Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.

446 U.S. 578, 100 S. Ct. 1889, 64 L. Ed. 2d 525, 1980 U.S. LEXIS 37, 10 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20353, 14 ERC (BNA) 1497

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 27, 1980
• Docket: 78-1918
• Status: Published

Opinions

Me. Justice Stewart

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 307 (b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (Act) provides for direct review in a federal court of appeals of certain locally and regionally applicable actions taken by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under specifically enumerated provisions of the Act, and of “any other final action of the Administrator under '[the] Act . . . which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.)¹ The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was correct in concluding that it was without jurisdiction under §307 (b)(1) to entertain a petition for review in which PPG Industries, Inc. (PPG), and Conoco, Inc. (Conoco), the respondents here, challenged a decision of the Administrator concerning the applicability of EPA’s “new source” performance standards to a power generating facility operated by PPG. More specifically, we must decide whether the Administrator’s decision falls within the ambit of “any other final action” reviewable in a court of appeals under § 307 (b)(1).

I

The dispute underlying this jurisdictional question involves a decision of the Administrator under § 111 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7411 (1976 ed., Supp. II). That provision requires the Administrator to publish, and from time to time to revise, a list of categories of any stationary source that he determines “causes, or contributes significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” § 111 (b)(1)(A), and to promulgate regulations establishing standards of performance for “new sources” within the list of those categories, § 111 (b)(1) (B). The Act defines a “new source” as “any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing a standard of performance under this section which will be applicable to such source.” § 111 (a)(2).

In 1971, the Administrator included “fossil fuel-fired steam generators” in his list of stationary sources. 36 Fed. Reg. 5931. Later that year, pursuant to his mandate to promulgate “new source” performance standards, the Administrator established certain emission limits for any “fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit” of more than 250 million Btu’s per hour heat input, the construction or modification of which was commenced after August 17, 1971, the date on which the standards were proposed. 40 CFR §§ 60.1-60.15, 60.40-60.46 (1979). These “new source” regulations define the term, “fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit,” § 60.41 (a), and also create a procedure under which the Administrator, upon request, will determine whether any action taken or planned by the owner or operator of a facility constitutes or will constitute “construction” or “modification” of the facility for purposes of triggering the applicability of the performance standards. § 60.5.

Sometime in 1970, the respondent PPG, a chemical manufacturing corporation, began the planning and preliminary construction of a new power generating facility at its plant in Lake Charles, La. That facility, designed to take advantage of fuel-efficient “cogeneration” technology, was to consist of two gas turbine generators, two “waste-heat” boilers, and a turbogenerator. The dispute between EPA and PPG concerns the applicability of the “new source” performance standards to the waste-heat boilers of this facility. This controversy first arose in 1975, when the respondent Conoco, PPG’s fuel supplier, informed EPA that Conoco was switching the supply of fuel to the Lake Charles facility from natural gas to fuel oil. An exchange of correspondence ensued, initiated by EPA’s request that PPG submit additional information bearing on whether the waste-heat boilers were covered by the “new source” standards. PPG’s submissions revealed that although assembly of the waste-heat boilers had not begun until 1976, the new power facility itself, of which the boilers were an integral component, had been originally designed and partially ordered in 1970, a year before the proposed date of the “new source” performance standards.

On the basis of PPG’s submissions, the Regional Director for Enforcement of the EPA notified PPG of his conclusion that the boilers were subject to the “new source” standards, since construction of the boilers themselves had not begun until long after January 14, 1971, the date on which the standards had been proposed. In response, PPG took the position that the boilers were part of an integrated unit, the construction of which had begun in 1970, before the proposed date of the standards. The Regional Director, nevertheless, reaffirmed his initial decision.

Pursuant to the procedure outlined in the “new source” regulations, 40 CFR § 60.5 (1979), PPG then submitted a formal request for an EPA determination that (1) the “new source” standards for “fossil fuel-fired steam generators” do not apply to the type of boilers in question, and (2) in any event, since construction of the facility of which the boilers were a part began before the date on which the standards were proposed, the boilers were not “new sources” and thus not- subject to the performance standards. In the event that EPA determined that PPG’s waste-heat boilers were subject to the standards, PPG also requested a clarification as to how those standards would apply.

Responding to PPG’s request, the Regional Administrator notified PPG by letter that he had concluded that the waste-heat boilers were, indeed, subject to the “new source” standards for “fossil fuel-fired steam generators,” and rejected PPG’s argument that construction of the boilers had begun with the construction of other facets of the Lake Charles facility. Thus, the Regional Administrator affirmed the previous EPA determination that the waste-heat boilers were subject to the “new source” performance standards. With regard to the manner in which those standards were to apply to the waste-heat boilers, the Regional Administrator indicated that since PPG’s gas turbine generators were not subject to the “new source” standards, PPG would be held accountable only for those emissions from the waste-heat boilers attributable to the combustion of fossil fuel, not those emissions attributable to waste heat from the gas turbine generators.²

PPG then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, seeking review of EPA’s decision concerning the applicability of the “new source” standards to its waste-heat boilers. Because of its uncertainty regarding the proper forum for judicial review, PPG also filed a complaint for injunctive relief against the Administrator in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. That suit has been stayed pending the disposition of the present case.

PPG’s uncertainty, and the issue in this case, stem from conflicting views as to the proper interpretation of § 307 (b) (1) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II). Before 1977, §307 (b)(1) provided for exclusive review in an appropriate court of appeals of certain locally or regionally applicable actions of the Administrator under several specifically enumerated provisions of the Act. Actions of the Administrator under provisions not specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1) were reviewable only in a district court under its federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Congress expanded the ambit of § 307 (b)(1) in 1977. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, added to the list of locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable exclusively in the appropriate court of appeals both (1) actions of the Administrator under another specifically enumerated provision of the Act, and (2) “any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.) Later in 1977, in enacting the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, Pub. L. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404, Congress added several more provisions to those listed in § 307 (b)(1) under which a locally or regionally applicable action of the Administrator is reviewable in the appropriate court of appeals.

It was under §307 (b)(1), as amended, that PPG filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Despite having filed its petition there, PPG, and Conoco as intervenor, argued that that court was without jurisdiction, since the Administrator’s decision was not an action taken under one of the provisions specifically enumerated in § 307 (b) (1), and could not be properly characterized as “any other final action of the Administrator.” The latter phrase, they argued, referred only to other locally or regionally applicable final actions under the provisions of the Act specifically enumerated in § 307 (b)(1). In response, EPA argued that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be read literally to mean any final action of the Administrator.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the Administrator’s decision did not fall within the meaning of “any other final action” under §307 (b)(1). 587 F. 2d 237. It was the court’s view that “[i]f Congress intended ... to cast the entire responsibility for reviewing all EPA action under the Act into the courts of appeals, the numeration of specific sections would appear to be redundant.” Id., at 243. The “most revealing” aspect of the legislative history of § 307 (b)(1), the court thought, was the complete absence of any discussion of such a “massive shift” in jurisdiction. Moreover, the court found it unlikely that Congress could have intended a shift of jurisdiction that would require the courts of appeals to review decisions of the Administrator that simply applied or interpreted his regulations, as in this case. Such a decision, the court noted, is often based on a “skeletal record” that may leave the reviewing court unable to perform meaningful judicial review. Since an appellate court is ill-suited to augment such a record, especially when compared to a trial court in which the tools of discovery are available, the court concluded that “[w]hatever addition to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals Congress may have contemplated by adding the ‘any other final action’ language to § 307 (b)(1), we assume that section was drafted with the mechanical limitations of the courts of appeals in mind.” 587 F. 2d, at 245. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals dismissed PPG’s petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 307 (b)(1). We granted certiorari, 444 U. S. 823, because of the importance of determining the locus of judicial review of the actions of EPA.

II

It is undisputed that the Administrator’s decision concerning the applicability of the “new source” performance standards to PPG’s waste-heat boilers was locally applicable action under a provision of the Act not specifically enumerated in § 307 (b)(1). The question at issue is whether the Administrator’s decision falls within the scope of the phrase, “any other final action of the Administrator,” so as to make that decision reviewable in a federal court of appeals under § 307 (b)(1).

At the outset, we note that the parties are in agreement that the Administrator’s decision was “final action” as that term is understood in the context of the Administrative Procedure Act and other provisions of federal law. It is undisputed that the Administrator’s ruling represented EPA’s final determination concerning the applicability of the “new source” standards to PPG’s power facility. Short of an enforcement action, EPA has rendered its last word on the matter. The controversy thus is not about whether' the Administrator’s decision was “final,” but rather about whether it was “any other final action” within the meaning of § 307 (b)(1), as amended in 1977.

A

The petitioners argue that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be construed in accordance with its literal meaning so as to reach any action of the Administrator under the Act that is “final” and not taken under a specifically enumerated provision in §307 (b)(1). The respondents argue that the statutory language 'should be construed more narrowly. Relying on the familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis, they assert that the phrase, “any other final action,” should be read not to reach all final actions of the Administrator, but rather only those similar to the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions that precede that catchall phrase in the statute.³ The similarity that the respondents discern among the actions under the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b)(1) is that those actions must be based on what the respondents refer to as “a contemporaneously compiled administrative record,” by which they mean a record “based on administrative proceedings reflecting at least notice and opportunity for hearing.” Since the Administrator’s informal decision in this case was not based on such a record, the respondents argue that his decision was not “other final action” within the meaning of §307 (b)(1) and thus not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.⁴

The respondents’ reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis is, we think, misplaced in two respects. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as applying only to other items akin to those specifically enumerated. Applying this rule to § 307 (b)(1), the respondents argue that “any other final action” must refer only to final actions based on an administrative record reflecting at least notice and opportunity for a hearing. The flaw in this argument is that at least one of the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b)(1), namely, § 112 (c) of the Act, 42 TJ. S. C. § 7412 (c) (1976 ed., Supp. II), does not require the Administrator to act only after notice and opportunity for a hearing. In fact, the respondents themselves recognize that an action by the Administrator under § 112 (c) would be based on an administrative record not unlike that involved in this case.⁵ Thus, even if the rule of ejusdem generis were applied, it would not significantly narrow the ambit of “any other final action” under §307 (b)(1).

The second problem with the respondents’ reliance on the rule of ejusdem generis is more fundamental. As we have often noted: “‘The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty.’ ” United States v. Powell, 423 U. S. 87, 91, quoting Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124, 128. With regard to § 307 (b) (1), we discern no uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase, “any other final action.” When Congress amended the provision in 1977, it expanded its ambit to include not simply “other final action,” but rather “any other final action.” This expansive language offers no indication whatever that Congress intended the limiting construction of §307 (b)(1) that the respondents now urge. Accordingly, we think it inappropriate to apply the rule of ejusdem generis in construing § 307 (b)(1). Rather, we agree with the petitioners that the phrase, “any other final action,” in the absence of legislative history to the contrary, must be construed to mean exactly what it says, namely, any other final action.⁶

B

We have found nothing in the legislative history to support a conclusion that the phrase, “any other final action,” in § 307 (b)(1) means anything other than what it says.

Congress added the language, “any other final action,” to § 307 (b) (1) in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The phrase first appeared in H. R. 6161, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). That bill, as reported out of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to include review of not only certain EPA actions of nationwide consequences under specifically enumerated provisions of the Act, but also “any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under [the] Act.” In parallel fashion, the bill expanded the jurisdiction of the regional courts of appeals to include review not only of certain local or regional actions under specifically enumerated provisions, but also of “any other final action of the Administrator under [the] Act which is locally or regionally applicable.” (Emphasis added.)

The only extended discussion of this proposed amendment to § 307 (b)(1) was contained in the Committee Report accompanying H. R. 6161. H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, pp. 323-324 (1977). That discussion, however, focused not on the jurisdictional question at issue here, but rather on the proper venue as between the District of Columbia Circuit and the other Federal Circuits. The Committee Report described the proposed amendments as “intended to clarify some questions relating to venue for review of rules or orders under the [A]ct.” Id., at 323. In this regard, the Committee Report explained:

“[The proposed addition to the first sentence of § 307 (b)(1)] makes it clear that any nationally applicable regulations promulgated by the Administrator under the Clean Air Act could be reviewed only in the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. . . .

“[The proposed addition to the second sentence] provides for essentially locally, statewide, or regionally applicable rules or orders to be reviewed in the U. S. court of appeals for the circuit in which such locality, State, or region is located. . . .” Ibid.

The Committee Report further stated that the proposed changes reflected the Committee’s agreement with certain venue proposals of the Administrative Conference of the United States, but added the caveat that the adoption of these proposals was not to be taken as an endorsement of the remainder of the Administrative Conference’s recommendations. Id., at 324.

The respondents infer from this scant legislative history that Congress never intended the addition of the phrase, “any other final action,” to § 307 (b)(1) to enlarge the jurisdiction of the .courts of appeals to include the review of cases based on an administrative record reflecting less than notice and an opportunity for a hearing. But, insofar as the respondents rely on what the Committee said in its Report, we fail to see how the Committee’s observations on venue have any bearing at all on the jurisdictional issue now before the Court.⁷ Moreover, since the Administrative Conference had not proposed that the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals be expanded to include “any other final action,” the fact that the Committee expressly disclaimed an endorsement of the recommendations of the Administrative Conference on matters other than venue would appear wholly irrelevant.

The respondents also rely on what the Committee and the Congress did not say about the 1977 amendments to § 307 (b)(1). It is unlikely, the respondents assert, that Congress would have expanded so radically the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and divested the district courts of jurisdiction, without some consideration and discussion of the matter. We cannot accept this argument. First, although the number of actions comprehended by a literal interpretation of “any other final action” is no doubt substantial, the number would not appear so large as ineluctably to have provoked comment in Congress. Secondly, it would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.⁸

C

The respondents finally argue that, as a matter of policy, the basic purpose of §307 (b)(1) — to provide prompt pre-enforcement review of EPA action — would be better served by providing for judicial review of cases such as this in a district court rather than a court of appeals.⁹ It is the respondents’ view that since agency action predicated on neither formal adjudication nor informal rulemaking is apt to be based on a record too scant to permit informed judicial review, the district court is the preferable forum, since the tools of discovery are there available to augment the record, whereas in a court of appeals a time-consuming remand to EPA might be required.

This is an argument to be addressed to Congress, not to this Court. It is not our task to determine which would be the ideal forum for judicial review of the Administrator’s decision in this case. See, e. g., Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1975). Rather, we must determine what Congress intended when it vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction under §307 (b)(1) to review “any other final action.” The language of the statute clearly provides that a decision of the sort at issue here is reviewable in a court of appeals, and nothing in the legislative history points to any different conclusion.¹⁰

We add only that, as a matter of policy, this conferral of jurisdiction upon the courts of appeals is not wholly irrational. The most obvious advantage of direct review by a court of appeals is the time saved compared to review by a district court, followed by a second review on appeal. It may be seriously questioned whether the overall time lost by court of appeals remands to EPA of those cases in which the records are inadequate would exceed the time saved by forgoing in every case initial review in a district court. But whatever the answer to this empirical question, an appellate court is not without recourse in the event it finds itself unable to exercise informed judicial review because of an inadequate administrative record. In such a situation, an appellate court may always remand a case to the agency for further consideration.¹¹

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Court, of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

1 Section 307 (b)(1) provides in full:

“A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement under section 112, any standard of performance or requirement under section 111,- any standard under section 202 (other than a standard required to be prescribed under section 202 (b) (1)), any determination under section 202 (b)(5), any control or prohibition under section 211, any standard under section 231, any rule issued under section 113, 119, or under section 120, or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this Act may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the Administrator’s action in approving or. promulgating any implementation plan under section 110 or section 111 (d), any order under section 111 (j), under section 112 (c), under section 118 (d), under section 119, or under section 120, or his action under section 119 (c)(2)(A), (B), or (C) (as in effect before the date of enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977) or under regulations thereunder, or any other final action of the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or disapproval by the Administrator under title I) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Administrator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise.” (Emphasis added.) § 307 (b) (1) of the Act, as added, 84 Stat. 1708, and amended by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L, 95-95, 91 Stat. 776, and the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, § 14 of Pub. L. 95-190, 91 Stat. 1404, 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (1) (1976 ed., Supp. II).

2 In a request for clarification, PPG expressed its understanding that the “new source” standards would not be applicable during the normal course of operation of the boilers, but only during performance tests or other periods when the boilers were operating on 100% fossil fuel. EPA by letter confirmed PPG’s understanding. This position, however, was inconsistent with both the Regional Administrator’s earlier ruling and with EPA’s position in similar cases. Accordingly, an EPA representative notified PPG by telephone that the letter was incorrect. In a subsequent letter, the Director of the Division of Stationary Source Enforcement of EPA reiterated that the “new source” standards would be applicable during the normal operation of the waste-heat boilers, but only to the extent that the boilers were operating on fossil fuel, rather than waste heat. The Director also indicated that, pursuant to the standards, PPG would be required to operate the boilers at all times with fuel containing less than a certain specified content of sulfur. He further noted that PPG would be required to install and operate opacity monitors in the stacks of the boilers and to perform alternative monitoring tests.

3 The respondents have abandoned the construction of the statute they advanced in the Court of Appeals, namely, that the phrase, “any other final action,” refers only to other final actions under those provisions specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1). That construction, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, is inconsistent with the fact that the phrase, “any other final action,” is modified not by “under these sections,” but rather by “under this Act.”

4 It would appear that the respondents’ construction of the statute is that adopted by the Court of Appeals, although the matter is not free from doubt. The doubt arises from the fact that the Court of Appeals’ opinion can also be read as establishing a jurisdictional test that turns on a case-by-case inquiry into the adequacy of the administrative record. But, as the respondents themselves acknowledge, that reading, of the opinion would create excessive uncertainty as to the proper forum for judicial review.

5 The respondents argue that this exception should be ignored in' applying the rule of ejusdem generis, since § 112 (c) governs the regulation of “hazardous air pollutants” for which Congress may have wanted “special review” in the courts of appeals, even in the absence of procedures requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing. It is our view, however, that if the rule of ejusdem generis is applicable, it must be applied to actions under all the specifically enumerated provisions in § 307 (b) (1), not simply those that fit the respondents’ theory.

6 The respondents raise several objections to so literal a reading of §307 (b)(1), none of which we find persuasive. First, the respondents assert that such a construction of §307 (b)(1) is both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with another provision of the Act. The internal inconsistency is said to arise from the fact that if the phrase, “any other final action,” were construed to include any final action of the Administrator, it would nullify the express exception from review in §307 (b)(1) of any “standard required to be prescribed under section 202 (b)(1).” The inconsistency with another provision in the Act is said to arise from the fact that a literal reading of “any other final action” would effectively repeal another judicial review provision in the Act, §206 (b)(2)(B), 42 U. S. C. § 7525 (b) (2) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. II). These objections fall far short of the mark, however, for the general language of the catchall phrase, “any other final action,” must obviously give way to specific express provisions in the Act.

The respondents also argue that if Congress had intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to refer to all final actions of the Administrator, it would have been unnecessary, in 1977, to add to the list in § 307 (b) (1) of specifically enumerated provisions under which actions of the Administrator are reviewable in the courts of appeals. This may be true, but the fact remains that even if Congress had intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to be read, as the respondents urge, in accordance with the rule of ejusdem generis, there still would have been no necessity to add to the list of specifically enumerated provisions.

7 That the Committee intended the phrase, “any other final action,” to result in at least some expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is evident in the fact that the Committee Report expressly indicated that several types of nationwide actions under provisions not specifically enumerated in § 307 (b) (1) would be reviewable in the District of Columbia Circuit. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-294, pp. 323-324 (1977) (e. g., regulations to carry out the nonattainment policy set out in § 117 of the Act). Thus, as even the respondents concede, the issue here is not whether Congress intended any expansion of the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, but rather the extent to which Congress intended to expand that jurisdiction. As to that issue, the legislative history is silent.

8 Arthur Conan Doyle, The Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes (1938).

9 The respondents also argue that a literal construction of §307 (b)(1) would violate due process of law. This argument turns on the interrelationship between §307 (b)(1) and its companion provision, §307 (b)(2), which provides that “[a]ction of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under [§ 307 (b) (1)] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement.” 42 U. S. C. § 7607 (b) (2) (1976 ed., Supp. II). To preclude a defendant in a civil or criminal enforcement proceeding from attacking the validity of informal action on the part of the Administrator would, in the respondents’ view, violate the defendant’s due process right to a “reasonable opportunity to be heard and present evidence.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 433. The short answer to the respondents’ argument is that the validity of § 307 (b) (2) is not at issue here. The constitutional question raised by the respondents must, therefore, await another day.

10 The dissenting opinions would modify the language of §307 (b)(1) so as to read either (1) any other final action similar to that under the specifically enumerated provisions other than those added in the Clean Air Act Technical and Conforming Amendments, post, at 600-602, or (2) any other final action expressly, but not impliedly, authorized under the sections of the Act not specifically enumerated in §307 (b)(1), post, at 607. But neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports either of these proposed readings of §307 (b)(1).

11 Whether the present administrative record in this ease is adequate to permit informed judicial review is a question that the Court of Appeals must determine.