J-S04036-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL JOSEPH LAWLER : : Appellant : No. 1700 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 24, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000220-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2020
Michael Joseph Lawler (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after he pled guilty to three counts of criminal trespass, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3503. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel (Counsel), seeks to
withdraw from representation pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa.
2009). Upon review, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm
Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
On January 11, 2018, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to three
counts of criminal trespass. On February 21, 2018, upon motion by the
Commonwealth, the Department of Corrections (the Department) took
Appellant into custody to determine his eligibility for a State Intermediate
Punishment (SIP) program. On September 28, 2018, the Department
determined that Appellant was ineligible for entry into SIP. On January 24, J-S04036-20
2019, Appellant appeared for sentencing before the trial court. At sentencing,
Appellant orally requested to withdraw his guilty plea based on the
Department’s determination that he was ineligible for participation in an SIP
program. The trial court denied Appellant’s request and sentenced him to 78
to 188 months of incarceration, with credit for time served.
On March 26, 2019, Appellant, although still represented by counsel,
filed an untimely pro se notice of appeal. Thereafter, Counsel filed a motion
seeking to reinstate Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc, which the trial
court granted on June 3, 2019. On June 11, 2019, Counsel filed a timely
notice of appeal. On December 4, 2019, this Court dismissed Appellant’s pro
se appeal as duplicative of Appellant’s counselled appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Lawler, 1130 EDA 2019. Both Appellant and the trial
court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
On December 5, 2019, Counsel filed an Anders brief, in which he argues
that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and requests permission from this Court to
withdraw as counsel. Appellant filed a pro se response to Counsel’s Anders
brief, seeking the appointment of new counsel or ordering Counsel’s continued
representation on appeal; Appellant did not raise any additional claims. See
Appellant’s Pro Se Response to Anders Brief, 12/17/19, at 2.
At the outset, we note there are particular mandates that counsel
seeking to withdraw pursuant to Anders must follow. These mandates and
the significant protection they provide to an Anders appellant arise because
a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a direct appeal and to counsel
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on that appeal. Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super.
2007). We have summarized the requirements as follows:
Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation thereof.
Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.
If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf).
Id. (citations omitted).
Additionally, there are requirements as to the content of an Anders
brief:
[T]he Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw … must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. When faced with a purported Anders brief, we
may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first deciding
whether counsel has properly requested permission to withdraw.
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Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted). If counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this
Court’s duty to conduct review of the trial court proceedings to determine
whether there are any other non-frivolous issues that the appellant could raise
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc).
Instantly, we conclude that Counsel has complied with the requirements
outlined above. Counsel filed a petition with this Court stating that after
reviewing the record, he finds this appeal to be wholly frivolous. Motion for
Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 12/5/19, at ¶ 3. In conformance with
Santiago, Counsel’s brief includes summaries of the facts and procedural
history of the case, and discusses the issues he believes might arguably
support Appellant’s appeal. See Anders Brief at 6-8, 11-16. Counsel’s brief
sets forth his conclusion that the appeal is frivolous and includes citation to
relevant authority. Id. Finally, Counsel has attached to his petition to
withdraw the letter that he sent to Appellant, which enclosed Counsel’s
petition and Anders brief. Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 12/5/19,
Ex. A. Counsel’s letter advised Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with
private counsel and to raise any additional issues that he deems worthy of this
Court’s consideration. Id. We thus proceed to review the merits of the claims
raised.
Counsel’s Anders brief raises four issues for our review (reordered for
ease of discussion):
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1. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea?
2. Did the trial court err in ordering an excessive sentence, given the background of the Appellant in this matter?
3. Did the trial court err in failing to find the Department of Corrections wrongfully denied the Appellant’s entry into the State Intermediate Punishment Program?
4. Did the trial court err in failing to dismiss the case based upon the Department of Corrections’ determination of entry into the State Intermediate Punishment Program not being completed within prescribed time limits?
Anders Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pre-
sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is governed by Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 591(A), which states:
(A) At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not guilty.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). The official comment to Rule 591 provides that “[a]fter
the attorney for the Commonwealth has had an opportunity to respond, a
request to withdraw a plea made before sentencing should be liberally
allowed.” Id., Cmt.
[I]n determining whether to grant a pre-sentence motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, the test to be applied by the trial courts
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is fairness and justice. If the trial court finds “any fair and just reason,” withdrawal of the plea before sentence should be freely permitted, unless the prosecution has been “substantially prejudiced.”
Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1973) (citations
omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015), our
Supreme Court provided additional guidance as to the proper exercise of a
court’s discretion in ruling on pre-sentence motions to withdraw a plea. While
reaffirming the “liberal allowance” standard, the Court acknowledged that its
previous application of that standard had “lent the [false] impression that
[the] Court had required acceptance of a bare assertion of innocence as a fair-
and-just-reason” for withdrawal and led to a “legitimate perception of a per
se rule” arising from the Court’s prior decisions. Id. at 1292. In clarifying
the standard, the Carrasquillo Court held that “a bare assertion of innocence
is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to require a court to grant” a pre-
sentence motion to withdraw. Id. at 1285. Rather, the Court concluded:
[A] defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea. More broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. The policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, consistent with the affordance of a degree of discretion to the common pleas courts.
Id. at 1292. The Carrasquillo Court established that trial courts possess
discretion to assess the plausibility of a defendant’s claim of innocence; in
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doing so, “both the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with
the relationship of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence,
are relevant.” See Islas, 156 A.3d at 1191.
Consistent with the well-established standards governing trial court discretion, it is important that appellate courts honor trial courts’ discretion in these matters, as trial courts are in the unique position to assess the credibility of claims of innocence and measure, under the circumstances, whether defendants have made sincere and colorable claims that permitting withdrawal of their pleas would promote fairness and justice.
Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d 112, 121 (Pa. 2019).
Instantly, Appellant expressed his desire to withdraw his plea as follows:
. . . I wish to withdraw my plea because I’m looking for the chance to help myself, not, I don’t even know how to say it. I want to do better in life, Your Honor. I don’t want to sit here for the next ten years of my life incarcerated and get out and be a violent felon and I have learned absolutely nothing because they don’t offer the type of programs that you need to rehabilitate yourself. The [State Intermediate Punishment (SIP)] was the only chance that I had for rehabilitation purposes and that’s why I took the plea that I did was for the S.I.P. Program so I could better myself and perhaps be an asset to the community instead of being a liability and it just didn’t work out that way, Your Honor.
N.T., 1/24/19, at 5.
In denying Appellant’s request, the trial court specifically found that
Appellant did not offer a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his plea. Rather,
the trial court noted that Appellant “stated on the record that his reasons for
wishing to withdraw his guilty plea were to ‘do better in life,’ and that the state
correctional institutions ‘do not offer programs to rehabilitate,’ and that he
‘took the plea for SIP.’” Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/19, at 5. Appellant made
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no assertion of innocence and did not contend that his guilty plea was
unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent. Thus, the trial court denied relief.
Based upon our review of the certified record, we agree with the trial
court’s determination that Appellant’s reasons for wanting to withdraw his
guilty plea did not satisfy the standard articulated in Carrasquillo.
Appellant’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea because he was denied
admittance into an SIP program does not constitute a fair and just reason for
withdrawal. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of
his sentence. “The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a
sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for permission to
appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super.
2014). “An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s
jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id.
We conduct this four-part test to determine whether:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). “A defendant presents a substantial question when he sets forth a
plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing
code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”
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Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
Our review reveals that Appellant failed to raise his discretionary
sentencing issue in a post-sentence motion or at sentencing. Accordingly,
Appellant’s objection to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is waived.
Commonwealth v. Kittrell, 19 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2011) (failure to
raise discretionary aspects of sentence claim in post-sentence motion or by
presenting the claim during sentencing proceedings is waived).
In his third issue, Appellant asserts that he was wrongfully denied
admittance into the State Intermediate Punishment program.1 Appellant was
denied Appellant admittance into the SIP program due to an outstanding
warrant from a magisterial district judge; however, Appellant avers that his
guilty plea made him an eligible offender, see 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103, and thus
the Department erred in denying his participation.
The SIP Drug Offender Treatment Program (DOTP) is a two-year
program designed to rehabilitate inmates convicted of drug-related offenses,
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1 “State intermediate punishment” is a statutorily authorized sentencing alternative. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a)(7). The General Assembly has directed the Department to “establish and administer a drug offender treatment program as a State intermediate punishment.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4105(a). The Department established its Drug Offender Treatment Program (DOTP) by regulation as a form of State Intermediate Punishment to provide a sentencing alternative for individuals who commit drug-related offenses. 61 Pa. Code § 97.101.
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who have an addiction to drugs or alcohol. 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4102-4108. The
program addresses “the individually assessed drug and alcohol abuse and
addiction needs of a participant” and “other issues essential to the
participant’s successful reintegration into the community.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. §
4105(a). An individual is eligible for State Intermediate Punishment if he or
she has been convicted of a drug-related offense,2 and:
(1) Has undergone an assessment performed by the Department of Corrections, which assessment has concluded that the defendant is in need of drug and alcohol addiction treatment and would benefit from commitment to a drug offender treatment program3 and that placement in a drug offender treatment program would be appropriate.
(2) Does not demonstrate a history of present or past violent behavior.
(3) Would be placed in the custody of the department if not sentenced to State intermediate punishment. ____________________________________________
2 A “drug-related offense” is “[a] criminal offense for which a defendant is convicted and that the court determines was motivated by the defendant’s consumption of or addiction to alcohol or a controlled substance, counterfeit, designer drug, drug, immediate precursor or marijuana, as those terms are defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103. Here, Appellant broke into cabins across northern Wayne County and stole $35,000 in goods. Appellant testified that he sold the goods and “purchased around $500 for food, and the remaining amount went towards buying Methamphetamine and Heroin.” N.T., 1/24/19, at 8. The trial court determined that “the addiction is what drives [Appellant] to commit crimes.” Id.
3 “Drug offender treatment program” (DOTP) is “[a]n individualized treatment program established by the Department consisting primarily of drug and alcohol addiction treatment that satisfies the terms and conditions in section 9905 of the act [at 42 Pa.C.S.A. Chapter 99] (relating to drug offender treatment program).” 37 Pa. Code § 97.102.
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(4) Provides written consent permitting release of information pertaining to the defendant's participation in a drug offender treatment program.
61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103 (emphasis added). A defendant is ineligible for State
Intermediate Punishment if he or she is subject to a sentence which includes
an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon; has been convicted or
adjudicated delinquent of a crime requiring registration as a sexual offender;
or has a current or prior conviction for specified offenses, none of which are
applicable to Appellant. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4103.
Placement in State Intermediate Punishment requires several steps.
First, the sentencing court must determine whether an individual qualifies for
placement. If so, the sentencing court refers the matter for an evaluation by
the Department. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4104(a)(1). Second, “[t]he Department will
conduct a risk assessment and assess the addiction and other treatment needs
of” the individual. 37 Pa. Code § 97.104(a). The Department, in its
evaluation, considers the following criteria:
(1) Information furnished to the Department by the sentencing court.4
(2) The results of the assessment of addiction and other treatment needs conducted by the Department.
4 The sentencing court provides the Department with a summary of the criminal defendant’s offense; information relating to the criminal defendant’s history of criminality and drug or alcohol abuse or addiction; the presentence investigation report; and any other information the sentencing court believes is relevant. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4104(a)(2).
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(3) The length of the sentence that would be typically imposed under the standard range of the sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
(4) The eligible offender’s motivation to participate meaningfully in a DOTP.
(5) Whether the eligible offender has provided to the Department written consent permitting the release of information pertaining to the eligible offender's participation in a DOTP.
(6) The eligible offender’s criminal history.
(7) The eligible offender’s escape or parole absconder history.
(8) The eligible offender’s institutional adjustment during current and prior incarcerations.
(9) The availability of the Department’s programming resources.
37 Pa. Code § 97.106(a). Where the Department, “in its discretion,” believes
the criminal defendant’s placement in these programs is appropriate, it
prepares a drug treatment program plan for the individual and provides it to
the sentencing court. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4104(c); 37 Pa. Code § 97.104(b). Upon
receipt of a drug treatment program plan, the court may sentence an
individual to State Intermediate Punishment. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4104(d). Where
the Department determines that the criminal defendant will not benefit from
a drug treatment program or that placement in a drug treatment program is
not appropriate, it provides a report setting forth the reasons for its
determination to the sentencing court. 37 Pa. Code § 97.104(b).
Whether an individual would benefit from a drug offender treatment
program and whether his or her placement in a drug treatment plan would be
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appropriate are matters committed to the Department’s discretion. Section
4104(c) of the Prisons and Parole Code states:
If the department in its discretion believes a defendant would benefit from a drug offender treatment program and placement in the drug offender treatment program is appropriate, the department shall provide the court, the defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth and the commission with a proposed drug offender treatment program detailing the type of treatment proposed.
61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4104(c) (emphasis added). Likewise, the statute does not
“[c]onfer any legal right upon any individual ... to ... participate in a drug
offender treatment program[.]” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4108(1)(i); see also 37 Pa.
Code § 97.106(b) (“An eligible offender does not have a right to placement in
a DOTP.”).
As outlined above, Appellant does not have a statutory right to
participation in an SIP program. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4108(1)(i); 37 Pa. Code
§ 97.106(b). The Department possesses the discretion to admit an inmate,
regardless of their eligibility and offender status. Accordingly, the Department
did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant admission into an SIP
program based on an outstanding warrant from a magisterial district judge.
In his fourth and final issue, Appellant challenges the Department’s
failure to provide the trial court with its assessment report within 60 days of
Appellant’s commitment to the Department, as prescribed by statute. See 37
Pa. Code § 97.104 (b) (“The Department will provide a report of its
assessment to the court, the defendant, the attorney for the Commonwealth
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and the Sentencing Commission within 60 days of the commitment of the
defendant to the Department for purposes of evaluation.”). “Appellant
believes that his case should have been dismissed due to the failure of [the
Department] to render a report within 60 days of his commitment to the state
system.” Anders Brief at 15.
Appellant fails to cite any authority, and our research does not reveal
any authority, to support a dismissal of charges when the Department fails to
provide a report of its assessment within the statutorily defined 60 days.
While we do not condone the delay, Chapter 97 does not provide for a remedy.
See Benson ex rel. Patterson v. Patterson, 830 A.2d 966, 968 (Pa. 2003)
(“[I]t is not the role of the judiciary to legislate changes the legislature has
declined to adopt.”). Appellant’s fourth issue is without merit.
Finally, our independent review reveals no other non-frivolous issues
that Appellant could raise on appeal. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. We
therefore grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment
of sentence.
Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 3/27/2020
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