Dooley, J.
In these consolidated appeals, we consider the status of zoning permit applications filed during what we will refer to as the “pendency period” — the period from the date that public notice is given of proposed amended zoning bylaws and the date that the bylaws come into effect. At issue is the meaning of 24 Y.S.A. § 4443(d),1 which provides that, following public notice of a proposed zoning bylaw amendment, a town administrator may not issue a permit regarding that amendment during the period between notice and the effective date of the adoption or rejection of the amendment, except with the written consent of the town’s legislative body after public notice and hearing. In construing § 4443(d), the environmental court bifurcated the pendency period, ruling that (1) persons filing permit applications after public notice but before the town’s adoption of amended zoning bylaws may elect to have their applications reviewed under the old bylaws or petition the town’s legislative body to consent to review of the applications under the amended bylaws; and (2) applications filed after the town’s adoption, but before the effective date of the adoption, of amended bylaws must be considered under the new bylaws. We find no basis in the plain language of the statute to support the court’s construction of § 4443(d), but conclude that the statute is unconstitutional because it gives town selectboards unbridled discretion to decide whether to review applications under the old or new zoning bylaws, with no standards to limit the exercise of that discretion. Accordingly, we conclude that the permit applications in both cases must be considered under our vested rights rule. We affirm the court’s decision in the Handy case, albeit on different grounds, and vacate the decision in Jolley and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
I.
The relevant procedural and historical facts are, for the most part, undisputed in both appeals. On December 3, 1996, the Town of [338]*338Shelburne published notice of a December 19 planning commission hearing to consider certain proposed zoning bylaw amendments, including amendments that would eliminate gas stations and fast-food restaurants as conditional uses in the Town’s residential-commercial zone.2 At the December 19 hearing, the planning commission voted to recommend that the Town selectboard adopt the proposed amendments. On January 5, 1997, the selectboard published notice of a January 21 public hearing to consider the proposed amendments. At the January 21 hearing, the selectboard adopted the amended bylaws. The Town’s adoption of the bylaws became effective twenty-one days later, on February 11.24 V.S.A. § 4404(c) (bylaw amendment shall be effective twenty-one days after its adoption).
With respect to the Handy case, in the summer of 1996 Paul Handy filed applications seeking, among other things, a permit to add gasoline pumps to a convenience store on his property in the Town’s residential-commercial zone. The Town denied the applications in August 1996 for reasons unrelated to the gasoline pumps, which were permitted as a conditional use under the zoning bylaws in effect at the time. Handy did not appeal the Town’s decision, but instead modified his site plan and revised the applications to respond to the concerns that had led to their denial.
On January 13, 1997, after the Town published notice of the proposed amended bylaws, but eight days before they were adopted, Handy submitted his revised applications seeking conditional use and variance approval for his proposed project. On February 10, the day before the new bylaws became effective, the selectboard held a public hearing under § 4443(d) to consider whether to give its written consent for the zoning administrator to act on Handy’s revised applications under the old bylaws. Following the hearing, the selectboard issued a written decision denying its consent for Handy to proceed under the old bylaws.
On appeal, the environmental court concluded that (1) this Court’s holding in Smith v. Winhall Planning Commission, 140 Vt. 178, [339]*339181-82, 436 A.2d 760, 761-62 (1981), entitles applicants such as Handy to have their good-faith applications considered under the bylaws in effect at the time that they were filed; and (2) when applications are filed prior to the selectboard’s approval of proposed amended bylaws, § 4443(d) is triggered only if the applicants elect to request the selectboard to consider their applications under the new bylaws. Because Handy did not request consideration under the new bylaws, and because he filed his applications before the selectboard approved those bylaws, the court ruled that he had a right to have his applications considered under the old bylaws, as long as the applications were complete and filed in good faith. The court remanded the matter to the zoning board of adjustment (ZBA) to consider the applications for conditional-use or variance approval under the old zoning bylaws, and then, if necessary, to the selectboard, apparently to consider whether the applications were complete and filed in good faith. The Town appeals.
With respect to the Jolley case, in April 1996 Jolley Associates (Jolley) contracted to purchase property in the Town’s residential-commercial zone, intending to construct a combination gas station, convenience store, and fast-food restaurant. Obtaining the necessary zoning permits was one of the contract contingencies. Under the zoning bylaws in effect at the time, all three of Jolley’s intended uses were allowed as conditional uses in the residential-commercial zone. In September 1996, Jolley met with town officials to discuss its proposed project.
On February 6, 1997, sixteen days after the Town adopted the amended bylaws, but five days before those amendments became effective, Jolley submitted conditional-use applications for his project under the old bylaws. Following a public hearing pursuant to § 4443(d), the selectboard denied Jolley’s request for consent to proceed with its applications under the old bylaws. On appeal, the environmental court concluded that the right of applicants to have their permit applications considered under the zoning bylaws in effect at the time the applications are filed does not extend to situations in which the applications are filed between the adoption and the effective date of new bylaws. According to the court, applications filed after the adoption of amended bylaws must be considered under the new bylaws. Because Jolley had filed its applications after the Town’s adoption of the amended bylaws, the court ruled that they must be considered under the new bylaws. The court remanded the matter to the ZBA to consider the applications for conditional use or variance [340]*340approval, and then, if necessary, to the selectboard for consideration under § 4443(d). Jolley appeals, and the Town cross-appeals.3
In the Handy case, appellant Town of Shelburne argues that the environmental court erred in ruling that applicants seeking zoning permits after public notice but before adoption of proposed amended bylaws may elect to seek the consent of a town’s legislative body under § 4443(d). In the Jolley case, appellant Jolley argues that the plain language of § 4443(d) does not support the environmental court’s distinct treatment of applications filed between public notice and adoption of amended bylaws, and those filed between the adoption and effective date of amended bylaws. According to Jolley, either its applications should be considered under the old bylaws based on the environmental court’s reasoning in the Handy case, or the environmental court should consider, upon de novo review, whether the circumstances and equities surrounding its applications require review of the applications under the old bylaws. As appellee and cross-appellant in the Jolley case, the Town contends that any review of the selectboard’s decision under § 4443(d) should be on the record, giving deference to the selectboard’s broad discretion, and further that the record before this Court supports the selectboard’s decision. Both Jolley and the Town agree that the environmental court erred in concluding that applicants must submit their conditional-use applications to the ZBA before seeking the selectboard’s consent to proceed under the old bylaws pursuant to § 4443(d).
II.
We first consider the environmental court’s construction of § 4443(d). The statute provides as follows:
If a public notice4 is issued under this chapter with respect to the adoption or amendment of a bylaw, or an [341]*341amendment to an ordinance adopted under prior enabling laws, the administrative officer shall not issue any permit under section (a)(1) of this section, if the permit is with regard to the bylaw, or amendment to a bylaw or ordinance, for the period commencing upon the date of that public notice and ending upon the effective date of the adoption or rejection of the bylaw or amendment, except with the written consent of the legislative body of the municipality given after public hearing upon public notice.
24 V.S.A. § 4443(d). We find nothing in the plain language of § 4443(d) to support either the environmental court’s distinct treatment of permit applications filed before or after the adoption of amended bylaws, or its conclusion that persons filing applications before the adoption of amended bylaws may elect to request a town’s legislative body to review applications under the amended bylaws.
In construing a statute to determine the Legislature’s intent, our first step is to examine the language of the statute itself. Town of Hinesburg v. Dunkling, 167 Vt. 514, 525, 711 A.2d 1163, 1169 (1998). We presume that the Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language, and if the meaning of that language is plain on its face, we normally ascertain legislative intent solely from the statutory language. Id. “It is inappropriate to read into a statute something which is not there unless it is necessary in order to make the statute effective.” State v. O’Neill, 165 Vt. 270, 275, 682 A.2d 943, 946 (1996); accord In re Weeks, 167 Vt. 551, 554, 712 A.2d 907, 909 (1998) (there is no need to look beyond plain language of statute if it resolves legal dispute without doing violence to legislative scheme).
Here, the plain meaning of § 4443(d) is that a town administrator may not issue a zoning permit during the period between public notice and the effective date of the adoption or rejection of proposed amended bylaws if the permit is “with regard to” the proposed bylaws, except with the written consent of the town’s legislative body following public notice and hearing. We find unavailing Handy’s argument that the term “with regard to” refers to permit applications that could be granted only under the amended bylaws. Rather than read an unnecessary limitation into the statutory language, see In re Graziani, 156 Vt. 278, 282, 591 A.2d 91, 94 (1991) (“we ordinarily do not assume that words are used in a more limited sense than their plain meaning”), we assume that the undefined term retains its plain and commonly accepted meaning. Donley v. Donley, 165 Vt. 619, 620, [342]*342686 A.2d 943, 945 (1996) (mem.). The ordinary, commonly accepted meaning of the term “with regard to” is not limited in the way suggested by Handy. Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary (2d ed. 1961) (defining “with regard to” as “with respect to; relating to; concerning; as to”); see also Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (D. Nev. 1994) (defining “with respect to” as “with reference to, relating to, or pertaining to”); Smith v. Matthews, 611 So. 2d 1377, 1380 (La. 1993) (same).
Moreover, the prohibitory, rather than permissive, language of § 4443(d) belies the environmental court’s conclusion that the statute allows persons filing applications before adoption of amended bylaws to elect whether to have a town’s legislative body review the applications under the amended bylaws. If the Legislature had intended to allow applicants to elect review under pending amended bylaws, such an election would undoubtedly have been expressed in permissive language. Plainly, the prohibitory language in the statute is aimed at limiting the issuance of permits under bylaws in the process of being amended, rather than allowing a new category of permits in advance of the effective date of proposed bylaws that might authorize them.
Apparently, the environmental court felt compelled, under the reasoning in Smith v. Winhall Planning Commission, to bifurcate the pendency period delineated in § 4443(d) and create an election for those applicants filing before adoption (or rejection) of proposed amended bylaws. Although Smith may prove central to the resolution of these disputes, as addressed at the end of this opinion, it does not control the construction of the statute. Smith establishes our vested rights rule in the absence of a controlling statute. In re McCormick Management Co., 149 Vt. 585, 588, 589-90, 547 A.2d 1319, 1321, 1322-23 (1988) (where “the legislature has dictated how th[e] policy considerations should apply,” the Smith rule does not control). Here, § 4443(d) is a controlling statute.
We recognize that the environmental court concluded that § 4443(d) overlapped with the vested rights holding of Smith, and it could implement both through its construction of § 4443(d). We conclude, however, that its construction of § 4443(d) is at variance with both the letter of the statute and the policy behind it. The obvious intent behind § 4443(d) is to create a “moratorium” on the issuance of permits for proposed projects whose status may be affected by pending amendments to zoning bylaws. Such a moratorium period assures that persons cannot compel towns to grant [343]*343permit applications that comply with current zoning bylaws but are repugnant to pending bylaw amendments. Under the environmental court holding, there is no moratorium.
III.
Our rejection of the environmental court’s construction of § 4443(d) does not necessarily mean that we must reverse the court’s decisions. We will not reverse a lower court’s decision “if the record before us discloses any legal ground which would justify the result,” Sexton v. Greer, 135 Vt. 343, 345, 376 A.2d 750, 751 (1977), “whether briefed or not.” Butler v. Milton Cooperative Dairy Corp., 112 Vt. 517, 518, 28 A.2d 395, 396 (1942). We have applied this principle on numerous occasions over the years, and yet have never suggested, as the dissent does here, 171 Vt. at 359, 764 A.2d at 1245, that an alternative affirmance rationale can be used only in the case of glaring error or exceptional circumstances when constitutional principles are involved. There is no heightened standard by which we apply unraised legal theories to affirm lower court decisions made on other grounds, regardless of whether those theories are constitutionally based.
Nor is there anything in our precedents to suggest that an alternative ground for affirmance cannot be our determination that a statute is unconstitutional in the context of the case before us. The dissent suggests that V.R.A.E 44 bars such consideration because no party has notified the clerk of this Court to give the Attorney General an opportunity to intervene and defend the constitutionality of the statute. Like the federal model on which V.R.A.E 44 is based, see 28 U.S.C. § 2403; Fed. R. App. E 44, our self-imposed rule is not jurisdictional so as to prevent the adjudication of a constitutional issue in the absence of official notice. Tonya K. v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1988). Unlike the federal model, which requires notification whenever the constitutionality of a statute is “drawn in question,” 28 U.S.C. § 2403, our rule applies only when a party raises the constitutional challenge. V.R.A.P 44.
In any event, we have carefully considered whether notification would perform a useful purpose or change the outcome, and have decided that it would do neither. Whenever we adopt a rationale for our decision different from that employed by the trial court and directly addressed by the parties, we take on the responsibility to fully research and explore our alternative. We have done so in this case.
[344]*344As the above discussion suggests, we conclude there is an alternative ground on which to affirm the Handy ease. This alternative ground was foreshadowed by Jolley’s argument that § 4443(d) may not be construed to give town selectboards unfettered discretion to grant or deny review of permit applications under current rather than proposed zoning bylaws. We would agree with that argument if we could find any way in the statutory language to limit that discretion. We conclude, however, that the statute can be construed only to give selectboards unfettered discretion to grant or deny permission to apply existing bylaw provisions, without regard to any proposed amendments. Thus, we do not agree with the dissent that we can create the necessary standards that would contain discretion, and especially we do not agree that we can create them after the fact. For this reason, as more fully set out infra, we conclude that § 4443(d) is unconstitutional because it is not limited by standards or guidelines.
As explained more fully in the discussion to follow, our alternative decision will reach exactly the outcome the environmental court reached in Handy — that is, that § 4443(d) is not implicated in the decision on Handy’s permit application. Our duty to affirm lower court decisions on any legal theory would not require us to reach the constitutional point in the Jolley case, but we do so as a matter of fairness, given that we are reaching the issue in its companion case.
We now turn to the merits of the constitutionality of § 4443(d). In Town of Westford v. Kilburn, 131 Vt. 120, 124, 300 A.2d 523, 526 (1973), we announced the requirement of deliberative standards for acting on zoning applications. At the time, the Westford zoning ordinance denied permission for any business, commercial, industrial or agricultural uses unless all adjoining landowners and long-term lessees consented to the use. As a safety valve, however, it authorized the zoning board to allow special exceptions after considering promotion of the public health, safety, convenience, and welfare of the inhabitants, encouraging the most appropriate use of land and protecting and preserving property value. Appellants, who wanted to use their barn for barn dances, attacked the ordinance as providing an insufficient standard for the exercise of the board’s discretion and for delegating power, without standards, to neighbors.
This Court upheld the challenge to the ordinance, concluding that the special exception provision failed “to prescribe appropriate conditions and safeguards” and delegated authority to adjacent property owners “with ... no standards to govern its use.” Id. at 125-26, 300 A.2d at 527. We described the reasons for requiring standards:
[345]*345When the Board of Adjustment exercises this discretion, guiding standards assure all parties concerned it has been exercised in a proper manner. When no such guiding standards are spelled out by the legislative body, the door is opened to the exercise of this discretion in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion. As a consequence of a failure of a legislative body to spell out guiding standards, the applicant for a permit is left uncertain as to what factors are to be considered by the Board of Adjustment.
... On one hand the standards governing the delegation of such authority should be general enough to avoid inflexible results, yet on the other hand they should not leave the door open to unbridled discrimination.
Id. at 124-25, 300 A.2d at 526.
Although Kilburn is grounded in the then-existing enabling statute, rather than the constitution, it relied largely on two constitutional decisions. Waterville Hotel Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 241 A.2d 50 (Me. 1968), the chief case relied upon in Kilburn, held that where a zoning ordinance attempts to authorize municipal officials to act on permit requests “without the guidance of any standards, equal protection is denied the citizens.” Id. at 52; accord State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wahner, 130 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Wis. 1964) (ordinance that gives power to board to deny permit for gas station without adequate standards .is unconstitutional). Thus, it expresses both the statutory and constitutional rule. See Powers v. Common Council of Danbury, 222 A.2d 337, 338 (Conn. 1966) (although requirement of standards is statutory, “it should also be noted that such a requirement is a fundamental aspect of constitutional law”). Recently, in In re Miserocchi, 170 Vt. 320, 749 A.2d 607 (2000), we relied upon Kilburn in holding that “a decision arrived at without reference to any standards or principles is arbitrary and capricious; such ad hoc decision-making denies the applicant due process of law.” Id. at 325, 749 A.2d at 611 (citation omitted).
There are actually three overlapping theories under which a delegation of standardless zoning approval power is found unconstitutional: (1) a delegation of legislative power without adequate standards violates the separation of powers required by the state constitution; (2) the power to grant or refuse zoning permits without standards denies applicants equal protection of the laws; and (3) administration of zoning without standards denies landowners due [346]*346process of law because it does not give them notice of what land uses are acceptable. 0. Delogu & S. Spokes, The Long-Standing Requirement that Delegations of Land Use Control Power Contain “Meaningful” Standards to Restrain and Guide Decision-Makers Should Not Be Weakened, 48 Me. L. Rev. 49, 54-57 (1996).
The first rationale dominates and is accepted in virtually every state jurisdiction. See 3 K. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 21.09 (4th ed. 1996); see also Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Bd., 148 Vt. 531, 535, 536 A.2d 925, 928 (1987) (explaining application of delegation doctrine in Vermont).5 As explained by the Maryland Court of Appeals:
When legislative power is delegated to administrative officials it is constitutionally required that adequate guides and standards be established by the delegating legislative body so that the administrative officials, appointed by the executive and not elected by the people, will not legislate, but will find and apply facts in a particular case in accordance with the policy established by the legislative body.
Gino’s of Maryland, Inc. v. City of Baltimore, 244 A.2d 218, 229 (Md. 1968) (emphasis omitted). It makes no difference that the delegation in this case is to a body that also exercises legislative power. Young, supra, § 21.10, at 721-22. Even if separation of powers could be applied to town governance, the selectboard here was exercising administrative power by establishing the proper zoning regime for a particular use on a particular piece of property. See Powers, 222 A.2d at 338.
The latter two rationales are most important in administrative adjudication. See S. Koslow, Standardless Administrative Adjudication, 22 Admin. L. Rev. 407, 422-28 (1970). The main concern of the second rationale is consistent decisions. Waterville Hotel, the Maine [347]*347case we relied upon in Kilburn, relied in turn on Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 75 N.W.2d 25 (Mich. 1956), which held:
Without definite standards an ordinance becomes an open door to favoritism and discrimination, a ready tool for the suppression of competition through the grant of authority to one and the withholding from another. ... A zoning ordinance cannot permit administrative officers or boards to pick and chose the recipients of their favors.
Id. at 28. As we said in Kilburn, the absence of standards results in the exercise of discretion in a discriminatory fashion. Kilburn, 181 Vt. at 124, 300 A.2d at 526.
While excessive discretion might lead to favoritism and discrimination, it is not true, as the dissent suggests, 171 Vt. at 357, 764 A.2d at 1243, that a vague standard examining whether favoritism or discrimination exists will be effective in controlling discretion. It is unlikely, given the limited record available by hindsight review under § 4443(d), that a court would be able to determine whether favoritism or discrimination had been involved in a specific selectboard’s decision, particularly given the infrequent use of the statute in Vermont towns. Judicial review would be illusory under the dissent’s proposed standards. In fact, consistency would be illusory without statewide standards in this context. Given the infrequent review under § 4443(d), no “common law” of selectboard review could develop. It is unlikely that any town would be able to adopt consistent standards, in accordance with the dissent’s suggestion.
This Court has already accepted the third rationale, which is concerned with assuring that the landowner be given fair notice of what it can and cannot do with the land. Miserocchi, 170 Vt. at 325, 749 A.2d at 611. The point is that zoning permit applicants are entitled to know: “What facts must I present to gain the Board’s approval?” Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508, 511 (Me. 1972); see also Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me. 1987) (landowner must be able to discern what use can be made of the land); Hardin County v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (same).
A detailed examination of the record in the Handy case, the only case for which we have a complete record,6 indicates that the absence [348]*348of standards seriously prejudiced the applicant in presenting any kind of ease to the selectboard. The action on Handy’s request for selectboard approval to proceed under the old bylaws began with a public hearing. The notice of the hearing provided no specification of how the selectboard would approach the issue before it, stating only that the board would consider Handy’s request for a multi-use facility that included a gas station. At the commencement of the hearing, the selectboard chair announced the issue as whether the proposal “fit into the regulations that were passed by the selectboard on January 21.” Because the January 21 amendment prohibited the exact use proposed, this was tantamount to a prehearing announcement that Handy could not prevail. Another selectman stated that precise position, noting that, based on a legal opinion of town counsel, “[t]here is only one choice and that is to deny.”
Handy’s representative made arguments that the equities,7 particularly the fact that the gas-station use had been presented prior to the warning of the amendment, warranted the granting of permission to proceed under the old bylaws, but the selectboard denied the request because it would “result in the knowing creation of a non-conforming use, in contravention of both general principles of zoning law and the clear intent of the recent amendments.” This was the same position taken by the chair at the beginning of the hearing. Although the selectboard also indicated that it was unpersuaded by Handy’s equitable arguments, it never took the position that equitable considerations could ever require it to grant permission to proceed under the old bylaws. Thus, the selectboard never committed itself to be bound by any standards either in the Handy case or any future ease.
We recognize that a standard sufficient to save the statute can be general, and can be derived from historical usage, see Kent v. Dulles, [349]*349357 U.S. 116, 127-28 (1958), or other parts of the statutory scheme. See Vincent, 148 Vt. at 535-36, 536 A.2d at 929; State v. Chambers, 144 Vt. 234, 239, 477 A.2d 110, 113 (1984). But, here, the specific statute involved, 24 V.S.A. § 4443, provides absolutely no standard or guidance. To the contrary, on its face, it provides unlimited discretion for a selectboard to grant or deny permission for a zoning applicant to proceed under the unamended ordinance. There is no historical usage. If we look at the zoning statutes overall, we find general and inclusive policy statements that do not help provide limits for administration of § 4443(d). Id. § 4302 (purpose and goals of zoning).
The Town suggests, and the dissent agrees, 171 Vt. at 356,764 A.2d at 1243, that we can find a standard in the Legislature’s authorization that towns may “prohibit expansion and undue perpetuation of nonconforming uses.” 24 V.S.A. § 4408(b). We agree that nonconforming use policy should be relevant to a selectboard’s decision, but its effect in the Handy case was to eliminate the exercise of discretion entirely. If the Legislature believed that avoidance of nonconforming uses should be the controlling policy in all instances, it could have simply made the effective date of any zoning amendment retroactive to the date it was first warned. Perhaps it did not do so because the perpetuation policy is not itself absolute; it prohibits only “undue” perpetuation.
We also recognize that the Legislature intended to give municipalities flexibility in dealing with development proposals at variance with new proposed zoning rules. But a grant of flexibility to the municipality is constitutional only if it is accompanied by some ability of landowners to predict how discretion will be exercised and to develop proposed land uses accordingly. Flexibility cannot be a synonym for ad-hoc decision making that is essentially arbitrary. We cannot ignore that in a small town environment, the people involved, and affected by, the decision-making process have frequently had extensive interaction with each other, and the use of flexibility may reflect that interaction rather than neutral, predictable, and universal administrative standards.
Nor can we resolve the deficiency in the statute by announcing that the selectboard does not have unfettered discretion and creating a “reasonable basis” review standard. 171 Vt. at 357-58, 764 A.2d at 1244. This course of action would offend all three of the reasons why a standardless delegation is unconstitutional. As demonstrated by what transpired in the instant cases, it would most offend the requirement that the landowner be given prior notice of what the rules are, but it would also fail to ensure consistent decision making.
[350]*350Finally, we emphasize two points about the impact of today’s decision and its effect on the decisions of the environmental court, particularly in Handy. There is no constitutional impediment to the Legislature requiring special selectboard review of development proposals that are filed after a zoning amendment is warned and are affected by the warned amendment, as long as the review requirement contains appropriate standards to govern the selectboard determination. Such a requirement serves an important public interest: to prevent a change in land use policy from being undermined by last-minute development which is inconsistent with the new policy. As noted below, our vested rights jurisprudence recognizes this policy. Indeed, if the standards urged by the dissent were added to the statute, the constitutional defect would be cured.
The second point is about the effect of this decision. As the environmental court explained, the decision that Handy does not have to go through selectboard review, and our similar ruling for Jolley, does not end the question of which version of the zoning ordinance applies. Our vested rights jurisprudence, first announced in Smith v. Winhall Planning Commission, 140 Vt. at 181-82, 436 A.2d at 761-62, normally vests a right in the developer to develop under the zoning ordinance in effect at the time of application. In adopting this minority rule, we explained that it particularly fit a situation “where no amendment is pending at the time of application,” id. at 182, 436 A.2d at 761, and that under the rule, the zoning proceedings must be “‘validly brought and pursued in good faith,”’ id. at 182, 436 A.2d at 762 (quoting In re Preseault, 132 Vt. 471, 474, 321 A.2d 65, 66 (1974)). In fact, jurisdictions keying vested rights to the date of application generally have an exception for cases where a zoning change is pending on that date. 4 E. Ziegler, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 50.04[l][b], at 50-20 (1999) (“Probably the most significant limitation on the [minority] rule is where a zoning change is pending at the time of an application.”). Thus, even though zoning amendments are effective on the date of adoption, or twenty-one days later, 24 V.S.A. § 4404, a developer may not have a vested right in an application filed while a proposed amendment is pending.
Contrary to the argument of the dissent, the “good faith” standard is specific and ascertainable, having been adopted and described in numerous decisions from other states. See, e.g., Stowe v. Burke, 122 S.E.2d 374, 379-80 (N.C. 1961); Penn Township v. Yecko Bros., 217 A.2d 171, 173 (Pa. 1966); see generally City of Jackson v. Lakeland Lounge, 800 F. Supp. 455, 461-62 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (collecting cases); [351]*351G. Hanes & J. Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 373, 398-400 (1989). Moreover, it is a rule of law to be applied according to its terms and not a broad grant of discretion to a decision maker to act within wide boundaries or no boundaries at all.
We cannot determine on this record whether Handy’s application was validly brought and pursued in good faith. Although the environmental court could make that determination in the first instance, we agree with it that the better procedure is that the zoning board make that determination first with review by the environmental court. We affirm that holding.
Similarly, because of the very limited factual development in the environmental court, we also cannot assess the Jolley application against this standard. We note only that because Jolley’s application came later in the process, its burden to show that it did not engage in a race to put in some development proposal before the ordinance became effective is much higher. See Yecko Bros., 217 A.2d at 173 (landowner must show it did not race to get the permit before a change was made in the zoning ordinance).8
The environmental court’s November 14, 1997 decision with respect to the Handy applications is affirmed. The environmental court’s November 14, 1997 decision with respect to the Jolley applications is vacated. The cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.