Justice ALBIN
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A jury determined that DuPont Chambers Works1 (DuPont) violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (also referred to as CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, by retaliating against one of its employees, plaintiff John Seddon, for reporting safety concerns about the company’s operation. The retaliatory acts caused Sed-don to suffer, in effect, a mental breakdown rendering him unfit for continued employment at DuPont. The jury found that Sed-don’s lost wages were the proximate result of DuPont’s retaliation and awarded him both economic and punitive damages.
The Appellate Division overturned the verdict and damages award, reasoning that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that Seddon could be awarded lost wages only if he was constructively discharged. According to the Appellate Division, Seddon was not entitled to lost wages unless “[t]he employer’s conduct [was] ‘so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than continue to endure it.’ ” Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 412 N.J.Super. 17, 31, 988 A.2d 604 (App.Div.2010) (citation and quotation omitted).
We now reverse the Appellate Division. Constructive discharge is but one ground for recovery of lost wages under CEPA CEPA does not permit an employer to take an “adverse employment action” against an employee for reporting workplace-safety violations. N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e), -3. If an employer engages in unlawful retaliation, then it is accountable for the damages proximately [248]*248caused to the employee. Here, the trial judge properly instructed the jury on both the elements of a CEPA claim and the common-law principles of damages that apply to such a claim. Seddon introduced medical testimony that the reprisals against him for his whistle-blowing activities mentally disabled him from continued employment at DuPont. That was a sufficient basis for the award of lost wages. Seddon was not required to show that a “reasonable person”—one not psychologically injured—would have left DuPont because of the intolerable conditions of his employment.
We therefore reinstate the jury’s verdict and award of damages.
I.
Defendant DuPont, which manufactures chemical products, employed plaintiff John Seddon for approximately thirty years.2 In December 2002, Seddon was an operator technician in the phosgene building at one of DuPont’s facilities. Phosgene is a “highly toxic” and “very reactive chemical.”3 Among Seddon’s duties was to ensure the safe operation of equipment and the safe handling of dangerous chemicals in the building. He was also responsible for the safety of those who worked there and those who lived in the surrounding area.
In December 2002, Seddon expressed to a shift manager his concern about the dangerous manner in which DuPont’s security guards were conducting random searches of employees’ cars at nighttime. Drivers were made to exit from their cars at the front gate and stand unprotected in the dark while passing traffic, [249]*249including trucks, whizzed by.4 Because DuPont did nothing to ameliorate the safety hazards caused by these stops, Seddon filed a complaint with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
After DuPont became aware of the OSHA complaint, it appointed Paul Kaiser to serve as Seddon’s direct shift supervisor. Kaiser began imposing sick- and vacation-day-reporting requirements specific to Seddon, who previously did not report to a shift supervisor.
In October 2003, Seddon filed complaints with DuPont’s management about unsafe conditions in the operation of the phosgene reactor. Seddon warned that deficiencies in the operation of the reactor could cause an explosion and the release of deadly gasses into the atmosphere, killing and seriously injuring nearby residents. Seddon compared the safety violations relating to the phosgene reactor to those that led to the infamous chemical disaster in Bhopal, India.5 In response, the DuPont Guardian Manual, to which Seddon referred in detailing safety violations, was removed from the phosgene control area where Seddon worked.
A few months later, according to Seddon, Kaiser falsely accused him of forging his timecards. Seddon also stated that, in March 2004, DuPont’s management falsely accused him of failing to take a proper reading of a caustic chemical and of making a fictitious entry in a log. There followed a negative performance review of Seddon and the institution of performance reviews every three months. During this time period, Kaiser subjected Seddon to constant verbal abuse. Seddon reported to DuPont’s corporate [250]*250headquarters that he had become the target of harassment for merely voicing safety concerns.
Although DuPont’s investigators questioned Seddon about his safety complaints and the ensuing harassment, their attention focused on allegations that Seddon had threatened DuPont employees, including Kaiser—allegations that Seddon categorically denied. In April 2004, based on a recommendation by DuPont’s employee-assistance counselor, Seddon was placed on short-term disability with pay. During that time, Seddon lost the considerable overtime that he had been earning. As a condition of his reinstatement, DuPont required that Seddon be examined by three mental-health experts and undergo a fit-for-duty evaluation. Three independent evaluators, a psychiatrist and two psychologists, examined Seddon and cleared him to return to work. Significantly, one of the mental-health experts diagnosed Seddon as exhibiting “features of significant dysphoria and vulnerability to depression.”6
The suspension, which lasted fifty-three days, made Seddon feel “worthless” and “beaten.” Moreover, DuPont placed Seddon on “probation” subject to performance reviews every three months. Seddon maintained that Kaiser continued to make false accusations that Seddon had threatened him and other employees. Interactions with Kaiser caused Seddon to suffer anxiety attacks, and Seddon lived in constant fear that he would become the target of continued false charges of misconduct.
In September 2006, DuPont required Seddon to work twelve-hour shifts in isolation. For Seddon, working a twelve-hour shift alone was “torture.” One month later, Seddon began seeing a therapist and psychiatrist.
In January 2007, Seddon took a six-month leave of absence. After completing that leave of absence, DuPont gave Seddon a disability pension. Seddon never returned to DuPont.
[251]*251II.
In February 2005, Seddon filed a civil complaint alleging that defendants DuPont and Kaiser retaliated against him for objecting to activity that he reasonably believed violated New Jersey’s law and public policy.7 Seddon asserted that the reprisals against him contravened the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. Seddon also asserted the common-law claim of intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress against both defendants.8 Seddon sought compensatory damages for “loss of earnings and other employment benefits” and for suffering mental anguish, humiliation, and injury to his reputation.
Seddon’s complaint was filed while he still worked for DuPont. His case did not come to trial until January 2008, after he left the company’s employ with a disability pension. Seddon did not amend his complaint to allege a constructive discharge.
At the beginning of the trial in January 2008, DuPont moved to bar Seddon’s economic-damages claim for front and back pay because he had not pled constructive discharge and DuPont had not terminated him.9 The trial court denied DuPont’s in limine motion.10 The court held that if Seddon could prove that DuPont’s retaliation caused him to suffer a psychological breakdown that led to his acceptance of an early disability retirement, [252]*252then he would be entitled to the difference between the wages he would have earned had he worked and retired in the ordinary course and the disability pension he was receiving.
During a several-week trial, numerous witnesses testified, including Seddon’s psychological experts, who concluded that Sed-don was mentally disabled as a result of DuPont’s retaliatory conduct. Louise Cressman-Watral, a therapist, counseled Seddon for approximately sixteen months. She testified that Seddon was suffering from “a major depressive disorder” caused by DuPont’s reprisals and general mistreatment of him. Seddon exhibited “fear of DuPont as an employer,” and was suffering from “insomnia, loss of appetite,” “anxiety,” and feelings of “hopelessness.” She further noted that the retaliation forced Seddon to take psychotropic medications to battle his depression and insomnia. Watral ultimately concluded that it was unlikely that Seddon would ever recover from the mental illness caused by DuPont.
Dr. Charles Semel, a psychiatrist, also testified, explaining that Seddon suffered from “pathological stress” that was “affecting the quality of his life.” The stress was “causally related” to DuPont’s retaliation against Seddon for raising safety concerns about the plant’s operation. Dr. Semel reasoned that Seddon had been sensitized to safety issues after witnessing a “devastating industrial accident” at DuPont years earlier in which several of his coworkers were severely injured. In addition to his concern for others, Seddon “felt physically at risk” at the plant, and the isolation he endured at the end of his career forced him “to function alone in a fairly dangerous environment.” Dr. Semel ultimately concluded that the mental illness caused by DuPont’s retaliation was both “worsening” and “permanent.”
The trial court charged the jury in accordance with its earlier ruling that a recovery of lost wages was not dependent on proving a constructive discharge. The court instructed the jury:
Mr. Seddon claims that DuPont caused him to suffer economic loss by depriving him of overtime pay, and by causing him to suffer a psychiatric illness that required him to retire earlier than he wanted to on a disability pension.
[253]*253In order to obtain economic damages related to his psychiatric disability, Mr. Seddon must prove that DuPont proximately caused his disability, and that his disability rendered him unable to perform work for DuPont.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Seddon, finding that he had “proven by a preponderance of the evidence that DuPont retaliated against him in violation of New Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act.” The jury awarded Seddon $724,000 for the “economic losses he ha[d] suffered as a proximate result of DuPont’s violations of [CEPA]” and $500,000 in punitive damages. Seddon did not receive an award for pain and suffering. Additionally, the trial court awarded Seddon $523,289 in counsel fees. DuPont appealed.
III.
The Appellate Division reversed and entered judgment in favor of DuPont, concluding that Seddon could not prevail on a lost-wage claim under CEPA unless he proved an actual or constructive discharge. Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 412 N.J.Super. 17, 22-23, 988 A.2d 604 (App.Div.2010).11 In justifying that decision, the panel compared the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, to CEPA. Id. at 30-36, 988 A.2d 604. The panel claimed that “in the LAD context,” several Appellate Division decisions concluded “that economic damages cannot be recovered where there has been no constructive discharge.” Id. at 32, 988 A.2d 604 (citations omitted). The panel reasoned that because CEPA and LAD cases have been construed “identically on a wide variety of substantive issues” and because “[njothing in the legislative history of CEPA requires a contrary [254]*254result,” a plaintiff in a CEPA case should be required in pursuing a lost-wage claim to prove an actual or constructive discharge. Id. at 38-35, 988 A.2d 604. Because punitive damages may be awarded only if a plaintiff receives an award of compensatory damages, the panel vacated the punitive-damages award as well. Id. at 36, 988 A.2d 604. Those rulings stripped Seddon of his status as a “prevailing party,” and therefore the panel vacated the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Id. at 36-37, 988 A.2d 604. In light of the panel’s ruling that Seddon was not entitled to attorneys’ fees, it did not address his claim that the fees awarded were insufficient. Ibid. Similarly, it did not address DuPont’s alternative arguments challenging the propriety of the punitive-damages award. Id. at 36, 988 A.2d 604.
We granted Seddon’s petition for certification, “limited to the issue whether recovery for economic losses associated with back and front pay requires proof of actual or constructive discharge under the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8.” See Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 203 N.J. 95, 999 A.2d 464 (2010). We also granted the motions of the New Jersey Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association and the Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys to participate as amici curiae.12
IV.
The question presented in this case is whether, under CEPA, an employee who becomes the victim of employer retaliation for [255]*255engaging in statutorily protected whistle-blowing activities and who becomes psychologically disabled due to that retaliation can pursue a lost-wage claim without having to prove a constructive discharge.
Seddon and amicus New Jersey Chapter of the National Employment Lawyers contend that the plain language and remedial purpose of CEPA support the trial court’s application of common-law principles of damages to the lost-wage claim in this case. They maintain that testimony from mental-health experts that unlawful retaliation caused an employee’s psychological breakdown rendering him unfit for duty is sufficient to make out a lost-wage claim. They urge this Court not to superimpose a requirement of constructive discharge—not found in the statute—as an essential element of a lost-wage claim in a CEPA case and to reinstate the jury’s verdict.
On the other hand, DuPont and amicus Academy of New Jersey Management Attorneys assert that, consistent with LAD jurisprudence, proof of a constructive discharge—absent an actual discharge—should be a prerequisite to the award of lost wages. They reason that applying an objective, constructive-discharge standard to a CEPA lost-wage claim will ensure predictability in compensatory-damage awards. They believe that affirming the Appellate Division’s approach will deter pretextual claims, protect against an award to the idiosyncratic plaintiff, and safeguard employers from an unwarranted expansion of liability claims.
The resolution of the issue before us is one of statutory interpretation—determining the remedies available to whistle-blowers under CEPA. Therefore, we first turn to CEPA, exploring its overarching purpose and the specific statutory language that applies to this case.
V.
The Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, is intended to encourage employees to speak up about unsafe working conditions that violate the law or public [256]*256policy and to provide protection for those who do so. See Barratt v. Cushman & Wakefield of N.J., Inc., 144 N.J. 120, 127, 675 A.2d 1094 (1996). Under CEPA, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee who “report[s] illegal or unethical workplace activities.” Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461-62, 828 A.2d 893 (2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Because CEPA is “remedial legislation,” it “should be construed liberally to effectuate its important social goal”—“to encourage, not thwart, legitimate employee complaints.” Id. at 463, 828 A.2d 893 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 192 N.J. 110, 120, 927 A.2d 113 (2007).
We begin our analysis by looking at the statute’s plain language, which is generally the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). We must ascribe to the words used in CEPA their “ordinary meaning and significance ... and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” Ibid, (citations omitted).
CEPA prohibits an employer from taking “any retaliatory action against an employee” who engages in certain protected activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3 (emphasis added). Thus, an employer may not retaliate against an employee who “[discloses ... to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer ... that the employee reasonably believes ... is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a). Nor may an employer retaliate against an employee who “[ojbjects to ... any activity, policy or practice which the employee reasonably believes ... is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation” or “is incompatible with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or welfare or protection of the environment.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). One could hardly dispute that an employee’s complaint to a supervisor or his objections raised about the catastrophic consequences that he reasonably believes might occur from the unsafe [257]*257operation of a reactor containing extremely dangerous chemicals falls within the activity protected by N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a) or (c).
The issue in this case is not whether Seddon engaged in protected activity under CEPA but whether DuPont took retaliatory action against him that entitles him to lost wages. “ ‘Retaliatory action’ ” is defined as “the discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e) (emphasis added). An employee who suffers “retaliatory action” may file a civil suit and, if he prevails, is entitled to “[a]ll remedies available in common law tort actions.” See N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. The statute further provides that “[t]he court shall also order, where appropriate and to the fullest extent possible!,] ... compensation for all lost wages, benefits and other remuneration.” Ibid,.
In surveying the sweep of CEPA, we must determine what acts are “ ‘Retaliatory’ ” under the statute, N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e), and then what “remedies available in common law tort actions” are applicable here, N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. CEPA specifies that the “discharge” of an employee for engaging in protected activity is retaliatory action. N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). A discharge encompasses not just an actual termination from an employment, but a constructive discharge. A constructive discharge occurs when an employer’s conduct “is so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than continue to endure it.” Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 28, 803 A.2d 611 (2002) (citation omitted). But the universe of possible retaliatory actions under CEPA is greater than discharge, suspension, and demotion; it includes “other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).
What constitutes an “adverse employment action” must be viewed in light of the broad remedial purpose of CEPA, and our charge to liberally construe the statute to deter workplace reprisals against an employee speaking out against a company’s illicit [258]*258or unethical activities. Cast in that light, an “adverse employment action” is taken against an employee engaged in protected activity when an employer targets him for reprisals—making false accusations of misconduct, giving negative performance reviews, issuing an unwarranted suspension, and requiring pretextual mental-health evaluations—causing the employee to suffer a mental breakdown and rendering him unfit for continued employment. See N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).
If the employer’s retaliatory action is the proximate cause of the employee’s mental unfitness for duty, then CEPA grants the employee “[a]ll remedies available in common law tort actions.” N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. The “[a]ll remedies available” language is complemented by the more specific provision that the “court shall also order, where appropriate and to the fullest extent possiblef,] ... compensation for all lost wages, benefits and other remuneration.” Ibid.
Under the common law, “a defendant who negligently injures a plaintiff or his property may be liable for all proximately caused harm, including economic losses.” People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 251, 495 A.2d 107 (1985). More to the point, a person injured by the tortious conduct of another “has the right to recover damages for diminished-earning capacity,” provided there is sufficient proof both to establish that the injury will impair his future income and to quantify the lost income. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 285, 827 A.2d 1040 (2003) (citations omitted); accord Coll v. Sherry, 29 N.J. 166, 176, 148 A.2d 481 (1959) (same). For example, a professional baseball player whose career ends because he was struck by a negligently operated car will have a lost-wage claim that likely will include, by the time of trial, a claim for back and front pay. The traditional principles of damages in tort eases apply with equal force in this case. To the extent that DuPont, by its retaliatory action, proximately caused Seddon to suffer a mental injury incapacitating him from his former employment, he [259]*259has “the right to recover damages for diminished-earning capacity.” See Frugis, supra, 177 N.J. at 285, 827 A.2d 1040.
This plain-language approach ordinarily would be dispositive and end our analysis. However, we also reject DuPont’s assertion that the legislative history of CEPA or the constructive-discharge jurisprudence under LAD suggests a contrary result. We address each of those points in turn.
VI.
A.
The Legislature enacted the Conscientious Employee Protection Act in 1986. See N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8; L. 1986, c. 105. Since its creation, CEPA’s overall structure has remained essentially unaltered, but the scope of its protections and the breadth of its remedies have expanded considerably.
The definition of “[rjetaliatory action” remains in its original form to the present day. Compare L. 1986, c. 105, § 2; with N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). However, the scope of protected activities has been expanded through several amendments. Compare L. 1986, c. 105, § 3; with L. 1989, c. 220; L. 1997, c. 98, § 2; and L. 2005, c. 329, § 1. Additionally, CEPA’s remedy provision, N.J.S.A. 34:19-5, has been strengthened twice since its enactment. See L. 1990, c. 12, § 4; L. 2005, c. 329, § 2. The first iteration of CEPA in 1986 did not include the following language added in 1990: “All remedies available in common law tort actions shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs.” Compare L. 1986, c. 105, § 5; with L. 1990, c. 12, § 4. Moreover, in 2005 the Legislature further expanded relief available to successful plaintiffs by amending N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. Before 2005, CEPA provided that a “court may also order ... compensation for lost wages, benefits and other remuneration.” L. 1990, c. 12, § 4. The newly enacted provision seemingly put more teeth in the remedy, stating that a “court shall also order, where appropriate and to the fullest extent [260]*260possible[,] ... compensation for all lost wages, benefits and other remuneration.” L. 2005, c. 329, § 2 (emphasis added).
DuPont argues that a statement issued by the Senate Labor Committee, at the time of the proposed 2005 amendments, indicates that the Legislature intended an actual or constructive discharge to be a precondition for a lost-wage claim. We find no credible support for that position.
The Senate Labor Committee reported favorably on the bill proposing the 2005 amendments, noting that it “enhances the scope and strengthens the enforcement provisions of’ CEPA. Senate Labor Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1886 (Oct. 14, 2004).13 The Committee emphasized that the proposed law “is not intended to diminish, reduce or curtail the rights or remedies available to employees under [CEPA] in any way.” Ibid. DuPont grasps on to the following language to suggest that a lost-wage claim is dependent on a constructive discharge:
The bill states that the court must order, to the fullest extent possible, an injunction against continuing violations, reinstatement to employment, compensation for lost pay and costs of the case, but only where appropriate. The bill thus takes into consideration that not all of these measures are always applicable, as, for example, in a case where the employer retaliation did not include a termination of employment.
[i&id]
This committee statement makes the unremarkable point that the remedy must, be commensurate with the loss or damage suffered by the plaintiff; thus, a remedy will only follow “where appropriate.” Surely, it would not be “appropriate,” or necessary, to order “reinstatement to employment” for an employee who was not terminated. It would not be “appropriate” to award “compensation for all lost wages” if the employee remained employed and suffered only emotional damages. But nothing in this committee statement in any way suggests that compensation for lost wages would not be “appropriate” if an employer that repeatedly retai-[261]*261iates against an employee causes the employee to suffer a disabling mental illness.
The clear language of CEPA is our surest guide. We will not “rewrite a plainly-written enactment” or engraft “an additional qualification which the Legislature pointedly omitted.” See Mazzacano v. Estate of Kinnerman, 197 N.J. 307, 323, 962 A.2d 1103 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The remedy provision of CEPA, N.J.S.A. 34:19-5, does not intimate that a constructive discharge is the only basis for a lost-wage claim in the circumstances before us.
In charging the jury, the trial court properly followed the Legislature’s expressed intent that “[a]ll remedies available in common law tort actions shall be available to prevailing plaintiffs.” Ibid. The jury’s verdict reveals that DuPont retaliated against Seddon because he expressed legitimate safety concerns about the operation of the phosgene reactor, that DuPont’s retaliatory action caused Seddon’s mental injury, that Seddon’s mental injury disabled him from working, and that his inability to work resulted in his lost wages.
B.
DuPont also urges us to abandon our plain-language interpretation of CEPA on the supposition that an actual or constructive discharge is the only means of pursuing a lost-wage claim under LAD. That supposition is somewhat dubious because this Court has never concluded in a LAD retaliation case that front and back pay can be awarded only in cases of actual or constructive discharge. On occasion, when appropriate, we have looked to LAD in construing CEPA.14 But CEPA and LAD are statutes [262]*262that have their own distinct purposes and are worded differently to achieve those purposes. See generally N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49; N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. It is enough for us to decide the case before us based on the controlling statutory language in CEPA without resolving different scenarios that might arise under LAD. Nevertheless, several points must be made in response to DuPont’s arguments.
We reject DuPont’s assertion that Shepherd, supra, 174 N.J. 1, 803 A.2d 611, stands for the proposition that a constructive discharge is a prerequisite to a lost-wage claim under CEPA. In Shepherd, Richard Saylor claimed that his employer—through harassing conduct—retaliated against him in violation of LAD, resulting in his constructive discharge. Id. at 7, 27, 803 A.2d 611. To prove a constructive discharge, Saylor had to show that his employer’s conduct was “so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign rather than continue to endure it.” Id. at 28, 803 A.2d 611 (citation omitted). The Court concluded that Saylor did not meet that threshold requirement. Id. at 29, 803 A.2d 611.
Unlike the case before us, Saylor did not claim or present expert testimony that his employer’s harassing conduct caused him a psychological illness that rendered him incapable of working and therefore entitled him to lost wages. More importantly, this Court did not hold that constructive discharge was a prerequisite to lost-wage damages in a retaliation ease arising under LAD. Shepherd addressed entirely different issues, under entirely different facts, within the context of an entirely different statute. Shepherd cannot control the outcome of this case.
We need not decide here whether, under the anti-retaliation provisions of LAD, a plaintiff can proceed with a lost-wage claim when an employer’s misconduct causes a mental-illness-induced retirement. For that reason, we decline to give an advisory [263]*263opinion on a case such as Padilla v. Berkeley Educ. Servs. of N.J., 383 N.J.Super. 177, 181, 183-84, 891 A.2d 616 (App.Div.2005), in which a LAD plaintiff who failed to prove constructive discharge entitling her to lost wages never claimed that her employer-caused illness rendered her incapable of working. See also Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J.Super. 252, 276-77, 675 A.2d 684 (App.Div.1996) (LAD plaintiff who admitted she was medically able to work was not permitted lost wages when her constructive-discharge claim was dismissed at summary judgment). We simply hold here that, given the facts before us, lost wages are recoverable in a CEPA case, even in the absence of a constructive discharge.
VII.
We conclude that the trial court properly charged the jury that Seddon could only receive “economic damages related to his psychiatric disability” if he proved that DuPont “proximately caused his disability, and that his disability rendered him unable to perform work for [the company].” With that charge, and based on the record before it, the jury had the authority to find that DuPont’s retaliation rendered Seddon unfit for work and that Seddon was entitled to front and back pay for lost wages.
We therefore reverse the Appellate Division and reinstate the jury’s award of economic damages to Seddon. Because the Appellate Division did not decide Seddon’s challenge to the sufficiency of the attorneys’ fees awarded to him by the trial court or DuPont’s challenge to the punitive-damages award, we remand these and any other unaddressed issues for its consideration.