Disabled American Veterans v. United States

650 F.2d 1178, 227 Ct. Cl. 474, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5047, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 279
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 20, 1981
DocketNo. 360-76
StatusPublished
Cited by74 cases

This text of 650 F.2d 1178 (Disabled American Veterans v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 650 F.2d 1178, 227 Ct. Cl. 474, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5047, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 279 (cc 1981).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

This case is before the court on review of the report of Trial Judge James F. Merow. Because we disagree with that portion of the report dealing with whether a satisfactory refund claim was filed relating to a deduction for the cost of the names list, we reverse the trial judge on that point. We are in agreement with the remainder of the report and, accordingly, we adopt the modified report as an opinion of this court.1

Regarding the above-discussed variance issue, the trial judge found that the informal oral knowledge gained by the Internal Revenue Service’ agents during the audit of plaintiffs (DAV’s) returns plus the submission of the pretrial response during the pendency of this case provided "express knowledge” to the Internal Revenue Service of DAV’s claim for a deduction for the cost of the names list.

We, however, reject out of hand the notion expressed by the trial judge that the information garnered by the Justice Department’s trial attorney from DAV’s pretrial submission constituted knowledge chargeable, to the Internal Revenue Service for purposes of section 7422(a). Such a position is in fundamental conflict with the clearly established and well-defined procedure found in the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations. See, e.g., section 6402; section 7422(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2. [476]*476Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that our cases focus not on whether the "Government” or, as DAV avers, the "defendant” has knowledge of the claim but, specifically, on whether the Internal Revenue Service has such notice. E.g., Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 103, 113, 389 F. 2d 437, 444 (1968); Nat'l Newark & Essex Bank v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 609, 615, 410 F. 2d 789, 792 (1969); Standard Lime and Cement Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 180, 187, 329 F. 2d 939, 943 (1964).

Filing a petition is not a satisfactory claim for refund, see section 7422(a); Union Pacific, 182 Ct. Cl. at 109, 389 F. 2d at 442; thus, a priori, filing a pretrial submission does not constitute notice to the Service for purposes of section 7422(a). We have said that "[a]vailability of information is not equivalent to notice that a claim is asserted based on that information. That claim must somehow be communicated to the Service.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 113, 389 F. 2d at 445. And the burden in that regard rests squarely on DAV. Nat'l Newark & Essex Bank v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. at 618, 410 F. 2d at 794.

The trial judge also makes much of the fact that DAV did, orally, raise the instant issue with the IRS agents auditing DAV’s returns. In addition, the agents agreed to "deny without further investigation the claims for refund as to all issues that had been considered by the Internal Revenue Service during the course of the audit,” due to the agents’ familiarity with such issues. While DAV did subsequently file a written claim (which was denied by the Service), that claim did not encompass the claim for a deduction for the cost of the names list.

Thus, for there to have been an acceptable claim for refund under section 7422(a) the oral representations made by DAV at the audit must constitute a valid informal claim. We have previously held, however, that an oral claim does not meet the statutory requirements. Sicanoff Vegetable Oil Corp. v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 278, 286, 181 F. Supp. 265, 269 (1960); Wrightsman Petroleum Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 217, 238, 35 F. Supp. 86, 96 (1940), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 578 (1941). Cf. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 106, 113, 318 F. 2d 915, [477]*477920 (1963); Rosengarten v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 287, 294, 181 F. Supp. 275, 279, cert. denied, 364 U. S. 822 (1960).

For an act to constitute a valid informal refund claim, that act must be clear and explicit and "we must be satisfied that [the act] contains the means by which the Commissioner will be apprised that a certain tax is being contested without resort to extraneous factors.” (Emphasis supplied.) Rosengarten v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. at 294, 181 F. Supp. at 279. As a general rule, an act sufficient to constitute a valid informal claim must take the form of a definite instrument. Id. The need for a written claim has been stated to be because

It is common knowledge that the personnel in governmental departments is constantly changing. Many times several different employees work on a single case. Some of them have before them only such information as is contained in the files. For this reason, and because of the shortness of the memory of man, and for many other reasons, only a written claim is sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute and the need it intended to fill. [Wrightsman Petroleum Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. at 238, 35 F. Supp. at 96.]

Moreover, the fact the agents agreed to promptly deny the subsequently filed claim does not mean the Service waived or did not intend the customary notice function of the claim for refund to be utilized. At best it is a statement that those agents would not change their positions on the issues raised. An appellate conference was also available to DAV, and the reasons for requiring a claim also apply to the appellate level.2 Therefore, we do not view the agents’ statement at the audit level as negating any further purpose for filing a refund claim. Instead, we view these facts as demonstrating a waiver by DAV of any IRS appellate level consideration plus a waiver of DAV’s claim for a deduction for the cost of the names list by its failure to make a timely claim therefor.

The trial judge’s report, as modified, follows:

[478]*478OPINION OF TRIAL JUDGE

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650 F.2d 1178, 227 Ct. Cl. 474, 48 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5047, 1981 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disabled-american-veterans-v-united-states-cc-1981.