OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
Wiley Stanley Patterson fathered five children, two of whom were born out of wedlock; Wiley Stanley Patterson Jr., bom to Cheryl Benson on March 25, 1984, and Aaron Patterson, bom to Leona Lewis on September 10, 1991. Stanley and Aaron are in the custody of their mothers; while support orders were entered requiring him to pay child support for [348]*348Stanley and Aaron, Patterson never made payments during his life.
Patterson was injured in an automobile collision, and received a $2.5 million settlement from a subsequent lawsuit. Soon afterward, Patterson made a will, making cash bequests to Stanley, Aaron, and his three other children. The residue of his estate was left to his sister, who was named executrix.
Patterson died of cancer August 1, 1999. The support orders were terminated; the estate satisfied all arrearages. The mothers of Stanley and Aaron filed an action in the Dauphin County Orphans’ Court,1 seeking continuation of support payments until their children reach the age of majority. In addition, the mothers sought an increase in the amount of support dué to two changes in circumstances: Patterson’s receipt of the personal injury settlement, and his death. Relying on Garney v. Estate of Hain, 439 Pa.Super. 42, 653 A.2d 21 (1995), the Orphans’ Court dismissed the complaints, finding no legal basis for imposing a duty of support on the estate of a deceased parent.
In Garney, a custodial parent disinherited three minor children and left his estate to his new wife. The mother with custody of the children filed for child support against the estate. The Superior Court held there was no statutory authority for imposing the duty of support upon the estate of the decedent. Id., at 22. Patterson’s children attempt to distinguish Garney because there were support orders in place against Patterson before his death; they argue an obligation of support existed in this case that was not present in Garney. The Superior Court, however, found this created no significant distinction between the two cases, as a parent [349]*349has a duty to support minor children even in the absence of a court order. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 4321. Concluding Gamey controls, the Superior Court affirmed the Orphans’ Court. This Court granted allocatur to consider whether a minor child may seek continued support from the estate of a deceased parent, and if so, whether the estate’s obligation should be determined in accordance with the support guidelines. Benson v. Patterson, 567 Pa. 469, 787 A.2d 971 (2002).
Patterson’s children urge us to apply principles of statutory law to impose a duty to support upon the estate;2 see generally 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-8815. However, “it is not the role of the judiciary to legislate changes in the law which our legislature has declined to adopt.” Gamey, at 21. In recent years, the legislature has expanded the duty of parents to support their minor children. While the common law duty of a parent to support a child was originally conditioned on receiving love, affection, and assistance from the child, Gross v. Oeler, 527 Pa. 532, 594 A.2d 649, 651 (1991), the conditional nature of the obligation no longer exists; the General Assembly has made the duty of parents to support their minor children “well nigh absolute.” Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa.Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764, 771 (1985); 23 Pa.C.S. § 4321(2). Pennsylvania has extensive support legislation, see id., at §§ 4101-4396, and judicially enforced support guidelines, see Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1-1910.50; however, the legislature has declined to extend the duty of support to the estates of deceased parents. No statute has directly or inferentially extended the obligation of support beyond the death of the parent. Gamey, at 21.
When presented with a request to expand a parent’s duty of support in Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992), this Court stated:
Under the Common Law, a parent had a duty to support a minor child. In its wisdom, our General Assembly has bestowed adulthood on minor children at age 18. Conse[350]*350quently, the common law duty to support a minor child must by necessity cease at age 18----Accordingly, since no legal duty has been imposed by our legislature, nor have we developed such a duty by our case law, we decline to do so. Since our legislature has taken an active role in domestic matters through amendments and reenactment of the Divorce Code and the Domestic Relations Act, we feel the more prudent course is to await guidance from that body rather than creating duties and obligations by judicial pronouncement.
Id., at 632.
We apply the same reasoning to the case at bar. A child’s needs do not end when a parent dies, but as sympathetic a fact as this may be, there are other considerations in the law, and it is clear we must defer to the legislature, which has taken an active role in developing the domestic relations law of Pennsylvania. Gamey was decided in 1995. The General Assembly could have responded to the holding in Gamey, (as it did in Blue), by amending the domestic relations and estate statutes; it has not done so, and it is not the role of the judiciary to legislate changes the legislature has declined to adopt.
Patterson’s children point to a number of states that require the estate of a parent to satisfy child support obligations. We have extensively reviewed the laws of our sister states and find the majority of jurisdictions have held, in the absence of a contract or an express provision in a judicial decree (e.g., divorce decree, child support order), that the duty to support minor children ends at death. See Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So.2d 1376, 1381 (Ala.1982) (child support payments are not vested rights; instead, they provide periodic allowances until terminated); Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.1957) (en banc) (only legislature has authority to enact laws imposing such a duty); Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 363 S.E.2d 547, 548 (1988) (periodic payment of alimony and child support terminates at death of obligor); In re Estate of Sweeney, 210 Kan. 216, 500 P.2d 56, 67 (1972) (separation agreement must expressly state duty survives death of obligor); Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Ky.1960) (death of obligor [351]*351terminates support obligation, unless there is provision to contrary in agreement or judgment); Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467, 472 (1970) (without statutory authority or contract, courts have no right to adjust property rights of individuals); Smith v. Smith, 349 So.2d 529, 531 (Miss.1977) (child support terminates upon death of father unless written agreement binds estate); Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731, 750 (1950) (obligation of support terminates at death of parent); Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220, 223 (1970) (statute allows approval and imposition of extended duty of support, but duty will not be imposed unless contracted for before death); Dupuis v. Click, 135 N.H.
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OPINION
Justice EAKIN.
Wiley Stanley Patterson fathered five children, two of whom were born out of wedlock; Wiley Stanley Patterson Jr., bom to Cheryl Benson on March 25, 1984, and Aaron Patterson, bom to Leona Lewis on September 10, 1991. Stanley and Aaron are in the custody of their mothers; while support orders were entered requiring him to pay child support for [348]*348Stanley and Aaron, Patterson never made payments during his life.
Patterson was injured in an automobile collision, and received a $2.5 million settlement from a subsequent lawsuit. Soon afterward, Patterson made a will, making cash bequests to Stanley, Aaron, and his three other children. The residue of his estate was left to his sister, who was named executrix.
Patterson died of cancer August 1, 1999. The support orders were terminated; the estate satisfied all arrearages. The mothers of Stanley and Aaron filed an action in the Dauphin County Orphans’ Court,1 seeking continuation of support payments until their children reach the age of majority. In addition, the mothers sought an increase in the amount of support dué to two changes in circumstances: Patterson’s receipt of the personal injury settlement, and his death. Relying on Garney v. Estate of Hain, 439 Pa.Super. 42, 653 A.2d 21 (1995), the Orphans’ Court dismissed the complaints, finding no legal basis for imposing a duty of support on the estate of a deceased parent.
In Garney, a custodial parent disinherited three minor children and left his estate to his new wife. The mother with custody of the children filed for child support against the estate. The Superior Court held there was no statutory authority for imposing the duty of support upon the estate of the decedent. Id., at 22. Patterson’s children attempt to distinguish Garney because there were support orders in place against Patterson before his death; they argue an obligation of support existed in this case that was not present in Garney. The Superior Court, however, found this created no significant distinction between the two cases, as a parent [349]*349has a duty to support minor children even in the absence of a court order. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 4321. Concluding Gamey controls, the Superior Court affirmed the Orphans’ Court. This Court granted allocatur to consider whether a minor child may seek continued support from the estate of a deceased parent, and if so, whether the estate’s obligation should be determined in accordance with the support guidelines. Benson v. Patterson, 567 Pa. 469, 787 A.2d 971 (2002).
Patterson’s children urge us to apply principles of statutory law to impose a duty to support upon the estate;2 see generally 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-8815. However, “it is not the role of the judiciary to legislate changes in the law which our legislature has declined to adopt.” Gamey, at 21. In recent years, the legislature has expanded the duty of parents to support their minor children. While the common law duty of a parent to support a child was originally conditioned on receiving love, affection, and assistance from the child, Gross v. Oeler, 527 Pa. 532, 594 A.2d 649, 651 (1991), the conditional nature of the obligation no longer exists; the General Assembly has made the duty of parents to support their minor children “well nigh absolute.” Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa.Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764, 771 (1985); 23 Pa.C.S. § 4321(2). Pennsylvania has extensive support legislation, see id., at §§ 4101-4396, and judicially enforced support guidelines, see Pa.R.C.P. 1910.1-1910.50; however, the legislature has declined to extend the duty of support to the estates of deceased parents. No statute has directly or inferentially extended the obligation of support beyond the death of the parent. Gamey, at 21.
When presented with a request to expand a parent’s duty of support in Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992), this Court stated:
Under the Common Law, a parent had a duty to support a minor child. In its wisdom, our General Assembly has bestowed adulthood on minor children at age 18. Conse[350]*350quently, the common law duty to support a minor child must by necessity cease at age 18----Accordingly, since no legal duty has been imposed by our legislature, nor have we developed such a duty by our case law, we decline to do so. Since our legislature has taken an active role in domestic matters through amendments and reenactment of the Divorce Code and the Domestic Relations Act, we feel the more prudent course is to await guidance from that body rather than creating duties and obligations by judicial pronouncement.
Id., at 632.
We apply the same reasoning to the case at bar. A child’s needs do not end when a parent dies, but as sympathetic a fact as this may be, there are other considerations in the law, and it is clear we must defer to the legislature, which has taken an active role in developing the domestic relations law of Pennsylvania. Gamey was decided in 1995. The General Assembly could have responded to the holding in Gamey, (as it did in Blue), by amending the domestic relations and estate statutes; it has not done so, and it is not the role of the judiciary to legislate changes the legislature has declined to adopt.
Patterson’s children point to a number of states that require the estate of a parent to satisfy child support obligations. We have extensively reviewed the laws of our sister states and find the majority of jurisdictions have held, in the absence of a contract or an express provision in a judicial decree (e.g., divorce decree, child support order), that the duty to support minor children ends at death. See Pittman v. Pittman, 419 So.2d 1376, 1381 (Ala.1982) (child support payments are not vested rights; instead, they provide periodic allowances until terminated); Flagler v. Flagler, 94 So.2d 592, 594 (Fla.1957) (en banc) (only legislature has authority to enact laws imposing such a duty); Foskey v. Foskey, 257 Ga. 736, 363 S.E.2d 547, 548 (1988) (periodic payment of alimony and child support terminates at death of obligor); In re Estate of Sweeney, 210 Kan. 216, 500 P.2d 56, 67 (1972) (separation agreement must expressly state duty survives death of obligor); Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Ky.1960) (death of obligor [351]*351terminates support obligation, unless there is provision to contrary in agreement or judgment); Wooddy v. Wooddy, 258 Md. 224, 265 A.2d 467, 472 (1970) (without statutory authority or contract, courts have no right to adjust property rights of individuals); Smith v. Smith, 349 So.2d 529, 531 (Miss.1977) (child support terminates upon death of father unless written agreement binds estate); Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731, 750 (1950) (obligation of support terminates at death of parent); Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220, 223 (1970) (statute allows approval and imposition of extended duty of support, but duty will not be imposed unless contracted for before death); Dupuis v. Click, 135 N.H. 333, 604 A.2d 576, 579 (1992) (support payments terminate at death because they are not debts against estate recoverable by judgment creditor); Keehn v. Keehn, 137 A.D.2d 493, 524 N.Y.S.2d 238, 241 (N.Y.App.Div.1988) (no common law or statutory duty to impose obligation of support on parent post-mortem); Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 178 S.E.2d 425, 428 (1971) (contract entered into created obligation to support children after death); Abrego v. Abrego, 812 P.2d 806, 812-13 (Okla.1991) (child support accruing after parent’s death is not required to be secured); Streight v. Estate of Streight, 226 Or. 386, 360 P.2d 304, 306 (1961) (extended duty of support to children with support orders would place those children in preferred status over children of intact marriage); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 270 S.C. 358, 242 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1978) (common law duty to support one’s children ends with death); Brandon v. Brandon, 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929, 930 (1940) (child support ends upon death of obligor); Colombo v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 26 Utah 2d 350, 489 P.2d 998, 1000 (1971) (divorce decree must specifically state duty shall survive death of obligor); Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wash.2d 454, 348 P.2d 225, 227 (1960) (child support operates in personam, and will not survive death of parent without express language in judicial decree).
Some states have found circumstances where the estate of a deceased parent may be ordered to pay support for a child. See Newman v. Burwell, 216 Cal. 608, 15 P.2d 511, 513 (1932) (obligation to support minor children fixed by property settle[352]*352ment or confirmed by divorce decree, is enforceable as charge against parent’s estate); L.W.K. v. E.R.C., 432 Mass. 438, 735 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (2000) (parent is not free to exercise testamentary discretion until legal obligation to support minor children is satisfied); West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 217 N.W. 924, 926 (1928) (duty to support minor children is common law obligation which becomes enforceable by court in case of divorce and amendable to give it effect of lien upon estate); Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 33 N.W.2d 30, 34 (1948) (if judgment of divorce manifests intention support is to survive death of parent, then it will be enforceable); Hornung v. Estate of Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 473 P.2d 541, 545 (1970) (father’s obligation of support, required by divorce decree, survived his death and was enforceable); Spencer v. Spencer, 165 Neb. 675, 87 N.W.2d 212, 220 (1957) (where divorce decree provides for payment of support, it survives death of parent because such payments become vested in payee as they accrue); Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 694 A.2d 557, 562 (1997) (by statute, estate is responsible for parent’s obligation of support to children); Hill v. Matthews, 76 N.M. 474, 416 P.2d 144, 146 (1966) (court-ordered child support claim may be brought in probate court seeking enforcement against parent’s estate); Fox v. Burden, 603 N.W.2d 916, 925 (S.D.1999) (child support obligation should survive death); Scott v. Wagoner, 184 W.Va. 312, 400 S.E.2d 556, 560 (1990) (court may enforce child support as lien against parent’s estate when compelling equitable considerations exist); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis.2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356, 365 (1958) (“[T]he court may, in a proper case, require the father or his estate to provide for the support of a minor child after the father’s death if that should occur while such support is otherwise in order.”); Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 271, 199 P.2d 840 (1948) (court ordered child support payments survive parent).
Despite the allure of the minority position, there is soundness in the majority as well, and we are guided by hundreds of years of Pennsylvania precedent instructing that a child is owed no support from a dead parent. Accordingly, we remain with the majority of states that do not extend the duty of [353]*353support for minor children to the estate of the parent. Because we decline to impose a duty of support on Patterson’s estate, there is no reason to decide whether such an order would be determined according to the support guidelines.
Order affirmed.
Former Chief Justice ZAPPALA did not participate in the decision of this case.
Chief Justice CAPPY files a concurring opinion in which Justice NIGRO joins.
Justice NEWMAN files a dissenting opinion.