CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.
This appeal comes to us from a decision by the district court to deny a motion by defendant Grasselli Employees Independent Association of East Chicago, Inc. (“defendant”) to enforce an arbitrator’s award against plaintiff E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (“plaintiff”). This case requires us to discuss the proper standard of review of an arbitrator’s decision and to apply that standard. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of the district court and order that the arbitration award be enforced.
[613]*613I
The controversy at issue involves the discharge of Willie McClendon by plaintiff on December 29, 1977. McClendon had been working the night shift (11:30 PM-7:30 AM) at plaintiff’s plant for several days prior to the morning of December 26,1977, and did not have any sleep before starting the late shift for December 25-26. At the end of that shift (ie., on the morning of December 26), McClendon had made arrangements with his supervisor Ralph Beiriger to meet him at the employee change house and to drive him to the front gate. However, when Beiriger came by to meet McClendon at 8:00 AM, McClendon was sitting naked in the change house and was not ready to leave. Beiriger stopped by at 8:30 AM and again at 9:00 AM, but McClendon was still naked and not ready to leave. Then, without any apparent provocation, McClendon flew into a rage. McClendon attacked Beiriger and damaged company property. McClendon, still naked, then ran into another building, where he struck an operator and attempted to create a chemical reaction that could have caused further damage. McClendon was finally subdued by police.
McClendon was admitted to the psychiatric ward of a hospital where he remained for more than thirty days. He took drug tests immediately after admission on December 26, and they were positive for both amphetamines and barbiturates. Three days later, the same tests were performed on McClendon and were negative. Physicians later testified that the initial tests could have been a false positive in view of the subsequent negative test and the fact that drugs remain in a person’s system for three to four days. On December 29, McClendon was officially discharged for assaulting fellow employees and destroying company property. He was hospitalized for thirty days and has not been treated subsequently.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, defendant filed a grievance protesting McClendon’s discharge. The grievance was denied by plaintiff, and the parties proceeded to submit the dispute to arbitration as required by the union contract. The critical issue at arbitration was whether McClendon was discharged for “just cause.”
The arbitrator heard testimony that the incident could have been caused by drugs taken by McClendon or by his mental or nervous breakdown. The arbitrator weighed the evidence and concluded that McClendon suffered a mental breakdown, did not misuse drugs, and that the likelihood of McClendon’s having a future breakdown was remote. The arbitrator reasoned that lack of fault must be considered in determining just cause for discharge, and that since McClendon’s outburst was caused by a mental breakdown rather than drug use, he was not at fault for his outburst, and thus just cause was not established. The arbitrator considered the danger to other employees and company property posed by the continued employment of McClendon but concluded that these concerns were not significant because he found the likelihood of a future breakdown by McClendon to be remote. Additionally, the arbitrator noted that his conclusion of no just cause was buttressed by plaintiff’s failure to follow its own procedural policy since it discharged McClendon without conducting a full investigation and giving him the opportunity to present his side of the story. Based on all of the above, the arbitrator reversed the discharge of McClendon and ordered him reinstated, though without compensation for lost wages for the twenty-one months between McClendon’s discharge and his reinstatement.
The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award. The district court stated that the arbitrator premised his decision on McClendon’s lack of fault without equal consideration of safety in the workplace, and that this indicated that the arbitrator was enforcing his own notions of equity instead of the collective bargaining agreement. The court dismissed the procedural irregularities noted by the arbitrator as irrelevant to the determination of just cause. Finally, [614]*614the court noted that public policy concerns regarding the safety of the workplace supported its decision to vacate the arbitrator’s award.
II
At the outset, it should be stressed that judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited. Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.1986); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 1400, 1402 (7th Cir.1986); Ethyl Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180,183 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1184, 89 L.Ed.2d 300. With other deferential standards of review, we still review the merits of the question or issue decided below, but must be very certain that the decision below was erroneous before we reverse that decision. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous....”). When reviewing an arbitration award, however, the standard of review is even more deferential, since the judiciary has no power to reach and determine the merits of arbitration awards merely because of disagreement, even strong disagreement, with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract. As here, so long as the arbitrator interpreted the contract in making his award, his award must be affirmed even if he clearly misinterpreted the contract. Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1402; Ethyl Corporation, 768 F.2d at 184, 186. An award may be overturned only if the arbitrator must have based his award on his own personal notions of right and wrong, for only then does the award fail to “draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” as required by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1353, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, and by ourselves in Ethyl Corporation, 768 F.2d at 184-85; Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, 760 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112; Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.1984), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 912, 83 L.Ed.2d 926. See generally R.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
CUMMINGS, Chief Judge.
This appeal comes to us from a decision by the district court to deny a motion by defendant Grasselli Employees Independent Association of East Chicago, Inc. (“defendant”) to enforce an arbitrator’s award against plaintiff E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company (“plaintiff”). This case requires us to discuss the proper standard of review of an arbitrator’s decision and to apply that standard. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the decision of the district court and order that the arbitration award be enforced.
[613]*613I
The controversy at issue involves the discharge of Willie McClendon by plaintiff on December 29, 1977. McClendon had been working the night shift (11:30 PM-7:30 AM) at plaintiff’s plant for several days prior to the morning of December 26,1977, and did not have any sleep before starting the late shift for December 25-26. At the end of that shift (ie., on the morning of December 26), McClendon had made arrangements with his supervisor Ralph Beiriger to meet him at the employee change house and to drive him to the front gate. However, when Beiriger came by to meet McClendon at 8:00 AM, McClendon was sitting naked in the change house and was not ready to leave. Beiriger stopped by at 8:30 AM and again at 9:00 AM, but McClendon was still naked and not ready to leave. Then, without any apparent provocation, McClendon flew into a rage. McClendon attacked Beiriger and damaged company property. McClendon, still naked, then ran into another building, where he struck an operator and attempted to create a chemical reaction that could have caused further damage. McClendon was finally subdued by police.
McClendon was admitted to the psychiatric ward of a hospital where he remained for more than thirty days. He took drug tests immediately after admission on December 26, and they were positive for both amphetamines and barbiturates. Three days later, the same tests were performed on McClendon and were negative. Physicians later testified that the initial tests could have been a false positive in view of the subsequent negative test and the fact that drugs remain in a person’s system for three to four days. On December 29, McClendon was officially discharged for assaulting fellow employees and destroying company property. He was hospitalized for thirty days and has not been treated subsequently.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, defendant filed a grievance protesting McClendon’s discharge. The grievance was denied by plaintiff, and the parties proceeded to submit the dispute to arbitration as required by the union contract. The critical issue at arbitration was whether McClendon was discharged for “just cause.”
The arbitrator heard testimony that the incident could have been caused by drugs taken by McClendon or by his mental or nervous breakdown. The arbitrator weighed the evidence and concluded that McClendon suffered a mental breakdown, did not misuse drugs, and that the likelihood of McClendon’s having a future breakdown was remote. The arbitrator reasoned that lack of fault must be considered in determining just cause for discharge, and that since McClendon’s outburst was caused by a mental breakdown rather than drug use, he was not at fault for his outburst, and thus just cause was not established. The arbitrator considered the danger to other employees and company property posed by the continued employment of McClendon but concluded that these concerns were not significant because he found the likelihood of a future breakdown by McClendon to be remote. Additionally, the arbitrator noted that his conclusion of no just cause was buttressed by plaintiff’s failure to follow its own procedural policy since it discharged McClendon without conducting a full investigation and giving him the opportunity to present his side of the story. Based on all of the above, the arbitrator reversed the discharge of McClendon and ordered him reinstated, though without compensation for lost wages for the twenty-one months between McClendon’s discharge and his reinstatement.
The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award. The district court stated that the arbitrator premised his decision on McClendon’s lack of fault without equal consideration of safety in the workplace, and that this indicated that the arbitrator was enforcing his own notions of equity instead of the collective bargaining agreement. The court dismissed the procedural irregularities noted by the arbitrator as irrelevant to the determination of just cause. Finally, [614]*614the court noted that public policy concerns regarding the safety of the workplace supported its decision to vacate the arbitrator’s award.
II
At the outset, it should be stressed that judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited. Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir.1986); International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 1400, 1402 (7th Cir.1986); Ethyl Corporation v. United Steelworkers of America, 768 F.2d 180,183 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1184, 89 L.Ed.2d 300. With other deferential standards of review, we still review the merits of the question or issue decided below, but must be very certain that the decision below was erroneous before we reverse that decision. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous....”). When reviewing an arbitration award, however, the standard of review is even more deferential, since the judiciary has no power to reach and determine the merits of arbitration awards merely because of disagreement, even strong disagreement, with the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract. As here, so long as the arbitrator interpreted the contract in making his award, his award must be affirmed even if he clearly misinterpreted the contract. Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1402; Ethyl Corporation, 768 F.2d at 184, 186. An award may be overturned only if the arbitrator must have based his award on his own personal notions of right and wrong, for only then does the award fail to “draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement” as required by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1353, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, and by ourselves in Ethyl Corporation, 768 F.2d at 184-85; Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, 760 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir.1985), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 136, 88 L.Ed.2d 112; Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir.1984), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 912, 83 L.Ed.2d 926. See generally R. Gorman, Labor Law — Unionization and Collective Bargaining 584-586 (1976); Note, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Refining the Standard of Review, 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 993, 995, 998 (1985).
This low standard of review is essential to prevent a “judicialization” of the arbitration process. Ethyl Corporation, 768 F.2d at 184. Arbitration is an alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes, and an extremely low standard of review is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added preliminary step to judicial resolution rather than a true alternative. Id. The parties have bargained ex ante for arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution, and ex post they must abide by this bargain. Camacho, 786 F.2d at 244.
Given this standard of review, it cannot be said that this arbitrator based his award on his own personal notions of right and wrong rather than on an interpretation of the contractual phrase “just cause.” The key to the arbitrator’s award was his reasoning that the plaintiff lacked just cause to terminate McClendon because he was not at fault for his conduct. This notion of fault analysis as part of a just cause determination is not a novel concept based on the personal whims of a single arbitrator; the same concept has been applied by several other arbitrators. See, e.g., Johns-Manville Perlite Corp., 67 L.A. 1255, 1260 (1977); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 60 L.A. 17, 22 (1972); Silas Mason Co., 59 L.A. 197, 200 (1972); Consolidated Foods Corp., 58 L.A. 1285, 1288 (1972). Similarly, the idea that the right to be discharged only if there is just cause contains certain procedural guarantees which were not met in the instant case is not so far-fetched that it could fairly be [615]*615said that the arbitrator was not interpreting “just cause” in the contract when he applied this concept. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp., 58 L.A. 421, 427 (1972). In other words the arbitrator in the instant case did not apply “his own brand of industrial justice,” Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361. While this Court does not necessarily agree with the arbitrator’s conceptions of just cause, mere disagreement does not allow an overturning of the award.
Plaintiff contends that the arbitrator failed to give sufficient consideration to safety in the workplace. We disagree. First, he did not ignore workplace safety. Indeed he explicitly considered danger to company employees and property but concluded that these dangers were not significant since the likelihood of a future mental breakdown by McClendon is remote (Arbitrator’s Award, pp. 25, 41). Second, and more significantly, since the arbitrator was interpreting “just cause” in the contract, we are not empowered to review either his factual finding that the likelihood of a future mental breakdown by McClendon is remote or his judgment that the remoteness of a future breakdown by McClendon renders any possible danger to workplace safety inconsequential.1
Plaintiff further contends that the enforcement of this arbitration award would violate public policy, specifically the public policy of providing a safe working environment as illustrated by various provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b), 654. Of course we should overturn an arbitration award if it violates public policy. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298; Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1403; Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir.1982); Wyman-Gordon Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 613 F.Supp. 626, 632 (N.D.Ill.1985). Unlike a review of the merits of the award itself, where, as illustrated above, there must be strong deference to the arbitrator, the question of whether the award violates public policy “is ultimately one for resolution by the courts.” W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183; Wyman-Gordon Co., 613 F.Supp. at 632. However, the public policy must be “well-defined and dominant” to justify a refusal to enforce the award on public policy grounds. W.R. Grace & Co., 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183; Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1403; Wyman-Gordon Co., 613 F.Supp. at 632. Precisely because this doctrine allows courts to by-pass the normal heavy deference accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to “judicialize” the arbitration process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public policy. Waterside Ocean Navigation Co., Inc. v. International Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 152 (2d Cir.1984); Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO Local Division 1309 v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir.1981). See Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1403; Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 550 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir.1983); Wyman-Gordon Co., 613 F.Supp. at 632.
Where an arbitration award has been overturned on public policy considerations, the court has not questioned the factual findings of the arbitrator. Rather, the court has found that, assuming all of the facts found below are true, the enforcement of the award will violate a public policy. See, e.g., Keystone Consolidated, 782 F.2d at 1403-05 (refusal to apply waiver provision of ERISA in interpreting a pension agreement violated public policy behind enactment of ERISA); Misco, Inc. [616]*616v. United Paperworkers International Union, 768 F.2d 739, 742-43 (5th Cir.1985) (employee who clearly was smoking marijuana won arbitration award because of arbitrator’s notion of industrial due process; such an award violated public policy against drugs); United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825-26 (1st Cir.1984) (employee who clearly embezzled money won arbitration award because of employee’s intent to return money; such an award violated public policy against dishonest postal workers); Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d at 124-25 (truck driver who clearly was intoxicated on the job won arbitration award because of possible alternative cause of truck accident; such an award violated public policy against drunk driving); Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d at 1144-45 (work rule which forbade employees from reporting unsanitary conditions directly to government officials violated public policy). While these courts correctly refused to defer to the arbitrator’s conceptions of public policy, they continued to respect his findings of fact. It is in this context that plaintiff's contention must be examined.
The concurrence argues that an arbitration award cannot be overturned on public policy grounds unless the contract as construed by the arbitrator violates some rule of positive law. More precisely, in the context of the review of an arbitration award which orders the reinstatement of an employee because there was no just cause to terminate that employee, the concurrence argues that so long as the reinstatement of that employee does not violate any rule of positive law, the award cannot be overturned on the ground of public policy. However, the courts have never construed the public policy exception so narrowly. An employer who employs someone who has used drugs does not violate any rule of positive law, yet the Fifth Circuit overturned an award which ordered the reinstatement of an employee who was smoking marijuana on company premises, because the award violated public policy. Misco, 768 F.2d at 742-43. An employer who employs a truck driver who admittedly drank while on duty does not violate any rule of positive law, yet the Fifth Circuit overturned an award which ordered the reinstatement of such an employee, because the award violated public policy. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d at 124-25. If the Postal Service employs a convicted embezzler, this employment does not violate any rule of positive law, yet the First Circuit overturned an award which ordered the reinstatement of such an employee, because the award violated public policy. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 825-26. In this last case, the union raised precisely the same argument that is proffered by the concurrence today: Even if there is a public policy against embezzling Postal Service funds, there is no public policy against the Postal Service employing convicted embezzlers, and to overturn an award on public policy grounds “[y]ou have to have something more — a direct legal prohibition.” Id. at 824. Yet the First Circuit explicitly rejected such a requirement. Id. See generally Gorman at 597 (“when the award, although not requiring illegal conduct, is said to be inconsistent with some significant public policy,” the award may be overturned).
The view of the public policy exception urged by the concurrence also conflicts with this Court’s prior case law. In Jones Dairy Farm, we held that an arbitration award upholding a work rule which forbade employees from reporting unsanitary conditions directly to the government officials violated public policy, and we refused to enforce the award. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d at 1144-45. However, we never said that the work rule violated any rule of positive law, nor did the work rule violate any positive law. Id. Jones Dairy Farm is thus in complete harmony with the public policy exception as stated today.
Nevertheless, given the above legal standard regarding the public policy exception to the review of arbitration awards, plaintiff’s contention that the arbitrator’s award violates public policy must be rejected. As already noted, there are [617]*617two components to the issue of workplace safety in this case. One component is the factual finding made by the arbitrator that the chance of recurrence of McClendon’s violent acts is extremely remote. The second component is his judgment that this remote chance of harm to others does not mandate an award against McClendon. Assuming that workplace safety is a valid public policy, cf Super Tire Engineering Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 125 n. 6 (3d Cir.1983), certiorari denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 83, 83 L.Ed.2d 31, the public policy doctrine allows this Court to decide de novo whether the judgment made by the arbitrator (i.e., the second component identified above) violates public policy. Given the remoteness of a recurrence of McClendon’s breakdown, we decide that the arbitrator’s judgment was permissible. Plaintiff makes the additional argument that the factual finding that the chance of a recurrence is remote (i.e., the first component identified above) is not supported by the record, and thus the policy of workplace safety is violated. This additional argument goes beyond the usual public policy argument, however, since it requires this Court to re-find facts found by the arbitrator, rather than accept the arbitrator’s factual finding and decide whether the arbitrator’s judgment based on that factual finding violated public policy. As already seen, courts applying the public policy doctrine have exercised only the latter function.
The appropriate standard of review for a factual finding such as this which pertains to a public policy exception has not yet been judicially established. On the one hand, plaintiff’s attack on this factual finding can be viewed as an end-run around the normal extreme judicial deference to arbitral fact-finding. Under this view, a court would apply that same extremely deferential standard of review to this type of factual finding as with all arbitral factual findings. On the other hand, this kind of factual finding is different because it pertains to a public policy exception. An arbitral award is not to be enforced if it violates public policy, and this duty would be impaired if a court had to defer to clearly erroneous factual findings made by the arbitrator. Viewed in this light, a less deferential standard of review such as the “clearly erroneous” standard embodied in Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) might be more appropriate with respect to this type of factual finding.
We need not decide here the precise legal standard for reviewing a factual finding that pertains to a public policy exception since even under the less deferential clearly erroneous standard of review the arbitrator’s factual finding that the likelihood of a future breakdown by McClendon is remote must be accepted.2 This factual finding is supportable because although Dr. Polydefkis testified that a repeat occurrence of McClendon’s breakdown is possible, Dr. Espindola testified that McClendon was not psychotic and was on the road to recovery (Tr. 151, 158). Additionally, McClendon had not experienced any incidents subsequent to the sole episode that led to his discharge.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the arbitration award will be enforced.