Wainwright v. Witt

469 U.S. 412, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 43, 53 U.S.L.W. 4108

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: January 21, 1985
• Docket: 83-1427
• Status: Published

Opinions

Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to examine once again the procedures for selection of jurors in criminal trials involving the possible imposition of capital punishment, see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and to consider standards for federal courts reviewing those procedures upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

I

Respondent Johnny Paul Witt was convicted of first-degree murder in Florida and sentenced to death. The murder was committed while respondent and a friend were bow- and-arrow hunting. The evidence at trial showed that the two had spoken together on other occasions about killing a human, and had even stalked persons as they would stalk animal prey. On the day in question, respondent, then aged 30, and his younger accomplice were hunting in a wooded area near a trail often used by children. When the victim, an 11-year-old boy, rode by on his bicycle, respondent’s accomplice hit the child on the head with a star bit from a drill. Respondent and his accomplice then gagged the stunned victim, placed him in the trunk of respondent’s car, and drove to a deserted grove. Upon opening the trunk, the conspirators discovered that the victim had died by suffocating from the gag. The two committed various sexual and violent acts on the body, then dug a grave and buried it.

Respondent was tried by a jury and convicted of first-degree murder. In accordance with the recommendation of the jury, the trial judge sentenced him to death. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court respondent raised a number of claims, one of which was that several prospective jurors had been improperly excluded for cause because of their opposition to capital punishment, in violation of this Court’s decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and this Court denied certiorari. Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497, cert. denied, 434 U. S. 935 (1977). After unsuccessfully petitioning for postconviction review in the state courts, see Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922 (Fla.), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 1067 (1980), respondent filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, raising numerous constitutional claims. That court denied the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and granted the writ. 714 F. 2d 1069 (1983), modified, 723 F. 2d 769 (1984).

The only claim the Eleventh Circuit found meritorious was respondent’s Witherspoon claim. The court found the following exchange during voir dire, between the prosecutor and venireman Colby, to be insufficient to justify Colby’s excusal for cause:¹

“[Q. Prosecutor:] Now, let me ask you a question, ma’am. Do you have any religious beliefs or personal beliefs against the death penalty?

“[A. Colby:] I am afraid personally but not—

“[Q]: Speak up, please.

“[A]: I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not religious.

“[Q]: Now, would that interfere with .you sitting as a juror in this case?

“[A]: I am afraid it would.

“[Q]: You are afraid it would?

“[A]: Yes, Sir.

“[Q]: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case?

“[A]: I think so.

“[Q]: You think it would.

“[A]: I think it would.

“[Q]: Your honor, I would move for cause at this point.

“THE COURT: All right. Step down.” Tr. 266-267.

Defense counsel did not object or attempt rehabilitation.

In Witherspoon, this Court held that the State infringes a capital defendant’s right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to trial by an impartial jury when it excuses for cause all those members of the venire who express conscientious objections to capital punishment. As the Court of Appeals in this ease noted, however, the Witherspoon Court also recognized the State’s legitimate interest in excluding those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to view the proceedings impartially, and who therefore might frustrate administration of a State’s death penalty scheme. The Court of Appeals drew the standard for determining when a juror may properly be excluded from Witherspoon’s footnote 21; jurors may be excluded for cause if they make it

“unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.” 391 U. S., at 522, n. 21 (emphasis in original).

The Court of Appeals construed our decisions to require that jurors expressing objections to the death penalty be given “great leeway” before their expressions justify dismissal for cause. “A prospective juror may even concede that his or her feelings about the death penalty would possibly color an objective determination of the facts of a case without admitting of the necessary partiality to justify excusal.” 714 F. 2d, at 1076-1080. The court concluded that the colloquy with venireman Colby reprinted above did not satisfy the Witherspoon standard. Colby’s limited expressions of “feelings and thoughts” failed to “unequivocally state that she would automatically be unable to apply the death penalty . . . .” Id., at 1082. In part, the court found the ambiguity in the record was caused by the lack of clarity of the prosecutor’s questions. The prosecutor’s question whether Colby’s feelings about the death penalty would “interfere” with her sitting was ambiguous, because the fact of such “interference” failed to satisfy Witherspoon’s requirement that she be unable to apply the death sentence under any circumstances. The court found its holding consistent with Circuit precedent applying the Witherspoon standard. See Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F. 2d 673 (CA5 1981); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F. 2d 396 (CA5 1980).

In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted its uncertainty over whether a state trial court’s finding of bias should be accorded a presumption of correctness under the federal statute governing habeas corpus proceedings, 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). The court stated, however, that under the circumstances it would reach the same result regardless of the standard of review. 714 F. 2d, at 1083, n. 10. Because this case raises questions on which there is considerable confusion in the lower courts, concerning the degree of deference that a federal habeas court should pay to a state trial judge’s determination that a juror may be excused for cause under Witherspoon, see Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F. 2d 1526, 1528-1530 (CA11 1984); O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F. 2d 365 (CA5 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1013 (1984); Texas v. Mead, 465 U. S. 1041, 1043 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and because of what seemed to us as more general confusion surrounding the application of Witherspoon, we granted certiorari. 466 U. S. 957. We reverse.

II

Witherspoon is best understood in the context of its facts. The case involved the capital sentencing procedures for the State of Illinois. Under the Illinois death sentencing statute, the jury was asked to decide only whether death was “the proper penalty” in a given case. Another Illinois statute provided:

“In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.” Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 512.

Pursuant to this statute, nearly half the veniremen at Witherspoon’s trial were excused for cause because they “expressed qualms about capital punishment.” Id., at 513. This Court held that under this procedure the jury obtained would not be the impartial jury required by the Sixth Amendment, but rather a jury “uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.” Id., at 521. It concluded that “a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Id., at 522.

Despite Witherspoon’s limited holding, later opinions in this Court and the lower courts have referred to the language in footnote 21, or similar language in Witherspoon’s footnote 9, as setting the standard for judging the proper exclusion of a juror opposed to capital punishment. See, e. g., Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U. S. 262, 265 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394 (1969);² Hackathorn v. Decker, 438 F. 2d 1363, 1366 (CA5 1971); People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 1091-1092, 458 P. 2d 479, 496-497 (1969). Later cases in the lower courts state that a venireman may be excluded only if he or she would “automatically” vote against the death penalty, and even then this state of mind must be “unambiguous,” or “unmistakably clear.” See, e. g., Burns v. Estelle, supra, at 398.

But more recent opinions of this Court demonstrate no ritualistic adherence to a requirement that a prospective juror make it “unmistakably clear . . . that [she] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment. . . .” In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 595-596 (1978), prospective capital jurors were asked:

“ ‘[D]o you feel that you could take an oath to well and truely [sic] try this case . . . and follow the-law, or is your conviction so strong that you cannot take an oath, knowing that a possibility exists in regard to capital punishment?’ ”

We held that the veniremen who answered that they could not “take the oath” were properly excluded. Although the Lockett opinion alluded to the second half of the footnote 21 standard, dealing with a juror’s inability to decide impartially a defendant’s guilt, the Court did not refer to the “automatically” language. Instead, it simply determined that each of the excluded veniremen had made it “‘unmistakably clear’ that they could not be trusted to ‘abide by existing law’ and ‘to follow conscientiously the instructions’ of the trial judge.” Id., at 596.

This Court again examined the Witherspoon standard in Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38 (1980). Adams involved the Texas capital sentencing scheme, wherein jurors were asked to answer three specific questions put by the trial judge. The court was required to impose the death sentence if each question was answered affirmatively. A Texas statute provided that a prospective capital juror “ ‘shall be disqualified . . . unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.’” Id., at 42. Before deciding whether certain jurors had been properly excluded pursuant to this statute, this Court attempted to discern the proper standard for making such a determination. The Court discussed its prior opinions, noting the Witherspoon Court’s recognition, in footnote 21, that States retained a “legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who could follow their instructions and obey their oaths.” 448 U. S., at 44. The Court concluded:

“This line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. The State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court.” Id., at 45 (emphasis added).

The Court went on to hold that as applied in that case certain veniremen had been improperly excluded under the Texas statute, because their acknowledgment that the possible imposition of the death penalty would or might “affect” their deliberations was meant only to indicate that they would be more emotionally involved or would view their task “with greater seriousness and gravity.” Id., at 49.³ The Court reasoned that such an “effect” did not demonstrate that the prospective jurors were unwilling or unable to follow the law or obey their oaths.

The state of this case law leaves trial courts with the difficult task of distinguishing between prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at trial. Although this task may be difficult in any event, it is obviously made more difficult by the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs markedly from the language of footnote 21. The tests with respect to sentencing and guilt, originally in two prongs, have been merged; the requirement that a juror may be excluded only if he would never vote for the death penalty is now missing; gone too is the extremely high burden of proof. In general, the standard has been simplified.

There is good reason why the Adams test is preferable for determining juror exclusion. First, although given Wither-spoon’s facts a court applying the general principles of Adams could have arrived at the “automatically” language of Witherspoon’s footnote 21, we do not believe that language can be squared with the duties of present-day capital sentencing juries. In Witherspoon the jury was vested with unlimited discretion in choice of sentence. Given this discretion, a juror willing to consider the death penalty arguably was able to “follow the law and abide by his oath” in choosing the “proper” sentence. Nothing more was required. Under this understanding the only veniremen who could be deemed excludable were those who would never vote for the death sentence or who could not impartially judge guilt.

After our decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), however, sentencing juries could no longer be invested with such discretion. As in the State of Texas, many capital sentencing juries are now asked specific questions, often factual, the answers to which will determine whether death is the appropriate penalty. In such circumstances it does not make sense to require simply that a juror not “automatically” vote against the death penalty; whether or not a venireman might vote for death under certain personal standards, the State still may properly challenge that venireman if he refuses to follow the statutory scheme and truthfully answer the questions put by the trial judge. To hold that Witherspoon requires anything more would be to hold, in the name of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, that a State must allow a venireman to sit despite the fact that he will be unable to view the case impartially.⁴

Second, the statements in the Witherspoon footnotes are in any event dicta. The Court’s holding focused only on circumstances under which prospective jurors could not be excluded; under Witherspoon’s facts it was unnecessary to decide when they could be. This Court has on other occasions similarly rejected language from a footnote as “not controlling.” See McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U. S. 130, 141 (1981).

Finally, the Adams standard is proper because it is in accord with traditional reasons for excluding jurors and with the circumstances under which such determinations are made. We begin by reiterating Adams’ acknowledgment that “Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the State’s power to exclude . . . .” Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S., at 47-48. Exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment began with a recognition that certain of those jurors might frustrate the State’s legitimate interest in administering constitutional capital sentencing schemes by not following their oaths. Witherspoon simply held that the State’s power to exclude did not extend beyond its interest in removing those particular jurors. But there is nothing talismanic about juror exclusion under Witherspoon merely because it involves capital sentencing juries. Witherspoon is not grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but in the Sixth Amendment. Here, as elsewhere, the quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. That is what an “impartial” jury consists of, and we do not think, simply because a defendant is being tried for a capital crime, that he is entitled to a legal presumption or standard that allows jurors to be seated who quite likely will be biased in his favor.

As with any other trial situation where an adversary wishes to exclude a juror because of bias, then, it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 157 (1879). It is then the trial judge’s duty to determine whether the challenge is proper. This is, of course, the standard and procedure outlined in Adams, but it is equally true of any situation where a party seeks to exclude a biased juror. See, e. g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025, 1036 (1984) (where a criminal defendant sought to excuse a juror for cause and the trial judge refused, the question was simply “did [the] juror swear that he could set aside any opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror’s protestations of impartiality have been believed”).

We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our decision in Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the above-quoted standard from Adams as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. That standard is whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.”⁵ We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon’s reference to “automatic” decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with “unmistakable clarity.” This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made “unmistakably clear”; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.⁶ Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. For reasons that will be developed more fully infra, this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.

Given this standard, it is clear that the Court of Appeals below erred at least in part; the court focused unduly on the lack of clarity of the questioning of venireman Colby, and on whether her answers indicated that she would “automatically” vote against the death penalty. Since there are portions of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that suggest that its result could be squared with Adams, however, we proceed to discuss another very important question in the administration of Witherspoon challenges — the degree of deference that a federal habeas court must pay to a state trial judge’s determination of bias.

Ill

This case arises from respondent’s petition for habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254, and therefore a federal reviewing court is required to accord any findings of the state courts on “factual issues” a “presumption of correctness” under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d).⁷ Although the District Court relied on this section and accorded deference to the state trial judge’s finding of bias, Witt v. Wainwright, No. 80-545-CIV-T-GC (MD Fla., May 14, 1981), the Court of Appeals did not decide whether this finding was subject to the presumption because in its opinion the facts of the case required reversal of the sentence “under even the least rigorous standard of appellate review.” 714 F. 2d, at 1083, n. 10. The court did note confusion over whether § 2254(d) applies to a Witherspoon finding, however, and subsequently the Eleventh Circuit adopted the position that such a finding was a “mixed question of law and fact” not subject to the section. See Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F. 2d, at 1528-1530.

This Court has recently decided several cases dealing with the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption. See, e. g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U. S. 1025 (1984); Rushen v. Spain, 464 U. S. 114 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S. 422 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U. S. 591 (1982) (Sumner II); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539 (1981) (Sumner I). These cases have emphasized that state-court findings of fact are to be accorded the presumption of correctness. See Sumner II, supra, at 597, n. 10; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 342 (1980).⁸ Last Term, in Patton, supra, we held that a trial judge’s finding that a particular venireman was not biased and therefore was properly seated was a finding of fact subject to § 2254(d). We noted that the question whether a venireman is biased has traditionally been determined through voir dire culminating in a finding by the trial judge concerning the venireman’s state of mind. We also noted that such a finding is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.⁹ Such determinations were entitled to deference even on direct review; “[t]he respect paid such findings in a habeas proceeding certainly should be no less.” Id., at 1038.¹⁰

Patton’s holding applies equally well to a trial court’s determination that a prospective capital sentencing juror was properly excluded for cause. In Darden v. Wainwright, supra, at 1529, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached a contrary conclusion because it viewed the exclusion of jurors under Witherspoon as a “mixed question of law and fact.” But the Darden court reached its conclusion because it labored under the misapprehension that the standard for determining exclusion was that found in Witherspoon’s footnote 21 — which imposed “a strict legal standard” and “a very high standard of proof.” 725 F. 2d, at 1528. Given this rather complex law, the court reasoned, a prospective juror’s answers would not alone decide the issues; the trial judge must still interpret them in light of the legal standard. Since the trial court’s function was application of law to fact, the determination was subject to independent review.

It will not always be easy to separate questions of “fact” from “mixed questions of law and fact” for § 2254(d) purposes, cf. Patton, supra, at 1037, n. 12. But it is nevertheless clear, based on the foregoing discussion concerning the standard for exclusion, that reasoning such as that found in Darden is destined for the same end as the footnote upon which it is based. Once it is recognized that excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias, Patton must control. The trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record. These are the “factual issues” that are subject to § 2254(d).

In so holding, we in no way denigrate the importance of an impartial jury. We reiterate what this Court stressed in Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162, 168 (1950): “[T]he trial court has a serious duty to determine the question of actual bias, and a broad discretion in its rulings on challenges therefor. ... In exercising its discretion, the trial court must be zealous to protect the rights of an accused.”

IV

Turning to the facts, we conclude that juror Colby was properly excused for cause. Applying the analysis required by § 2254(d), we have already determined that the question of challenge for bias is a “factual issue” covered by the section. Nor does respondent seriously urge that the trial court’s decision to excuse juror Colby for bias was not a “determination after a hearing on the merits.” Respondent does argue, however, that this conclusion was not “evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia . . . .” We disagree.

The transcript of the voir dire reprinted above shows that juror Colby was questioned in the presence of both counsel and the judge; at the end of the colloquy the prosecution challenged for cause; and the challenge was sustained when the judge asked juror Colby to “step down.” Nothing more was required under the circumstances to satisfy the statute. Anyone familiar with trial court practice knows that the court reporter is relied upon to furnish an accurate account of what is said in the courtroom. The trial judge regularly relies upon this transcript as written indicia of various findings and rulings; it is not uncommon for a trial judge to merely make extemporaneous statements of findings from the bench.

Our conclusion is strengthened by a review of available alternatives. We decline to require the judge to write out in a separate memorandum his specific findings on each juror excused. A trial judge’s job is difficult enough without senseless make-work. Nor do we think under the circumstances that the judge was required to announce for the record his conclusion that juror Colby was biased, or his reasoning. The finding is evident from the record. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S., at 433. In this regard it is noteworthy that in this case the court was given no reason to think that elaboration was necessary; defense counsel did not see fit to object to juror Colby’s recusal, or to attempt rehabilitation.¹¹

The finding of the trial judge is therefore “presumed correct” unless one of the enumerated reasons for avoiding the presumption is present here. Respondent does not suggest that paragraphs 1 through 7 are applicable; he must therefore rest his case on the exception in paragraph 8 — that the finding of bias is “not fairly supported” by the record viewed “as a whole.” Respondent attacks the record in two ways. First, he notes that venireman Colby was the first juror questioned, and claims that from the record there is no way to determine whether the trial judge applied the correct standard. As we have stated on other occasions, however, where the record does not indicate the standard applied by a state trial judge, he is presumed to have applied the correct one. See Marshall v. Lonberger, supra, at 433; LaVallee v. Delle Rose, 410 U. S. 690, 694-695 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 314-315 (1963). Here, in addition, there is every indication that the judge indeed applied the correct standard. Although the judge did not participate in questioning venireman Colby, the record shows that on several subsequent occasions during voir dire he did participate in questioning. On each of those occasions the judge asked questions entirely consistent with the Adams standard.¹² There is no reason to believe, as respondent seems to suggest, that the judge’s understanding of the standard changed between the time of the questioning of Colby and the questioning of the later veniremen.

Respondent’s second contention is that the colloquy between the prosecutor and Colby is simply too ambiguous to support the trial court’s decision to excuse her. Respondent claims that the ambiguity he sees is due to the prosecutor’s use of the word “interfere” in his questioning of Colby; merely because juror Colby affirmed that her views would “interfere” with her sitting does not necessarily indicate whether she could in any event have applied the law impartially. Respondent agrees that some jurors might interpret “interfere” to mean “prevent” (the word which is used in the key passage in our Adams opinion), but claims that other equally reasonable jurors could understand it to mean “make difficult,” “create emotional turmoil,” or “impair, but not substantially.” As a corollary, respondent suggests that because the posited ambiguity was caused by the question, rather than the answer, there is no reason to defer to the trial judge’s finding, since a finding based upon Colby’s demeanor would be worthless without a finding that she had a particular understanding of the question. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that “[t]he word ‘interfere’ admits of a great variety of interpretations,” and that the colloquy between the prosecutor and Colby did not indicate the extent of the “interference.” 714 F. 2d, at 1082.

If we were so brash as to undertake a treatise on synonyms and antonyms, we would agree that the dictionary definitions of “interfere” are not identical with the dictionary definitions of “prevent.” But that, of course, is not the question. The fact that a particular verb is used in a key passage of an appellate opinion stating the standard for excusing jurors for cause does not mean that that word, and no other, must be used in all the thousands of subsequent proceedings in which the prosecution challenges jurors for cause. The law is stated in an opinion such as Adams; but the question in subsequent cases is whether a trial court finding that the standard was met is “fairly supported” by the “record . . . considered as a whole . . . .” The standard in this case is the easily understood one enunciated in Adams; whether the juror’s views “would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” 448 U. S., at 45. Relevant voir dire questions addressed to this issue need not be framed exclusively in the language of the controlling appellate opinion; the opinion is, after all, an opinion and not an intricate devise in a will.

As we emphasized in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U. S., at 432, the question is not whether a reviewing court might disagree with the trial court’s findings, but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record. Here we think there is ample support for the trial court’s finding that Colby’s views would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties as a juror. On four separate occasions she affirmed that her beliefs would interfere with her sitting as a juror. One common meaning of “interfere” is to “create an obstacle.” Respondent argues that in Colby’s case, the obstacle was not insurmountable; but the trial court found to the contrary. As we stated in Marshall v. Lonberger, supra, at 434:

“As was aptly stated by the New York Court of Appeals, although in a case of rather different substantive nature: ‘Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. , . . How can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. ... To the sophistication and sagacity of the trial judge the law confides the duty of appraisal.’ Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, 429, 169 N. E. 632, 634.”

Thus, whatever ambiguity respondent may find in this record, we think that the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of Colby’s demeanor, was entitled to resolve it in favor of the State. We note in addition that respondent’s counsel chose not to question Colby himself, or to object to the trial court’s excusing her for cause. This questioning might have resolved any perceived ambiguities in the questions; its absence is all the more conspicuous because counsel did object to the trial court’s excusing other veniremen later on during the voir dire. Indeed, from what appears on the record it seems that at the time Colby was excused no one in the courtroom questioned the fact that her beliefs prevented her from sitting. The reasons for this, although not crystal clear from the printed record, may well have been readily apparent to those viewing Colby as she answered the questions.

Respondent’s attempt to separate the answers from the questions misses the mark; the trial court, hopefully imbued with a fair amount of common sense as well as an understanding of the applicable law, views the questioning as a whole. It is free to interrupt questioning to clarify any particular statement. There is nothing in this record which indicates that anybody had trouble understanding the meaning of the questions and answers with respect to Colby. One of the purposes of § 2254(d) was to prevent precisely this kind of parsing of trial court transcripts to create problems on collateral review where none were seen at trial.

The trial court’s finding of bias was made under the proper standard, was subject to § 2254(d), and was fairly supported by the record. Since respondent has not adduced “clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous,” we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.¹³

It is so ordered.

1 Respondent argued in the Court of Appeals that 3 of the 11 prospective jurors excused for cause — veniremen Colby, Gehm, and Miller — were improperly excused. The court considered Mrs. Colby’s colloquy the “least certain statement of inability to follow the law as instructed,” and limited its discussion to her questioning. See 714 F. 2d, at 1081 (emphasis in original). We agree that Mrs. Colby provided the least clear example of a biased venireman, and we therefore need not discuss the voir dire of veniremen Gehm and Miller.

2 Maxwell and Boulden cited the following language from footnote 9:

“Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position.” Maxwell, 398 U. S., at 265; Boulden, 394 U. S., at 482 (emphasis added).

3 The Court cited the following answer of venireman Jenson, whom the Court found was improperly excluded: “ ‘Well, I think it probably would [affect my deliberations] because afterall [sic], you’re talking about a man’s life here. You definitely don’t want to take it lightly.’ ” 448 U. S., at 50, n. 7. The Court also found other veniremen improperly excluded who had been unable to state whether their views would or would not “affect” their deliberations. Id., at 50.

4 For similar reasons the references to “automatic” decisionmaking in both Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U. S. 262 (1970), and Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478 (1969), also can be discounted. At the time those cases were decided the death sentencing statutes in Arkansas and Alabama, respectively, apparently allowed juries unlimited discretion in imposing the death sentence. In addition, both cases involved jurors who were excused merely because they had “conscientious” objections to, or did not “believe in,” the death penalty. Maxwell, supra, at 264-265; Boulden, supra, at 483-484.

5 The dissent chides us for our failure to discuss in greater detail the Witherspoon case, and apparently seeks to remedy this defect by devoting page after page to its own exegesis of that decision. Much of this exegesis, however, is a latter-day version of a “fair cross section” theme barely adumbrated by that opinion. But even accepting the dissent’s latter-day underpinnings for Witherspoon, that case represented a necessary balancing of the accused defendant’s right to a jury panel drawn from a “fair cross section of the community” — which if carried to its logical conclusion would require that a juror be seated who frankly avowed that he could not and would not follow the judge’s instructions on the law — against the traditional right of a party to challenge a juror for bias — which if carried to its logical extreme would permit exclusion from jury panels of groups of people whose general philosophical views might have no bearing on their ability to follow a judge’s instructions. We adhere to the essential balance struck by the Witherspoon decision rendered in 1968, if not to the version of it presented by today’s dissent; we simply modify the test stated in Witherspoon’s footnote 21 to hold that the State may exclude from capital sentencing juries that “class” of veniremen whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties in accordance with their instructions or their oaths.

6 See, for example, the excerpts of the voir dire of venireman Pfeffer set out in O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F. 2d 365, 379 (CA5 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1013 (1984):

“ ‘THE COURT: Well, the law requires that we have to have a definite answer.

“ ‘[A]: I understand, right.

“ ‘THE COURT: Because the law does allow people to be excused because of certain beliefs that could be prejudicial or biased for one side or the other, and both sides just want to know if you can keep an open mind, consider the entire full range of punishment, whatever that may be, and under the proper set of circumstances, if they do exist and you feel they exist, that you could return that verdict. And that’s in essence what they’re asking.

“ ‘[A]: Indirectly, I guess I would have to say no.

“‘THE COURT: You could not?

“ ‘[A]: I would have to say no then, to give you a yes or no answer.

“‘THE COURT: Then, am I to believe by virtue of that answer that regardless.of what the facts would reveal, regardless of how horrible the circumstances may be, that you would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty?

“ ‘[A]: As I say, I don’t know.

“ ‘THE COURT: Well, that’s the question I have to have a yes or no to.

“‘[A]: Right.

“‘THE COURT: And you’re the only human being alive who knows, Mr. Pfeffer.

“ ‘[A]: Right, I understand. If I have to make a choice between yes and no, I would say I couldn’t make the judgment.’”

Some period later, juror Pfeffer gave the following answer:

“ ‘THE COURT: You yourself are in such a frame of mind that regardless of how horrible the facts and circumstances are, that you would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty? Is that correct?

“‘[A]: Well, if it says a yes or no, I would have to say yes, I would automatically vote against, to give a correct answer.’”

7 Section 2254(d) provides:

“In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—

“(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;

“(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;

“(8) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;

“(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;

“(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;

“(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or

“(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;

“(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record:

“And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.”

8 In Cuyler, 446 U. S., at 342, this Court held that “mixed determination[s] of law and fact” are not subject to the § 2254(d) presumption.

9 In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 156-157 (1879), this Court stated:

“[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words. That is seen below, but cannot always be spread upon the record. Care should, therefore, be taken in the reviewing court not to reverse the ruling below upon such a question of fact, except in a clear case.”

10 In O’Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F. 2d, at 392 (Higginbotham, J., concurring specially), Judge Higginbotham artfully discusses those factors, in addition to the trial court’s advantage of having seen and heard the juror, which dictate deference to the trial judge’s decision under these circumstances. He suggests deference is mandated in general in the interest of finality — to preserve a trial court’s integrity as a court of law, instead of as an “entrance gate” for fact collecting subject to appellate review. In addition, he points out that on habeas review, comity and federalism indicate the need to defer to the independent mechanisms of state government that already have reached one decision on the same facts. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F. 2d 1526, 1551 (CA11 1984) (Fay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

11 In so stating, we do not mean to suggest that respondent “waived” his Witherspoon claim under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), by failing to contemporaneously object. There is no doubt that in spite of respondent’s failure to object, the Florida courts reached the merits of his Witherspoon claim. See Witt v. State, 342 So. 2d 497 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 935 (1977). Under circumstances where the state courts do not rely on independent state grounds for disposing of a claim and instead reach the merits of a federal question, the federal question is properly before us. See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 154 (1979). Nevertheless, counsel’s failure to speak in a situation later claimed to be so rife with ambiguity as to constitute constitutional error is a circumstance we feel justified in considering when assessing respondent’s claims. We note that since Witt was decided by the Florida Supreme Court that court has enforced a contemporaneous-objection rule when dealing with Wither-spoon challenges. See Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d 690, 693-694 (1980).

12 See, e. g., the questioning of Ms. Kazmierczak:

“THE COURT: Wait a minute, ma’am. I haven’t made up my mind yet. Just have a seat. Let me ask you these things. Do you have any prefixed ideas about this case at all?

“[A]: Not at all.

“THE COURT: Will you follow the law that I give you?

“[A]: I could do that.

“THE COURT: What I am concerned about is that you indicated that you have a state of mind that might make you be unable to follow the law of this State.

“[A]: I could not bring back a death penalty.

“THE COURT: Step down.” Tr. 341.

and the questioning of Mrs. Hill:

“THE COURT: Well, ma’am, what I am concerned about is whether or not you will render a fair and impartial verdict, whether you have any prefixed ideas about this case, and whether you will follow the law. That’s the whole shebang right there.

“[A]: I would give a true verdict. I mean, I wouldn’t — I can do that.

“THE COURT: Well, from what you are saying, I have some concern. Will you follow the law in this case?

“[A]: Pardon?

“THE COURT: Will you follow the law in this case?

“[A]: Yes, unless it was that I had to give a death sentence. I couldn’t do that.” Id., at 372.

Since it is clear that the trial judge applied a standard in accord with our decision today, there is no need to address respondent’s contention that the Florida Supreme Court applied the incorrect standard on direct review.

13 Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the alternative ground that the Supreme Court of Florida at the time of his appeal of his conviction was engaged in soliciting and receiving psychiatric, psychological, and other reports concerning the mental condition and backgrounds of individuals sentenced to death which had not been introduced in the trial proceedings. In Ford v. Strickland, 696 F. 2d 804, 811 (CA11), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 865 (1983), a majority of the Court of Appeals accepted the Supreme Court of Florida’s determination that it did not in fact make use of the material in question in its review of capital cases. We see no reason to disturb this essentially factual determination by the Court of Appeals.