United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 23-1794
JOHN DEATON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF BARRINGTON; JAMES CUNHA, Town Manager, Town of Barrington; DAVID WYROSTEK, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; ANTHONY DECRISTOFORO, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington; JOHN LACROSS, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Gelpí, Howard, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
John E. Deaton, with whom Deaton Law Firm LLC, was on brief, for appellant. Marc DeSisto, with whom Sarah D. Boucher, Kathleen A. Hilton, and DeSisto Law LLC, were on brief, for appellees. May 3, 2024 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant John Deaton
("Deaton") was arrested and charged with assault, battery, and
disorderly conduct. Although the charges were later dismissed, he
brought state and federal claims against the Town of Barrington
and other individuals in their capacities as police officers and
town manager (the "Defendants"). The Defendants removed the case
from Providence County Superior Court to the United States District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, Deaton's motion for remand
was unsuccessful, and then he added federal claims via an amended
complaint. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Defendants on most counts, and remanded three counts, one
in full and two in part, for the state court to resolve. Deaton
now appeals, arguing that the district court improperly found that
probable cause to arrest him existed, that it improperly denied
his post-judgment motion, and that it should have abstained and
remanded to state court to allow the state claims to be resolved.
We disagree and affirm.
I. Background
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe
the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, in this case, Deaton. See Mancini v. City of Providence ex
- 3 - rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018). The facts below
are undisputed unless noted otherwise.
A. Facts
In September 2017, Deaton and his partner attended a Pop
Warner football game in Barrington, Rhode Island.1 Deaton's
partner's ex-husband, Ronald Warner ("Warner"), and his new
partner were also in attendance. A verbal and physical altercation
occurred between Deaton and Warner, and while the details of the
encounter are disputed, it is undisputed that Deaton said something
to the effect of not wanting to "whip [Warner's] ass." Warner
called 911 and claimed he was assaulted by Deaton. While Warner
claimed that Deaton "put his hands on [Warner's] throat," Deaton
claimed that he pushed Warner away and likely touched his throat
or "neck area." A football coach told the men to "knock it off
and get out of there."
The Barrington Police Department dispatched Officers
David Wyrostek ("Officer Wyrostek") and Anthony DeCristoforo
("Officer DeCristoforo") to Barrington High School where Officer
Wyrostek arrived first and spoke with Warner. Warner claimed
Deaton placed his hands on his throat and choked him. Officer
Wyrostek did not notice any apparent injuries on Warner. As Deaton
drove by, Warner pointed him out to Officer Wyrostek who
1 For those not familiar, Pop Warner football is a youth football program.
- 4 - immediately pulled Deaton over. Officer Wyrostek allowed Deaton
to exit the car and told Deaton that Warner claimed Deaton choked
him, which Deaton denied. Shortly after this exchange, Officer
Wyrostek placed Deaton in handcuffs and told him he was being
arrested for simple assault and battery and disorderly conduct.
Officer DeCristoforo arrived at the field shortly after
Officer Wyrostek pulled over Deaton. Officer DeCristoforo spoke
with Warner and his partner, confirming the account Warner gave to
Officer Wyrostek. Officer DeCristoforo obtained a witness
statement from the football coach who stated that he witnessed
Deaton "put his right hand on [Warner's] throat."2 Officer
DeCristoforo noted that Warner's throat was not red, swollen, or
had any indication of finger marks. After Deaton had been
handcuffed, Officer DeCristoforo told Officer Wyrostek that he had
a witness who confirmed Warner's story. Later that day, Officer
DeCristoforo became aware of an active arrest warrant for Warner
who was then arrested pursuant to that warrant.3 After
approximately two hours at the police station, Deaton was released
on his own recognizance.
2There is a dispute over when this conversation occurred. Deaton claims it was after he was arrested while the Defendants claim it was before Deaton's arrest. 3The warrant for Warner's arrest was for assault and battery in an unrelated incident.
- 5 - B. Procedural History
The Town of Barrington prosecuted the charges against
Deaton. The criminal case was scheduled for trial in state court,
but the town dismissed the charges without prejudice, with Warner's
consent, in exchange for Deaton's completion of thirty hours of
community service. Deaton then filed suit in Providence County
Superior Court. Deaton alleged civil rights violations pursuant
to 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) for unlawful arrest (Count
I), civil rights violations for false imprisonment under 12 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-7-1 (1956) (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count
III), conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 9 R.I. Gen.
Laws § 9-31-1 (1956) (Count IV), invasion of privacy (Count V),
assault and battery (Count VI), failure to supervise (Count VII),
and municipal liability (Count VIII). Deaton also alleged
violations of the United States Constitution, including the "right
to be secure in his person [and] to equal protection of the laws
of Due Process in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments."
The Defendants removed the matter to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island on federal question
grounds. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. Deaton moved to remand, which
the district court denied because the complaint "clearly alleged
violations of state and federal law." Deaton then amended his
complaint, adding claims of unreasonable search and seizure
- 6 - pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IX), conspiracy to deprive him
of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count
X),4 and failure to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count
XI).
The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts
arguing that Deaton's arrest was justified and that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court
granted summary judgment, entering judgment on false imprisonment
in violation of 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-1 (1956) (Count II),
malicious prosecution (Count III), invasion of privacy (Count V),
assault and battery (Count VI), unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count IX), conspiracy to violate
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights (Counts IV and X) and failure to
intervene (Count XI), and partially granted summary judgment for
failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count
VIII) in relation to those counts. The district court remanded to
the Rhode Island state court claims for unlawful arrest in
violation of 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) (Count I) and
failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count
In the district court's order denying remand, it determined 4
that Count IV must be based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1 (1956) "is Rhode Island's waiver of sovereign immunity and does not create its own cause of action." When Deaton subsequently amended his complaint, adding a specific conspiracy claim, Count X, these two counts were considered "one and the same."
- 7 - VIII) in relation to Count I. Deaton filed a motion to reconsider,
which was denied. Deaton now timely appeals both decisions.
II. Discussion
Deaton argues that summary judgment was not proper
because (1) probable cause to arrest Deaton did not exist at the
time of his arrest, (2) several facts materially undermined the
determination of probable cause, and (3) the district court
improperly made credibility determinations and weighed the
evidence. In addition, Deaton argues that (4) denial of Deaton's
post-judgment motion was plain error, and (5) the district court
should have abstained and remanded to allow full resolution of the
state court claims by the state court. His arguments are
unpersuasive. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment.
A. Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
We review a district court's determination of a summary
judgment motion de novo. See López-Hernández v. Terumo P.R. LLC,
64 F.4th 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Murray v. Kindred Nursing
Ctrs. W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)). We examine the
record in "the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[]
all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Id. Summary
judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A 'genuine'
- 8 - issue is one on which the evidence would enable a reasonable jury
to find the fact in favor of either party," and "[a] 'material'
fact is one that is relevant in the sense that it has the capacity
to change the outcome of the jury's determination." Perez v.
Lorraine Enters., Inc., 769 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (first
citing Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1994); and
then citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1,
5 (1st Cir. 2010)). When the material facts, "what the police
knew at the moment of the arrest, the source of their knowledge,
and the leads that they pursued or eschewed," are undisputed, as
they are here, "the existence vel non of probable cause ordinarily
is amenable to summary judgment." Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores,
Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2004).
2. Probable Cause5
Deaton asks us to find that probable cause did not exist
at the time of his arrest and therefore the district court's grant
of summary judgment should be vacated. We disagree. Because the
facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Deaton, support
5 RhodeIsland state courts "accord the federal interpretation [deference] when construing" claims brought under article 1, section 6, the state's equivalent to the Fourth Amendment, including probable cause. State v. Sinapi, 295 A.3d 787, 806 (R.I. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Andujar, 899 A.2d 1209, 1224 n.12 (R.I. 2006)).
- 9 - a finding of probable cause at the time of his arrest, we affirm
the district court.6
Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI hinge
on Deaton's claim of lack of probable cause to arrest.7 Deaton
6 It is disputed when Deaton was actually arrested for purposes of the probable cause analysis. Deaton claims he was arrested the moment he was handcuffed whereas Officer Wyrostek claims the arrest occurred when he told Deaton he was being arrested. The district court addressed this and assumed, without deciding, that the time of arrest was the time Deaton was placed in handcuffs. Deaton takes issue with the district court's assumption of the time of arrest, arguing that this was a dispute of material fact, implying that the assumption improperly altered the probable cause analysis. This argument is irrelevant, however, as the district court chose to use Deaton's version of events, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Deaton. See López-Hernández, 64 F.4th at 28; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 7 Deaton's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (Counts IV, IX, X, and XI) are all based on his contention of lack of probable cause because in order to succeed, he must prove that he was deprived by one of the officers of a right "secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). Deaton alleges that the Defendants violated his rights by arresting him without probable cause, therefore the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims inherently hinge on the determination of probable cause. Counts II and III for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution also rest entirely on probable cause because it is a "necessary element in . . . false imprisonment[] and malicious prosecution claims." Beaudoin v. Levesque, 697 A.2d 1065, 1067 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam). As for Count VI for assault and battery, Deaton did not challenge that the existence of probable cause vitiates the claim, instead arguing that probable cause was a disputed fact, therefore it is included in the analysis. Counts VII and VIII for failure to supervise on the alleged constitutional violation and municipal liability also, at least partially, relate to probable cause because if probable cause is found, there is no constitutional violation, negating these claims. See Acosta, 386 F.3d at 12 (noting the relation of municipal liability to constitutional rights).
- 10 - was arrested for misdemeanor assault, battery, and disorderly
conduct. Assault is "a physical act of a threatening nature or an
offer of corporal injury which puts an individual in reasonable
fear of imminent bodily harm." Broadley v. State, 939 A.2d 1016,
1021 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Hennessey v. Pyne, 694 A.2d 691, 696
(R.I. 1997)). Battery is "an act that was intended to cause, and
does cause, an offensive contact with or unconsented touching of
or trauma upon the body of another, thereby generally resulting in
the consummation of the assault." Id. at 1021 (quoting Fenwick v.
Oberman, 847 A.2d 852, 855 (R.I. 2004)). "A person commits
disorderly conduct if he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly . . . engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent
or tumultuous behavior." 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-45-1(a)(1) (1956).
Therefore, we must determine whether there was probable cause to
arrest Deaton for only one, if not all, of the offenses. See
Wilber v. Curtis, 872 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (determining
probable cause for one of two offenses). As the district court
properly concluded, there were undisputed facts to support the
conclusion of probable cause to arrest Deaton.
"A warrantless arrest, like the one at issue here, must
be based on probable cause." United States v. Fiasconaro, 315
F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2002). The probable cause determination
turns on "whether . . . the facts and circumstances within [the
police officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
- 11 - trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent
[person] in believing that" a crime was committed or was being
committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). "Probable cause
is a 'fluid concept' and 'not a high bar.'" Karamanoglu v. Town
of Yarmouth, 15 F.4th 82, 87 (1st Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
The finding of probable cause does not need to be "ironclad, or
even highly probable," as it "need only be reasonable." United
States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1999).
"[O]nce police officers are presented with probable cause to
support an arrest, no further investigation is required at that
point." Forest v. Pawtucket Police Dep't, 377 F.3d 52, 57 (1st
Cir. 2004).
For us to determine if an officer had probable cause, we
look to the totality of the circumstances and "examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer, amount to probable cause." United States v.
Flores, 888 F.3d 537, 543 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018)). The existence of
probable cause is determined by what the police officer knew "at
the time of the arrest." United States v. Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 41
(1st Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 91
(1st Cir. 1999)). "[P]robable cause determinations predicated on
information furnished by a victim are generally considered to be
- 12 - reliable," B.C.R. Transp. Co. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 10 (1st
Cir. 1984), and victim statements can therefore be relied on by
officers to support the determination of probable cause, Forest,
377 F.3d at 57 (citing id.). Even where there is no admission of
tortious conduct by the alleged suspect, the bare accusation by
the victim can be enough to support probable cause. See Holder v.
Town of Sandown, 585 F.3d 500, 505 (1st Cir. 2009). Therefore, in
situations where police rely on a victim's statement, "the primary
inquiry . . . is whether there is any evidence that the officers
acted unreasonably when they determined that [the victim]'s
accusation was credible, in light of all the circumstances known
at the time." Forest, 377 F.3d at 57.
It is helpful to establish the relevant, undisputed
facts that Officer Wyrostek knew at the time of the arrest in order
to proceed with our analysis. At the time of the arrest, it is
undisputed that Officer Wyrostek had interacted with Warner and
collected his statement that Deaton had assaulted him and put his
hands on his throat, had interacted with Deaton and collected his
statement that he was assaulted by Warner and denied choking him,
did not observe any injuries on Warner, and knew that Deaton was
the new partner of Warner's ex-wife. Officer Wyrostek, then, knew
that Warner claimed Deaton choked him and that Warner and Deaton
had a strained relationship. These facts, standing alone,
constitute "reasonably trustworthy information . . . sufficient
- 13 - to warrant a prudent [officer] in believing that" Deaton assaulted
Warner. Beck, 379 U.S. at 91.
However, Deaton claims that additional facts should be
factored into the probable cause analysis and ultimately result in
a lack of probable cause, or at least, disputed facts that must go
to a jury. First, Deaton claims that because Warner had an active
warrant out for his arrest at the time Deaton was arrested, this
should have impacted Warner's credibility. However, as the
district court pointed out, Deaton merely mentioned to Officer
Wyrostek that Warner could have a warrant out for his arrest, and
Officer Wyrostek did not have actual knowledge of the warrant until
after Deaton was placed in handcuffs. Officer Wyrostek was "not
required to credit a suspect's story," Cox v. Hainey, 391 F.3d 25,
32 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004), and therefore did not need to take Deaton's
claim of an alleged warrant into consideration when determining
probable cause. Second, Deaton argues Officer Wyrostek knew at
the time of the arrest that Deaton told him Warner seemed to be
under the influence of illegal substances and had a propensity for
violence. However, Officer Wyrostek was not required to consider
these statements as true, as we just explained. Third, Deaton
also argues that because Officer Wyrostek admitted in his
deposition that he did not have probable cause before receiving a
corroborating statement from a witness, the issue was required to
go to the jury. This argument fails. "The question of probable
- 14 - cause, like the question of reasonable suspicion, is an objective
inquiry. The 'actual motive or thought process of the officer is
not plumbed.'" Holder, 585 F.3d at 504 (quoting Bolton v. Taylor,
367 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)). Therefore, the district court did
not err as a matter of law because Officer Wyrostek could have
established probable cause at the time of arrest without the
witness statement corroboration.
Thus, the additional facts that Deaton claims Officer
Wyrostek knew at the time of his arrest, even if taken as true, do
not materially alter the analysis. "On issues where the nonmovant
bears the ultimate burden of proof," as here, "he must present
definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Mesnick v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986)). Evidence
provided that is "merely colorable or is not significantly
probative" cannot successfully defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Deaton claims that the following were also known to
Officer Wyrostek at the time of his arrest and should have been,
and should be, considered.8 Officer Wyrostek had limited
information about Warner as he did not confirm Warner's identifying
information, Deaton told Officer Wyrostek that Warner had
8Deaton posits said information is contained in Officer Wyrostek's, as well as his own, deposition.
- 15 - assaulted both Warner's ex-wife and his current partner, Deaton
told Officer Wyrostek that Warner was "out of control," Officer
Wyrostek confirmed that Deaton had no active warrants for his
arrest, Officer Wyrostek had declined to let Deaton take his
children home before being handcuffed, Deaton was placed in
handcuffs within one to two minutes of speaking with Officer
Wyrostek, and Officer Wyrostek was unaware of what his co-worker
Officer DeCristoforo was doing.9 These facts, even if true, do
not require a reversal of the district court's ruling. "We are
not . . . required to 'accept as true or to deem as a disputed
material fact, each and every unsupported, subjective, conclusory,
or imaginative statement' made by a party." Bonefont-Igaravidez
v. Int'l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting
Torrech–Hernández v. Gen. Elec. Co., 519 F.3d 41, 47 (1st Cir.
2008)).
We now turn to the probable cause analysis pertaining to
Warner as the alleged victim in the altercation. Thus, we must
determine if, based on the totality of the circumstances and
information known at the time, Officer Wyrostek acted unreasonably
9 Two additional alleged facts Deaton claims Officer Wyrostek knew before he was placed in handcuffs were that Deaton told Officer Wyrostek he was a lawyer and would not jeopardize his practice by choking Warner and that Warner was using Officer Wyrostek as a part of a "scheme to cause problems for Deaton." However, these alleged facts come from Deaton's own deposition testimony where he claimed they were said after he was handcuffed, not before, so they are irrelevant to the probable cause analysis.
- 16 - after he assumably, for purposes of the probable cause analysis,
determined that Warner's account of the incident was credible.
Warner, the alleged victim, gave Officer Wyrostek his
account of the incident, after having called 911, claiming to have
been in a verbal altercation with Deaton that resulted in Deaton
grabbing his throat. Deaton claimed that Warner was the initial
aggressor and he was defending himself by pushing Warner away.
Warner's "uncorroborated testimony . . . standing alone . . . can
support a finding of probable cause" that Deaton committed assault,
battery, or disorderly conduct. Acosta, 386 F.3d at 10. Deaton
argues that because Officer Wyrostek did not see any injuries on
Warner, this fact negated the probable cause determination and
lends to the unreasonableness of crediting Warner's account. This
argument fails for two reasons: (1) apparent injuries are not
required for a battery, and (2) probable cause need only be
determined for one of the three charges Deaton was arrested for,
which include disorderly conduct and assault, both of which do not
require a physical touching.
Deaton also argues that even though the district court
acknowledged that Officer Wyrostek knew of the relationship
between Deaton and Warner, the district court "completely ignored
the fact that [Officer] Wyrostek testified that it was cause to
suspect Warner's credibility in this case." However, to support
this contention Deaton relies solely on Officer Wyrostek's
- 17 - deposition testimony given in response to a hypothetical question.
The inquiry remains the same: a determination of probable cause is
analyzed by facts leading up to and at the time the arrest was
made, not by deposition testimony provided afterwards when a civil
lawsuit is filed. Regardless, we agree with the district court's
statement that although it is true that the nature of Deaton and
Warner's relationship could provide cause to suspect Warner's
credibility, see Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F. Supp. 2d 128, 133
(E.D.N.Y. 1998), it doesn't render Warner per se uncredible. In
addition, we have never held that a past relationship between the
parties automatically renders the victim's credibility
questionable and have in fact rejected such argument. See Holder,
585 F.3d at 505 (rejecting the argument that because the officer
knew of a prior bad relationship, the "witness's credibility must
be considered questionable").
The facts in Holder are comparable. Mr. Holder and his
estranged wife Ms. Holder got into an altercation at their child's
soccer game. Id. at 502. Ms. Holder called the police and told
the officer on scene that Mr. Holder had pushed her. Id. Mr.
Holder told the officer on scene that Ms. Holder initiated a verbal
confrontation and "made contact with him" before he pushed her
back. Id. He told the officer that Ms. Holder was his estranged
wife who was attempting to get a restraining order and keep him
from their child. Id. He further informed the officer that the
- 18 - two were involved in a tumultuous divorce and child custody battle,
urging the officer to speak with other witnesses. Id. at 502-03.
The police arrested Mr. Holder for simple assault, the charges
were dismissed, Mr. Holder sued for lack of probable cause to
arrest, summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants,
and Mr. Holder appealed. Id. at 503. We held that even without
an admission by Mr. Holder that he had pushed Ms. Holder, Ms.
Holder's claim that she was pushed was enough because "information
furnished by a victim is generally considered sufficiently
reliable to support a finding of probable cause." Id. at 505
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Acosta, 386 F.3d at 10).
Therefore, in this case, Officer Wyrostek could have concluded
that probable cause to arrest Deaton existed based solely on
Warner's claims about Deaton.
In addition, we have held that a police officer is not
required to further "investigate potential defenses or resolve
conflicting accounts prior to making an arrest." See id. (citing
Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11). "[W]e have made it clear that an officer
normally may terminate her [or his] investigation when she [or he]
accumulates facts that demonstrate sufficient probable cause."
Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11. Deaton implies that because Officer
Wyrostek did not interview other witnesses to the altercation, he
could not have made a proper probable cause determination. But
because Officer Wyrostek could have found probable cause by
- 19 - weighing of Deaton's and Warner's accounts, he was not required to
investigate further. Therefore, the witnesses' statements were
not required.
Similarly, Deaton attempts to argue that because he and
Warner had conflicting accounts, there could not have been probable
cause to arrest him. He supports this claim with Officer
Wyrostek's deposition, which he alleges the district court
ignored. However, "[a] reasonable police officer is not required
to credit a suspect's story." Cox, 391 F.3d at 32 n.2. Police
officers "do not have an unflagging duty to complete a full
investigation before making a probable cause determination," even
when presented with conflicting accounts. Charron v. Cnty. of
York, 49 F.4th 608, 616 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Acosta, 386 F.3d at 11 (explaining
that police do not have an obligation to investigate defenses
before finding probable cause). An "officer [is] not obligated to
make a definitive credibility judgment about the relative accuracy
of the accounts of the protagonists." Holder, 585 F.3d at 506.
Therefore, Deaton's arguments as to conflicting accounts, the past
relationship, lack of apparent injuries, and lack of witness
statements fails to materially alter the probable cause analysis.
See id. at 506 ("The fact that Mr. Holder and Ms. Holder were not
on good terms and had given somewhat differing accounts of the
encounter did not render unreasonable Officer Morrow's conclusion
- 20 - that it was fairly probable that Mr. Holder had committed a simple
assault.").
Deaton lastly claims that "[t]he [district] court held
that [Officer] Wyrostek's credibility determination was not
unreasonable yet also stated that a reasonable officer could decide
Warner was more credible than Deaton." Deaton argues that the
district court was contradicting itself and making its own
credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. This is
incorrect. The district court was analyzing what Officer
Wyrostek's credibility assessment could have been and his
permissible probable cause determination. The district court was
analyzing whether Officer Wyrostek had enough facts known to him
at the time of arrest to support a credibility analysis of Warner,
Deaton, and the probable cause determination. Accordingly, the
district court did not engage in a credibility determination.
In conclusion, Officer Wyrostek had sufficient
information to make a probable cause determination and arrest
Deaton. "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-71 (2003) (alteration in
original) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
Police officers are permitted to "draw reasonable inferences from
[the] facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior
- 21 - experience." Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir.
2010) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975)). Thus, based on these facts and Officer
Wyrostek's experience and evaluation of the situation, it was
reasonable for Officer Wyrostek to have concluded probable cause
existed.
B. Post-Judgment Motion
Deaton asks us to conclude that the district court's
denial of his post-judgment motion for relief was plain error.
"The hurdle [to succeed] is a high one." Latin Am. Music Co. v.
Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers, 642 F.3d 87, 91
(1st Cir. 2011); see also Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15,
19 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that "relief under Rule 60(b) is
extraordinary in nature and that motions invoking that rule should
be granted sparingly"). "To obtain relief, the movant must
demonstrate either that newly discovered evidence (not previously
available) has come to light or that the rendering court committed
a manifest error of law." Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24,
30 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402
F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)); see also Karak, 288 F.3d at 19
(noting "a party who seeks recourse under Rule 60(b) must persuade
the trial court, at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely;
that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary
relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff
- 22 - to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no
unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the
motion be granted"). "[W]e will not overturn the district court's
denial of a motion for reconsideration absent an abuse of
discretion." Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30 (first citing Iverson v. City
of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006); and then citing In re
Sun Pipe Line Co., 831 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987)).
Deaton claims that the district court found probable
cause on a clear mistake of fact. In other words, because Officer
Wyrostek testified in his deposition that he did not have probable
cause to arrest Deaton until he had the coach's witness statement
corroborating Warner's account, then it was impossible for Officer
Wyrostek to make a credibility determination that Warner's account
was more credible than Deaton's at the time of arrest. This claim
was already made in the opposition to the motion for summary
judgment and was properly considered by the district court, as we
explained, therefore there was no error. "[A] motion to alter or
amend is not 'a mechanism to regurgitate old arguments previously
considered and rejected.'" Ing v. Tufts Univ., 81 F.4th 77, 85-86
(1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772
F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir. 2014)).
In addition, Deaton argues that because the district
court found that "there are genuine issues of material fact as to
whether Officer Wyrostek was plainly incompetent," as to 12 R.I.
- 23 - Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) in relation to Count I, then it must be
true that a jury could find him incompetent to determine
credibility for probable cause. This is misguided. The probable
cause analysis was properly decided by the district court because
there were no disputed material facts. Because there were no
disputed material facts, the district court was permitted to
analyze and conclude as a matter of law whether Officer Wyrostek
could have concluded there was probable cause. Therefore, Deaton
did not meet the high hurdle to succeed on his post-judgment motion
for relief claim.
C. Remanded State Court Claims
Lastly, Deaton asks us to reverse the district court's
entry of summary judgment and order it to abstain from hearing any
federal claims. Deaton argues that the constitutional claims in
this case rest on unsettled questions of state law under 12 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956), therefore, according to Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), the state-law
claims should be settled first. This argument was made for the
first time in his post-judgment motion for relief. Deaton's
failure to request abstention before judgment counsels against
upsetting the district court's decision. See First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n of Bos. v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 424 (1st Cir. 1979)
(explaining that failure to raise an abstention argument below
creates a "poor position, equitably, to seek abstention"). Because
- 24 - parties can come "close to waiving, if they [do] not actually
waive, any claim that the district court should abstain" when they
seek to "send [an] already-decided case to another tribunal," we
may "take into account the proponent's failure to bring the issue
to the lower court's attention where the argument is not clearly
suggested by the circumstances." Id. at 425, 425 n.9. Regardless,
abstention is inappropriate here.
A party seeking Pullman abstention has the burden of
showing that the resolution of "settling [an uncertain] question
of state law [raised by the suit] will or may well obviate the
need to resolve a significant federal constitutional question.”
Casiano-Montanez v. State Ins. Fund Corp., 707 F.3d 124, 128 (1st
Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, questions about 12 R.I.
Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) have no bearing on Count IV, which is
rooted only in the federal constitution and therefore necessarily
requires a court to reach the federal probable-cause issue. Thus,
we will not abstain from hearing Deaton's claims because resolution
of the 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) question would not
"avoid[] unnecessary decision of constitutional issues." 17A
- 25 - Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4242 (3d ed. 2023).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the district court's orders
granting summary judgment and denying post-judgment relief are
Affirmed.
- 26 -