PER CURIAM:
The Board on Professional Responsibility (Board) has filed with this court a Supplemental Report and Recommendation that respondent, Karen P. Cleaver-Bas-combe, be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years with a requirement that she prove fitness before reinstatement for conduct violating four disciplinary rules, namely: Rule 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee); Rule 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal); Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice). Cleaver-Bascombe excepts to the Board’s supplemental report and recommendation, con[1193]*1193tending that the record does not support the Board’s findings or the recommended sanction. Alternatively, Cleaver-Bas-combe requests that the court impose as a sanction a thirty-day suspension and suspend its execution for a period of six months with the requirement that she have a practice monitor and complete a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course on record-keeping. We adopt the Board’s findings in its supplemental report but reject its recommended sanction. We order that Karen P. Cleaver-Baseombe be disbarred.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case returns to the court following remand proceedings pursuant to this court’s opinion and remand order in In re Karen P. Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396 (D.C.2006) (Cleaver-Bascombe I).1 The case stems from findings that respondent, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), D.C.Code §§ 11-2601 et seq. (2001) in an extradition case, submitted a fraudulent voucher to the court seeking compensation for services that she knew she had not rendered. In Cleaver-Baseombe I, we considered the Board’s initial report in which the Board adopted essentially the Hearing Committee’s findings, concluded that respondent’s conduct violated four disciplinary rules (Rules 1.5(a), 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)) and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, with reinstatement conditioned upon her successful completion of a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course on time and record-keeping, while Bar Counsel urged a one-year suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness to practice law. In making its original recommendation, the Board had declined to find that respondent’s misconduct was aggravated by her testimony at the disciplinary hearing in which she supported the validity of the claimed services on the voucher. The Board “agree[d] with Respondent that the [Hearing] Committee’s findings do not support a conclusion that [Respondent] presented false evidence or testimony.” Id. at 399. In Cleaver-Baseombe I, the court identified a tension between the Board’s findings in its initial report that required resolution by the Board before determining the appropriate sanction for the proven violations.2 Id. at 399. Specifically, the court stated that “[b]eeause Respondent swore to essentially the same propositions in her voucher and in her testimony, ... the Board’s finding that the voucher was intentionally false and patently fraudulent is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with its later treatment of Respondent’s testimony as not [1194]*1194having been proved to be deliberately false.” Id. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the Board for revised findings and a new recommendation consistent with the court’s opinion. Id. at 413.3
The Board explained in its supplemental report that it did not return the matter to the Hearing Committee on remand because the court did not direct it to do so, and neither Bar Counsel nor respondent requested it in their briefs on remand. Moreover, the Board expressed the view that even if the case were remanded to the Hearing Committee, it could not reasonably expect it to reconstruct accurately its credibility impressions after such an extended lapse of time. The Board stated that “[i]n these circumstances, the only course reasonably available to us is to review the Committee’s findings anew with a view to identifying the conduct that we are confident at this juncture can be said to have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”4 Following briefing by the parties on remand and upon further review, the Board issued its supplemental report in which it adhered to its prior finding that respondent submitted for payment a fraudulent voucher seeking compensation for services she knew that she had not rendered and made the additional finding that respondent exacerbated her misconduct in sworn testimony when she “defended her voucher as written and insisted that it fairly reflected the services she rendered.” The Board concluded as a matter of law that respondent perjured herself in her testimony before the Hearing Committee. Therefore, the Board revised its recommended sanction to a suspension of two years with the requirement that respondent prove fitness before reinstatement.5
II.
A. Standard of Review
When considering a Report and Recommendation from the Board on Professional Responsibility, this court must “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h) (2006); accord, In re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 373 (D.C.2007); In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 766 (D.C.2000). Similarly, “the Board is obliged to accept the hearing committee’s factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole.” Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373 (quoting Berryman, supra, 764 A.2d at 766). “Generally speaking, if the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C.2003) (other citations and quotations omitted).
As we said in In re Goffe:
[1195]*1195Ultimately, however, the system of attorney discipline, including the imposition of sanctions, is the responsibility and duty of this court. In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d [919,] 924 [ (D.C.1987) ]. “When the court disagrees with the Board as to the seriousness of the offense or the demands of consistency, however, the Board’s recommendations are accordingly granted less weight.” In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1228 (D.C.1988) (citing In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 230-31 (D.C.1986) (en banc)). More specifically, decisions of this court can serve as overall guidelines to assist in defining the permissible range of sanctions.
In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458
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PER CURIAM:
The Board on Professional Responsibility (Board) has filed with this court a Supplemental Report and Recommendation that respondent, Karen P. Cleaver-Bas-combe, be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years with a requirement that she prove fitness before reinstatement for conduct violating four disciplinary rules, namely: Rule 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee); Rule 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal); Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice). Cleaver-Bascombe excepts to the Board’s supplemental report and recommendation, con[1193]*1193tending that the record does not support the Board’s findings or the recommended sanction. Alternatively, Cleaver-Bas-combe requests that the court impose as a sanction a thirty-day suspension and suspend its execution for a period of six months with the requirement that she have a practice monitor and complete a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course on record-keeping. We adopt the Board’s findings in its supplemental report but reject its recommended sanction. We order that Karen P. Cleaver-Baseombe be disbarred.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
This case returns to the court following remand proceedings pursuant to this court’s opinion and remand order in In re Karen P. Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396 (D.C.2006) (Cleaver-Bascombe I).1 The case stems from findings that respondent, an attorney appointed to represent an indigent criminal defendant under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), D.C.Code §§ 11-2601 et seq. (2001) in an extradition case, submitted a fraudulent voucher to the court seeking compensation for services that she knew she had not rendered. In Cleaver-Baseombe I, we considered the Board’s initial report in which the Board adopted essentially the Hearing Committee’s findings, concluded that respondent’s conduct violated four disciplinary rules (Rules 1.5(a), 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)) and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days, with reinstatement conditioned upon her successful completion of a Continuing Legal Education (CLE) course on time and record-keeping, while Bar Counsel urged a one-year suspension with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness to practice law. In making its original recommendation, the Board had declined to find that respondent’s misconduct was aggravated by her testimony at the disciplinary hearing in which she supported the validity of the claimed services on the voucher. The Board “agree[d] with Respondent that the [Hearing] Committee’s findings do not support a conclusion that [Respondent] presented false evidence or testimony.” Id. at 399. In Cleaver-Baseombe I, the court identified a tension between the Board’s findings in its initial report that required resolution by the Board before determining the appropriate sanction for the proven violations.2 Id. at 399. Specifically, the court stated that “[b]eeause Respondent swore to essentially the same propositions in her voucher and in her testimony, ... the Board’s finding that the voucher was intentionally false and patently fraudulent is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with its later treatment of Respondent’s testimony as not [1194]*1194having been proved to be deliberately false.” Id. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the Board for revised findings and a new recommendation consistent with the court’s opinion. Id. at 413.3
The Board explained in its supplemental report that it did not return the matter to the Hearing Committee on remand because the court did not direct it to do so, and neither Bar Counsel nor respondent requested it in their briefs on remand. Moreover, the Board expressed the view that even if the case were remanded to the Hearing Committee, it could not reasonably expect it to reconstruct accurately its credibility impressions after such an extended lapse of time. The Board stated that “[i]n these circumstances, the only course reasonably available to us is to review the Committee’s findings anew with a view to identifying the conduct that we are confident at this juncture can be said to have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.”4 Following briefing by the parties on remand and upon further review, the Board issued its supplemental report in which it adhered to its prior finding that respondent submitted for payment a fraudulent voucher seeking compensation for services she knew that she had not rendered and made the additional finding that respondent exacerbated her misconduct in sworn testimony when she “defended her voucher as written and insisted that it fairly reflected the services she rendered.” The Board concluded as a matter of law that respondent perjured herself in her testimony before the Hearing Committee. Therefore, the Board revised its recommended sanction to a suspension of two years with the requirement that respondent prove fitness before reinstatement.5
II.
A. Standard of Review
When considering a Report and Recommendation from the Board on Professional Responsibility, this court must “accept the findings of fact made by the Board unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence of record, and shall adopt the recommended disposition of the Board unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or would otherwise be unwarranted.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h) (2006); accord, In re Elgin, 918 A.2d 362, 373 (D.C.2007); In re Berryman, 764 A.2d 760, 766 (D.C.2000). Similarly, “the Board is obliged to accept the hearing committee’s factual findings if those findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record, viewed as a whole.” Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373 (quoting Berryman, supra, 764 A.2d at 766). “Generally speaking, if the Board’s recommended sanction falls within a wide range of acceptable outcomes, it will be adopted and imposed.” In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 371 (D.C.2003) (other citations and quotations omitted).
As we said in In re Goffe:
[1195]*1195Ultimately, however, the system of attorney discipline, including the imposition of sanctions, is the responsibility and duty of this court. In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d [919,] 924 [ (D.C.1987) ]. “When the court disagrees with the Board as to the seriousness of the offense or the demands of consistency, however, the Board’s recommendations are accordingly granted less weight.” In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1228 (D.C.1988) (citing In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 230-31 (D.C.1986) (en banc)). More specifically, decisions of this court can serve as overall guidelines to assist in defining the permissible range of sanctions.
In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 464 (D.C.1994).
We iterate briefly the applicable principles. To determine what discipline is appropriate under the circumstances, we review the respondent’s violations in light of all the relevant factors. Reback, 513 A.2d at 231. These factors include (1) “the nature of the violation, [ (2) ] the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, [ (3) ] the need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession,” Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 924, and (4) the moral fitness of the attorney. Id. (citing In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). The purpose of imposing discipline is to serve the public and professional interests identified and to deter future and similar conduct rather than to punish the attorney. Kennedy, 542 A.2d at 1231; Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 924.
Id.
And as we said in Cleaver-Bascombe I, “where ‘this court has had little occasion to pass upon conduct such as was involved in that case and here, and therefore our role in reviewing the Board’s recommendation may be more assertive than in more familiar types of misconduct.’ ” Cleaver-Bas-combe, supra, 892 A.2d at 402 (quoting In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206, 211 (D.C.1989) (brackets and ellipses omitted in original)).
In the final analysis, we are always mindful that the solemn obligation and responsibility for determining and imposing disciplinary sanctions on a member of our bar rest upon this court. In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203, 1207 (D.C.1993). See also Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 402; Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 376. With these standards in mind, we consider the Board’s findings and recommendation and the arguments of the parties with respect thereto.
B. The Board’s Findings on Remand
Respondent argues that the record does not support the Board’s conclusion that she submitted a patently fraudulent voucher. She contends that the Board’s original finding that the voucher was prepared without much deliberation and that it was reckless, careless, and not cunning, negates any conclusion that respondent acted with a fraudulent intent. She argues that eleven of the twelve entries on the voucher are supported by the evidence and that one uncorroborated entry, i.e., a jail visit, would not render the entire voucher patently fraudulent. However, in Cleaver-Bascombe I, this court rejected respondent’s argument that the Hearing Committee’s findings lacked adequate support in the record. Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 402. The Board found that all of the Committee’s factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and adopted them “in toto,” and this court did the same. Id. To the extent that respondent seeks to revisit the challenges previously raised and disposed of, we are foreclosed from doing so by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Lenkin Co. Mgmt. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 677 A.2d 46, 48 (D.C.1996) (citing Kritsidi-[1196]*1196mas v. Sheskin, 411 A.2d 370, 371 (D.C.1980)); see also M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) (“[N]o division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court ... and ... such [a] result can only be accomplished by this court en banc.”). Thus, we consider here only those new or additional findings made in response to this court’s remand order.
In the prior decision, the court affirmed the Board’s findings and conclusions that respondent knowingly submitted a voucher for payment for services that she knew that she had not performed. Consistent with the Board’s report, the court concluded that respondent’s conduct violated four disciplinary rules: (1) Rule 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee); (2) Rule 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal, ie., Superior Court); (3) Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation); and (4) 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice).6 Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 403-04. The question that the court wanted clarified on remand before determining the appropriate sanction was the inconsistency between “the Board’s conclusion that Respondent submitted a ‘patently fraudulent voucher’ with its position that the Hearing Committee’s findings ‘do not support the conclusion that she presented false evidence or testimony....’” 7 Id. at 410-11.
In response to the court’s remand order, the Board found that there was “clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly submitted a false voucher and exacerbated the misconduct with false testimony at the hearing.” Citing as an “example” testimony concerning the jail visit, the Board went on to find that “Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knew when she testified to it that her story about the D.C. Jail visit was false.” The Board pointed out that respondent defended her voucher, insisting that it fairly reflected the services she had provided. Although the Hearing Committee did not find her testimony credible, it did not find it to be deliberately false. The Board made that finding on remand. The Board then concluded, that respondent perjured herself.
Respondent argues that the record does not support the Board’s supplemental finding that she testified falsely at the disciplinary hearing or perjured herself. She contends that although the Hearing Committee did not credit her testimony, it did not find that her testimony was deliberately false, but rather based its finding on other credible evidence. She contends further that she qualified her testimony, bas[1197]*1197ing it upon her recollection and even identifying some mistakes in the bill. Bar Counsel argues that there is substantial record evidence to support the Board’s finding that. Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly submitted a false voucher to the Superior Court and that respondent deliberately gave false testimony before the Hearing Committee concerning it.
The Board acknowledges correctly, as respondent points out, that “[t]he Hearing Committee heard [Respondent] testify and found her testimony not to be credible, but it did not make a finding that her testimony was deliberately false.” However, the Board reached that conclusion based on the facts that were established by the evidence. Specifically, the Board found that:
While it is hard to imagine why Respondent would have made up the D.C. Jail visit out of whole cloth when she originally prepared her voucher — as we have noted she did have encounters with her client to which she could have properly attributed time — we find that when she stuck with her story during the disciplinary proceedings, she did so knowing it was false.... And even though the Hearing Committee listened to her testimony and did not find it to be knowingly false, we find that the Committee erred in this respect. We find that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knew when she testified to it that her story about the D.C. Jail visit was false.
In reaching the foregoing conclusions, the Board accepted the Hearing Committee’s factual findings that were supported by substantial evidence. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373 (citations omitted) (setting forth the standard that the Board must accept the Hearing Committee’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence). Those findings included that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent did not meet with her client at the D.C. Jail on the date that she indicated on her voucher. While the Hearing Committee reached its determination by crediting certain evidence and discrediting other evidence, as respondent contends,8 this factor does not undermine the Board’s conclusion based on that evidence that Respondent knew when she testified in detail about the meeting that it had not occurred. As to the claimed meeting at the jail, the Board could properly conclude that “it is hard to imagine that Respondent forgot that she did not go [to the jail]” and that she could not be reasonably mistaken in testifying otherwise.9 The Board’s factual [1198]*1198finding in this regard is supported by substantial evidence of record; therefore, we adopt it. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h); Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373.
The Board went further to conclude that respondent perjured herself, citing as an example her testimony concerning the jail visit. Respondent argues that the record does not support the conclusion that she perjured herself. She contends that such a finding should not be made absent a finding of the requisite specific intention, which the Hearing Committee did not make. Whether the Board could properly find all elements of perjury in the legal sense based on the Hearing Committee’s factual findings or on the record has no significant impact on the sanction here, given the facts that have been established.10 It is sufficient for purposes of the disposition of this case that the Board found that respondent’s testimony concerning her jail visit was knowingly false, a finding fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Indeed, as we said in Cleaver-Bascombe I:
[I]f Respondent did not in fact come to the jail on that occasion, and if the claim in her voucher that she did visit was a deliberate falsehood, then she necessarily also lied under oath at the hearing; it is hard to imagine that Respondent forgot that she did not go.
Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 410. We need not, and do not decide, whether the Board’s further legal conclusion that respondent is guilty of perjury in any legal sense of the term is supported.
C. Sanctions
Mindful of the legal principles we have outlined in Section II.(A) (Standard of Review), we reject the Board’s recommended sanction of a two-year suspension with a fitness requirement. We likewise reject respondent’s contention that a three-month suspension coupled with a requirement that she complete a CLE course in record-keeping is the appropriate sanction.
What we said in Cleaver-Bascombe I bears repeating here:
The allegations in this case are extremely serious. The compensation of attorneys who represent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia courts pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act is based upon the assumption that members of our Bar are honorable men and women who will accurately report the work that they have done, and who will not demean them noble calling and bring disgrace to themselves and to their pro[1199]*1199fession by swearing that they performed work that they did not do. Attorneys who accept CJA appointments are therefore expected to be scrupulously honest and to exercise a high degree of care in completing their vouchers, which are paid out of taxpayer funds, and which are submitted to the court under penalty of perjury. Where an attorney has deliberately falsified a voucher and sought compensation for work that he or she has not performed, or for time that he or she has not devoted to the case, that attorney’s fitness to practice is called into serious question. This is especially true if the attorney has compounded his or her initial fraud by testifying falsely during the resulting disciplinary proceedings.
Id. at 398.
The first factor our cases call for us to consider is “the nature of the violation.” Goffe, supra, 641 A.2d at 464. Cleaver-Bascombe submitted a “patently fraudulent” voucher seeking compensation from public funds for work she had not performed. We see no meaningful distinction between such fraudulent conduct and other fraudulent conduct leading to disbarment. Cleaver-Bascombe I, 892 A.2d at 414 (Glickman, J., dissenting in part) (describing behavior for which “disbarment is virtually automatic, including misappropriation of client funds, In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 191 (D.C.1990) (en banc); mail or wire fraud, In re Bond, 519 A.2d 165, 166 (D.C.1986); felony theft of federal funds, In re Patterson, 833 A.2d 493 (D.C.2003), and other felony theft offenses, see id. (citing cases).”). We see no basis for distinguishing for the purpose of disciplinary sanction between stealing clients’ funds and stealing public funds. The fundamental element of basic dishonesty is the same. Both reflect the lack of moral rectitude needed to be a member of the legal profession. As we said in In re Minninberg, “[mjisappropriation by an attorney of a client’s (or other) funds is a most serious offense.” 485 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C.1984).
Where we have concluded that the attorney’s conduct falls into a category of dishonesty of a flagrant kind we have held disbarment to be the appropriate sanction. See, e.g., Berryman, supra, 764 A.2d at 761 (paying self attorney fees from a probate estate without prior court authorization); In re Utley, 698 A.2d 446, 447 (D.C.1997) (paying attorney fees from conservatorship funds without prior court approval and delay in repayment); In re Gil, 656 A.2d 303, 304 (D.C.1995) (misappropriation by creating false documents); and In re Goffe, supra, 641 A.2d at 461 (submitting false statements and manufactured documents to IRS and lying to the Tax Court). To be sure, Cleaver-Bascombe did not succeed in her attempt to fraudulently obtain public funds. That failure was through no fault of her own. Rather, it resulted solely from the extraordinary diligence of now deceased Judge Steffen W. Graae, who was the Superior Court judge responsible for approving the voucher in question. Judge Graae ultimately disapproved the voucher in toto and referred the matter to Bar Counsel.
Another of the factors we must consider is “the need to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession.” In re Goffe, supra, 641 A.2d at 464 (quoting Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924). We can say it no better than Judge Glickman did in his partial dissent in Cleaver-Bascombe I:
Importantly, too, for this case, we keep in mind that one purpose of discipline is “to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.” In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 231 (D.C.1986) (en banc).... In the interest of effective general deterrence, the severity of a [1200]*1200sanction should take into account the difficulty of detecting and proving the misconduct at issue. That principle argues strongly in favor of disbarring Respondent, because inflated vouchers are difficult to detect and prove. To deter unscrupulous attorneys who know they are not likely to be caught if they inflate their charges, voucher fraud must incur a heavy penalty.
Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 414.
Yet another factor we consider is the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. In mitigation are the absence of prior discipline and “lack of harm to the client.”11 These mitigating factors are massively outweighed by the aggravating factor-testifying falsely under oath in the disciplinary proceeding that the voucher was indeed accurate.
Lawyers have a greater duty than ordinary citizens to be scrupulously honest at all times, for honesty is “basic” to the practice of law.... Every lawyer has a duty to foster respect for the law, and any act by a lawyer which shows disrespect for the law tarnishes the entire profession.
In re Mason, 736 A.2d 1019, 1024-25 (D.C.1999) (quoting Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924).
In addition to her own testimony, Cleaver-Bascombe presented the testimony of another witness to support her claimed “jail visit.” The Hearing Committee discredited this witness’ testimony based on written records and other evidence which contradicted his claim of being present at the jail during the visit.12
Here we have a fraudulent attempt to obtain public funds by submitting a sworn CJA voucher, under pains and penalties of perjury, which was false and fraudulent compounded by Cleaver-Bascombe presenting false testimony in support of the fraudulent voucher. As the Board said in its Report: “The attempted cover-up often exceeds the initial misconduct. It did so here.” And as we said in Cleaver-Bas-combe I, “lying under oath on the part of an attorney for the purpose of attempting to cover-up previous ... [misconduct] ... is absolutely intolerable.... ” Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 412. In sum, Cleaver-Bascombe submitted a “patently fraudulent” voucher while under oath. She then lied, also under oath, about submitting the voucher. She maintains now, as she has throughout the proceedings beginning with Judge Graae in the Superior Court, throughout the disciplinary proceeding in Cleaver-Bascombe I and here, in Cleaver-Bascombe II that her voucher is accurate and her testimony was truthful.
The purpose of imposing discipline is to serve the public and professional interest and to deter future and similar conduct. Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 924. We conclude that this record demonstrates that Cleaver-Bascombe lacks the moral fitness [1201]*1201to remain a member of the legal profession.13 It is
ORDERED that Karen P. Cleaver-Bas-combe is disbarred from the practice of law in the District of Columbia, effective thirty days from the date of this opinion. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(f). For the purpose of seeking reinstatement to the Bar, the period of disbarment shall not be deemed to begin until Cleaver-Bascombe files a sufficient affidavit pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).
So ordered.