In Re Patterson

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

In Re Patterson

833 A.2d 493, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 690, 2003 WL 22309081

CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals

DecidedOctober 9, 2003

Docket02-BG-498, 02-BG-1130

StatusPublished

Cited by15 cases

This text of 833 A.2d 493 (In Re Patterson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re Patterson, 833 A.2d 493, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 690, 2003 WL 22309081 (D.C. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

On May 9, 2002, respondent pleaded guilty to the felony of stealing property in excess of $1,000 belonging to the United States Government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The matter is before this court on the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility that respondent be disbarred pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (2001) (disbarment upon conviction of crime involving moral turpitude).

Disbarment for conviction of an offense reached by § ll-2503(a) — i.e., involving moral turpitude — is mandatory. See In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463, 466 (D.C.2000). Respondent’s executed plea agreement is proof of his criminal conviction. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10(f). “[A] valid guilty plea acts as a conviction of the crime charged, as well as an admission of all the material facts alleged by the government.” In re Untalan, 619 A.2d 978, 981 (D.C.1993); see also In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.1988). Having stolen property from the United States worth more than $1,000, appellant was convicted of felony theft, a crime this court has previously determined to involve moral turpitude per se. See In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152 (D.C.1997) (grand theft; California statute); In re Sluys, 632 A.2d 734 (D.C.1993) (grand larceny; New York statute); In re Slater, 627 A.2d 508 (D.C.1993) (grand larceny; Virginia statute); In re Hopmayer, 602 A.2d 655 (D.C.1992) (theft; New Jersey statute); In re Solerwitz, 601 A.2d 1083 (D.C.1992) (grand larceny; New York statute).

Accordingly, respondent is hereby disbarred pursuant to § ll-2503(a). * For purposes of reinstatement, the period of disbarment shall not be deemed to commence until respondent files the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

So ordered.

*

We dismiss as moot the pending reciprocal matter based on a public reprimand respondent received in Virginia for misconduct in practicing law after his license was suspended and dishonestly advising a judge that he was unaware of the suspension. See In re Dechowitz, 741 A.2d 1061 (D.C.1999).

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PER CURIAM:

On May 9, 2002, respondent pleaded guilty to the felony of stealing property in excess of $1,000 belonging to the United States Government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The matter is before this court on the recommendation of the Board on Professional Responsibility that respondent be disbarred pursuant to D.C.Code § ll-2503(a) (2001) (disbarment upon conviction of crime involving moral turpitude).

Disbarment for conviction of an offense reached by § ll-2503(a) — i.e., involving moral turpitude — is mandatory. See In re Spiridon, 755 A.2d 463, 466 (D.C.2000). Respondent’s executed plea agreement is proof of his criminal conviction. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 10(f). “[A] valid guilty plea acts as a conviction of the crime charged, as well as an admission of all the material facts alleged by the government.” In re Untalan, 619 A.2d 978, 981 (D.C.1993); see also In re Shillaire, 549 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.1988). Having stolen property from the United States worth more than $1,000, appellant was convicted of felony theft, a crime this court has previously determined to involve moral turpitude per se. See In re Caplan, 691 A.2d 1152 (D.C.1997) (grand theft; California statute); In re Sluys, 632 A.2d 734 (D.C.1993) (grand larceny; New York statute); In re Slater, 627 A.2d 508 (D.C.1993) (grand larceny; Virginia statute); In re Hopmayer, 602 A.2d 655 (D.C.1992) (theft; New Jersey statute); In re Solerwitz, 601 A.2d 1083 (D.C.1992) (grand larceny; New York statute).

Accordingly, respondent is hereby disbarred pursuant to § ll-2503(a). * For purposes of reinstatement, the period of disbarment shall not be deemed to commence until respondent files the affidavit required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g).

So ordered.

*

We dismiss as moot the pending reciprocal matter based on a public reprimand respondent received in Virginia for misconduct in practicing law after his license was suspended and dishonestly advising a judge that he was unaware of the suspension. See In re Dechowitz, 741 A.2d 1061 (D.C.1999).

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833 A.2d 493, 2003 D.C. App. LEXIS 690, 2003 WL 22309081, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-patterson-dc-2003.

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