retreat arched backward toward a constitutional appreciation of discretion.

In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the Court did not merely tolerate discretion, but mandated it! Death penalty statutes following Furman had apparently confined the exercise of discretion “at both ends.” These statutes generally required the sentencing authority to consider certain statutorily specified aggravating circumstances and statutorily specified mitigating circumstances found to accompany the murder. The trial court in Lockett had apparently concluded that to allow consideration of claimed mitigating circumstances not in the statute would authorize the type of unbridled discretion condemned in Furman. The Supreme Court held, however, that the Constitution requires states to afford the sentencing authority the discretion to consider any circumstances claimed to be mitigating, whether encompassed in the statute or not. Thus, the Court constitutionally imposed unbridled discretion in the grant of mercy. It appeared, however, that the Court may have left the consideration of aggravating circumstances to those prescribed in the various state statutes.

The Court then “dropped the other shoe.” In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) and Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), the Court revealed its appreciation of the fact that a defendant is guilty of a murder for which the death penalty could be imposed where it is found that the murder was accompanied by one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances. Thus, the capital crime is not murder; it may be called aggravated murder or capital murder. Once convicted of such a crime, not only can unlimited mitigating circumstances as per Lockett be shown, but the state can prove facts in aggravation of the capital crime, whether listed as statutory aggravating circumstances or not.

4. The Death Penalty Today: “Aggravated Murder”

Prior to Furman, the sentencing authority in a murder case had unfettered discretion to consider virtually anything asserted in mitigation. Lockett re-established that practice. Prior to Furman, the sentencer in a capital case could consider anything, in its unfettered discretion, in aggravation. Barclay and Zant have re-established this practice so long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance accompanies the murder. In practical terms, the Court has reinvigorated discretion in capital sentencing in order to guarantee an individualized sentencing process.

Engineers and surveyors use the phrase “failure to close” to express the idea that one has measured from a known reference point to certain unknown points without returning to the original reference point. This expression aptly describes the historical progression of death penalty jurisprudence. Shortly after Lockett, we noted the “inherent tension” between the Court’s aspiration for “individualized sentencing and objective standards.” Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1521 (11th Cir.1983). Justice Scalia has recently denounced this tension as internally contradictory. Walton v. Arizona, — U.S. -, -, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3051-52, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).⁴³

The Court seems to have resolved the tension by making one full turn on a “coil spring” or a “spiral staircase” of case law. The Court has returned the law largely to its pre-Furman state but has ratcheted the doctrine up one step from its starting point. Prior to Furman, “simple murder” was a capital crime. Today the level of criminal conduct for a capital crime has been raised; a defendant must commit the new crime of “capital murder” or “aggravated murder” in order to be eligible for the death penalty. This new crime is defined as “murder accompanied by one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances.” The sentencing authority may not impose the death penalty for “simple murder.” The essential point of this development in the law, at least with regard to Johnson’s claim of actual innocence, is that when the prosecution has proved that the defendant committed aggravated murder, the sentencing authority has very broad discretion to sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment or the death penalty.

Because Johnson’s proposed showing of factual error does not cast doubt on his guilt of a crime for which the sentencing authority in his case could impose the death penalty (i.e., “murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance”), he has not made a colorable showing of actual innocence. Therefore, Johnson is not entitled to a review on the merits of his defaulted constitutional claim.

5. The “Eligibility” Test for Actual Innocence

The Supreme Court has not told us what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty. In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), a majority of the Court held that “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal ha-beas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”⁴⁴ This statement expresses a fundamental tenet of our administration of criminal law: “an innocent person ... in custody or in jeopardy of the execution of a death sentence [must have unlimited opportunities] to repair to a court of justice for relief.” Gunn v. Newsome, 881 F.2d 949, 966 (11th Cir.) (Hill, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989).

In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986), the Court acknowledged the difficulties in translating the concept of “innocence” from the guilt phase of a capital trial to the sentencing context. The Smith Court also reiterated that, even in the sentencing context, courts must continue to distinguish between actual, as distinct from legal, innocence. Smith, 477 U.S. at 537, 106 S.Ct. at 2666. A more recent majority of the Court expressly reaffirmed that the actual innocence test limits a federal habeas court’s authority to reach the merits of defaulted claims for which a petitioner cannot demonstrate cause. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1217-18 n. 6, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989).

In both Smith and Adams, as in the present ease, the Court considered allegations that constitutional errors led to factual inaccuracies in the sentencing process. In Smith the Court considered the importance under the actual innocence standard of certain highly prejudicial statements made by the defendant to his court-appointed psychiatrist. The trial court admitted these statements at Smith’s sentencing in violation of Smith’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Like Johnson, Smith had defaulted on these claims. The Court found that the alleged error did not concern a factual inaccuracy in the sentencing process since the inadmissible evidence was both probative and reliable.

The panel majority attempted to distinguish Smith by noting that Johnson’s allegations of error do in fact involve claims of factual inaccuracies. Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 467-68.⁴⁵ The panel majority ignored the “critical role” that the alleged constitutional error in Smith “played ... in the determination that death [was] an appropriate penalty”; that error, in fact, “made the difference between life and death in the jury’s consideration of [Smith’s] fate.” Id. 477 U.S. at 539, 106 S.Ct. at 2669 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court assumed that Smith was “legally innocent” — that if the trial court had properly suppressed his statements the sentencing body probably would have imposed life imprisonment rather that the death penalty. The Court nevertheless held that the claim was “unrelated to [actual] innocence.” Id. at 539, 106 S.Ct. at 2668. The sentencing body in Smith would have remained free, even if the trial court had excluded Smith’s statements, to impose the death penalty; thus Smith’s claim of error did not implicate his actual innocence of the death penalty.

In other words, although factual inaccuracy in the guilt or sentencing context may well be necessary to a claim of actual innocence, factual inaccuracy is not sufficient unless the inaccuracy demonstrates, at least colorably, that the petitioner is actually innocent, or ineligible for, either an adjudication of guilt or the sentence imposed. If prejudicial factual inaccuracy alone is enough to warrant review of a defaulted claim, then the actual innocence standard is meaningless.

Dugger v. Adams also illustrates this point. In that case, the Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that an alleged Caldwell error established a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). The petitioner asserted that the trial judge violated the Eighth Amendment when he mistakenly advised the jury that its sentencing recommendation was merely advisory. The statements purportedly misled the jury regarding its role in the capital sentencing process under Florida law. The Adams majority acquiesced in the view (expressed in Justice Blackmun’s dissent) that the alleged Caldwell error did not concern merely “the [erroneous] inclusion or exclusion of particular evidence”; the error was “global in scope” and pervasive in its tendency to influence the jury’s recommendation. Adams, 489 U.S. at 423, 109 S.Ct. at 1224 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rather than refute the dissent’s characterization of the facts, the majority instead expressly rejected the idea that “a fundamental miscarriage of justice results whenever ‘there is a substantial claim that the constitutional violation undermined the accuracy of the sentencing decision.’ ” Id. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6 (quoting Blackmun, J., dissenting, id. at 415, 109 S.Ct. at 1219 n. 4). Because, as in the case at hand, the sentencing body was free to impose the death penalty despite the alleged error — regardless of whether it would have done so in the absence of the error — the claim did not implicate Adams’s actual innocence of the death penalty.

As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court has not expressly defined actual innocence in the context of the death sentence. Id. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6. In the guilt phase of a trial, a defendant is innocent of the crime if, under the alleged facts, he or she is not eligible for an adjudication of guilt. “Actual eligibility” and “legal eligibility” are distinct; a defendant is innocent of a crime only if he is ineligible for an adjudication of guilt — either by virtue of a (correct or incorrect) finding of innocence, or through objective facts that prove that a guilty verdict was wrong because the defendant did not commit each and every element of the crime charged.

A properly convicted defendant’s claim to innocence in the sentencing context is likewise tied to eligibility. A convicted defendant is eligible for any punishment within the discretion the legislature accords the sentencing body. One cannot say that the defendant is innocent of the sentence imposed if the defendant actually committed the necessary acts that would make him eligible for the particular punishment chosen. Even if the guilty defendant can demonstrate that a constitutional error led to a factual inaccuracy — which in turn prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing body’s deliberative process — the defendant is not innocent of the sentence imposed.

The somewhat narrower scope of innocence in the sentencing phase of a trial, as compared to the guilt phase, results from the unique role that discretion plays in sentencing. The discretionary nature of sentencing necessarily reduces the objective criteria by which a court may determine that a particular sentence is wrong or unauthorized. Only under very limited circumstances is a court competent to determine that a defendant is ineligible for a particular sentence despite the sentencing body’s decision to the contrary. In the guilt phase of a trial, innocence and guilt have an objective existence that a court may under certain circumstances discern— either at trial or in a collateral proceeding. The petitioner may assert new facts (or improperly excluded facts) with regard to guilt, and a court may determine that, given those facts, a finding of guilt was unauthorized.

At sentencing, by contrast, there are few “elements” necessary for a particular sentence. A showing that an erroneous factual premise probably influenced the sentencing body does not necessarily mean that the defendant is innocent or ineligible for the sentence imposed. Only under very limited circumstances may a court determine that a factual showing demonstrates the defendant’s ineligibility for the sentence imposed in light of purportedly inaccurate or incomplete facts. The sentenced defendant must demonstrate not merely that the error affected the sentencing outcome, but that the error resulted in a sentencing outcome for which the defendant is not eligible by virtue of his conduct.

In the capital sentencing context, the defendant becomes eligible for the death sentence only if the sentencing body correctly finds that he has committed a crime for which the sentencing body could, in its discretion, sentence him to death. Thus, a petitioner may make a colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty by presenting evidence that an alleged constitutional error implicates all of the aggravating factors found to be present by the sentencing body. That is, but for the alleged constitutional error, the sentencing body could not have found any aggravating factors and thus the petitioner was ineligible for the death penalty. In other words, the petitioner must show that absent the alleged constitutional error, the jury would have lacked the discretion to impose the death penalty; that is, that he is ineligible for the death penalty.⁴⁶

6. The Panel Majority’s “Actual Prejudice” Test

The panel majority attempted to articulate a test to determine whether a constitutional error has skewed a “sentencing body’s deliberative process ... to such a degree that its ultimate conclusions are probably factually in error.” Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468 (emphasis omitted). Asking the wrong question necessarily begets the wrong answer. When a defendant is eligible for the death penalty (by virtue of having committed first-degree murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance), it is nearly impossible to determine that the sentencing body’s ultimate conclusion that imprisonment is more appropriate than the death penalty (or vice versa) is “correct” or “accurate,” or “incorrect” or “inaccurate.”

The nature of the question asked by the panel majority illustrates its misinterpretation of the “actual” or “factual” innocence standard. Although factual errors can undermine the factual premises from which the sentencing body reaches its ultimate conclusion, one can never say that the ultimately discretionary choice by the sentencing body is “factually in error.” Other than in the context of a general proportionality review, a court lacks objective criteria by which to divine that it is “factually incorrect” to sentence a particular death-eligible defendant to death, or to life imprisonment instead. So long as the jury could have imposed the death penalty, there can be no “correct” or “incorrect” sentencing outcome.

It is, however, possible to determine that a constitutional error led to a factual error, and that the factual error probably influenced the sentencing body to select the death penalty. In fact, courts often define “prejudicial error” in just this fashion. It is within Congress’ power to enable federal courts to review these errors in habeas proceedings, regardless of a litigant’s procedural default or of an abuse of the writ. The Supreme Court has interpreted habeas jurisdictional statutes to require, in such defaulted or abusive cases, more than prejudicial error. The Court reached this conclusion in light of certain expressions of congressional intent and a serious concern for comity and finality.

The panel majority attempted to distinguish its test from the ordinary test for prejudice. The majority was correct that the Supreme Court has admonished courts to apply the test for “actual innocence” in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was admitted (or excluded) as a result of constitutional error. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627 n. 17, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (citing Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U.Chi.L.Rev. 142, 160 (1970)); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 538, 106 S.Ct. at 2668. We recognize that the panel majority applied its test in light of all probative evidence. Our concern is that the panel majority’s test seeks to answer the wrong question. The panel majority’s test asks whether, but for a factual misim-pression with regard to aggravation or mitigation, the sentencing body probably would have exercised its discretion in a different manner. The Supreme Court has made clear that the question is whether, in light of all probative evidence, including evidence that was or was not admitted as a result of the alleged constitutional error, the petitioner has made a colorable showing that he has suffered a conviction or received a punishment that the adjudicator of guilt or the sentencing body was not free to impose under the actual facts.

In answering what is a wrong and an unanswerable question, the panel majority propose a test that equates “correctness” or “accuracy” of sentence with a deliberative process free from factual errors that affect the exercise of discretion. According to the panel majority, if the petitioner makes a colorable showing of the following, he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his claim — regardless of an unexcused procedural default or an abuse of the writ:

(1) the sentencing body was under a mis-perception as to the factual background of either the offender or the offense, and

(2) but for those factual misperceptions held by the sentencing body, the petitioner probably would not have received a sentence of death.

Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 468-69.

The panel majority’s test has only a slight bearing on the petitioner’s “innocence” of the sentence imposed. It instead looks to the purity of the deliberative process and grants relief for errors that probably affected the outcome. The panel majority held that a petitioner is “guilty” of the death penalty only if the process by which he received that sentence is absolutely free from any omissions or presentations of fact that probably influenced the sentencing body’s exercise of discretion. Conversely, a petitioner is actually innocent of the death penalty, according to the panel majority, if any “factual” error with regard to aggravation or mitigation probably influenced the deliberative process. In short, the panel majority sets forth a roughly accurate description of the standard for evaluating the significance of a timely raised allegation of constitutional error in connection with the sentencing process.⁴⁷

Aside from being wrong, the panel majority’s test is an undesirable one for several reasons. The test is fundamentally offensive to both comity and finality. It requires a federal court to review the merits of a claim whenever an alleged constitutional error probably influenced the sentencing body to impose the death penalty even though a claim is procedurally defaulted, constitutes an abuse of the writ, or is barred under both doctrines. Thus, the panel majority’s test abolishes the distinction between a petitioner’s first federal ha-beas petition and all subsequent such petitions. It matters not, under the panel majority’s test, that a petitioner is filing his second, third, fourth, or even tenth federal habeas petition. If he can make out a colorable claim of “actual prejudice,” he is entitled to have the merits of his claim reviewed. Were this Johnson’s first federal habeas petition, he would have to allege and prove both that the performance of his counsel at sentencing was deficient, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the panel majority’s test, Johnson need prove no more even though his claim is procedurally defaulted or abusive or both.

The test creates the necessity of holding an evidentiary hearing for the first time in federal court on a claim the petitioner should have presented to a state court long ago. Were we to remand this case, as the panel majority held we should, a federal district court would hear evidence a state court never had the opportunity to hear and evaluate. The panel majority’s assertion that its test is reserved for extraordinary cases is of little comfort. This case demonstrates that the panel majority’s test “turn[s] the case in which an error results in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, the ‘extraordinary case,’ ... into an all too ordinary one.” Adams, 489 U.S. at 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 1217-18 n. 6. Johnson’s claim is a common one. He claims that his counsel did a poor job — they could have done better, and if they had, he probably would not have received the death penalty. We are faced with similar claims in many capital cases. Thus, the panel majority’s test would require evidentiary hearings in many not-so-extraordinary cases.

Lastly, the panel majority’s test encourages and rewards “sandbagging.” Johnson’s habeas counsel admitted they filed first in federal court because they believed they could always go back to state court later. In part, the procedural default doctrine is designed to prevent such practices. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The panel majority’s test allows petitioners to circumvent the procedural default doctrine and the policy against intentionally withholding claims all too easily.

7. Is Johnson Actually Innocent of the Death Penalty?

The excluded evidence does not implicate any of the four aggravating factors found by the trial judge and upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida. Johnson, therefore, was convicted of murder accompanied by at least one aggravating factor. Further, the introduction of the now proffered evidence would not have deprived the sentencing judge of the discretion to impose the death penalty. The panel majority uncritically accepted Johnson’s claim that the proffered evidence, if true, would have been considered a mitigating factor by the advisory jury and trial judge. We disagree. There is a very real possibility that both the jury and the judge might not have accepted the drug compulsion theory as a mitigating factor, but instead would have considered Johnson’s propensity toward violent crime — whether or not the product of a drug addiction — as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. Even if the evidence would have established the existence of statutory mitigating circumstances, however, we nevertheless conclude that Johnson has not satisfied the actually innocent exception to the procedural default doctrine. In other words, Johnson has not shown that the trial judge was not free to sentence Johnson to death. We hold that Johnson has not made a colorable showing that he is actually innocent of the death penalty and we should not, therefore, exercise our discretion to review the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim.

V. ABUSE OF THE WRIT

Because we conclude that Johnson’s ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim is procedurally barred, we need not decide whether the claim is also an abuse of the writ.

VI. JOHNSON’S OTHER CLAIMS

The district court rejected on the merits both Johnson’s Hitchcock claim and his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. We find no error in those determinations. The district court concluded that Johnson’s jury override claim was an abuse of the writ. We agree with the panel majority’s conclusion that the claim is successive and that no exception to the abuse of the writ doctrine requires us to address the merits of that claim. Finally, the district court determined that Johnson’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is procedurally barred. Again, we agree with the panel majority that the claim is procedurally defaulted and that no exception to the procedural default doctrine requires us to reach the merits of that claim.

VII.CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court denying Johnson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

1 . Two court-appointed attorneys represented Johnson prior to trial and in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.

2 . A different team of three court-appointed attorneys represented Johnson at both the sentencing hearing before the advisory jury and the sentencing hearing before the trial judge.

3 .The five aggravating circumstances identified were:

(1) at the time of the murder, Johnson was under a sentence of imprisonment, but had escaped, see Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(a); (2) Johnson had previously been convicted of two felonies involving the use or threat of violence to the person, see Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(b); (3) Johnson knowingly created a great risk of death to the other three persons present in the drugstore at the time of the murder, see Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(c); (4) the murder was committed during the commission of an armed robbery, see Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(d); (5) the manner in which Johnson killed his victim was "atrocious and cruel and was committed to reek revenge upon [the victim] for having defended his life and property in a completely lawful manner,” see Fla.Stat. § 921.141(5)(h).

See Record at 1719-23.

4 .Another court-appointed attorney represented Johnson on direct appeal. In that proceeding, Johnson presented the following challenges: (1) a claim addressing the exclusion of an expert witness who would have testified as to the unreliability of eyewitness identification; (2) constitutional challenges that the imposition of the death penalty after the jury had recommended life imprisonment violated his right not to be subjected to double jeopardy, his right to due process, his right to trial by a jury, and his right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment; (3) a claim that the trial judge’s override of the advisory jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment was inconsistent with the standard set forth in Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975); (4) a claim that improper cross-examination by the prosecutor constituted prose-cutorial misconduct and denied him a fundamentally fair trial; and (5) an attack on the trial court's decision to admit photographic evidence reconstructing the crime scene. See Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981).

During the pendency of his direct appeal, Johnson joined with 122 other Florida death row inmates in filing an application for extraordinary relief and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in state court based upon the allegation that the Supreme Court of Florida had a practice of reviewing ex parte, non-record information concerning capital defendants. The Supreme Court of Florida denied relief. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 542, 70 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981).

5 . The court held that the trial judge erred in finding an aggravating circumstance based upon Johnson having created a great risk of death to many persons. “Three people are not 'many persons' as we have interpreted that term in the context of section 921.141(5)(c).” Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1980) (citation omitted). The other four aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge were upheld. Under Florida law, the sentencing court may impose a sentence of death if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. Fla.Stat. § 921.141 (Supp. 1991).

6 . In his first federal habeas proceeding, Johnson was represented by three volunteer attorneys, at least one of whom was also court-appointed. None of the three attorneys represented Johnson at trial or sentencing. In his petition, Johnson raised the following issues: (1) the Brown issue {see footnote 4); (2) the jury override issue; (3) the trial judge’s application of the Tedder jury override standard; (4) the prosecutorial misconduct issue; (5) the expert witness issue; (6) the allegedly improper admission of photographs of the interior of the pharmacy; (7) whether he was denied due process because the Supreme Court of Florida failed to remand his case for resentencing after it had found that one of the five aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court did not exist; and (8) whether the trial court’s alleged failure to consider nonstatutory mitigating factors proffered by Johnson deprived him of due process.

7 . Johnson v. Wainwright (Johnson I), 806 F.2d 1479, 1481 n. 2 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987).

8 . During this proceeding, Johnson was represented by court-appointed attorneys. In his petition, Johnson raised five claims: (1) the trial court restricted its consideration of mitigating circumstances to the statutory list in violation of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); (2) appellate counsel ineffectively presented the override issue; (3) appellate counsel ineffectively challenged the aggravating circumstances found by the trial court; (4) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress a pretrial photographic identification; and (5) the excusal of two jurors pursuant to section 40.-01(1), Florida Statutes (1977), which provided automatic exemption from jury service for pregnant women and women with children under age 15, deprived Johnson of his Sixth Amendment right to trial by a fair cross-section of the community and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

9 . During this proceeding, Johnson was represented by the same court-appointed attorneys who represented him in the Supreme Court of Florida proceeding (Johnson II).

10 . In addition to Johnson’s new claim of ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel, he also claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an independent ballistics expert.

11 . In the present proceeding, Johnson was represented by court-appointed attorneys in the district court, before the panel and before the en banc court.

12 . Judge Tjoflat, in a separate opinion, notes his belief that in cases such as this one, where a petitioner presents a claim that is barred by both the abuse of the writ doctrine and the procedural default doctrine, we should analyze whether to excuse the abuse of the writ before we proceed to an examination of whether we should excuse the procedural default. See post at 1187 n. 4. As a general proposition, that approach may be the proper one.

In this case, however, we believe there are two reasons why it is prudent to address the procedural default issue before the abuse of the writ question. First, the parties, at the written request of the en banc court, focused both their briefs and arguments on the procedural default question. Second, this court took this case en banc primarily to resolve the procedural default issue.

13 . The rule provides in pertinent part:

A motion to vacate a sentence which exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than two years after the judgment and sentence become final unless it alleges (1) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or his attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or, (2) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.

Any person whose judgment and sentence became final prior to January 1, 1985, shall have until January 1, 1987, to file a motion in accordance with this rule.

14 . The Supreme Court of Florida has made its view of the importance of rule 3.850 clear:

The credibility of the criminal justice system depends upon both fairness and finality. The time limitation of rule 3.850 accommodates both interests. It serves to reduce piecemeal litigation and the assertion of stale claims while at the same time preserving] the right to unlimited access to the courts where there is newly discovered evidence or where there have been fundamental constitutional changes in the law with retroactive application. When Johnson filed his motion for postconviction relief, over nine years had elapsed from the date of the trial. The motion was filed more than fifteen months after January 1, 1987. His claims do not fall within the two exceptions prescribed by the rule. Hence, the trial court properly denied Johnson’s motion as untimely.

Johnson III, 536 So.2d at 1011.

15 . In an affidavit filed in the district court as part of his second federal habeas proceeding, Johnson states,

I asked [my postconviction attorneys] to file everything they possibly could in my case. I told them I was innocent of this crime and that they should look into the evidence given by the State at my trial and raise that as an issue in my case. I also told them about Dr. Yarbrough seeing me late at night before my sentencing hearing. I told my lawyers to file a motion for me objecting to what my trial and sentencing lawyers did not do for me. I asked them to raise ineffective assistance of counsel issues in the proper motion.

Supplemental Appendix at 1.

16 . The importance of delineating such a procedural rule is amplified since the exception is also available to petitioners who present claims that are an abuse of the writ. See McCleskey v. Zant, - U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1470.

17 . At two points in his en banc brief Johnson refers to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). See Appellant’s En Banc Brief at 13-14 n. 5 & 33. We interpret these references to be an attempt to bolster Johnson's ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel claim and not a separate claim based solely on Ake. The panel, in examining similar references to Ake in Johnson’s brief to the panel, reached the same conclusion. See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 478-79 n. 80.

18 . Record at 1504-07.

19 . Id. at 1507-08.

20 . Id. at 1510-11.

21 . Id. at 1511-12.

22 . Id. at 1511.

23 . Id. at 1513.

24 . Id. at 1515.

25 . Id. at 1515, 1522.

26 . Id. at 1516, 1523.

27 . Id.

28 . Id. at 1517.

29 . Id. at 1520-21, 1524-25.

30 . Id. at 1525.

31 . Id. at 1525-26.

32 . Id. at 1526.

33 . Id. at 1527-28.

34 . Record at 1613-16, 1680-82. The trial judge agreed to exclude evidence of Johnson’s escape attempt (which took place while he was being held pending trial). He did so because Johnson had not yet been adjudicated guilty of the attempt.

On January 31, 1979, a jury found Johnson guilty of attempted voluntary escape and battery on a law enforcement officer. Johnson was sentenced to fifteen years on the escape count and five years on the battery count, to be served consecutively. See Transcript of Escape and Battery Trial at 146-47.

35 . Record at 1613-16 ("We intend to put on no evidence as to the defendant’s character for reasons that are obvious”).

36 . Petition at 124; Appendix 1 a 4-5.

37 . Id. at 5.

38 . The panel majority also imagined at least one other scenario where the exception would apply:

We can at least theoretically envision an instance in which a defendant has introduced sufficient evidence to conclusively establish that under no circumstance he or she should be given the death penalty; however, because of an erroneous instruction or some other unconstitutional factor, the deliberative body is unable to so conclude. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the factual record is complete, the jury, given the unconstitutional error, cannot assess the record appropriately. Such errors, if of sufficient magnitude, would also appear to fall within the scope of the exception as discussed in [Dugger v.] Adams [489 U.S. 401, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989) ] and Smith.

Id. at 469 n. 71.

39 . The discussion of what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty, contained in sections IV.B.3, B.4, B.5 and most of section IV.B.6 of this opinion, is taken directly from the dissenting opinion, with only minor changes. See Johnson v. Dugger, at 483-491 (Hill, J., dissenting). Indeed, many paragraphs are simply transcribed verbatim; we omit quotation marks for easier readability.

40 . See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 360, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("the Court has come full circle, not only permitting but requiring what Furman once condemned”).

41 . See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976) (same).

42 . Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (upholding guided discretion statute that requires the establishment of certain aggravating circumstances); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (upholding guided discretion statute that requires establishment of certain aggravating circumstances and a balancing of circumstances); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (upholding guided discretion statute that includes, among other factors, future dangerousness in the determination of whether to impose death).

43 . Justice Scalia argues that Lockett "completely exploded whatever coherence the notion of ‘guided discretion’ once had,” Walton, - U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3061, and notes that "[to] acknowledge that there perhaps is an inherent tension ... is rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent tension between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II,” id. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 3063 (internal quotation marks omitted).

44 . The Carrier Court made clear the "actual innocence” test defines the limits of federal habeas jurisdiction to review defaulted claims. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 493-94, 106 S.Ct. at 2646-47.

45 . Even if we agreed with the panel majority’s characterization of the potential value to Johnson of introducing his proffered psychiatric evidence, we could not agree that the failure to present such evidence resulted in the admission of false “facts” and "precluded" the development of true "facts.” See Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 475. First, even assuming arguendo that the sentencing attorneys did not exercise reasonable professional judgment in failing to apprise Dr. Yarbrough adequately regarding Johnson's pri- or involvement with drugs, or to pursue this theory after the jury recommended life, it seems odd to say that the error "precluded” the development of true facts. We think it fair to presume that Dr. Yarbrough knew that Johnson was convicted for killing a person in the course of robbing a drugstore for drugs, and that the attorneys could expect an examining psychologist, who was at the time and still is an expert in the field of drug abuse (See Appendix to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 1 at 5 (affidavit of Ronald Yarbrough)), to have inquired into the patient’s involvement with drugs. Second, neither the judge nor the jury would be required to find that the speculative opinion testimony proffered by Johnson today establishes as a matter of law either the statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances suggested by the panel majority. See id. at 477. Finally, and most importantly, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts must apply the "admission of false facts/preclusion of true facts” test to determine whether the defendant is actually, not legally, innocent of the crime charged or sentence imposed. Thus, even if one could characterize Johnson’s new psychological evidence as having caused the admission of false “facts” or "precluded” the admission of true "facts,” such evidence suggests prejudice, not "actual innocence.”

46 . We suppose a petitioner might also be able to make a colorable showing of actual innocence by demonstrating that but for an alleged constitutional error, the sentencing body would have been compelled to choose life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. This case does not present such a situation.

47 . The panel majority’s heavy reliance on Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930, 936 (11th Cir.1986), and similar cases, see Johnson v. Dugger, 911 F.2d at 462, makes clear that it seeks to replace the Supreme Court’s actual innocence test with the standard presently used to determine prejudice in the sentencing context. Porter did not involve either a procedural default or an abuse of the writ, both of which the panel majority conceded are present in this case. In simple terms, Porter explains the method by which a court determines whether a petitioner is entitled to relief for a constitutional error that is timely asserted (or an untimely assertion of error for which a sufficient legal excuse exists).